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Abstract
Avery Brundage became President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
in 1952, ready to lead the IOC according to the vision of its modern founder, Pierre de
Coubertin. One of the IOC’s challenges during Brundage’s tenure as President involved
the participation of South Africa in the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games. Racial
discrimination and segregation, known as apartheid, was rampant in South Africa
because of governmental laws and policies. These discriminatory practices, which
were ingrained in the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC), conflicted
with principles laid down in the Olympic Charter, especially Article 1 forbidding racial
discrimination. Due to pressure from the international community, the IOC opposed
apartheid by suspending South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City
Olympic Games through IOC policy and procedure, which eventually led to South
Africa’s expulsion from the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement in 1970.
This dissertation explored the debates and correspondence of important actors
within the IOC and the Olympic Movement from 1955 to 1968, in the context of the
organization's discussion of South Africa's controversial place in the Olympic
Movement and Olympic Games. A reconstructionist approach was adopted to examine
the relationship between the IOC and SANOC, by investigating specifically the
correspondence of key actors in a network of exchanges that centred on Brundage
and the IOC. Perspectives and strategies of the actors in this network were traced. The
analysis identified three ‘dominant voices’ in this debate: (1) South African Olympic
affiliates; (2) domestic resistance; and (3) a concerned international sport
community. Furthermore, three factors that guided the decision-making of the IOC
ii

when determining South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games emerged: (1)
IOC rules and regulations; (2) IOC structure and protocol; and, (3) the IOC’s stance to
remain a neutral party in domestic political issues. This in-depth investigation into
the thinking of these central and influential actors contributes a new dimension to our
understanding of the IOC’s approach to the South African controversy, and the events
leading to South Africa’s expulsion.

Keywords: Avery Brundage, Olympic Games, International Olympic Committee, South
Africa, Apartheid.
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Chapter One:
Avery Brundage, the IOC, and South
African Race Politics
1.

Introduction
As the fifth President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the only

non-European to have held the office to date, Avery Brundage steered the
international growth of the organization by expanding its reach to Africa, Latin
America, and Asia.1 Although the Western world still had firm control of the IOC
during his tenure as President (1952-1972), the percentage of Europeans and North
Americans elected to IOC membership declined by 13.8%. The percentage of Africans
and Latin Americans increased by 11.3%. The total number of participating Olympic
nations rose to 127 by his retirement in 1972.2
This expansion also created new political issues and challenges for the IOC and the
nations represented in it. In particular, the IOC’s increasing reach in Africa brought
the issue of the organization’s position on racism in sports to the forefront,
particularly concerning the racial politics of South Africa. Here Brundage played an
influential role in shaping the relationship between the IOC and South Africa when the
issue of apartheid first arose in the 1950s. The position of Brundage in these
developments has been generally summarized. What has not been made explicit and
examined in detail are the specific strategies, actions, interventions, and interactions
that characterized Brundage’s position on these issues, during the crucial time period
from 1956 to 1968.
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1.1 Avery Brundage and the IOC’s Position on Race and Sport
Reflecting on the man behind the IOC presidency could provide some introductory
insights into the understanding Brundage brought to the management of
controversies during his term in office. Born in Detroit on 28 September 1887,
Brundage had a humble upbringing.3 His family eventually moved to Chicago where
he was raised by his mother. He attended the University of Illinois to become a civil
engineer. During his adolescent and university years, Brundage participated in
multiple sports, eventually gravitating towards track and field where he specialized
in multiple events. He eventually competed in the 1912 Olympic Games as part of the
United States (US) pentathlon and decathlon teams, an Olympic teammate to both Jim
Thorpe and George S. Patton.4 Subsequent to his athletic career, Brundage devoted
himself to the development of amateur sport and its organization in America. On 20
November 1928, Brundage was elected President of the Amateur Athletic Union,
where he served through seven terms of office from 1929 to 1936. He served as VicePresident of the International Amateur Athletic Federation from 1930 to 1952. On 19
November 1930, he was elected President of the American Olympic Association, and
following the Berlin Olympics in 1936, he replaced Ernest Lee Jahncke as a member
of the IOC.5 He went on to become the organization’s Vice President in 1945, and its
President in 1952.6
Brundage emulated Pierre de Coubertin’s administrative style and shared his
vision for the Olympic Movement, which ultimately reflected the force driving the
direction of the IOC.7 Brundage viewed the Olympic Movement from the perspective
of a ‘religion’ that strongly emphasized ideals of fair play, sportsmanship, and
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amateurism.8 When Brundage spoke of the Olympic Movement, he emphasized
competition and spectacle, but also visualized it as a gathering of individuals from
across the world who abided by a single tenet while putting aside differences of race,9
religion, and politics.10 He was the ultimate Olympic idealist, preached the benefits of
being a part of the Olympic Movement,11 and was suspicious of those who held
membership “for reasons other than allegiance to Olympism.”12 As the IOC views it
today, Olympism’s definition should be based on Coubertin’s ideals:
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a
balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport
with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life
based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good
example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.13
Aligned with this interpretation of Olympism, Brundage understood the inherent
meaning of the Olympic Games to be:
… a demonstration of idealism in action and as such they [the Games]
appeal to all people of every country who hope for a better world.
They are an enterprise, conducted by devotees, by dedicated
individuals, who seek to demonstrate the best and the finest without
thought of personal gain. Based on the high principles of the amateur
code, they illustrate a system where everyone has an equal
opportunity and where the reward is measured by the ability and the
application of the participant – a system that is honest, fair, just, and
so a system which meets the aspirations of all people.14
Brundage was explicit in his emphasis on “the zeal with which the International
Olympic Committee defends its principles and the firmness of the steps it sometimes
has to take” to prevent becoming too “materialistic and politically driven.”15 He used
these standards when selecting new IOC members:
Members are co-opted and selected for their devotion to the Olympic
Movement, their international viewpoint, their knowledge of and
experience in amateur sport, and their independent spirit. They are
ambassadors from the Committee to their countries. It is the man
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and not the country that counts. Nations new to the Movement have
insisted that they should name a ‘representative’ on the committee.
But the Olympic Games would soon lose all their purpose if they
were controlled by a committee composed of members striving to
advance the interest of their own country instead of the Olympic
Movement. Political considerations would soon prevail and blocs
would form within the Committee, which would be incompatible
with its rules and principles.16
Brundage could be seen as an idealist preacher of Coubertin’s ideology of the
Olympic Movement.17 His strong personal interpretation of Coubertin’s ideals of
Olympism influenced his outlook and shaped the direction of the IOC’s development.
Brundage’s insistence on an amateur, non-political, and anti-commercial Movement
influenced his dealings when political issues such as the problem of racism and
Olympic sports arose.
Brundage was confronted with the issue of racial politics within the Olympic
Games well before dealing with the apartheid issue in South Africa. Though the 1936
Berlin Olympics were overshadowed by boycott campaigns to protest racial policies
espoused by Hitler and the National Socialists, Brundage himself opposed boycotts,
insisting that political issues had no place in the Olympic Movement.18 Only major
infractions against the Olympic mission would sway Brundage from his position to
endorse American participation in the 1936 Games.19 However, the true reasons for
his support of the Berlin Games will always be in question because of anti-Semitic
remarks that came to light in letters to his friends; neither was he shy in his support
for the German government’s promotion of Nazi state physical education.20 Some
three decades later, according to Sam Ramsamy:
An Olympic Committee for Human Rights (OCHR) was formed to
lobby for a black American boycott of the 1968 Olympic Games,
openly accusing Brundage of being a racist. The committee
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demanded the removal of Avery Brundage from his post as President
of the International Olympic Committee. The OCHR exposed the fact
that at the time Brundage owned the Montecito Country Club in
Santa Barbara, California which in fact excluded Jews and Blacks
from membership. Brundage also displayed sympathy for the white
South African National Olympic Committee.21
Brundage rejected the accusations of being anti-Semitic and anti-black. In a cogent
overview, Maynard Brichford pointed out some of the race issues confronted by
Brundage during his career; ranging from the removal of the 1920s track and field
championships from New Orleans to employing blacks and Jews in his businesses.22
Brundage was not averse to instigating confrontations. He, too, was not hesitant in
defense of positions which he considered important. Thus, in response to the black
American boycott led by Harry Edwards tied to the Mexico City Olympics, Brundage
tellingly said, “If the American Negro Athletes boycott the Olympic Games, they won’t
be missed.”23 This comment energized the well-known protest of Tommie Smith and
John Carlos during the medal awards ceremony in 1968. At the same time, Brundage
showed instances of forward-thinking leadership as indicated by the delight
expressed in his last opening address prior to the 1972 Munich Olympic Games at
seeing Islamic women being free to participate in sport.24
It was true that Brundage’s life was filled with controversial episodes, and the
Olympic Games themselves had a history of racial controversy where some
considered the expulsion of South Africa to indicate the end of racism in the Olympic
Movement25 while others considered the retirement of Brundage as marking the end
of racial thinking.26 In any case, the fact that black athletes from Africa did not enter
Olympic competitions until 195227 could be interpreted as an indicator of the IOC’s
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ambivalent attitudes towards its policies of concerning race; an attitude that played a
part in determining the slow pace of change in the Olympic Movement in this regard.
Nonetheless, while dealing with the ‘South African situation’,28 Brundage and the
IOC were confronted with other challenges. Deciding if the Nationalists in Taiwan or
the Communists on mainland China represented the Republic of China became a
concern in the early 1950s. How to deal with East and West Germany’s participation
in the Olympic Games after World War II needed to be addressed throughout the
South African situation. The problem of performance enhancement drug use became
salient at the 1952 Winter Games at Oslo. Before the 1956 Melbourne Games, the IOC
had to deal with the aftermath from the Suez War and Hungarian Revolution. The IOC
had to suspend the Indonesian National Olympic Committee in 1963 for denying visas
to Israeli and Nationalist China athletes to compete in the IOC sponsored Asian Games.
North Korean athletes were suspended for the 1964 Tokyo Games for participating in
the discriminatory Games of the New Emerging Forces. Due to the civil rights
movement during the 1960s in the USA, the threat of boycott and using the Olympic
Games as a political platform lingered. Lastly, leading up to the 1968 Mexico City
Games, the IOC had to confront the killing of peaceful protestors by the Mexican army
weeks before the Games.29
Beyond world politics, the 1960s had its share of IOC organizational struggles. How
to distribute the revenue from Olympic Games’ demanded the IOC’s attention. This
affair changed the dynamic of the organization drastically as NOCs united to create
the Permanent General Assembly in 1968 and ISFs founded in 1967 the General
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Assembly of the International Federations to negotiate their respective percentages
of the revenue.30
Therefore, although the South African situation and racism in sport were important
foci for Brundage and the IOC from the mid-1950s to 1970, they were two of many
ongoing challenges that Brundage and the IOC had to resolve to maintain the integrity
and existence of the Olympic Games.

2.

Statement of the Research Issue
Due to pressure from the international climate, the IOC opposed apartheid by

suspending South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games
through IOC policy and procedure, which eventually led to South Africa’s expulsion
from the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement in 1970. This dissertation
investigated the debates and correspondence of important actors within the IOC and
the Olympic Movement, within the context of the organization's discussion of South
Africa's controversial place in the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games. Tracing
the shifting positions of the IOC and those segments of the Olympic Movement
concerned with the South African situation is the aim of this reconstruction. This
debate emerged in response to the rise of apartheid policies in South African society
and sports, and it was reconstructed here through an archival investigation of the IOC
President Avery Brundage's voluminous correspondence on the issue.
The time frame for the investigation was defined by the issue of apartheid in South
African Olympic sports first reaching international notoriety in the mid-1950s, to its
intermediate conclusion with the retraction of South Africa's invitation the 1968
Mexico City Olympics; these Games were the last that South Africa would have been
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eligible to attend prior to its expulsion from the Olympic Movement in May 1970. The
focus was provided by the debates, opinions and proclamations carried on by
important actors in the IOC in a series of exchanges with influential IOC President
Avery Brundage at the centre. The investigation revealed that what I refer to as the
'three dominant voices' shaped the debate, ranging from the IOC and its South African
affiliates, to South African domestic resistance, and parts of the international
community interested in Olympic sports. As the literature review indicates, such a
detailed historical reconstruction of the South African situation between 1955 and
1968 from the perspective of a series of exchanges centering on the leadership of the
IOC, in particular Avery Brundage, has not been completed to-date.
Therefore, my research contributes to the body of knowledge in two specific ways.
First, it used the archival and historical record to trace and reconstruct specific
positions, arguments, interventions, and actions with respect to the issue of South
African apartheid in Olympic sports and the Olympic Movement. From this specific
contribution, a secondary outcome has resulted: an engagement with the study of race
and racism in sports, with a particular focus on the race politics of South African
sports in their connection to the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games. Explicit
negative racializing remarks are absent from the IOC correspondence investigated
here, but it is clear that the IOC’s decisions in regard to South Africa’s involvement
had racializing implications, either contributing to the effects of apartheid on South
African sports by operating under the status quo, or by rejecting the effects of
apartheid, as was ultimately done through the expulsion of South Africa in 1970.
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Before proceeding to a review of the academic literature pertaining to the IOC and
South African situation, the historical and cultural background for this study need to
be delineated by examining the importance of sport in South African society and the
influence exerted on that sport system by the racial politics of the South African
regime.

3. The Historical Context of South African Sport and
Race Politics
According to George Wright, the popularity of sports in South Africa could be
attributed to a variety of reasons, “1) the country has a splendid climate; 2) there is
an abundance of open space; and 3) there exists a relative impoverishment of other
cultural-aesthetic outlets.”31 In addition, sport had been seen as the epitome of social
expression and cultural dominance for the white population, thus used as a tool to
express the superiority of a more ‘civilized’ white race32 over the black population,
which itself adopted sport at the same time as the white population. The origin of the
racial tensions that came to characterize sports could be traced back to the days of
early colonial expansion, specifically to 1652 when the Dutch East India Company
established itself in South Africa.33 After the Dutch East India Company went bankrupt
in 1794, the British occupied the Cape, “British missionaries began to arrive, and as
soon as the Cape was definitively annexed, in 1807, attempts were made to stimulate
and modernize the economy.”34 During that time, sport became prevalent in South
African society with the first ever cricket match played in 1808. 35 Although sport
interchanges across racial barriers did occur, this did not indicate equality because
British rule was generally based on principles of racial discrimination. This was most
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clearly expressed through the development of the Constitution of the Union of South
Africa in 1910.36
The constitution did not entirely prevent interracial sport and competition from
developing between members of the non-white populations, that is, blacks and
coloureds.37 However, by the early 1900s, segregation was encouraged because it was
believed that segregation itself was the best way to preserve and strengthen existing
cultures, which in South Africa meant grouping whites with whites and blacks with
blacks. The Natives’ Land Act of 1913 limited black ownership of land to 7% of the
country, increasing that amount to 13% in 1936.38 In 1923, the Natives (Urban Areas)
Act established segregated living areas in cities and the Representation of Natives Act
of 1936 further restricted African political rights in the Cape, limiting Africans to
voting for only white representatives.39 These initiatives, though introduced by the
British, were carried on by the (also white) Dutch-Afrikaner population in a harsher
fashion when the British political presence waned. However, non-whites established
political representation in 1912 when the South African Native National Congress was
founded, which was later renamed the African National Congress in 1923.40
During the first half for the 20th century, the black population, more so than the
coloured population, had minimal opportunities to participate in sport. The lack of
access to resources hindered the development of sport for the non-white four-fifths
of the population in general.41 Thus from 1895 to 1910, it was exclusively white-only
organizations that were admitted to international or British Empire organizations. By
1945, not only were firm links established internationally, but some white South
African sports leaders had assumed executive positions.42 As a founding member of
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the International Rugby Board and the International Cricket conference, as well as
participation in the Olympic Games since 1908, South Africa succeeded in developing
deep roots and allies in the international sporting community.43
The segregation of whites from blacks and coloureds deepened when the Afrikaner
National Party came to power in 1948. “Apartheid,” an Afrikaans word meaning
apartness, came to stand for and symbolize the new regime’s political direction.44 The
population was classified according to physical differences and racial heritage. These
distinctions ultimately determined the extent of legal and civic rights extended to the
individual. They were codified through various laws in the 1940s and 1950s whose
oppressive effects were aimed at the black population in particular.45 In 1949, the
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act was introduced to prevent whites from marrying
blacks and coloureds, and a year later, the discouragement of interracial romances
was heightened by the Immorality Act, which prohibited sexual acts between whites
and any non-whites. Other Acts were passed in 1950 such as the Population
Registration Act, which established mechanisms for determining and registering the
race of all South Africans. This registration helped to control further segregation of
races into specific geographical areas established by the Group Areas Act. The
Suppression of Communism Act was also enacted in 1950. This particular Act was
harmful to any advocacy for change since communism was defined as “… any scheme
that aimed ‘at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change
within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder’ or that encouraged
‘feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races of the Union
the consequences of which are calculated to further’ disorder.”46 In 1951, Separate
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Representation of Voters Act reserved government official positions to white
representatives. In 1952, Natives Laws Amendment Act restricted the length of time
a person can remain in an urban area without a permit. In 1953, the separation of
races became more specific with the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, which
forced each race to have separate amenities that did not need to be equal across races.
The Bantu Education Act, also enacted in 1953, removed funding from various nonwhite schools, and in 1959, the Extension of University Education Act prohibited
blacks from attending white institutions of higher education.47 Due to the many racist
Acts, Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon noted in their important study of racism in
South African sports:
By savagely curtailing black access to education, urban residence,
employment, wealth, and the freedom to associate, to travel and to
free expression, the Nationalist Government necessarily stunted the
natural development of sport and dealt a crippling blow to the
attempts of black players to improve their standards of play and
organization.48
Thus, sports came to be another explicitly politicized area of cultural practice, but
it was not until 25 June 1956 that the first official statement regarding sport was made
by then Minister of the Interior, Dr. Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges.49 He denied that
the government interfered with non-white sport by pointing out that sport did not fall
under government jurisdiction. Most importantly, however, he affirmed that sport
should be organized and practiced separately by whites and non-whites, that no
interracial competition should occur within the country’s borders, and that racial
integration on teams should be avoided.50 However, well before that official
statement, white clubs and associations already practiced segregation.51 For example,
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the South African Athletic Association erected a colour bar in 1931, ensuring that
sports would be developed in a segregation perspective.52
In a Bill ostensibly designed to award full independence to tribal reserves in South
Africa in 1959, the Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, ended the possibility for black
representation in parliament, a strategy designed to further strip blacks of political
power in South Africa.53 Two years later, in 1961, a similarly important
announcement came from the Minister of the Interior, Senator Jan De Klerk. On 29
March, he announced that “the government would not approve the participation of
mixed teams in global sporting events; that mixed teams from other nations would
not be welcome in South Africa; and that only separate white and non-white teams
could compete abroad in international competition.”54
Some anticipated the possible suspension of South Africa from the Olympic
Movement following this policy statement, especially in view of strengthened racial
laws when South Africa became a Republic in 1961.55 However, at the subsequent IOC
Session in Moscow, in 1962, only five members voted for immediate suspension,56
allowing South Africa more time to mitigate the effects of apartheid policies on sport.
In February 1963, De Klerk outlined four principles of the National Party’s sports
policy: each racial group would form a separate controlling association in each sport,
white associations would control the code, send representatives to the world
federation competitions, and assist the development of black associations. Racially
mixed teams would not represent South Africa, and sports officials would not invite
racially mixed teams from abroad to play in the Republic.57
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Amid those repressive developments, then, the impact of the anti-apartheid
movement on sport had to be taken into account.58 The first challenge to apartheid
policies in white South African sports occurred in 1946, when the non-white
weightlifters requested recognition from the British Empire Games Weightlifting
Federation because the officially recognized South African governing body restricted
membership only to white weightlifters.59 Likewise, in 1947, the beginnings of an antiapartheid stance could be noticed when the non-racial South African Table Tennis
Board became a recognized affiliate of the International Table Tennis Federation
(ITTF). At the same time, ITTF refused to acknowledge the white African Table Tennis
Union.60 In a similar vein in 1955, Dennis Brutus61 raised the issue of discrimination
in South African sport for the first time in the Olympic Movement.62
Such actions, however, foundered on the IOC’s membership policies, since only one
specific National Sports Federation (NSF) per country could be represented at the
National Olympic Committee (NOC) level and cases of divergence of opinion with the
IOC were referred back to the NOC, which in the case of the SANOC was dominated by
whites. This created a near unsurmountable obstacle for black athletes.63 In South
Africa, whites, therefore, completely controlled access to international selection and
competition. Although Avery Brundage advocated as early as 1958 for a form of dual
representation from the white and black federations in order to create a national
team, his suggestion was never seriously considered by the white federations and
SANOC.64 Nonetheless, during the 1950s, the black athletic community began to build
a voice against apartheid in sport, aided and abetted by other NOCs, NSFs, and
International Sports Federations (ISF).
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The 1950s were important years for the anti-apartheid movement as many
organizations and key relationships began to develop.65 An international appeal
opposing apartheid was signed by 123 world leaders on 10 December 1957. 66 The
South African Sports Association (SASA), formed in 1958, quickly grew to include over
70,000 black sportsmen and women.67 This first non-racial sports organization,
originated from a meeting of black sports federations arranged by Brutus, was closed
down by police and government representatives.68 Brutus himself became the target
of an extended harassment campaign.69 In May 1959, SASA sent a memorandum to
the IOC indicating the failure of SANOC to comply with the Olympic Charter.70 Also
during 1959, the anti-apartheid sport movement received support from Soviet
representatives.71 The IOC was asked by the Soviets to ban South Africa from the
Olympic Games on the basis of its apartheid policies72 and SANOC’s lack of active
pursuit of fulfilling the Olympic Charter rules for participation, in particular, the
stipulations laid down in Articles 1 and 24. 73 Article 1 addressed the rejection of
participation based on race, religion, or political affiliation. Article 24 enjoined NOCs
to enforce all IOC rules and regulations, including Article 1 of the Olympic Charter.74
Responding to the Soviet initiative, Reginald Honey, the South African IOC
representative, gave assurances that all athletes entered by SANOC would be issued
passports for competition travel. What Honey omitted to point out was that the
likelihood of non-white athletes being entered by the South African Committee was
nil.
Brundage’s awareness of the political explosiveness of the apartheid issue before
the formal request for South Africa’s expulsion in 1959 was fortuitous for SANOC.75
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The question of black athletic opportunity in South Africa was raised by Brundage
three years earlier with then SANOC Secretary Ira Emery. 76 Emery’s initial response
was not positive and there was evidence in an April 1958 letter to Emery that
Brundage tried to make recommendations to be proactive in order to pre-empt the
eventual attention this issue would attract on the international stage.77 SASA tried to
lobby the IOC to put pressure on SANOC to integrate black athletes, but Brundage
stood firm in his belief that the IOC should not get involved in member nations’
domestic affairs.78 All Brundage sought was an affirmation from SANOC that it would
do its utmost to abide by the Olympic Charter. Although SASA tried to combat the racial
discrimination issue by working with the IOC and SANOC, it was difficult for the latter
organizations even to acknowledge SASA’s concerns.79 However, in tune with the
initial Soviet backing, support for more open African sport systems also came from
fellow Socialist countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. In addition,
support was registered by western European countries such as Italy, Belgium and
France.80
The horrific Sharpeville and Langa massacres of March 1960 added to the political
urgency of the issue. Sixty-nine people were killed and hundreds wounded when
police opened fire on a nonviolent demonstration.81 Both the African National
Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress were banned, as well as new laws that
“reinforced official powers of repression: it became legal to detain suspects for up to
90 days without trial or judicial control, subsequently to 180 days (in 1965), then one
year, then one year indefinitely renewable.”82
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This event received international attention and significantly increased the
awareness of the apartheid situation in South Africa. SASA subsequently transformed
into the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) in 1962, which
integrated the black and coloured organizations in South Africa.83 This coincided with
the formation of the African bloc nations into a major anti-apartheid, proactive force
against white South Africa.84 The development of the African bloc nations began after
World War II during the postcolonial era. According to Philip Bell, three crucial events
stood out between 1945 and the early 1960s, which changed the African landscape:
(1) the Algerian War of 1954-62; (2) the increase of African state representation on
the United Nations by 1962; and, (3) the attention garnered by the apartheid conflict
in South Africa.85
In the area of sport, increased representation in the IOC and participation in the
Games in conjunction with support from the Eastern bloc allies gave added power to
this growing African bloc. Sport provided an international stage to voice political
statements against South Africa. Brundage, because of his understanding of the
Olympic Movement as non-political,86 was not happy with such statements.
By the 1960s, joining the white establishment in South Africa became a possibility
for the black and coloured associations and federations. This courtesy extended by
the whites created the appearance of political change, but it did nothing to alter the
balance of power between the dominant white minority and the black majority; nonwhite organizations remained in a subservient role.87 As the 1964 Tokyo Olympics
approached, the political pressure on SANOC to abide by the Olympic Charter
increased, especially with regard to Articles 1 and 24. 88 SANOC ultimately was found
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to be in contravention of these principles, and South Africa’s invitation to the Tokyo
Olympics was withdrawn. African delegates even threatened to walk out of a 1965
NOC Assembly in Rome if South African representative Honey were admitted.89
Nonetheless, in an ongoing attempt to establish a balance suitable for the IOC,
Brundage continued to welcome new African NOCs into the IOC, even though he
feared that the new member nations would use their positions in the Movement to
achieve political objectives, especially since sport in ‘new’ African nations was closely
aligned with their respective governments.90 Brundage’s concerns about the new
members’ political actions were confirmed through the founding of the Supreme
Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) in 1966. Although its “general purpose was
coordination and promotion of sport throughout Africa … its specific objective was
the attack against South African apartheid in sport.”91 SCSA not only wanted ISFs and
NSFs to cut ties with South Africa, but also encouraged boycotts of all major
competitions attended by South Africa.92 In addition, the United Nations (UN), in 1966,
deemed apartheid a crime against humanity.93 However, many ISFs maintained the
status quo during the 1950s and 1960s. For the exception of the ITTF banning the
white table tennis NSF in 1956 and the International Amateur Boxing Association
expelling South Africa in 1968, most South African NSFs benefited from international
affiliation until 1970 and beyond.94
As a proactive measure aimed at securing admittance to the 1968 Olympic Games
in Mexico City, SANOC President Frank Braun announced the following concessions:
(1) South Africa would send a mixed team to the Games, (2) all
members would march under the same flag and wear the same
colors, (3) South Africans of different racial groups would compete
against each other at the Games, and (4) a non-white Olympic
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committee would be formed and each racial group would designate
its candidates for selection.95
Following Braun’s statement, Prime Minister Vorster reaffirmed that apartheid
would still be enforced domestically. To avoid a backlash, Braun tried to expedite
South Africa’s acceptance to the Mexico City Olympics. If the IOC did not accept the
terms immediately, Braun feared the concessions would be stalled and then reversed
upon the South African Olympic team’s arrival at the Games. Upon receiving Braun’s
statement, the African bloc, led by the President of the Ethiopian Olympic Committee,
announced a boycott of the Games if South Africa were to be present.96 Brundage
affirmed that a decision would be made at an upcoming IOC Session, after a
commission consisting of Lord Killanin of Ireland, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola of Nigeria,
and Reginald Alexander of Kenya had visited South Africa. The commission was given
instructions by Brundage not to become involved in political matters.97 The
commission’s report categorically found that South Africa was not in compliance with
Olympic principles.98 Nonetheless, the Western-dominated IOC still favoured South
African participation in the Mexico City Olympic Games. This decision did not sit well
with the African bloc, SCSA, and SAN-ROC. A boycott was organized that included fifty
countries which threatened to withdraw if South Africa were allowed to participate.99
After a brief personal visit to South Africa, Brundage held a meeting to vote on a
retraction of the invitation to South Africa. In a vote on 21 April 1968, the IOC
supported retraction by a 47 to 16 vote.100 In an attempt to avoid the overt
politicization of the issue, the IOC rationalized its decision out of a concern for safety
issues, rather than on the basis of a violation of the Olympic Movement’s principles.101
Brutus, however, offered insight into SANOC’s actual political strategies:

20
Frequently it is said that South Africa had undertaken to send, for the
first time, a truly representative team which would include nonwhites. This is not the whole truth. There are documents to show
that the offer made by the [South African National Olympic
Committee] was in fact a conditional one, that only those non-whites
who were prepared to accept apartheid in sport would be
considered for selection. It was this condition that caused the
majority of the non-white sportsmen to reject the offer and it was
the knowledge of this that enabled General Clark, President of the
Mexican Olympic Committee, to decline to follow the IOC’s order to
issue South Africa an invitation.102
Subsequent to the exclusion of South Africa from the 1968 Games, the United
Nations (UN) also placed the issue of South African apartheid and sport on its agenda.
The UN General Assembly passed its first resolution on 2 December 1968, and
subsequent resolutions were extensions of this initial resolution.103 Although nonbinding, the UN resolutions enhanced the legitimacy of the anti-apartheid movement
and provided an added rationale for those who protested against South Africa.104 The
increasing international pressure led to the expulsion of South Africa from the
Olympic Movement in Amsterdam in May 1970, with a vote of 35 to 28, and 3
abstentions.105 Led by SCSA’s secretary-general Jean-Claude Ganga (Congo) and
President Abraham Ordia (Nigeria), SCSA was an influential voice when the IOC made
the decision to terminate South Africa’s membership.106
The expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Movement registered both
supporters as well as opponents. On one side, there were the traditional conservative
Western IOC members and Avery Brundage, who gave South Africa the benefit of the
doubt on the issue. On the other side was the alliance of Communist states and Third
World countries who vowed to eliminate South Africa from the IOC. The position of
the Communist and Third World alliance continued to strengthen as more nations
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were admitted to the Olympic organization, which, as much as he welcomed them,
caused Brundage concerns since he feared the increasing politicization of the
movement.107 Brundage, fearing intrusion of domestic politics, or, for that matter any
kind of politics, was reluctant to trust the motivations behind any new committees
and groups that formed in support or non-support of the current South African sport
system.
In an attempt to offer an illusion of change after expulsion from the IOC, South
Africa undertook a rebranding strategy to mask as ‘multi-national’ the racializing
tendencies of apartheid. The 1971 multi-national sports policy had three goals:
(1) to break up the unified sports federations and create separate
Indian, Coloured and African associations; (2) to create new racial
federations where it proves impossible to provoke a division; (3) to
finance and promote the emergence of a new sporting elite among
Blacks whose sporting and political interests will lead them to
support the status quo and the official policies of the regime, while
effectively depriving the non-racial sports associations of finance
and facilities.108
However, sporting organizations were not misled by South Africa’s attempted
rebranding of the sport system as multi-racial sport. Only when total isolation from
international sport seemed to be a threat, did sports administrators attempt to
introduce modifications that accommodated non-white participants.109
South Africa, then, had a well-entrenched history of sport, racism, and segregation.
The IOC and the Olympic Movement played a role in contributing to, and opposing,
racism and segregation in sport within South Africa. During the pivotal period when
South Africa’s relationship with the IOC and the Olympic Movement changed from
active membership to excommunication, Avery Brundage was the IOC President. In
addition to addressing the racist politics of South Africa and the internal and external

22
pressures placed on the IOC, Brundage also had to take into account the IOC’s past
encounters with racism and his own personal accusations of being anti-black and antiSemitic.
The following section examines literature pertaining to Brundage’s character and
the state of racism in South African sport to provide some human and cultural context.
In addition, the literature that discussed Brundage’s private correspondence with
sport and government officials regarding the South African issue was examined to
provide an idea of Brundage’s firsthand thoughts on South Africa’s standing within
the IOC.

4.

Literature Review

4.1 Racism and the Olympics
The Olympic Games, as the relevant literature indicated, have experienced its share
of controversy with regard to the issue of racism and politics of race. A telling example
occurred as early as the 1904 Games. Matti Gøksyr showed that the 1904
Anthropology Days accompanying the Olympic Games consisted of evaluating various
African, Asian and American Indian representatives on their physical capabilities in
comparison to “sport’s dominated cultural group at the time: the white man.”110
Although the racializing thrust of this exhibit originated with the organizers of the
Fair, and not with the Olympic organizers, the author pointed out the latter did not
attempt to end or at least reframe the focus of the Anthropology Days.
The issue of racism came to the fore again during the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games,
which Adolph Hitler and Nazi leaders avidly supported to display the superiority of
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the Aryan race and Fascist political ideology.111 The discrimination towards Jews and
other ‘undesirable’ minorities was widely known,112 but these circumstances were not
sufficient to dissuade the Olympic Games’ organizers to change the host destination.
To alleviate suspicions the Americans had regarding the charges of discrimination
against Jews and others in Germany, Brundage, as the President of the American
Olympic Committee, conducted an investigation in 1934. In addition to being
impressed by Germany’s sense of order, Brundage interviewed Jewish leaders who
assured him that there would be no discrimination.113 Therefore, upon his return,
“The American Olympic Committee, which met with Brundage and voted to accept
Germany’s invitation to participate in the Games, claimed that sport was the wedge
that would lead to the end of discrimination in Germany.”114 Although Brundage
garnered much criticism for his pro-German stance and anti-Semitic tendencies,115 his
support for Olympism and action as the catalyst that brought the American team to
the Berlin Games won him a seat on the IOC.116
Carrying the same attitude from the Berlin Games—the Olympics enabling contests
between individuals, not nations117—Brundage was supportive of South Africa’s
ongoing inclusion in the IOC and participation in the Olympic Games. As Ramsamy
mentioned, Brundage considered apartheid a domestic political issue whereby the
IOC had no jurisdiction over the government’s actions and, therefore, could not
sanction SANOC.118 Even after South Africa’s expulsion from the IOC and after
Brundage’s retirement as President in 1972, he believed South Africa should be readmitted into the Olympic Movement.119 The interesting query remained: was
Brundage’s justification of South Africa’s position sound and consistent throughout
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the years, especially when he made bold statements regarding the violation of the
Olympic Charter:
If and when a Government determines to take over its national
Olympic Committee there is, of course, very little effective opposition
that can be offered by the national amateur sports organizations. The
only correction for situation of this kind when the letter and spirit of
the Olympic rules are not followed is for the rest of the world to
refuse to play with countries which are in violation of Olympic
principles.120
There was abundant literature referring to Brundage’s politics and the impact he
had as IOC President during the South African issue.121 However, the literature
detailing the correspondence between Brundage and officials from the IOC, NOCs,
ISFs, South African government, or other sport organizations was rare. To my
knowledge, only a few important studies concentrating on the correspondence
between Brundage and officials existed. Nonetheless, three areas of literature in
regard to Brundage and the South African issue need to be discussed: (1) Avery
Brundage’s life and work in the Olympic Movement; (2) sport, racism, and South
Africa; and, (3) studies concentrating on the correspondence between Brundage and
officials.

4.2 Avery Brundage’s Life and Work in the Olympic
Movement
In a previous section, Avery Brundage and the IOC’s Position on Race and Sport, an
account was provided outlining Brundage’s life and involvement in the IOC. However,
even though I, and many others,

122

have profiled Brundage, it is worth briefly

highlighting three authors who have examined the life of Avery Brundage.
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In an extremely flattering book, Heinz Schöbel (East Germany’s [DDR] first IOC
member) explored the four dimensions of Brundage: sportsman, sports leader,
construction engineer, and art lover and collector.123 Schöbel chronicled Brundage’s
young life as a good student and athlete devoted to both pursuits equally. After his
career as an athlete, peaking as the United States all-round champion in athletics,
Brundage began participating in the administrative side of sport. His work in the
United States garnered much attention at the international level, where he became
Vice President of the IOC in 1945 and President in 1952. Being aligned with
Coubertin’s ideals for the Olympic Movement, he seemed to be the perfect fit for the
job of IOC President. Schöbel painted Brundage as a President who fostered
international growth of the IOC and development of domestic NOCs, while his ideals
were anchored in fair play, sportsmanship, and amateurism. Published in 1968 while
Brundage was still IOC President, Schöbel’s work was a favourable, positive
interpretation of Brundage’s presence on the international sports scene, best
categorized as hagiography.
A biographical work about Brundage completed by Allen Guttmann in 1984 is the
seminal reference on issues related to Brundage.124 The detail and breadth of
Guttmann’s work advances far beyond Schöbel’s effort. Guttmann chronicled
Brundage’s every step, from his humble beginning in Detroit to his death in a German
hospital on 8 May 1975. Guttmann seemingly constructed the Brundage narrative
from an objective viewpoint, highlighting both negative and positive aspects of
Brundage’s life. Some of Brundage’s more controversial moments included the
inclusion of the Soviet Union in the Olympic Movement and trying to keep South Africa

26
and Rhodesia involved as well. Furthermore, a chapter was dedicated to the Nazi
Olympics, which discussed Brundage’s controversial support of Germany and, as a
result, being labeled as an anti-Semite.125 Guttmann also included a large section on
the South African issue, which detailed Brundage’s struggle to keep South Africa in
the Olympic Movement. His efforts became so strong, he eventually was labeled as
anti-black, as well.
These two immediate examples of Brundage maintaining his firm stance of
keeping politics and the Olympic Games separate can be seen as one of Brundage’s
positive characteristics. For the most part, although one might not favour Brundage’s
stances, he was consistent even during stressful, controversial situations. Not only did
he have strong views on the separation of politics and the Olympic Games, he also
supported amateurism and non-commercialism in the Games. Above all, Brundage
considered the Olympic Movement as a ‘secular religion’ which all affiliated with the
IOC had to support. When in power, Brundage’s perception of Coubertin’s ideals led
the decision-making of the IOC and he made sure he was surrounded by those who
shared the same perception of Olympism. It was not until his last term as President
that he lost control of the IOC.
There was only one other person who could possibly offer a more concise
biography of Avery Brundage. Maynard Brichford was the leader of the team
responsible for processing the Avery Brundage Collection (ABC) in 1975 at the
University of Illinois.126 Brichford did not write a complete Brundage biography, but
he has written a variety of articles based on ABC materials. Brichford considered eight
aspects of Brundage’s life – student, engineer, financier, athlete, sports official,
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ideologue, public symbol, and collector.127 Although Brichford did discuss each in his
publications, two aspects specific to Brichford’s work garnered particular attention:
Brundage’s ‘internationalization’ of the Olympic Games,128 and his stance on
racism.129
Brundage’s contribution to the international growth of the Olympic Movement
was rarely celebrated in the literature. Brichford mentioned, “In 1960 alone,
seventeen new nations emerged in Africa. Brundage presided over the first Olympic
Games in Australia, Asia and Latin America, played a major role in establishing the
Pan-American Games, and attended the first African Games.”130 Even though
Brundage was severely criticized for this focus on internationalism, he continued to
include countries in the Olympic Movement regardless of domestic and international
politics. Unfortunately, Brundage’s perceived negative actions drew attention away
from the much more positive actions which benefited the Olympic Movement. One
recurring controversial theme was how Brundage dealt with racism. The Olympic
Charter clearly stated that racism was not to be tolerated within the Olympic
Movement. However, for Brundage, this ideal clearly clashed with the ideal of a nonpolitical Olympic Movement environment. Unfortunately, Brundage seemed to focus
more on making sure the Olympic Games remained non-political, which clouded his
judgement when evaluating domestic racism as a violation of the Olympic Charter.
The biographical literature on Brundage helped identify what type of
characteristics made up his personality and how those characteristics could have
affected his decisions and proclamations when acting as the IOC President. How he
dealt with the South African issue is the focus of this study. So, too, was how he reacted
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to challenges relative to consideration of the state of sport and racism in South Africa
during his tenure as IOC President.

4.3 Sport, Racism, and South Africa
Considering the importance of the South African apartheid issue, the range of
articles and books discussing this topic was extensive. This section highlights some of
the notable publications strictly pertaining to sport, racism, and South Africa. One of
the earliest inclusive books on sport and race in South Africa was written by Mary
Draper in 1963.131 It provided a detailed account of the then current laws and
government policies affecting multi-racial sport and reminds the reader only actual
law can be enforced, regardless of the government policies supported by the
Nationalist Party. Draper discussed the Olympic Charter, the associated South African
sporting bodies such as SANOC, SASA, and SAN-ROC, the stance of the IOC, South
African Olympic and government representatives, and the general status of South
Africa in the Olympic Movement. Of course, how the South African issue was discussed
and detailed depended on the author’s viewpoint and information available to the
author at the time.
In 1970, when South Africa was expelled from the Olympic Movement, more
valuable publications surfaced discussing the South African issue. Morgan Naidoo
voiced his concern with the black sport situation in South Africa. 132 The black
community was interested in increasing involvement at every level in sport, but he
was convinced whites were not interested in the welfare of black sport. Naidoo cites
Braun, who was then President of SANOC, as one administrator who attempted to
incorporate the black community. However, Naidoo believed it was just an attempt to
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appease the IOC rather than having the welfare of black sport at heart. Taking a more
optimistic view, Richard Lapchick argued that the issue of racism and the Olympic
Movement had come to an end in 1970 after the long struggle which resulted in South
Africa’s expulsion.133
Dennis Brutus’ hardships, endured on behalf of the non-white South African sport
movement, are well-documented in the literature.134 Brutus provided a close,
personal perspective shaped by his in-depth involvement as a leader in the antiapartheid movement from the 1950s.135 Another detailed contribution about the
South African issue came from Chris de Broglio.136 His booklet was an updated version
of Draper’s 1963 book, which included additional details about the government’s
continued attempt to appease the IOC while maintaining the apartheid stance in terms
of other domestic and international matters. De Broglio’s insight was unique because
it was informed by his athletic experiences as a competitive weightlifter and
representative of South African weightlifting from 1949 to the early 1960s. He later
joined forces with Brutus to form SAN-ROC and, as a result, was forced to leave South
Africa, ultimately settling in England.
The year following South Africa’s expulsion from the Olympic Movement, Peter
Hain released a book documenting the Stop the Seventy Tour (STST) campaign,137
which successfully forced South Africa from participating in most international rugby
and cricket competition. Hain provided a concise historical background of South
Africa and apartheid, and included South Africa’s struggle in the Olympic Movement
to contextualize STST.138 In addition to discussing STST and providing multiple useful
summaries, Joan Brickhill139 added something new by commenting on the South
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African government’s attempt to rebrand apartheid sport as ‘multi-national’ sport in
1971. As Brickhill notes, “multi-national sport entails competition (a) between the
four main racial groups, each group being treated as a separate nation, and (b)
between international teams and the four main racial groups.”140 The perception of
multi-racial competition was just a ruse by the government to keep racial groups still
segregated while maintaining the white status quo.
Reflecting back on the campaign to isolate South Africa from international sport
and its effect on the whole state of apartheid in South Africa, March Krotee and Luther
Schwick141 and Krotee142 used personal observation, personal correspondence with
South African sport officials, and secondary sources to examine the social and
historical aspects to try to identify the external pressures which affected internal
change. One such external factor was the involvement of the UN. Maxine Hunter
focused strictly on the UN and its role in the anti-apartheid movement.143 After
providing a summary leading up to the first UN resolution in 1968 that outlined
sanctions against South Africa specifically pertaining to sport, multiple resolutions
are highlighted in the study. Although the UN resolutions and declarations can be used
to legitimize the protest or exclusion of South Africa from sporting activities, Hunter
reminded the reader that UN resolutions and declarations were not lawfully binding,
but only carried as much importance as countries attached to it.
In 1982, Sam Ramsamy144 and Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon145 added to the
breadth of literature on South Africa, sport, and racism. Ramsamy’s work capitalized
on many documents from the 1970s and 80s not previously provided in other
publications. In addition to being a concise reference manual, Ramsamy included a
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small chapter highlighting the role of sponsorship in apartheid and sport, which had
not been done before. Archer and Bouillon provided a complete account of sport and
racism in South Africa from the beginning of European explorers landing on South
African soil on 5 April 1652 to the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand. Although
sport was the focus, Archer and Bouillon also discussed in detail the socioeconomics,
education, and politics in South Africa. A more recent version of Archer and Bouillon
can be found in Douglas Booth’s account of sport and politics in South Africa.
Published in 1998, Booth’s study brought the perspective of a new South Africa after
the resolution of apartheid and a democratic election placing Nelson Mandela as its
new leader.146
Although the aforementioned literature on sport, racism, and South Africa was an
integral part to frame the South African issue, it was the literature focusing on the
correspondence between Brundage and officials which was of utmost importance to
this dissertation.

4.4 Correspondence between Brundage and Officials
Focusing strictly on the rise of the African bloc in opposition to the IOC during the
South African race issue, Shane Quick suggested a shift in power away from Brundage
and the IOC to African and Third World representation.147 As Brundage expressed
continually throughout his tenure on the IOC, politics had no place in the Olympic
Movement, while, conversely, the African nations deemed sport, especially the
Olympic Games, as an ideal venue to gain leverage and use the power of politics to
make statements on an international stage about issues outside sport. Nonetheless,
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the African nation-states’ increase of power, in part, was made possible by Eastern
bloc support.
At a meeting between the IOC and NOCs in 1959, dialogue ensued between
Brundage, the Soviets, and South African representatives about apartheid and
sport.148 Brundage was well aware of the pressure arising from apartheid in South
Africa because the IOC had received letters of concern before 1959. In letters to
SANOC officials, Brundage suggested a proactive approach to prevent potential
political fallout.149 The IOC continued to support SANOC’s involvement with the
Olympic Movement because of its firm stance of separating politics from the Olympic
Games. Only after a vote to eliminate South Africa from the IOC was proposed and
defeated in 1962, did Brundage issue a formal warning to South Africa to abide by the
Olympic Charter by October 1963 in order to avoid suspension from the 1964 Olympic
Games.150 South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games was withdrawn as a
result of SANOC’s non-compliance with the conditions contained in Brundage’s official
warning. Quick pointed out that at the meeting where the invitation was withdrawn,
the African bloc’s power was extended as NOCs of four African countries were granted
full recognition by the IOC.151 Brundage continued to pursue communication between
SANOC and the IOC in order to keep South Africa involved in the Olympic Movement.
The report of a commission to assess South African sport indicated that SANOC was
still not meeting the minimum standards for participation in the Olympic Movement.
The majority of IOC members ignored this when voting to allow South Africa to
participate, based on the fact that SANOC ostensibly was doing as well as could be
expected under the political conditions existent in South Africa. This IOC decision
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triggered the threat of a wide-spread boycott of the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. As a
result, the invitation to South Africa was withdrawn once again and South Africa was
eventually expelled from the IOC and Olympic Movement in 1970.
Quick’s study clearly displayed the influence that the African bloc had on the
expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Movement. Quick focused on the voices of
Brundage and South African officials to provide indication of the pressures on the IOC
and SANOC which led to the expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. Quick attributed
Brundage’s loss of power to the rise of power in the African bloc. Quick’s examination
was helpful because the pressure from African nations was certainly one factor
playing a part in the expulsion of South African involvement in the Olympic
Movement.
Donald Macintosh, Hart Cantelon, and Lisa McDermott discussed how the IOC,
under Brundage’s leadership, acted as a transnational organization when dealing with
South Africa in the Olympic Movement during the 1950s and 1960s.152 The IOC’s
mission was to spread Olympism through NOCs without exhibiting much interest in
the political ideology expressed by IOC members and hosting countries; thus, the
IOC’s decisions were driven by the commitment to Olympism.153 Therefore, to have
SANOC abide by the Olympic Charter was the IOC’s main interest. To provide evidence
of the IOC’s attempt to keep the focus on the values of Olympism and the
organizational procedures of the IOC, and away from the subject of apartheid in South
Africa, ABC was used to highlight the correspondence between SANOC and the IOC
officials. Letters between Brundage and SANOC officials discussing strategies to help
South Africa comply with IOC rules appeared as early as the late 1950s. Macintosh,
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Cantelon, and McDermott suggested that the ideals of Olympism were the main thrust
for decision making within the transnational structure of the IOC, not Brundage
himself. Brundage represented a brand of Olympism that enforced the non-political
nature of the IOC, which ignored the internal policies of South African government,
and, in turn, influenced the continual inclusion of South Africa in the IOC. Although
the Olympic Movement was the most important factor directing the IOC, the conflict
and struggle amongst IOC members regarding apartheid was created by how
Olympism should be pursued by the IOC. By the time South Africa’s exclusion became
a reality, the ideals of Olympism Brundage once enforced became extinct because of
the gravity of the apartheid issue. Brundage felt strongly about his version of
Olympism because of the charismatic legacy left by the founder of the modern
Olympic Games, Pierre de Coubertin.
Cantelon and McDermott made a connection between the decision-making of the
IOC and the “charismatic legacy” of Coubertin.154 Indicative of this connection was the
correspondence between Brundage and the South African representative to the IOC,
Reginald Honey. It showed how Coubertin’s idealist vision of Olympism was ingrained
in the IOC organization. In turn, that devotion to Olympism drove the decisions of the
IOC on important matters such as dealing with the South African apartheid issue.
Brundage expressed Coubertin’s Olympic ideals in his letters to IOC members, such as
freedom from domestic and international political pressure. As South Africa’s
representative on the IOC from 1948 until his death in 1982, Honey was an influential
advocate of Brundage’s concept of Olympism.155 As an ideal IOC member who
dedicated and volunteered much of his time to sport, Honey played an important role
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in the South African situation and was devoted to Olympic ideals. Honey faced
extreme pressure during the years leading to South Africa’s expulsion from the
Olympic Movement in 1970. Although he had to defend South Africa’s racial policies,
he was favoured enough to be asked to remain on the IOC after South Africa was
expelled.156 According to the authors, Honey and Brundage shared not only the same
devotion to the Olympic Movement, but similarities characterizing the membership
of the IOC during the 1950s and 1960s: white, male, well-educated, and privileged. All
these similarities between Honey, Brundage, and other IOC members added to the
IOC’s cohesive strength in continuing the charismatic ideals of Coubertin. Further, and
more importantly, Brundage trusted the support from those who shared these
characteristics. It was only when opposition arose to Brundage’s and Honey’s version
of Olympism that problems ensued with South Africa’s membership in the IOC.
Cantelon and McDermott suggest that the correspondence between Brundage and
Honey slightly favoured the white regime,157 not because Brundage and Honey were
racists, but because they sought to uphold Coubertin’s vision of Olympism. There was
a sense of entitlement given to SANOC to control all-things Olympic within South
Africa because of its history with the IOC and commitment to the Olympic Movement
since 1908.158 Cantelon and McDermott’s study was valuable because it provided
insight into how those of Brundage’s and Honey’s persuasion made decisions within
the IOC, and because it identified Honey as one source of input Brundage had on South
Africa’s status. Despite Honey’s history as a representative of South Africa on the IOC,
by the mid-1960s, he became more of a diplomatic figure.
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Honey, however, was not the only IOC member Brundage confided in with regard
to South African politics and sport. Identifying a different IOC member, Maureen
Smith focused on Reginald Alexander’s correspondence with the IOC regarding the
status of South Africa in the Olympic Movement. Alexander’s written exchanges span
more than 25 years and involve three IOC Presidents, one of whom was Brundage,
who considered Alexander an ally and trusted confidante.159 Elected in 1960,
Alexander represented Kenya on the IOC. He and Brundage shared the same
sentiment about domestic politics not infringing on participation in the Olympic
Games. Therefore, not only should South African politics not prevent athletes from
participating in the Games, it was, in fact, the athletes who were experiencing
discrimination based on a violation of the Olympic Charter.160 In his letters, Brundage
shared his optimism with Alexander about finding the right solution to help the nonwhite sportsmen in South Africa. Brundage held Alexander in such high regard, he
selected Alexander as part of the three man fact-finding commission to investigate
South African sport before making a decision on South Africa’s status for the 1968
Mexico City Games.161 Although Brundage was one IOC President discussed in Smith’s
study, her primary focus was Alexander’s contribution to the South African issue, not
the three IOC Presidents with whom Alexander communicated. Alexander’s
correspondence with Brundage was valuable in providing a better picture of
Brundage’s perception of the South African issue, but it was only one piece of the
puzzle.
These articles focussed on partial aspects of the topic proposed for this study, and
as such are of value in the framing of the research issue. They do not, however,
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represent the theme in its completeness, neither in the selection of its time period,
nor in the focus of its questioning. The much more detailed investigation of the
historical and archival record carried out in this study acknowledges this literature,
but provides a more detailed as well as more in-depth investigation of the issue.

5.

Methodology and Methods
Historiography attempts to recreate historical events of a past accessible only

through the stories and narratives produced about them. In an important study on the
work and methods of sport historians, Douglas Booth analyzes three models of the
creation of narrative and historical inquiry in sport history: reconstructionism,
constructionism, and deconstructionism.162 First, Booth argues, reconstructionists
seek to reveal history through the interrogation and contextualization of historical
facts taken as direct empirical evidence; it is the facts that ‘tell the story’ as much as
the historian who produces it. Reconstructionists thus uphold that “history exists
independently of the historian and that discovering the past is an objective process,
uncontaminated by ideology.”163 Reconstructionists transform historical data,
conceived as ‘objective facts’, into a narrative that most closely approximates the
historical process as, in the understanding of the historian, it objectively happened.
Secondly, constructionists, in a stance critical towards reconstructionism, argue
that it is impossible to shape empirical historical facts into historical narrative from a
completely objective perspective, and insist on the importance of theory in the
production of narrative. In this view:
…theory is fundamental in history for at least three reasons. … It
provides frameworks and principles for selecting evidence and thus
steers practitioners away from contradictions in their explanations.
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Second, theory brings to the fore interrelations between the
components of human experiences at given times and in so doing
enriches historical accounts. Third,… identifying historical patterns
invariably involves some form of abstract thinking and connections
to theoretical explanation and interpretations.164
That is to say, the historical narrative does not simply emerge through the historical
data, but the treatment of the data itself is shaped by the perspectives and concepts
provided through the specific theoretical lens used.
Deconstructionists, thirdly, move away from an insistence on the preeminence of
the data as shaping the historical narrative. They focus on the problems of creating
historical narrative itself, and on the importance of language in the creative process.
They acknowledge the possibility of multiple perspectives and reject the possibility
that a single interpretation only can be applied to the data in a given case.165
Booth’s model of sport historiography is helpful since it allows me to locate my
own approach to the topic of this study. I adopt a reconstructionist approach since my
aim is to trace and reconstruct the IOC’s treatment of the South African situation,
through investigating specifically the correspondence of key actors, connected
through a series of exchanges that centre on Avery Brundage and trace his
correspondence with other actors playing important roles in this issue, and also
tracing the interaction between these actors. Through this reconstruction, I unravel
the perspectives and strategies of the actors that become evident in the voluminous
correspondence developed on the issue. Conducting the analysis from the
reconstructionist stance allowed me to identify and trace ‘three dominant voices’ in
this debate that became influential as the debate unfolded in the correspondence; the
thesis was structured to provide a perspective on the three dominant voices. This in-
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depth investigation of these central and influential actors contributes a new
dimension to our understanding of the IOC’s approach to the South African situation,
and the events leading to South Africa’s expulsion.
Since this study’s research problem necessarily makes reference to issues of race
and racial discrimination, my conceptual approach to these phenomena requires a
brief explanation. Although the correspondence from Brundage and the IOC did not
contain explicitly racist remarks, decisions made by the IOC in the context of the South
African apartheid regime, had racializing implications, either challenging the effects
of apartheid or confirming the status quo. The implicit racializing effects created by
such decisions cannot be understood as expressions of racist postures adopted by
Brundage or the IOC; neither can the implicit racializing effects be ignored. Paraschak
and Tyrone, among other writers, have referred to such implicit or consequential
racializing effects as “structural racism.”166 Such racism was not the result of explicitly
expressed racializing positions or actions, but it emerged from the structural
properties of the social system of South Africa within which people and organizations,
the IOC among them, acted to effect certain outcomes in the area of Olympic sports in
disregard of racially discriminatory consequences resulting from their actions.167 The
racializing effects of the IOC’s, Avery Brundage’s, or the other relevant actors’
perspectives and strategies expressed in their correspondence during their
involvement in the South African issue, merit extensive consideration in a separate
study.
The method for the empirical research for this study makes extensive use of
archival sources. The IOC’s organizational structure defined the important positions
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that had a bearing on the evolution of the South African situation, notably the position
of President Brundage. In order to clarify why and how decisions were made by the
IOC in regard to SANOC, a narrative was developed using the correspondence,
dialogue, commentary, press examinations, and position statements from IOC and
NOC officials, SANOC, South Africa’s domestic resistance representatives, and the
international community. Early in the research process, three dominant voices
emerged in dialogue with the IOC: (1) South African Olympic affiliates; (2) domestic
resistance, and (3) international community. Therefore, the source materials were
placed in one of the three categories to construct the narrative. The South African
Olympic affiliates were any individuals and groups already associated with the white
South African sport structure and culture. Domestic resistant forces represented any
individuals and groups within South Africa that were fighting for non-white equality
and equity in South African sport. Finally, the international community represented
any individuals and groups from outside South Africa that were not associated with
any South African Olympic affiliates or domestic resistant forces, and argued in
support of, or against, South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, and
Olympic Movement.

6.

Limitations and Delimitations
It is possible that important documents on the South African situation have been

placed in archives in South Africa. Should such documents exist, they may possibly
have been written in Afrikaans, the dominant language of political exchange in the
country at the time. Both those possibilities place a limitation on the scope of sources
accessible to me for the completion of this study: I do not speak Afrikaans, and it was
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logistically impossible for me to visit archives in South Africa that might have such
documents in their holdings. Such documents thus were not utilized for this study.
The study was limited to documents written in English.
A delimitation on the scope of the archival sources to be investigated for this
project emerged from the way I defined my main topic and perspective. Investigating
the IOC’s viewpoint on the South African situation from the perspective of its most
influential administrator at the time, IOC President Avery Brundage and his numerous
correspondents on this issue, allowed me to concentrate my research effort on
Brundage’s voluminous correspondence and related documents. This collection in its
entirety is housed at the University of Illinois. In the 1970s, the German
Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaften in Cologne arranged to have the entire
collection microfilmed.168 A copy of these microfilms was acquired by the
International Centre for Olympic Studies at Western University in London, Ontario.
Western University’s copy of the Avery Brundage Collection emerged as one of two
main archival sources of information used in this study; the second primary source
was the Wolf Lyberg translations and summaries of the IOC Executive Committee
Minutes and IOC General Session Minutes, also housed at the International Center for
Olympic Studies.169
The time line of this dissertation is delimited to the years 1955 to 1968. The year
1955 was selected as the starting point because debates on the issue of racial
discrimination in South Africa relative to the Olympic Movement first emerged at that
time. The end date was defined by the IOC’s withdrawal of the invitation to South
Africa for the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games; these were the last Olympic Games
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South Africa was eligible for prior to its expulsion from the Olympic Movement in May
1970. South Africa never recovered from the controversy of the 1968 Grenoble vote,
and the opposition had enough supporters in the IOC to ostracize South Africa until
racial discrimination was satisfactorily reduced from South African sport.
Since this study focusses on the thinking of the ‘three dominant voices’ on the issue,
and since, therefore, their correspondence necessarily was the primary focus,
newspaper material was included only to the extent that newspaper clippings were
summarized in items of correspondence, and thus contributed to express the thinking
of the primary players. The undoubtedly voluminous newspaper reporting on the
issue thus lay outside the specific research focus of my study. It would require a
separate study to carry out a content analysis of the newspaper reporting.

7.

Chapter Overview
In the main chapters of this study, the correspondence between the IOC and other

officials was retraced to understand the interplay between the IOC, the developing
political situation in South Africa, and the influence of extraneous social
circumstances, during three crucial phases of this development, within the relevant
time line for this study.
Chapter 2 covers the years 1955 to 1960, the time when the issue of South African
racial discrimination and its significance for South African sports and the Olympic
Movement first rose onto the agenda. It traces the beginnings of a divergence of
opinions between the IOC and South African sport and government officials. Inquiries
into apartheid were made by Avery Brundage and other IOC officials, internal and
external pressure on the IOC began to mount, the Afrikaner Nationalist Party started

43
to establish official sport policies, and non-white resistant forces became better
organized within South Africa. During this time period, the IOC thus had to renegotiate
with SANOC concerning its status in the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement.
Furthermore, the IOC’s debates on this issue were influenced by the questions and
accusations against SANOC from domestic resistance and the international
community.
Chapter 3 covers the years 1960 to 1964, which saw the growing strength of
domestic, non-white resistance and the IOC’s first confrontation with SANOC,
resulting in an official warning by Brundage to SANOC to comply with the Olympic
Charter, in order to be included in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. Surprisingly, after
being replaced in 1961, former SANOC Secretary General Ira Emery emerged as a
valuable though unofficial source of information about the internal status of South
African sport and South African governmental laws and policies. Since SANOC did not
comply with the terms of the IOC’s Baden-Baden resolution, the 1964 Tokyo Olympic
Games marked the first time the IOC withdrew its invitation to South Africa.
Chapter 4 examines the explosion of an international presence supporting the antiapartheid movement from 1964 to 1968. To help negotiate South Africa’s
involvement in the IOC, Olympic Movement, and Olympic Games, Brundage organized
a Commission to assess South African sport. The South Africa Commission report in
conjunction with SANOC’s assurance of entering a mixed race team resulted in an
absolute majority vote to include South Africa in the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games,
which caused the anti-apartheid movement to become stronger. With the threat of a
significant boycott looming, political aspects began to dominate the IOC’s decision-
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making process, resulting in the withdrawal of the IOC’s invitation to South Africa to
participate in the 1968 Mexico City Games.
Chapter 5 offers the conclusions that emerge from this study. It will reflect on the
changing relationships between the IOC and the South African sport community, in
particular SANOC, and the ways in which this found expression in the thinking and
reasoning of the ‘three dominant voices,’ as it emerged during the time period under
consideration.
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Chapter Two:
Avery Brundage, the South African
National Olympic Committee, and the
Birth of the Non-White Resistance, 19551960
1.

Introduction
Although Avery Brundage was an avid believer in a non-political International

Olympic Committee (IOC), Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement, the IOC itself was
a transnational political body. Member individuals and countries are chosen based on
the ability to spread the IOC’s ideological brand of Olympism. Further, the IOC was
much about relationships between the members and countries which compose the
modern Olympic Movement. Brundage’s connections to the IOC began while he was
the President of the American Olympic Association. He became an IOC member in
1936, and his importance within the IOC increased when he became Vice President in
1946. It was during his tenure as IOC Vice President that relationships between
Brundage and the South African representatives evolved, which, combined with
Brundage’s Olympic Movement ideals, set the tone for his approach to the South
African issue when he ultimately became President. When Brundage rose to the
Presidency, he, in effect, became the face of the Olympic Movement. With this
privileged position came the responsibility of dealing with people and organizations
that wanted their voices to be heard. Therefore, not only was Brundage prompted
towards developing a working relationship with IOC affiliates, he also had to deal with
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internal as well as global developments. This was most certainly apparent in the case
of South Africa in the modern Olympic Movement.
There are four main forces to consider in examining the issue of South African
participation in the Olympic Games and membership of the IOC: (1) President
Brundage and the IOC itself; (2) the role of South African Olympic affiliates; (3)
domestic resistance within South Africa; and, lastly, (4) the international community.
As the South African issue developed from the mid-1950s to South Africa’s expulsion
in 1970, the message and position of each of these stakeholders varied.
Since a network of correspondents – centering on Brundage as IOC President, the
IOC and extending out into the sphere of the international Olympic community – is
the focus of this inquiry, he is posited and examined here as expressing the position
of the IOC on the South African issue. Personal advice provided by other individuals
involved with the IOC notwithstanding, it was ultimately Brundage who formulated
the IOC’s message. Then, in the ten years leading up to the 1960 Rome Games, in
addition to Brundage and the IOC, the position and message of the other three
stakeholders began to develop. Brundage was challenged to manage and negotiate
with these three voices to arrive at a stance and course of action that he could consider
to be satisfactory. Therefore, in this and the two chapters that follow, I will provide a
detailed examination of the message and position of the four stakeholders as
expressed in the voluminous correspondence accessible in the Avery Brundage
Collection (ABC). I will conclude each chapter with a discussion of Brundage’s
resolutions and position on the issue as influenced by the exchanges with the
respective stakeholders.
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2.

South African Olympic Affiliates
Correspondence between Avery Brundage and the IOC representative for South

Africa, Reginald Honey, commenced as early as 1949.1 In his first letter to Brundage,
Honey requested his assistance for South African National Olympic Committee
(SANOC)2 member, Dr. Ernst Jokl, during a visit to the USA. Almost two months later,
Brundage responded in kind, pointing to correspondence with Dr. Jokl, and
mentioning that he would do everything he could to assist Jokl. As well, Brundage
stated that he looked forward to seeing Honey at the next IOC session in Rome.3
Correspondence from the subsequent year, 1950, indicated another connection
between Brundage and South African sports, namely, between Brundage and the
Honorary Secretary of SANOC, Ira Emery. In Emery’s initial letter, dated 19 May 1950,
he provided Brundage with a listing of the past and current members of SANOC and
South African IOC representatives, as well as a detailed account of SANOC’s selection
process for its national Olympic team. “The [South African National Olympic
Committee] selects its South African team from the nominations received,” stated
Emery, “in accordance with the money available at the time of selection.”4 What was
unique about this particular letter was a series of questions posed by Emery to the
IOC:
(a) Can a National Body of Sport break away from the [South African
National Olympic Committee] and enter direct to the Organizing
committee of the Olympic Games and without reference to the
National Olympic Committee.
(b) If the National Olympic Committee refuses to forward all
nominations for a National Body of Sport, may the latter send their
entries direct to the Organising Committee.

56
(c) In effect, is it permissible for a National Body of Sport whose full
entry is not forwarded owing to lack of funds, to raise their own
funds and enter direct to the Organising committee without
reference to the National Olympic Committee? If this is no it could
mean that in this country a wealthy National body could send a large
team and a poorer association could not raise funds to send a team,
thus the entry from this country would not be representative of the
sport of this country, and therefore not a truly National team for an
Olympic Games.
(d) It is pointed out that on no account does the national Olympic
Council in South Africa alter the order in which National sports
teams are nominated. For instance, if the National Athletic Union
nominated 20 and we had only sufficient money to send 15 athletes,
only the last five names would be deleted. Will the Organising
Committee, in effect, accept only the entries forwarded by the
National Olympic Committee of South Africa?5
These questions sought to clarify the power and authority of a National Olympic
Committee (NOC) domestically, as well as within the Olympic structure generally.
However, could these questions also be interpreted as guiding the development of
proactive measures in anticipation of things to come in South Africa – were some
National Sporting Federations (NSF) beginning to challenge the authority of SANOC?
Any such considerations are not evidenced in Brundage’s response to Emery; he
merely referred Emery to the Olympic rule book and reaffirmed that the IOC only
recognized the nominations and suggestions from the respective NOCs, who, in turn,
received the nominations from NSFs.6 Brundage also offered suggestions on how to
organize the funding and how to select South African participants to represent the
country at the Olympic Games. Again, Brundage’s helpful reply to Emery regarding
these questions suggested that Brundage did not count on SANOC harbouring ulterior
motives behind its questions, but was only seeking clarification of Olympic rules and
regulations.
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Some of the early informal letters between Brundage and South African Olympic
affiliates continued to express a positive relationship. When Emery asked Brundage
to meet with a friend, E. Garson-Walker, who might call upon him while visiting the
USA,7 Brundage replied: “Because of our warm relations in the field of sport for so
many years, we have always felt very close to South Africa and any sportsman from
your country is assured of a warm welcome.”8 Brundage ended his letter by asking,
once again, that Emery convey his greetings to Honey. It was obvious that Brundage
wished to keep a close connection with both Emery and Honey. Furthermore, there
existed no evidence to suggest that Brundage and South African Olympic affiliates
enjoyed anything other than an ongoing, friendly relationship prior to the period
when the South African apartheid issue was to become a worry for the IOC.
It was not until a 22 September 1953 letter from Emery to Brundage that negative
press news about the Olympic Games entered the correspondence.9 “These articles
speak for themselves,” stated Emery, “but I am sorry to say they are causing quite a
deal of dissension. We are endeavouring always to keep the Olympic Movement in
mind, but articles such as appeared here are not conducive to the public being at all
pleased.”10 Brundage responded quickly:
Sensational stories of this kind, of course, are not helpful to the
Olympic Movement, but it is difficult to prevent newspapers from
featuring articles of this sort even though they are quite ridiculous.
We have the same trouble everywhere. That is why one of the most
important duties of National Olympic Committees is to teach the
public (and that means the newspapers also) the philosophy of the
Olympic Games and the code of amateur sport.11
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Emery’s letter, and Brundage’s reply, referred to amateur sport and paid athletes
being allowed to participate in the Games, which was becoming a hot button issue
within the Olympic Movement.
In a subsequent letter from Emery to Brundage, their friendly relationship
continued unharmed by such negative reporting.12 In his response, Brundage thanked
Emery for the letter, and mentioned: “Our greatest troubles today come from
commercial and political interference…. If they are ready to support the ideals of the
movement, very good, but many seek to take and not to give. In a materialistic world
it is a continuous battle to maintain our high standards.”13 This amicable interaction
between Emery and Brundage created a relationship close enough also to exchange
information on sensitive Olympic matters, such as Russia’s, Poland’s, and Hungary’s
teams possibly training in China to prepare for the 1956 Games scheduled for
Melbourne, Australia.14
Nonetheless, this amicable relationship between Brundage and Emery was cast in
doubt in January 1956, when a letter from Emery to Brundage, for the first time,
focused on apartheid in South Africa: “I am given to understand you were more than
diplomatic when the question of the ‘colour bar’ came up at the meeting of the IOC in
Paris and in view of that I thought perhaps you might wish to be informed of opinion
in this country from the highest levels of this very contentious subject.”15 Emery went
on to hint at a potential future ‘overreaction’ by the IOC, using football as an example:
“How far the present international football delegation will get with their enquiry in
South Africa (they are at present in Johannesburg) I do not know but one has the
feeling that if they are not exceedingly careful they will do irreparable damage to

59
European international sport in this country.”16 In his response, Brundage clearly
reiterated his and the IOC’s position:
I am more or less familiar with the problems in your country and, as
a matter of fact, we have a situation here due to misguided legislation
that is equally serious…. I do know that these situations are very
delicate and have to be handled with the utmost care. We, of course,
have the problem of our fundamental principle, which requires that
we welcome the youth of the world regardless of color, creed or
politics.17
This initial interaction regarding the South African issue was telling. Brundage fully
supported Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, which was a fundamental principle that
included: “No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on ground of
race, religion or politics.”18 Therefore, this and any future support for Article 1
appeared to have signaled to Emery the possibility of a confrontation with the IOC.
Nonetheless, the South African racial issue was not then as pressing for Brundage as
one might expect in retrospect. In two letters to Reginald Honey in February and April
of 1956, Brundage did not mention the South African racial situation even in
passing.19
The South African issue did not resurface until three months later. On 12 June 1956,
Emery sent a follow-up letter to Brundage, updating him on the results of the football
inquiry previously mentioned. “I drop this short note to you,” wrote Emery,
“expressing my very great pleasure at the decision of the International Football
Association not to accede to the demands by the Coloured Football Association for
another two years.”20 Further, Emery added: “When I am in Melbourne I will tell you
personally and confidentially the whole of the setup in this country, as I am not a
member of the IOC and can express my views publicly. I am quite sure that if I speak
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to you … a lot of bother might be saved.”21 The “whole of the setup” referred to the
structure of the sport system and the politics surrounding the decisions made in
reference to domestic and international sport in South Africa. Emery was willing,
indeed eager, to explain the South African sporting situation to Brundage.
Over a year later, the pace of events surrounding the South African issue increased
as Emery asked for Brundage’s advice:
You will see from my letter that it is quite impossible for nonEuropeans and Europeans to compete with or against each other in
South Africa and if any International Federation were to demand
that we must accept non-Europeans in our teams, we could not
possibly do so. As you know, Uganda, Kenya and Algeria have
separate Olympic Committees and perhaps you, yourself, could
suggest a way out of this impasse. The position is very serious as the
demands coming from the non-European bodies for affiliation to the
European bodies and the right to compete with South Africans at
trials for inclusion in Olympic teams are being fostered for political
reasons…. As I write this letter in confidence, I can inform you very
definitely that there would not be 1% of the millions of nonEuropeans in this country who would care to train with and compete
with Europeans. You will notice further in my letter that extreme
difficulty will be found for the Bantu, the Cape Coloured and the
Indian ever to agree in policy if they had one Association
representing them all.22
Emery’s letter ended with an encouragement extended to Brundage to visit South
Africa in order to “see for [him]self the position regarding the non-European and
European policy in this country.’’23 No other interpretation can be gained from
Emery’s letter than a request to the IOC to become involved in the South African
situation. However, he did try to prevent the racial implications by choosing the labels
‘European’ and ‘non-European’ instead of white and non-white. After all, Emery was
mounting an argument to maintain the status quo without being racist. He was
convinced that the white and non-white populations would not be able to cooperate,
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afraid, too, that International Sport Federations (ISF) might try to force the two
groups to mesh in South Africa, an act that would threaten the racialized state of
domestic sport. Emery, feeling pressured from domestic groups, asked the IOC to
recognize representation from both groups, although he ultimately argued that the
non-white bodies requested representation for political reasons, rather than for
sporting reasons. Further, despite Emery appearing to be certain that the number of
non-white athletes interested in competing with white sportsmen was extremely low,
and it would be virtually impossible to assemble a sport body to represent the three
non-white groups, he could have been creating invalidated premises for his argument
to maintain the racial status quo.
Within the same 27 November 1957 letter given to Brundage, Emery provided
further information, which included a copy of Emery’s personal letter to Eugène
Gouleau, Secretary of the International Weightlifting Association (i.e., Fédération
Internationale Haltérophile et Culturiste). Emery requested a favour from Gouleau:
“You will recall also that you asked my help in the voting so that you would be
appointed as President of the International Weight-lifting Federation. I pointed out to
you the difficulty that would arise if your Federation demanded that non-Europeans
must take part in sport against Europeans in South Africa.”24 There was little doubt
that Emery was concerned with the rise of the non-racial South African Amateur
Weightlifting and Bodybuilding Federation (SAAWBF):
European Governing bodies of sport in South Africa have at all times
offered assistance, financially and actively, in helping nonEuropeans to take part in amateur sport and it is mainly through
Government subsidies and subsidies by various Public Bodies that it
made it possible for non-Europeans to take part in amateur sport in
this country. This is particularly the case in regard to the thousands
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of Africans who are employed on the Mines. Insofar as these people
are concerned, they have no wish to take part in sport outside their
own areas and it is only a few people who are controlling the nonEuropean Weight-lifting Association who are pressing, and we think
for political reasons only, their claims to take part with South Africa
at the Olympic Games.25
Here, Emery defended the racism of the white governing bodies by pointing out
that white groups offered assistance to non-white groups to take part in amateur
sport, and at the same time, critically stated that it was only the political motives of a
select few from the SAAWBF who wanted representation at the Olympic Games.
Further, Emery reminded Gouleau of issues that might arise by championing the cause
of non-European sport bodies in South Africa and offered suggestions on how to deal
with non-Europeans:
I will suggest to you now that if you grant direct affiliation to your
body by any non-European body in South Africa you will find that
before long you will have applications for affiliation from the Bantu
(native), Cape Coloured and Indians as we have found for years past
that these three races will not agree among each other and I
personally feel you will have extreme difficulty in having a
recognised South African body among these three races. Since time
immemorial, the non-Europeans and the Europeans have never
mixed socially or in sport in South Africa. It is the policy of the
country and a policy that will be never removed. I am suggesting to
Mr. Avery Brundage that the question of the non-Europeans in South
Africa must be discussed at a meeting of the International Olympic
Committee to see if some way out cannot be found to permit the nonEuropeans from South Africa being represented at the Olympic
Games even if it means sending two separate teams. The
International Olympic Committee created a precedent by dividing
China into Nationalist China and Communist China, allowing them to
send separate teams. I have been Secretary of the [South African
National Olympic Committee] for 45 years and it is only in the past
12 months that we have received any applications for nonEuropeans to represent South Africa with Europeans overseas. I
would suggest further that if your Association were to demand our
accepting non-Europeans to travel with and compete with South
African Europeans, we would not be able to do so and you would be
losing the substance for the shadow.26
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A month later Brundage responded to Emery: “Unfortunately, however, one of the
fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement is involved and therefore I cannot
give you an answer. I shall give more thought to the subject and perhaps discuss it
confidentially at the next meeting of our Executive Board.”27 Brundage avoided
providing a response to the now dramatically complicated situation. Although he
hinted at discussing it at the subsequent IOC Executive Board meeting, the issue was
not formally raised until the 22 May 1959 meeting in Munich.28
Two months after Brundage sent his brief letter to Emery, the IOC President
received a reply from Emery, further extending his argument that non-white groups
would not be able to organize single representation. He also reminded Brundage that
the South African issue was a domestic matter:
I now send a cutting from to-days [sic] Johannesburg Daily
Newspaper from which you will see that the Africans, that is Bantu,
want less co-operation of Indians, coloureds and European interests.
This bears out entirely what I have told Mr. Gouleau and I humbly
suggest that your Executive does nothing at all in this matter until
we write to you again an official letter in this connection…. We are
doing our best to solve this problem ourselves, and we are the only
people who can solve this problem, as nobody can solve it for us. We
will write you fully after the 18th March and one of our Country’s
representatives will endeavour to make personal contact with you
or your Executive.29
This was the first time that Emery requested Brundage and the IOC not to involve
themselves in the South African issue. SANOC wanted to try to control the issue itself
without IOC intervention towards a resolution of the situation. After not hearing from
Emery for six weeks, Brundage wrote to Emery for an update:
Pressure is mounting and I am receiving many protests and requests
for official statements from all over the world. While our rules are
quite clear, as you know, I have as yet made no pronouncement.
Sooner or later, and probably sooner, the matter will be placed on
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our agenda, and there can only be one result…. In your letter you say
‘We are doing our best to solve this problem ourselves and we are
the only people who can solve this problem, as nobody can solve it
for us.’ I am sympathetic to your point of view because we have
similar problems in this country, which have not always been
handled wisely. I hope, therefore, that you can develop a policy and
a program that will solve this thorny problem and that we will hear
from you shortly.30
Obviously, the South African issue and SANOC’s handling of the issue garnered
greater attention from Brundage. He was well aware that something had to be done
soon; he could only stall on the issue for a limited amount of time. To Emery, he again
stressed Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. The pressure mounted intensely for Emery
and SANOC to develop a policy and program to solve the racial discrimination issue.
On 18 April 1958, Emery finally responded to Brundage. First, in a private addition
to the official correspondence, Emery stated:
I am quite sure that if you could persuade your Executive not to have
this matter fully discussed until after the 1960 Games, I feel
confident that there will be some solution as far as this country is
concerned. It would be rather tragic if any action were taken that
would compel us to withdraw from the Olympic Games in 1960….
You will remember in Melbourne you said as far as you could see no
action would be taken in this matter to prevent South Africa taking
part in the 1960 Games…. Again I state we are doing our best to
overcome this difficulty, but it is not an easy matter and I will keep
you posted as to what is happening.31
Emery’s plea to Brundage to postpone the major discussion on the South African
issue until after the 1960 Games, allowing South Africa to take part in the Games,
insured their presence in Rome in 1960.
In the official part of the 18 April letter, Emery provided a lengthy explanation of
non-European and European participation in South Africa in regard to the Olympic
Games. He explained that the South African Olympic team had consisted entirely of
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Europeans because of traditional policy based on social grounds. Emery then
proceeded to discuss the suitability of non-white athletes as members of the Olympic
team. First, he made the point that most non-white sportsmen were professional,
which excluded them from Olympic competition; and second, those who were
considered amateur did not possess the necessary skills to compete on an
international level. Then, Emery raised the issue of claiming unfairness for political
purpose:
In recent years the Non-European sportsmen in South Africa have
adopted the attitude that they are unfairly excluded from
participation in what can be called ‘International Sport’. Certain NonEuropean Sportsmen have called into being, quite irregularly,
‘sporting bodies’ and excluding the colour bar from their
Constitution. These bodies are now making representations that
inasmuch as the existing [South African National Olympic
Committee] restricts competition to Europeans, the existing
Association should be expelled from the International Olympic
Committee and replaced by the wholly incompetent and useless
bodies that the Non-Europeans have formed and are forming…. We
in South Africa appreciate that these mushroom associations will
never be able to accomplish anything useful, but unfortunately
overseas opinion is tending to reprobate our traditional attitude….
The [South African National Olympic Committee] is well aware that
the applications now being made by a few non-Europeans in this
country for the right to compete with Europeans in the South African
Team at the Olympic Games are being made mainly for political
purposes.32
To this, Emery added further details on the conditions and procedure for nonwhite athletes to become legitimately considered for international competition:
Several of the South African Governing Bodies of Sport in South
Africa are willing to permit the affiliation of Non-European bodies to
their Associations, providing their representatives are Europeans.
The information which the South African Sporting Federations
require before affiliation could be granted is as follows: (1) The
Constitution of its Association and whether it includes BANTU
(NATIVE), INDIANS and CAPE COLOUREDS. (2) The names and
addresses of the officials of the Non-European Provincial
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Associations. (3) The number of Clubs in each Province, the number
of active competitors and the venues in which competitions are held
by the Non-Europeans and under whose control…. Providing the
South African Governing Bodies of Sport can obtain this information
(WHICH THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SINCE 1947) affiliation
would in all probability be granted. Also providing the NonEuropean sports bodies in this country WERE PROPERLY
CONSTITUTED AND REPRESENTED, that is the BANTU (NATIVE),
THE INDIAN, AND THE CAPE COLOURED there would be no
objection to one of their teams, or individuals, being given authority
to compete in International Sport, PROVIDING THE EUROPEAN
SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNING BODIES OF SPORT WERE SATISFIED
WITH THE ABILITY OF THE NON-EUROPEAN COMPETITORS SO
NOMINATED TO TAKE PART IN INTERNATIONAL SPORT…. when
the so-called amateurs in the Non-European sections of sport have
been judged by Europeans who are recognised officials it has been
found that their performances cannot match up to the European
standards in this country.33
Finally, Emery recommended meeting with Reginald Honey if the issue required
immediate attention. To add to his argument, in a subsequent letter, Emery quoted the
Rhodesian Empire and Olympic Games Association minutes to help explain SANOC’s
appeal to Brundage for his consideration in connection with this matter, by shifting
responsibility to the respective sports governing bodies. Emery felt it was the
responsibility of each NSF to choose the right time to augment the rules of their
respective sports’ charters to accommodate multi-racial teams.
After receiving the letters, Brundage responded to Emery by pointing out the
urgency of the situation as the international pressure to resolve the South African
issue increased:
I don’t know how long we can defer action on this matter since we
are receiving letters of protest from all over the world, and as you
know, it has become an issue in Great Britain because of the
Commonwealth Games this summer…. I read your report with
sympathy because I am well acquainted with what happens in
matters of this kind. You state that the individuals in question are
neither amateurs nor of international class, and I am reasonably sure
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you are correct. If you held separate tryouts, none of them would
qualify on one ground or another, and you would comply with the
rules. Why is this not the solution? … Someone may raise this
question at our meeting and I hope Mr. Honey will be there.34
Brundage suggested a ‘sporting’ solution to the problem that would be in full
compliance with the rules for qualification (and thus sidestep the political
opprobrium). Less than two weeks later, Emery responded to Brundage’s sense of
urgency:
From this letter you will see the attitude which has been adopted by
our Government, and I think the last paragraph represents the views
expressed in all our previous correspondence … nothing would
please us better in this country if we could officially hold these
separate Try Outs. At the moment it would be most unfair for us to
attempt such Try Outs as the Non-Europeans’ Associations are not
formed through the country. There are a few mushroom bodies as
pointed out previously who would submit candidates for Try Outs;
this would not by any stretch of imagination represent the NonEuropeans in this country…. My Chairman and the members of our
Council give you an assurance which you can pass on to the members
of your Executive that the [South African National Olympic
Committee] will do its utmost to comply with the rules of the
International Olympic Committee, but your members must surely
realise that until such times that the Non-Europeans are agreed
amongst themselves as to what control they desire it is impossible
for any European Association to arrange separate trials.35
Clearly, Emery did not want the issue to be discussed at the IOC level because of
the risk of being asked not to attend the 1960 Rome Games. Showing optimism, he
even provided an example to support the progress he assured was being made:
As a matter of fact a Non-European Soccer Team and Athletic Team
will leave this month from South Africa to take part in competition
in the Federation i.e., Northern and Southern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. This is a step in the right direction; as a result of this we
are confident we will be able to lead the Non-Europeans into the
right way of thinking in so far as International Sport is concerned.36
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Emery needing to lead the non-white population “into the right way of thinking”
indicated the non-whites were practicing the “wrong way of thinking” about
international sport. Unfortunately, it was not clearly indicated by Emery if he was
referring to a “white way” of practicing international sport or he was referring to how
the international structure of sport and competition functioned in a certain way that
the non-white population must learn.
In an effort to be transparent, Emery admitted that SANOC had a problem with the
population of Indian origin which was seeking affiliation with the International
Football Association and the weightlifting association. Emery also included a nine
page memorandum from the Football Association of Southern Africa to FIFA and
another document to Brundage outlining South African government policy.37 Further,
he left Brundage with a hopeful outlook on ways the issue could be resolved:
My Association may ask Mr. Honey to attend your meeting in Monaco
and I sincerely trust that for the sake of the European Population in
this country that no decision will be taken by your Executive or the
International Committee debarring us from competition in Rome….
We have given you our assurance that as soon as the Non-Europeans
are organised in this country and are affiliated to our own South
African Governing Bodies of Sport, trials will be given these people
providing that they will accept such trials.38
In addition to the “official letter” to Brundage, a personal and confidential letter
from Emery also dated 6 May 1958, reiterated much of the same argument. Four
months later, on 11 September 1958, Emery wrote yet another personal letter to the
IOC President:
I have been advised by a Mr. Brutus, a Coloured member of the nonEuropean Weightlifting Association, who describes himself as an
International Correspondent, that you have written to him at the
time of the International Committee in Tokyo, advising him that you
are asking my Association for a report on South Africa. If this is the
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case, I respectfully state that I have not received such a letter from
you, but all the reports we have previously written you from my
Association officially are the correct versions…. We have now
obtained a list of the names and addresses of the Chairman and
Secretaries of the Associations in South Africa of this non-European
Weightlifting body, and it is the first time such information has been
received since our first request in 1947. We have asked the official
European South African Amateur Weightlifting Association to
interview these Chairman and Secretaries and to ascertain if these
Clubs are genuine or not.39
This letter marked the first instance demonstrating a disconnect in the
communication between Emery and Brundage. Indeed, and of critical notation, it
marked the first occasion that the name Dennis Brutus entered the narrative. Brutus,
a representative of the SAAWBF, was an activist gaining non-white organization
recognition within South Africa. As will become clearly evident, he was less than
popular with Emery and SANOC. Nonetheless, in a quick follow-up to his note of 11
September, Emery sent another letter to Brundage suggesting evidence of the
domestic struggle to organize non-whites. At the same time, he was trying to discredit
Brutus and the SAAWBF:
[From the attached newspaper cutting] you will see that in the South
African Parliament the Cape Coloureds Representative, Mr. G.S.P. Le
Roux, said that the coloureds demanded that Apartheid [sic] should
be applied between them and the Natives. In the penultimate
paragraph of this extract you will see that the Minister of Native
Affairs and the Prime [M]inister of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd, said
that he agreed that Apartheid [sic] should be applied not only
between Coloured and Native, but also between Native and Indian,
and furthermore not only the Coloureds were asking for this
apartheid, but the Bantu races, such as Zulus, were asking for
protection against the Indian…. From this true extract from our
South African Government you will see how difficult and dangerous
it might be for any of the International Sporting federations affiliated
to the International Olympic Committee to accept any direct
application made by a Non-European Association from South
Africa…. We are convinced that Mr. Brutus the international
Correspondent of the Non-European Weightlifting Association is not
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only concerned with the welfare of Non-European Weightlifters in
this country.40
With all this in mind, a restive Brundage tried to allay Emery’s concerns about the
South African situation, while at the same time reminding him of the urgency of the
situation:
Rest assured that the International Olympic Committee is not going
to intervene in your domestic affairs. In any event, we do not
recognize National Federations…. The only question is whether we
can continue to recognise the [South African National Olympic
Committee]. The subject has not yet been raised officially, but it
probably will be in the near future, since we have begun to hear from
other countries on this subject…. I am fully aware of your problems
and the difficulty of solving them. I should think that perhaps the
simplest way would be for the National Federations to have two or
more sub-organizations to handle independently the different
groups. Then for international competition each group could hold its
own tryouts and a composite team could be selected from the
winners of these tryouts soon…. I hope that you are making effort to
solve this problem, since it will undoubtedly be placed on the agenda
of one of our meetings.41
Brundage’s remark on the question of the expulsion of SANOC quite possibly
reflected the pressure felt by the IOC from other countries. Brundage encouraged
Emery to solve the problem and again suggested to have separate tryouts organized
by NSFs. In his response a few weeks later, Emery presented a new idea:
I am quite sure that sooner or later we will overcome this difficulty,
but the only way is for the International Olympic Committee to
permit two teams from South Africa…. We will keep in close contact
with you in this matter, particularly in regard to when meetings of
the International Olympic Committee are held, and then at your next
meeting we will suggest how we think this matter can be overcome
more expeditiously.42
Emery’s optimistic tone hinted that SANOC’s solution might be the only course to
follow. For the moment, he appeared to forget who was in charge of the Olympic
Games, in effect, the IOC, not SANOC. Attached with Emery’s letter was a copy of a
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letter sent from Emery to SAAWBF, in which he noted that SAAWBF could not request
affiliation to any international sports governing bodies because the South African
Amateur Weightlifting Union (SAAWU) was already affiliated with SANOC. SANOC
could not compel any Association to accept affiliation, but if SAAWU accepted
SAAWBF, SANOC would have no objection. Further, Emery reminded SAAWBF
secretary G.R. Smith:
The [South African National Olympic Committee] is doing its utmost
with international Bodies to overcome the difficulties of the colour
bar insofar as South Africa is concerned…. The [South African
National Olympic Committee] would have to be satisfied if you
become affiliated to the S.A. Amateur Weightlifting Association that
your Association caters for all Non-Europeans, i.e. Bantu, Cape
Coloured and Indian, and we think that this assurance will be asked
for by the S.A. Amateur Weightlifting Association…. I do not think any
good purpose will be served by dealing with your typewritten
review of our discussions seriatum, and I can assure you that the S.A.
Governing Bodies of Sport (European) are doing their utmost to try
and overcome the colour bar insofar as overseas Teams are
concerned. It is not possible to hasten this question more than we
are doing at the moment. Perhaps more patience by your own
Federation will bring better results.43
After reviewing Emery’s newest letter, as well as the attachment of the
correspondence to the SAAWBF, Brundage reminded Emery of the urgency of the
situation, emphasizing the value of having South African representation at future
meetings:
I note that you are still trying to find a solution to the thorny race
problems and I hope that you will be successful. I am reasonably
sure, however, that the IOC will not accept two separate teams from
your or any other country. I still think that separate tryouts with an
impartial jury, as I suggested in my previous letters, might be the
answer…. In any event, I hope that Mr. Honey will be present at our
coming meeting in Munich next May. There is more and more
pressure, as I told you, coming from different directions on this
question and there should be someone present with a thorough
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firsthand knowledge of the subject to present your point of view
when it is discussed.44
A week later, Emery once again assured Brundage that SANOC‘s actions would not
cast doubt on the respectability of the IOC. “We appreciate the kind thoughts you
express in your letter,” wrote Emery, “and we are certainly taking action as far as this
country is concerned so that your International Olympic Committee will not be
embarrassed.”45 Emery followed up with another letter soon thereafter, maintaining
the optimistic tone:
I am pleased to tell you that our Mr. Honey will attend the meeting of
the International Olympic Committee in Munich next May. By that time
I am convinced that the arrangements we will make regarding the
competition by Non-Europeans will be satisfactory to the International
Olympic Committee, and also to the International Sporting
Federations…. Meantime it is our earnest request that nothing is done
in the matter by your Committee until such time as our full and final
report is placed before you in May.46
Once again, Emery projected confidence that a consensus would be reached
satisfactory to the IOC. Referring to public opinion, Emery enclosed a news item: “I
send for your information a page from a Johannesburg paper, regarding the colour
bar…. You will see even the Press are anxious that we can find a solution to this vexed
question, and which I am sure we can do.”47 Such optimism might have been
overstated, as reflected in a letter from Emery to Brundage less than a month later:
For your information I append an extract from a letter received from
the S.A. Cycling Federation dated 22nd November, which will again
give you the difficulties we are encountering in having the NonEuropean Associations applying for affiliation to any South African
Governing Body of Sport…. I am still convinced that the Bantu, Cape
Coloured and the Native in this country will never mix insofar as
control for Non-Europeans is concerned, and I again state that the
only troubles we are having are from a few non-European people in
Port Elizabeth, not numbering more than one dozen, bringing all this
matter up for political reasons.48
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A month later, to strengthen his case about the difficulties South Africa was
experiencing to properly integrate the non-white population into the current sport
system, Emery provided further newspaper article evidence that suggested to pursue
the incorporation of the non-white population with caution:
This article indicates how extremely careful we must be in South
Africa in the admittance of Non-Europeans to Governing Bodies of
Sport until such time as we are certain that the Non-European Bodies
will be able to adhere to the amateur rules and regulations which are
required by International Bodies.49
Mr. Bourquin [manager of Durban’s Native Administration
Department] says that growing tensions in Native sports
organizations may – unless rectified – lead to serious disturbances….
In a two-page report Mr. Bourquin says that the Durban and District
African Football Association, because of growing internal dissension,
is ‘becoming difficult to control and therefore represents a threat to
law and order.’50
A week later, Brundage received a letter from Emery with an attached letter that
had been circulated to all ISFs and the British Empire and Commonwealth Games
Federation (BECGF).51 In the circular, Emery discussed the affiliation of nonEuropean sport associations. He announced that the first application made by the
South African Bantu Amateur Athletic Association to the South African Amateur
Athletic Association, had, in principle, been approved by satisfying three conditions:
(1) The South African Bantu Amateur Athletic Association will be
considered as a federation of clubs or associations and as such will
be entitled to two representative votes on the parent body.
(2) All competitive meetings organised by the non-European
association are to be conducted in accordance with the recognised
policy of trusteeship relating to non-European affairs practiced in
South Africa.
(3) Any problems in regard to racial questions which might arise will
be dealt with in consultation with the Union Government.52
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Further, Emery provided details to all ISFs to explain what was happening in South
Africa. Two weeks later, Brundage wrote a brief letter to Emery, reiterating that he
was “… well aware of the difficulties presented by the racial problem in your country
and I am glad to note that it has your continued attention. It is most important that
Mr. Honey attends the next session of the IOC in Munich this coming May.”53
Unable to avoid the South African issue within the halls of the IOC any longer,
Brundage realized that in Munich penetrating questions would be asked about South
Africa. The issue was becoming more public and global by the day – Brundage referred
Emery to a feature article, The Tragic Story of South Africa, in the 30 January 1959
issue of U.S. News & World Report.54 Emery’s response a week later, presented
concerns relative to Brutus’ involvement in the South African situation:
… I wrote you recently saying that application had been accepted by
the South African Amateur Athletic Association of the Non-European
Body, which is comprised of the Bantu (Native). You will see … that
our friend Mr. Brutus is again being difficult in this matter, and trying
to upset the very fair arrangements which have been attempted. Mr.
Brutus is an Indian, and insofar the applications for affiliation by the
Non-Europeans have been most difficult. It is this type of gentleman
who is causing the trouble in this country for the affiliation of the
Non-Europeans. As you can see he does not wish to accept a
subservient status. They want full control the same as the table
tennis got and which has killed this sport in South Africa.55
Clearly Emery viewed Brutus as an antagonist in South Africa, as well as a deterrent
to unifying the non-white population to achieve affiliation to NSFs. Shorter and curter
responses from Brundage began to signal exasperation and the erosion of their close
connection. As the situation became more serious and entered the IOC’s agenda,
Brundage’s correspondence tone became more formal. For example, in Brundage’s
next letter, he thanked Emery for the informative newspaper clippings, since the

75
clippings, “… indicate the difficulties that you face in trying to find a solution to the
serious problems in your country;” he went on to “suggest that when Mr. Honey comes
to our meeting in Munich next May that he is well supplied with information of this
kind.”56 Brundage’s message conveyed the challenge to South African Olympic
affiliates to defend themselves against the accusation of racial discrimination within
the sport system.
Two months later, Emery responded in a lengthy communication to Brundage. It
included two attachments: one, a report from SANOC that dealt with the applications
for affiliation for non-European sporting bodies; and, second, a letter from Emery to
the Secretary of the International Athletic Federation.57 In his personal letter, Emery
had much to report, much of it of dire concern:
… it would appear that the question of Colour Bar at the 1960
Olympic Games in Rome is to be discussed by the International
Committee during its meeting in Munich in May 1959…. An
Association has been formed in Durban naming itself the South
African Sports Association and this association, we understand, is
making application for direct affiliation to the International Olympic
Committee for recognition as a controlling body of sport throughout
South Africa. The [South African National Olympic Committee] gives
you an absolute assurance that this body is comprised of a half a
dozen non-Europeans (mostly Indians) and they cannot possibly
control sport in the union of South Africa. They are not organised to
do, they have no facilities, and they would not, on any consideration
whatsoever, be accepted by any of the South African Governing
Bodies of Sport in this country…. Here then is the crux of the whole
position, where a few coloureds and Indians are endeavouring to
upset the affiliation of the properly constituted Bantu Athletic
Association. This resolution is indicative of the attitude being
adopted by an International correspondent, Mr. Brutus, who is
mentioned in the attached report and who has had direct
correspondence with you…. No doubt it will be asked why nonEuropean have not been accepted in International Teams from South
Africa previously. The reason is that, in the first place, until 1957
none of the non-European Bodies, whose sport is on the Olympic
programmes, had been properly constituted and controlled, and
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individual non-European had no desire or wish to attend or to apply
for membership of European clubs. It was only at the end of 1957/58
that any organised non-European association had applied for
affiliation. Naturally, none of the South African Governing Bodies of
Sport could accept applications from mushroom non-European
bodies that were being formed, one in opposition to the other, as has
so repeatedly been stated to you, it being extremely difficult for the
non-European who is Bantu, Coloured or Indian to agree among
themselves as to the control of their particular sport. Irrespective of
what Mr. Brutus or the correspondent for the South Africa Sports
Association, or the South African Amateur Athletic and Cycling
Association, may state in a memorandum to you, the [South African
National Olympic Committee], which has been affiliated to the
International Olympic Committee for nearly forty years suggests
that if any consideration whatsoever is given to the thought that nonEuropeans could control the whole of the sport in South Africa, is
ridiculous, and would be the complete end of international sport
between South Africa and countries overseas…. Our Mr. Honey does
not speak with a mandate from South Africa and will give his own
views as a member of the International Olympic Committee, but in
view of the fact that a few non-Europeans (not the South African
native) but Coloured and Indians are forcing this issue, I am sure you
will reason with Mr. Honey on this most difficult question…. Finally,
the [South African National Olympic Committee] gives you an
assurance that when the non-European amateur associations are
properly constituted, and control the various section of nonEuropeans’ sport in South Africa, they will be accepted as affiliated
members of the South African Governing Bodies of Sport. The
assurance is also given that no obstacle will be placed in the way of
any non-European competitor, in any event including the British
Empire and Olympic Games, of taking part in these events if the
controlling body nominates him to the [South African National
Olympic Committee].58
This statement marked the first mention of the South African Sports Association
(SASA), which was a group trying to promote non-racial sport and defame SANOC.
Emery immediately endeavoured to discredit it in order to protect SANOC from any
challenges in respect of control of sport in South Africa. He pointed to Brutus as the
cause of the continued fight against SANOC as the legitimate NOC. Emery, in
customary fashion, again cited the lack of interest by non-white groups to partake in
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Olympic programmes at least until 1957, and the lack of non-white organizations, as
reasons for low or no non-white participation. The notion of non-whites controlling
South African sport, in Emery’s view, was ridiculous. He hoped his assertion that nonwhite amateur athletes would face no obstacles towards competing internationally,
once proper affiliations were made to the South African Governing Bodies of Sport,
would assure the IOC’s cooperation.
The five-page attachment from SANOC on the subject of SANOC and non-European
affiliations stated that SANOC’s constitution, dating to 1920, did not exclude nonwhites. The attachment’s list of the South African Governing Bodies of Sport indicated
that the only non-white associations interested in affiliation were weightlifting,
athletics, cycling, boxing and football. SANOC described these sports in detail and
provided updates on the status of the non-white affiliation process with regard to
each association. It was clearly stated that there were no restrictions on non-white
athletes to compete internationally if each respective sport were to form a national
association representing all non-whites, which, in turn, would then be accepted by the
NSFs, providing that all athletes were confirmed amateurs, and that the athletes
involved achieved international standards.
To provide a specific detailed example of the affiliation process, Emery provided a
copy of his correspondence with D.P.T. Payn, Secretary of the International Amateur
Athletics Federation (IAAF).59 Further, Emery confirmed the legitimacy of the South
African Bantu Amateur Athletic and Cycling Association (SABAACA), which was an
affiliated non-white member of the controlling bodies of athletics and cycling in South
Africa. To provide proof of SABAACA’s legitimacy, Emery included a letter from its
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secretary, D.F. Botha60 indicating SABAACA’s acceptance of the terms of the South
African Cycling and Athletic organizations. Botha stated: “We have been assured that
when any of our athletes or cyclists reach the standard required for international
competition that they will be included in South African teams selected for the
Commonwealth Games and/or Olympic Games. My association is very pleased about
this and we feel that this is a step forward in athletics and cycling among non-Whites
in this country.”61 Emery also attempted to warn Payn about the danger of, he argued,
illegitimate and non-approved associations attempting to attain international
recognition, again warning against Brutus’ activities:
There is a certain Mr. Brutus of Port Elizabeth to whom reference is
made in the memorandum of the Olympic Games Association and
who is causing a considerable amount of annoyance in South Africa
with his letters to International Federations on behalf of the nonWhites. I respectfully ask your Federation not to be misled by any of
these mushroom associations which are being formed by nonWhites in this country, many for political reasons, but to know that
the present South African Amateur Athletic Association controlled
by Europeans and who have accepted the non-White South African
Bantu Amateur Athletic and Cycling Association as an affiliated
member, is the one body in South Africa in whom you can have the
utmost faith in the promotion of athletics for both White and nonwhite people in this country.62
It was obvious in his lengthy letter to Brundage that Emery was assuming
ownership and control of the situation. He constantly provided Brundage with fodder
to support SANOC’s progress.
Emery also continued to provide material showing the disunity among non-white
sporting bodies. For example, he sent two documents to Brundage highlighting a
quarrel between SAAWBF and another representative from a seemingly false
organization trying to affiliate with SANOC. 63 In addition, as SASA tried to become
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more noticeable, Emery again attempted to discredit it, enlisting one Sol Cruste, who
in A Plea for Co-Ordination on 1 May 1959, claimed that the SASA was not
representative of non-European sporting bodies; a new sports co-ordinating body
was recommended.64 Emery advised Brundage that the letter from Cruste:
… makes it perfectly plain that the South African Sports Association,
non-White, who have submitted a report to you, does not in fact
exist. It has not been formed and is not representative of 0.001% of
non-Europeans in South Africa … I am sorry to have to give you all
this trouble, but unless you have the true facts of the position
regarding non-Europeans in South Africa and their endeavours to
take control through a few political leaders, you or some of the
Members of the international Olympic Committee at your previous
meeting, may have been misled.65
Brundage may have harboured doubts as to Cruste’s authority to make such claims
since his position – an unspecified association with a Vocational Training Centre –
only appears at the bottom of the letter. There existed no additional correspondence
to Brundage identifying Sol Cruste as a trustworthy and authoritative source.
Brundage was also kept appraised of the way the issue was received in the South
African public. He received a copy of a letter sent to Otto Mayer from A.G. McKenzie,
who was a representative of Johannesburg’s daily The Star. In the letter, McKenzie
thanked Mayer for the information on the proceedings of the IOC General Session in
Munich, where the South African issue was formally discussed.66 McKenzie also
included The Star article in which Mayer’s remarks were cited. The article stated that
South Africa and Rhodesia would continue to be a part of Olympic Movement on the
condition that each do everything possible to develop non-white sport. A lofty
statement, perhaps, but it became clear that the IOC’s patience in the matter was being
sorely tried. For instance, Mayer was quoted: “‘In future the committee will maintain
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a strict check on what has been promised by Mr. Reginald Honey…. If the committee
has not taken action before, it is because the problem was not so important. Sport
among the Coloured people of South Africa was not so developed as it is now.”67 The
Star article also focussed on South African IOC member Reginald Honey:
Mr. Honey’s defence of South Africa’s practices was two-fold: He said
that the South Africa Olympic Games Association would encourage
non-European sport and the non-Europeans would automatically be
included in the South African teams if they reached Olympic
standards…. The executive board asked Mr. Honey for a statement in
view of the representations it had received from the South African
Sports Federation (a mixed organization) and from the British-based
campaign against race discrimination in sport and in view of the
attack which Mr. Alexis Romanov one of the Russian delegates had
made in Rome last week…. Mr. Honey said non-European sport had
evolved slowly in South Africa and gave a formal assurance that
South Africa complied strictly with the Olympic charter…. When Mr.
Honey added that any non-European athletes who reached the
required standards would be included in South African Olympic
teams, Mr. Brundage asked whether they would get visas to leave the
Union…. Yes, replied Mr. Honey. He had recently had an assurance to
that effect from the Minister of the Interior.68
Brundage accepted Honey’s assurance as the IOC could only request that the South
African NOC find a solution in keeping with the Olympic Charter. By now the South
African issue within the context of the Olympic Movement had escalated to a level
where representatives from both sides began to issue public statements. Prior to the
IOC making its public statement Mayer informed SANOC that the IOC wished to issue
a statement to the press addressing the subject of racial discrimination in South
Africa: “Before [issuing a statement] we wish to submit [to] you our text with the
request that you let us know your approval or your eventual remarks as soon as
possible.”69 The IOC deferred to SANOC on the wording of this following proposed
statement that addressed racial discrimination in South Africa:
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… while [SANOC] does not control all South African bodies and
therefore cannot dictate their policy, it is taking active steps to
ensure them to accept the view that all peoples in South Africa are
entitled to compete in international sport and particularly in the
Olympic Games. It has made a public statement that if any non-white
amateur athlete proves through tests that he is of international or
Olympic standard, no objection will be raised to his being sent to
take part in these over-sea competitions…. It has informed us that
the government of South Africa will raise no objection to this
problem, and that passports will be issued…. the N.O.C. of South
Africa has informed us that they are proceeding to assist in providing
training and coaching facilities and organization leadership to nonwhites.70
Indirectly addressing Mayer’s letter, a frustrated Emery wrote to Brundage,
indicating the increasing divergence of their opinions on this issue:
It is, of course, quite impossible for the [South African National
Olympic Committee] to accept the affiliation from two separate
Bodies, and the South African Sports Federation must now apply to
the various South African Governing bodies of Sport for affiliation of
their various sections. I am sure you will also realise that the South
African Governing Bodies of Sport will not accept affiliation from any
Association that is not properly constituted.71
Emery thus, in part, contradicted Mayer’s press release, noting that it would not be
easy for non-white amateur athletes to prove that they were of international or
Olympic competition standard. Emery remained unmoved on the process of nonwhite associations first becoming affiliated with the respective NSFs recognized by
SANOC, before being able to nominate non-white atletes for tryouts. From Emery’s
point of view, the IOC press statement was an oversimplification of the process, which
would increase pressure on SANOC to admit those who were not prepared to compete
on the international stage.
However, in his subsequent letter to Brundage, Emery provided an official update
on SANOC’s deliberations.72 At SANOC’s meeting of 18 June 1959, Honey recounted
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his meetings in Rome with NOCs, and with the IOC and ISFs in Munich. His message to
them, assertively delivered, was that SANOC would not entertain the idea of two
Olympic Games Associations in South Africa, and that SASA had been advised that
non-white bodies of sport must affiliate to the South African Governing Bodies of
Sport, which were, in turn, affiliated with ISFs. Further:
The [South African National Olympic Committee] has advised the
South African Sports Association (non-white) that they cannot in
future have any further dealings with this Association, as it has no
say whatsoever in the selection of Teams for the Olympic Games, as
these selections are made, as in all other countries, by the Governing
Bodies of Sport concerned. My Association is quite confident that all
people of South Africa will be given the opportunity of competing in
international events overseas and as mentioned in the statement to
be issued by the Chancellor of the International Olympic Committee
any non-white who reaches the standard required by South Africa
for sending a team to international sports will be sent…. My
Association trusts that, in view of the assurance that we have now
given, correspondence between the South African Sports Association
or any non-white Association which refuses to accept affiliation by a
recognised South African Governing Body of Sport which has been
affiliated constitutionally to their International Sports Federation
should be returned to South Africa.73
But there was more. Emery, desiring to maintain strict control of sport in South
Africa, reiterated this point with the IOC and the international community. In addition,
to avoid any confusion, Emery clarified the selection process for South African teams:
The South African Governing Bodies of Sport, whose event figure on
the Olympic or British Empire & Commonwealth Games programme
conduct their own trials, and after these trials have been completed
forward their nominations in order of merit to the South African
Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [SANOC]. My
Association then deals with the nominations received and sends the
Team according to the amount of money it has available for that
purpose. If the occasion arises when the [South African National
Olympic Committee] has not sufficient money to send the full team
nominated by the various Governing Bodies of Sport, the teams
nominated are cut but the order of merit is not changed. In fact if, for
instance, the athletes nominated ten people and through lack of
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funds the Olympic Council could not send the full team No. 10, 9 and
8, as the case may be, would be dropped. This instances what has not
been made clear to the various Associations who attended the
meeting in Rome and Munich by the people who opposed South
Africa’s continuance at the Games.74
Prompted by continuing unrest on the issue, Emery invited Brundage to visit South
Africa and see the situation for himself, “… you will be able to see more from your own
personal observations than all the letters in the world can convey to you. It will be
possible for you to meet the Non-European Association, if you so desire, and this
invitation is sent with all our best wishes.”75 Brundage, however, declined the
invitation, pointing out that his schedule prevented a visit at that time.76 Since
Brundage declined to visit South Africa at that time, Emery was left with reinforcing
SANOC’s position by continuing to repeat his arguments about the unpreparedness of
non-whites for international competition. He sought to offer an example from cycling:
This information which we have given the International Cycling
Federation, bears out conclusively the statement that we have
repeatedly made to the International Olympic Committee, and
confirmed at your meeting in Rome by your representative for South
Africa, Mr. R. Honey, that the non-whites at the moment, are
nowhere near the standard required for international competition….
You will also see that the promises made that South Africa would do
all it could for non-white sports are being carried out.77
To further embellish this example, Emery attached a letter he planned to send to
the International Cycling Union.78 In this letter, Emery provided an update of the
Bantu Association’s involvement in cycling competitions. He listed the finish times of
the winners of the non-white competition and offered a comparison to the South
African record. He pointed out that non-white athletes were far too behind
international standards and far too inconsistent to be sent to the Olympics. SANOC’s
best interests, he stated, were to send competitors to represent South Africa who, at
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the very least, reached international standard times. In closing, Emery reiterated
SANOC’s promise that if non-white South Africans could reach international
standards, they would be allowed to compete overseas.
Emery’s point of view insinuated that SANOC had done all it could to help integrate
non-white athletes and better the sport situation in South Africa. He belaboured
Brundage, asking him to read the letters written by SANOC to the International
Amateur Boxing and Weightlifting Federations,79 and the newspaper clippings of a
cricket match between white and non-whites, as an example of SANOC’s efforts to
honour Honey’s statements.80 Yet not all news was positive from Emery’s perspective,
as evidenced by a personal and confidential letter to Brundage, with newspaper
cuttings on a riot of 2000 mine-workers attached. Emery’s patience appeared to be
wearing thin:
… this again shows how difficult it would be to get this tribal
difference sorted out if ever you demanded a competition of mixed
races from South Africa at the Olympic Games…. We are doing our
best to educate these non-whites to the standard of education and
living which would warrant them being mixed with competitors
from other nations at the Olympic Games, and when the time comes,
and this has been successfully organised, South Africa will gladly
consider discussing the matter again with the International Olympic
Committee.81
Despite Emery’s growing frustration, he stood firm on SANOC’s place in the current
IOC structure, standing firm against forces attempting to reconstruct the IOC and
sport in South Africa on their own terms:
We have received circular letters from the Olympic Committee of the
U.S.S.R., one dated 29th April 1959 and the other, 30th November,
1959 regarding their proposal for the alteration of the composition
of the International Olympic Committee. This Matter will be
discussed by my Executive on the 26th January and I will report to
you the result of the discussions…. It is my own considered opinion
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that Russia and the non-white countries are endeavouring to get
control of the IOC and I do not think we will support the proposals….
P.S. South Africa still awaits your reply as to whether you and your
good lady will visit us.82
Brundage resumed the correspondence with some brief supportive remarks, some
four months later,83 and with the 1960 Rome Games on the horizon, Emery once again
pleaded SANOC’s case, now to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, seeking to separate sports
from politics in a way that would confirm his argument:
… we are doing our utmost to get the non-whites organised so that
whatever Association is formed, will represent all the non-whites in
this country and not only one section. The South African Sports
Association, as we told you before, does not and never will be able to
represent the whole of the non-whites in South Africa, and it is for
this reason we sincerely trust that your Committee will not grant
such an interview as being asked for…. P.S. STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL: You no doubt have heard of the trouble going on in
this country just at the moment, but might I assure you that all the
amateur sports bodies in this country are completely non-political.
We are doing our utmost to have our men properly trained and
money raised to send them to Rome in 1960. I can assure you that
none of us wish to be drawn into political arguments and we give the
assurance that when the non-Whites are willing to co-operate with
us in amateur sport devoid of all political reasons, we will be happy
to meet them. It might not be long before such a state of affairs will
come about.84
Emery tried to paint SASA as a political body more so than a sporting body. If and
when a non-white association might be formed legitimately, Emery opined, then the
non-white community would be in the position of being taken seriously in the South
African sporting community. It was clear whom Emery wished to be regarded as the
main obstacle to progress towards a solution:
… the South African Sports Association was not so much interested
in the organising of non-White sport, as they were with political
matters…. The Action of the Security Police bears out this statement
very completely, as no other non-White sports body has been
screened, to our knowledge…. In view of the fact that Mr. Brutus has
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again forwarded correspondence to the International Federation
and others whom we do not know, these new developments should
make it clearly understandable that the [South African National
Olympic Committee], who is not concerned whatsoever in politics,
cannot accept the affiliation of such a body as the South African
Sports Association under the present conditions…. when the nonWhites form themselves into a sporting body and not a political body
and represent the non-Whites in the country who are interested in
sport, they would be affiliated to the various associations in this
country…. when any non-White Association is properly constituted
and represents the whole of the non-Whites, and not merely a
section, they would be accepted as members of the associations
concerned…. You will realise therefore, if the European Associations
accept the wishes of the IOC and cut their teams to a minimum and
to keep them within international standards, we cannot be expected
to send non-White competitors whose performances are so far
below those of the White competitors…. The [South African National
Olympic Committee] has no dealings whatsoever in politics, and we
are doing our utmost to see that the team which will take part in the
1960 Games is representative of all the branches of sports in which
we take part in this country. Insofar as the non-Whites are
concerned, the only sports which they take part in nationally, is
athletics, cycling, weight-lifting, and boxing and all four of these
sections are being given trials under the supervision of officials who
have been accepted by the respective International Federations…. I
am quite sure that the present position with the [South African]
Sports Association is such that [South African National Olympic
Committee] will be able to have far better dealings with the genuine
non-White sports associations who are not tainted with any political
motives…. I can say without hesitation, that if the South African
Sports Association is disbanded for its political activities, non-White
sport in this country will go ahead by leaps and bounds.85
The article Emery attached detailed a police raid of the homes of SASA President
Dennis Brutus, the secretary and the assistant secretary, resulting in the seizure of
letters, pamphlets, and documents.86 The article also noted that among Brutus’
correspondents were Avery Brundage and Otto Mayer, President and Chancellor of
the IOC, respectively.
In the face of non-white South African representation planned for the upcoming
Games in Rome failing to materialize, Emery offered an explanation to Brundage from
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the President of SABAACA stating that non-Whites could not reach the standards
required for the Olympic Games.87 This explanation was based on the performance at
the cycling trials and athletics trials, trials presided over by both “European” and
“non-European” officials. Since during these trials no non-white athlete met Olympic
standards, no nominations for the South African Olympic team had occurred. 88 The
President of SABAACA explained that they were trying to improve standards – he
hoped for continued assistance and support from SANOC and the IOC in this regard.
In Emery’s next letter to Brundage, he included reports from a non-white newspaper
as proof that there was not a single non-white athlete near international standards in
amateur boxing; however, progress was occurring:
You will see that the S.A. Athletic and Cycling Union is endeavouring
to have a Coach imported to teach the Non-White Athletes. I am quite
sure that this article should give you plenty of scope to squash any
further attempts by our Mr. Brutus in this country, and other people
in other countries who are waiting to have the policy discussed by
the International Olympic Committee.89
A month later, just before the 1960 Olympic Games opened in Rome, a seemingly
exasperated Emery sent a note to Mayer concerning the difficulty of uniting the
different coloured races: “This is only one of many instances [an enclosed newspaper
article] where the opposing teams fight it out instead of playing it out. Only last week,
the whole of one non-White football team was charged with the murder of three of
the opposing players…. So much for Mr. Brutus saying that they have not been given
the opportunity of competing.”90 Mayer responded to Emery with congratulations on
progress, while noting that complete resolution of the issue was still a long way off:
I am very pleased that the South African Rowing Federation has
modified its rules and that no difference is now existing between
White and coloured members. I informed Mr. Anthony Steel in
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London about it. But I send him also the paper cutting showing the
fight during a football match between non-whites and in presence of
27,000 non-White spectators!91

3.

Domestic Resistance
G.R. Smith, Secretary of the SAAWBF, was the first person to write to Brundage

about the South African race issue.92 On 11 November 1954, Smith requested
information to help SAAWBF gain international recognition so its affiliated athletes
might take part in world championships. In addition, Smith asked for Brundage’s
advice regarding the limited opportunities for non-white athletes:
In our country another body exists. This organisation caters for
athletes with white skins only and you can see how many ‘dark’
skinned athletes are deprived from real chances. The other
organisation has obtained international recognition but does not
comply with the true aims of Physical Education. With this in mind,
you will no doubt see the urgency of the appeal that we are lodging
with you. We seek your expert advice on this matter…. We sincerely
trust that you will be sympathetic towards our appeal, and trust that
you will view it in the light of real Physical Education. We now look
forward to you[r] comments which we trust will be received by us at
your earliest possible convenience.93
The “true aims of physical education” to which Smith referred were the “all-round
development of all men, irrespective of colour, sex, or creed.”94 Brundage’s response
encouraged Smith and SAAWBF to write a similar letter to the ISF in France. Said
Brundage: “For your information, so far as the Olympic Games are concerned, one of
the fundamental principles is – ‘no discrimination is allowed against any country or
person on grounds of color, religion or politics’.”95 Brundage stood firm on Article 1
of the Olympic Charter, supporting those who strove for such an ideal.
The discussion between SAAWBF and the IOC continued intermittently. Almost
two years later, on 1 October 1956, IOC Chancellor Mayer responded to a letter
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received a month earlier from SAAWBF,96 in which SAAWBF gave notice of its plan to
apply for admission to the Olympic Games in Rome 1960. Mayer’s response reiterated
applicable rules and regulations and included the restatement that it must become a
member of the NSF sponsored by SANOC. Thus, the IOC recused itself from
consideration of the issue. The SAAWBF, stated Mayer, should confer with SANOC for
further instruction. Over a year later, Brundage received a letter from Brutus with an
attached copy of a report submitted by SAAWBF to K.S. Duncan, the Honorable
Secretary of BECGF.97 The key points of the report to Duncan were as follows:
With regard to our efforts for Olympic participation, we have been
advised by one of the affiliates to the IOC that it is ‘with us every inch
of the way in your request for admission to the Olympic Games to be
held in Rome in 1960’…. We applied to the South African Amateur
Weightlifting Union and were advised ‘no non-Europeans may
affiliate to our Union’. In a further letter we were advised that: ‘My
Union has been in communication with the [South African National
Olympic Committee] about the application for affiliation. As an
association affiliated to the S.A.O.G.A [i.e., SANOC] we can naturally
not amend our Constitution without its approval. However, the latter
association has assured us that they are giving the matter immediate
attention with a view to coming to an agreement which will suit
everyone concerned’. On the 20th of this month, Press reports
appeared of a decision taken on this matter at the Executive meeting
of the SANOC and our Secretary has written requesting confirmation
and clarification of reports that the Association has resolved not to
admit any non-white sportsmen or sporting organizations to the
SANOC … We are still awaiting a full reply to our request for
confirmation of statements attributed by the Press to Mr. Sims,
Chairman of the SANOC on the 28th August…. While all Press reports
agree that the SANOC has resolved to refuse membership to all nonwhite sport bodies in the country, divergent reasons are given as
follows: (1) that the SANOC must maintain the policy of apartheid,
not only because it is the policy of the present Government, but
because it has always been the policy of the country; (2) that it is
against the constitution of the SANOC; (3) that it is contrary to the
laws of the country for Europeans and non-Europeans to take part in
competitive sport together and it was therefore impossible for the
Association to sanction such competition…. It is reported that a
memorandum is to be drawn up either by the Secretary or by a
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committee, its purpose being reported variously to be (a) to explain
the policy of apartheid in sport, (b) to explain the section in the
constitution which excludes non-whites and (c) to explain the laws
which forbid competitive sport between white and non-white…. We
have written to the SANOC asking ‘would you kindly let us know
what we must do now to have our sportsmen represented’, as we felt
that this flat refusal can hardly be regarded as the ‘agreement to suit
everyone concerned’ which we were promised…. We have also
queried other statements attributed to Mr. Sims, viz.: 1. If
international sporting associations decide to penalize us because of
our stand, it will be just too bad: 2. If one sporting association should
lose international recognition as a result of this stand, then the
SANOC would withdraw all the other sporting bodies it embraced: 3.
That the non-whites are not prepared to accept white
representatives in their controlling bodies; 4. That the non-whites
do not want help but status.98
Brutus’ letter casted doubt on Emery’s interpretation of sport in South Africa.
Further, although Brutus went to some length to explain that the statements given by
SAAWU to justify the exclusion of non-whites were complete nonsense, Brundage was
both brief and curt in his initial response to Brutus: “We shall no doubt hear from the
South African Olympic Association on this subject in due time.”99 Brundage, seemingly
unperturbed, was apparently satisfied by his discussion with SANOC. A month later,
Brutus wrote to Brundage for clarification relative to his (Brundage) communication
with SANOC:
My Federation is a little puzzled by your statement: We shall no
doubt hear from the South African Olympic Association on this
subject in due time. We have been negotiating with the South African
Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [SANOC] since
August of 1956 and we would like to know if they have not advised
the International Olympic Committee of our attempts to secure
recognition…. We have also the precaution of advising the
Chancellor, M. Otto Mayer, of our efforts and we trust that they will
be given due attention.100
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Despite not receiving response from Brundage or the IOC for a further two months,
Brutus continued to look to the IOC for guidance and support. In a letter to Brundage
in April 1958, he noted:
Further to our inquiry whether the matter of our efforts to secure
international recognition had not been previously discussed by the
International Olympic Committee, I have to inform you that inquiries
have also been directed to the South African Olympic and
Commonwealth Games committee, and to the Chancellor of the IOC,
M. Otto Mayer…. Since we were informed on the 23rd December by
M. Gouleau of the International Weightlifting Federation that it was
a matter for the International Olympic Committee, we are very
anxious to have the matter discussed. Could you please advise us
whether it will be possible to have the matter raised at the May
meeting of the Congress in Tokyo? … We would also appreciate
advice on how to act in this matter.101
Brutus and SAAWBF, having tried without success to communicate with various
sources on their plight, and generally ignored regarding the matter of international
recognition, conducted a turn towards the IOC. However, when Brundage finally
responded two weeks later, he only noted: “We do not intervene in national affairs
unless our regulations are violated. We have asked our representatives in South Africa
for a report. The situation will be re-examined when that report is received.”102
Brundage’s response appeared to be at odds with Article 1 of the Olympic Charter and,
as we have seen in the earlier section of this chapter, Brundage discussed Article 1
with Emery as early as February 1956.103 Obviously, Brundage was stalling, trying to
buy time for SANOC as a courtesy for its long history with the IOC and its assurances
of trying to right the race situation.
Emery wrote to G.R. Smith to expedite the non-white inclusion process:
… every South African Governing Body of Sport affiliated to the
[South African National Olympic Committee] has had the courtesy to
send us the names and addresses of the Chairman and Secretaries of
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their Associations together with Clubs affiliated to their Provincial
Bodies. There seems little reason why we cannot receive this
information from you and for which we have asked repeatedly.104
Emery also mentioned that the proper authorities had been advised in regard to
SAAWBF requesting affiliation, but that the necessary information to be considered
for admission to SANOC had not been provided. Emery did, however, notify Brundage
of receiving the pertinent information needed from SAAWBF.105 In the same letter,
Emery queried Brundage on a report he (Brundage) was supposedly awaiting from
SANOC, while days before, Brutus had asked about the same report: “My federation is
anxious to know whether the report has been received,” wrote Brutus, “whether its
contents will be made available to us, and whether any decision has been taken by the
International Olympic Committee.”106
Regardless of the existence of a report, Brutus provided a copy of an extremely
detailed letter submitted to the weightlifting ISF to provide further support for
SAAWBF’s application for membership. 107 This focussed Brundage’s attention to the
issue. In his next letter to SAAWBF, he asserted that a report was being developed, but
that it would take some time because of the complicated nature of the issue:
In reply to your letter of September 8, as we advised you previously,
we requested a report from the South African [National] Olympic
Committee on the situation in your country. We have just recently
heard from this organization that the situation is a very complicated
one, with a number of different groups seeking recognition. We have
been assured that they are continuing to study this involved problem
and endeavoring to find a solution in line with Olympic regulations….
In any event, the International Olympic Committee does not
recognise national organizations other than National Olympic
Committees.108
This statement is important because here Brundage reasserted the structure and
processes of the IOC in no uncertain terms. Veiled in his words was a polite request to
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stop writing the IOC directly and funnel its information through SANOC. Ignoring this
advice, Brutus continued to keep Brundage updated. Brutus, it became obvious, and
not without reason, did not trust SANOC. Brutus notified Brundage of a round table
conference organized by SAAWBF for national sporting organizations to take place on
5 October 1958 to discuss the entire issue of non-white sport in South Africa.109
The round table conference did indeed take place. Following the conference, Emery
reminded G.R. Smith that SAAWBF could not request affiliation to any international
bodies because SAAWU already represented South Africa. SANOC could not compel
any association to accept affiliation, but if SAAWU accepted the provincial branches
of the SAAWBF, SANOC would have no objection.110 The assurances mentioned by
Emery and his request for patience notwithstanding, Smith was not content, as
became evident in a letter to Brundage:
While my Federation agrees completely that the situation is very
complicated, we are not satisfied that the S.A. Olympic Committee is
truly ‘endeavouring to find a solution in line with Olympic
regulations’ and we will continue to press for a full examination of
the position by the International Olympic Committee…. We note that
a report has been sent to the International Olympic Committee by
the S.A. Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association, and are
anxious to have a copy of this. We are thus applying to the SANOC for
it and failing that, must request the International Olympic
Committee to furnish us with a copy. A copy of our request for this
report is enclosed for your information…. It was also agreed at our
Annual General Meeting in East London that a report of the position
should be submitted by our Federation, and this will be forwarded
in due course.111
In his letter requesting information from SANOC, which was included with his
letter to Brundage, Smith continued to seek the answers: “… there are three important
points requiring clarification: a. ‘a number of different groups are seeking recognition’
b. ‘that they are continuing to study this involved problem’ c. that they are
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‘endeavouring to find a solution in line with Olympic regulations’ … Could you please
enlighten us on these points? If necessary we are prepared to send a representative
to Johannesburg.”112 The confidence displayed by the SAAWBF in this missive was
surprising, the requests are expressed in a bold, firm, and, at times, seemingly
overbearing manner.
On the subject of rising domestic resistance, Brundage received official word of the
new organization – South African Sports Association (SASA). It came from the
Secretary of SASA’s steering committee, R.S. Govender: “The South African Sports
Association, a newly formed organisation representing every major Non-White Sports
Body in the country, is holding a National Sports Conference in Durban on the 10 th
and 11th January, 1959, for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of different sports
codes in an effort for international recognition.”113
A month later, Brundage responded to Govender:
… I note that the South African Sports Association has been
organized to endeavor to find a solution to the problems existing in
your country… So far as Olympic rules are concerned, there can be
only one National Olympic Committee in a country and it should
include all the National Federations which are members of the
International Federations which govern sports on the Olympic
program.114
Brundage stood firm and consistent. His message to Govender enunciated the IOC
structure and its rules. However, when Brundage sent a copy to Mayer, he added a
notation: “There should be something in our rules to indicate that there can be only
one NOC in a country. This is something we have overlooked.”115 This note revealed
that sports organizations might have been led to assume that more than one NOC per
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country could exist within the IOC, so clarification in the IOC rules was needed to
rectify this confusion.
Two weeks later, Brutus provided an update to Brundage regarding SASA:
The South African Sports Association will be taking up the matter of
international recognition actively, in addition to its internal work of
co-ordinating the work of the National Sports Federation in South
Africa. As you are aware, the South African Olympic and
Commonwealth Association which might do this work, excludes
non-white South Africans…. The SASA is already supported by ten
national non-racial sporting bodies and we expect the number to
increase in the near future.116
Brutus and the SASA were forcing the issue of international recognition with an
organization, the IOC, which already recognized a national body. For the SASA to
become the official body representing South Africa, first, SANOC would have to be
expelled, and second, SASA had to be accepted by the IOC. Brutus’ letter to Brundage
included a copy of a letter sent to Mayer. The letter to Mayer stated the resolutions
adopted at the conference on national non-racial sporting bodies. Each of the National
Sports Federations supporting the conference was seeking international recognition.
Brutus directed Mayer’s, and in turn, Brundage’s, attention to Resolutions 5 and 6,
which fell within the purview of the IOC:
Resolution No. 5 – In view of the fact that the International Olympic
Committee has called for a report in the South African situation, the
South African Sports Association resolves to submit a
comprehensive memorandum on the subject and calls on all National
Sports Federation to supply relevant data for inclusion in the
memorandum.
Resolution No. 6 – This Conference of the South African Sports
Association believes that it is the inherent right of every South
African to compete on merit for the right to represent South Africa
in international sport and calls on all organisations controlling
international sports to afford representation only to bodies truly
representative of all South Africans.117
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In the letter to Mayer, Brutus also summarized SASA’s aims and motivations:
It is the attention not only of the IOC but of all international bodies
which we desire, and we will therefore be sending copies of the
resolutions to all international bodies … We hope to have the
memorandum ready well in advance of the next congress of the IOC
and will also circulate it to your affiliates. We trust that you will give
it due consideration and that you will be prepared to interest
yourself in our plight and that the IOC will grant us the redress we
are not able to find anywhere else.118
In Brundage’s subsequent response to Brutus and the SASA, he remained factual.
At the bottom of the letter, attached to Mayer’s copy, was a note to obtain more
information and to reiterate that the organizations supporting the SASA remained in
question:
Referring to the letter addressed to you by this Organization under
date of January 23, I suggest that you write and ask them how many
organizations belong to the various Federations, Associations and
Unions mentioned, how many individual members each one of them
has and what activities they have promoted and who participated.
You might also point out that the organizations which are mentioned
can have no direct connection with the International Olympic
Committee, although we shall appreciate information on their
activities.119
Shortly after Brundage sent his remarks to Brutus, Emery informed Brundage of
the continued difficulties caused by Brutus.120 To advance from “no representation”
to “equal representation” was a bold move, but to gain equal control right away may
have been unrealistic.
In the context of this negative news, Brundage received another letter from Brutus,
providing additional information: “I am enclosing clippings relating to the work of the
Sports Association. The Minutes of our Conference will be sent to you as soon as they
are available…. We will arrange to keep you fully informed of our activities and thank
you for your interest.”121 In like manner, Brutus responded to Mayer’s 10 February
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letter, in which he provided information on SASA, mentioning a membership of over
70,000 and the support from ten national bodies.122 All the national bodies, stated
Brutus, staged national events every year – some had been in existence for five years,
many more than ten. “Most of these bodies consist of various provincial units drawn
from the provinces of South Africa, but it is the policy of the South African Sports
Association to offer membership only to the parent national bodies, and only to bodies
which are opposed to racial discrimination and are working for its removal.”
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Brutus concluded his letter by assuring Mayer that a comprehensive memorandum of
the facts and figures would be sent, as well as the SASA constitution, then under
preparation.
The flow of information from SASA persisted. A statement by SASA President G.K.
Rangasamy was sent to Brundage.124 The statement noted Mayer mentioning that the
IOC would discuss South Africa’s colour bar issue at the next meeting, focussing on
Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. As welcome as that information was, three important
goals remained for SASA:
1. All national bodies must stand together in this fight and help to
present a full case to the IOC on our position.
2. We must expose misleading statements such as that of the
Chairman of the South African Olympic Association, Gen. Klopper,
that subservient affiliation is as good as full recognition.
3. We must fight against attempts to make us accept racial
discrimination in sport, and against its acceptance by the South
African Cricket Board of Control.125
This strong language marked a rising confidence and commitment by SASA to
strive for more equal representation in South African sports. SASA continued to press
its case, sending a letter to Mayer, which included an abridged copy of the
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memorandum to be submitted to the IOC. A full version of this memorandum would
also be distributed to many countries affiliated with the IOC before the May 1959
meeting in Munich. A final remark by Brutus re-enunciated a desire to be present at
such time as the IOC debated the South African issue:
I am aware that much of the material sent does not fall within the
jurisdiction of your Committee, but we are anxious to present a full
picture of the situation in our country and of our activities, in order
to avoid being wrongly represented or reported…. Please advise me
at the earliest convenient time if it will be possible for an observer
or spokesman to attend the meeting on behalf of the South African
sportsmen who are at present excluded from participation at the
Olympic Games.126
Brutus’ request was denied. As a rationale for denial, Mayer noted that
recommendations must first be made by the Executive Board to the General
Session.127 Brutus persisted nevertheless. Though expressing appreciation for
Brundage’s interest in upholding the principles of the Olympic Games and his
willingness to discuss the problem, Brutus attempted to summarize the issue into one
core issue:
We believe that basically our problem is a simple one: the prejudice
of sports administrators being expressed in a colour-bar in sport
without the justification of law, tradition or the wishes of sportsmen
generally. But this simple issue is so obscured by other, secondary
issues, that it is extremely difficult to discuss it fully and fairly. It is
for this reason that we have applied to the International Olympic
Committee for permission to have a representative or observer at
the Munich meeting.128
By this point the racial situation in South Africa had become well known in
international circles, prompting Brutus to pursue a South African “presence” at future
IOC meetings on the issue, which he conveyed to both Brundage and Otto Mayer:
I must point out that with the exception of two very small sections in
Soccer and Athletics, the 10 million non-whites of South Africa are
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completely without representation on the International Olympic
Committee and no accurate account of their plight or of their
activities can be given in the absence of a spokesman on their behalf.
I realize that the International Olympic Committee can only deal with
recognised national Olympic Committees, but it is hoped that this
will be treated as a special case, because of the special circumstances,
and that your Executive will agree to someone speaking on behalf of
the non-white South Africans when the matter comes up for
discussion.129
Brutus concluded his request for “special consideration” by asking that Mayer send
a message by cable once the Executive Board had reached a decision on this request
to admit a representative to speak on behalf of the non-white community in South
Africa at the next IOC General Session in Munich. Again, Mayer responded negatively,
informing Brutus that it was not necessary to send an observer or spokesman since
the whole problem first had to be discussed by the IOC Executive Board.130
Brutus and the SASA were not without international supporters in their struggle to
gain recognition. For instance, Mayer responded to a letter from Antony Steel,
Secretary of an organization based in London, England, called the Campaign Against
Race Discrimination in Sport (CARDS), telling him in no uncertain terms not “… to
send an observer or a representative to our Munich meeting, as this problem has first
to be discussed at our Executive Board meeting. Therefore please don’t take the
trouble to send a Member of the British Parliament to attend on [SASA’s] behalf.”131
Dealing with SASA did not only fall to Mayer alone, Brundage, too, became immersed
in the issue. Brutus provided Brundage with an advance abridged copy of the
memorandum SASA proposed to submit for consideration at the Executive Board
meetings in Rome as well as the Munich General Session scheduled for 23 May. Brutus
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noted: “It will give a fair idea of the nature of our case, and the manner in which we
will present it.”132
Brutus’ persistence translated to mounting annoyance for the IOC administration.
First, Mayer told Brutus, once more: “As I told you already in my last letter that
problem will be studied by our Executive Board in Munich and not in Rome…. With
reference to my last letter I wish to confirm that it is not necessary that you send your
representative to Munich.”133 Brundage, likewise, adopted a stern stance with Brutus,
telling him bluntly:
I think it is safe to say that the International Olympic Committee is
not going to deviate from its fundamental principle that there shall
be no discrimination against any country or person on grounds of
race, religion or politics. This must be done, however, within the
framework of our rules and regulations, without altering the
structure of international sport, which is already complicated … It is
not necessary for you to send a representative to Munich. In any
event, the meetings of the International Olympic Committee are
closed. We hope to be able to solve this thorny problem insofar as
the Olympic Movement is concerned with justice to all.134
Since SASA was denied a representative at the forthcoming IOC general meeting, it
decided to release a circular to affiliates, sporting bodies, and all interested persons:
The decision of the International Olympic Committee earlier this
year, to examine the question of the colour-bar in South African
sport, was hailed by SASA as the beginning of the most decisive
phase in the fight for international recognition of all South Africans
in sport…. The submission of a Memorandum to the IOC by SASA has
taken the fight a step further, and it will serve as the basis for
discussion in the period of controversy and debate which now
probably lies ahead before we reach our ultimate goal…. It is
expected that the IOC will not give a decision at this stage – its
machinery is too immense for speedy action – but that it will give the
closest attention to the South African problem in the coming months
before the Olympic Games at Rome in August of next year.…135
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This circular pressed the IOC to discuss and if possible solve the South African sport
issue in the immediate future, rather than stalling indefinitely.
The IOC was not the only organization confronted by SASA. To hold those in charge
of South African sport true to their expressed goals, Brutus sent a follow-up letter to
Emery on behalf of the bodies representing SASA, “… I was directed to advise you that
the SASA welcomes the recent assurance by Mr. Reg. Honey, President of the
S.A.O.B.E.&C.G.A. that non-whites will be considered for selection in South African
teams at the Olympic Games if they prove themselves fit for selection.”136
Furthermore, Brutus asked for assurance on a variety of points:
1. What method will be used when considering them for selection?
2. Will it be necessary for such candidates to be members of your
affiliated national bodies?
3. What will be the position if it is not possible for them to be
affiliated to one of the national bodies because of clauses excluding
them from membership?
4. Will membership be granted only to such candidates, or will it be
granted to other non-whites participating in the code of sport
concerned?137
A day later, before receiving a response from SANOC, SASA released another
statement:
SASA expresses its appreciation to the IOC for considering the
question of racialism in South African sport. The outcome of the
discussions of the International Olympic Committee is hailed by
SASA as a signal victory in the fight for true non-racialistic sport in
our country…. SASA would have been content if the IOC had merely
consented to inquire into the position. Instead, our South African
administrators have been served due warning, through the IOC
Resolution, that the position will be closely watched, and racial
discrimination will not be tolerated or countenanced in the Olympic
Games…. To those like Mr. Reg Honey who have told the world that
there is no racial discrimination in Springbok teams, there is nothing
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SASA can say: we must leave them to try and reconcile their
consciences with the facts. To those who have been excluded by
racial discrimination in the past, SASA has two things to say: Do not
be deluded that entry into non-racial sport will be easy; a period of
delicate and difficult negotiation lies ahead, in which it will be
necessary to stand firm, and not to be duped into accepting inferior
or unequal status…. The way is clear for non-white sportsmen to
stake a bold claim, on merit, for inclusion in teams representing our
entire country. Only merit will count, and it is up to them to make
resolute efforts to prove their worth…. The glittering prize of
international honours, in equal competition with the best in the
world, is now within their grasp.138
This statement publicly praised the IOC for at least taking note of the issue of
racism in South African sports, challenged the current South African sport bodies and
administrators to hold true to their words, and encouraged non-white athletes to take
advantage of the opportunities to compete while keeping expectations reasonable.
After SASA publicly claimed its stake in the fight for equality in South African sport,
Brutus attempted to be civil and cordial when asking Emery whether it would be
possible for SASA to arrange a meeting with Brundage or hosting him during a visit to
South Africa.139 In a letter to Brundage, Brutus extended an invitation by SASA to
welcome Brundage as its guest during his visit, paying careful attention to the value
of his visit: “It is our considered opinion that it will only be possible for you to form a
complete picture of the situation in sport in our country after you have met
representatives of various sporting bodies, many of whom have been unable, up to
now, to secure membership of the national Olympic Association.”140
Unfortunately for Brutus and SASA, Brundage replied that he had no plans to visit,
but when he would, he would be happy to meet with representatives.141 In
anticipation of the upcoming Munich General Session, Brutus also asked to arrange a
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meeting between SASA officials and SANOC executive members in the near future to
discuss the session in Munich.
Some five months later, as related by Brutus to Brundage, the friendly overtones to
SANOC had fallen on deaf ears. A thoroughly frustrated Brutus cabled Brundage,
reporting no change in the racial discrimination and sporting practices in South
Africa:
In the name of Olympic ideals fair play and sportsmanship urgently
request IOC direct attention to continued racial discrimination in
South African sport despite assurances Rome May 1959. Racial
discrimination in affiliation and trials being imposed though not
legally required. Entreat remedial or disciplinary action before
Rome Olympics.142
Not receiving any response from the IOC for two months, Brutus on 13 April 1960
again pleaded with Brundage to draw attention to the South African issue by
discussing it at the next meeting and allow a spokesman on behalf of the non-white
population to present its case:
The South African Sports [A]ssociation formally requests, on behalf
of the thousands of non-white South Africans who are excluded from
the national sport of their country on grounds of race, that the
Congress of the International Olympic Committee consent to discuss
this issue and that permission be granted to a spokesman to present
the case on behalf of these sportsmen…. You are doubtless aware
that a considerable mass of information has already been submitted
and is in the hands of the Chancellor of the IOC, M. Otto Mayer. Since
the meetings in Rome and Munich last year, there has been further
evidence of the determination of the administrators of the nationally
recognized bodies in South African to exclude sportsmen on racial
grounds, or to admit them under conditions which would preserve
the racial structure of sport in South Africa contrary to the principles
of the International Olympic Committee.143
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Brutus, in some exasperation, even reached out to Reginald Honey for help.
SAAWBF and SAAWU had reached a deadlock in negotiations and Brutus attempted
to enlist Honey’s assistance:
… we are anxious that non-white weightlifters should be considered
for the national representative team to take part in the forthcoming
Olympics at Rome…. The South African Amateur Weightlifting Union
is only prepared to permit this if we agree to affiliate to them on
conditions which are racially discriminatory and which are contrary
to the principles of the IOC, that is, that we should agree to be a
subservient body, racially segregated from them, unequally
represented in comparison with the white unions (provincial) which
are affiliated to them, and that we should only be represented on
their national council by white South Africans. This is blatant racial
discrimination, to which the IOC is strongly opposed, and we must
therefore ask you to interest yourself in the matter…. we have
indicated to the S.A.A.W.U. that we are perfectly willing to work with
them on condition that we are not forced to affiliate under conditions
of racial discrimination: to this offer there has not yet been a reply….
I must point out that we had hoped to have some information and
assistance from the South African Olympic and Commonwealth
Games Association [i.e, SANOC] on this issue: so far none has been
forthcoming.144
To this plea, Brutus attached a letter to C. Oehley, Chairman of SAAWU, which
contained a detailed account of the discussion between the two weightlifting
associations.145 It was evident that Brutus and SAAWBF were at an impasse, due
mainly to the fact that SAAWBF refused to be treated as inferior to SAAWU and its
members. Through a later SASA statement, it became obvious that Honey did not wish
to become involved in the weightlifting quarrel.146
In a reply to the 13 April 1960 letter, meanwhile, Brundage reaffirmed to Brutus
where the IOC’s allegiances lay:
… the International Olympic Committee is concerned solely with
Olympic affairs and we have been assured by the South African
Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [i.e., SANOC], which
we recognize, that no citizens of South Africa of Olympic calibre will
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be barred from the South African team by reason of race, religion or
political affiliations. Since this is in conformity with Olympic
regulation, we see no purpose in a conference such as you suggest.147
Adhering to the status quo, Brundage leveraged IOC rules, supporting SANOC based
on its assurances. Although societal racial discrimination that hindered non-white
sporting success was beyond the control of SANOC, it was clear that Brundage knew
what governmental and sport institutional obstacles SANOC could overcome to
include non-whites on the South African team. Brundage trusted that SANOC would
do everything it could to remove the racial barriers for non-white inclusion.
Confirming what Brundage had been informed of in an earlier letter from Emery,148
SASA finally released a statement detailing the police raids on the homes of SASA’s
President, secretary, and assistant secretary.149 This act, though not proof of a SANOC
violation of Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, did, however, send conflicting messages
of how Brundage and the IOC should handle the South African situation. In its
“released statement,” the resilient, determined, and obstinate SASA announced 10
observations to help their case.150 Though the SASA announcement displayed a
collection of acknowledgements, sent letters and appeals, and notes of rejection,
ultimately, the IOC recognized SANOC, not SASA, as South Africa’s Olympic
representative. Despite assurances made to the IOC by SANOC, Brutus continued his
focussed attack: “… we have fresh evidence that racial discrimination was practised
in the selection of the South African Olympic team. It is this evidence we wish to
present for discussion by your Committee. Further the South African representative
of the IOC, Mr. Reg. Honey, has gone on record, in an official interview with the London
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‘New Statesman,’ as defending racial discrimination at present existing in South
African sport.”151
Some two months following Brutus’ last letter to Brundage, G.K. Rangasamy
formally charged SANOC of violating the Olympic Charter because of the racial
discrimination in South African sport.152 Rangasamy assured that non-racial trails
were not conducted to determine the composition of the South African Olympic team
and non-white organizations had to accept racial discrimination as a condition to
affiliate with the white dominated national bodies.
In the same letter to Brundage, Rangasamy made a request to put these charges on
the agenda of the IOC meeting in Rome, and for SANOC to answer the charge. He also
requested the opportunity to submit evidence, as well as a representative to be
permitted to attend. The “charges” laid against SANOC by SASA appear in complete
contradiction to the progress stated by Emery in his correspondence with the IOC.
Brutus, in an effort to uphold Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, extended SASA’s
position in the fight for the removal of racial discrimination in South African sport.
Brutus formally charged SANOC with practising racial discrimination. He also wanted
SASA representatives at the next IOC meeting and he pointed out that in spite of the
assurances given in Rome that discrimination was not practiced by SANOC,
discrimination continued in South Africa.153 A week later, a SASA statement from
Brutus indicated that Rangasamy and Brutus, desiring to go to Rome to attend the IOC
meeting, had their applications for passports denied.154 At that point, an appeal was
sent to all the countries affiliated with the IOC for assistance to achieve
representation.
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Since Rangasamy and Brutus were prevented from attending the IOC meeting in
Rome, Rev. Michael Scott was chosen to speak on behalf of SASA and CARDS. Before
addressing Olympic officials, Scott wrote to Brundage, hoping for a meeting to discuss
the issue.155 However, there is no record of a Scott - Brundage meeting. Nonetheless,
in the address presented to the International Olympic Games Committee in Rome
August 1960, Scott did indeed mention that Brutus was unable to attend because of
the refusal to issue a passport to him.156 Scott went on to note the absence of free
competition, the unequal conditions of competition, and the lack of facilities for nonwhite athletes. He cited examples from boxing and weightlifting, identifying nonwhite athletes who could not qualify for the Rome Games even though they performed
better than white athletes. SANOC, Scott argued, remained in breach of Article 1 of the
Olympic Charter, despite Honey’s assurances that no athlete of Olympic calibre would
be excluded from the South African team. Competition was not open to all members
unless one was affiliated with the South African national sport bodies that,
unfortunately, operated a colour bar.157
This statement by Scott on behalf of SASA and CARDS claimed to expose as farce
the actions of Honey and SANOC. SASA and CARDS demanded action – a ban of the
South African team. A dictum was issued directly before the 1960 Rome Olympic
Games. A lack of support for SASA’s and CARDS’ position resulted in SANOC not being
banned from the Games.
What other support did SASA have in its battle against SANOC? One measure of
support came from international activists and organizations. I now turn to an
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examination of their activities, through the lens of Avery Brundage’s correspondence
and his view of these developments.

4.

International Community
Avery Brundage’s concern relative to the South African issue was evident from the

correspondence with SANOC and SASA. However, it was questionable whether
Brundage’s concerns about the negative publicity of the international voice and
pressure really affected how he perceived and dealt with the South African situation.
Nonetheless, the first international inquiry into the South African issue from a party
not directly involved in the primary discussion about the South African race issue
came from Olaf Ditlev-Simonsen, the IOC member from Norway. At the end of October
1956, before the Melbourne Games, Ditlev-Simonsen requested more information on
the South African issue. He sent Otto Mayer a detailed letter, providing an impression
of the public climate in Norway on the issue: “The Norwegian papers are very strongly
stating that they think the IOC ought to take steps towards the South African National
Olympic Committee to prevent them from excluding ‘black people’ from their sport
associations and thus exclude them from taking part in the Olympic Games.”158
Two months later, Mayer sent a response, attributing the IOC’s slow pace in dealing
with this matter to the South African government’s political prerogatives:
As regard to the South African situation concerning the exclusion of
coloured people from the selection of their Olympic Team, I must say
that the IOC, and especially our President Mr. Avery Burndage, has
lengthily dealt with this matter. It has been given us to understand
that this was a question concerning an internal Government’s
question in which the IOC should not be mixed in … the Laws of a
country cannot be altered by the IOC – Mr. Brundage has had long
correspondence with South Africa in this matter and I wish you
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would inform the Norwegian Press that up to now we have not been
successful.159
This is the first time that a response from an IOC representative identifies the South
African government as the responsible party, as well as being a clear expression of the
IOC’s stance of non-involvement in political and domestic matters. Further, in the
same letter, Mayer noted what the IOC’s position would be:
I proposed to our President to exclude the South African [National]
Olympic Committee unless it recognizes our rules which are
absolutely clear on this subject: ‘no discrimination of race’. We have
done so for Argentine, Puerto-Rico and Cuba while the Governments
of those countries wanted to interfere in the Olympic affairs of those
resp. countries. Why should we not do the same for South Africa?
But, as we cannot control the legislation of every country, the
attention of the legislator should be drawn to the necessity of
modifying certain laws, so that they may conform to the principles
that we are defending. In suspending the South African [National]
Olympic Committee are we going to change the situation? I am afraid
not. We shall only stop those athletes for taking part in the Games. I
quite agree with your point of view and I think an action should be
taken. Therefore I shall inform Mr. Brundage about it, with copy of
this letter, asking him to bring the matter on discussion at our
Melbourne Session.160
Mayer did have a different interpretation than Brundage as to how to deal with
South Africa. He did not want to become involved in a country’s domestic politics, but
SANOC had to discover a way to separate it from government policies imposing
apartheid.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Brundage had been accused of anti-Semitic and antiblack biases. More than ever, in dealing with the South African issue at this juncture,
Brundage had to maintain a non-discrimination stance, both personally and as the
head of the IOC. One example of his concern for the IOC’s public profile during this
time was Brundage’s demonstrated desire for Olympic growth in Africa. In response
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to a letter from the Secretary-General of the Milo Academy of Health and Strength
mentioning plans to organize a Pan-African Amateur Sport Federation in order to hold
a Pan-African Games every four years,161 Brundage exuded optimism. Also, Brundage
sought to secure the influence of the Olympic Movement in these developments: “I
note that you hope to be able to hold Pan-African Games. We observe that there is a
great and growing interest in international competition and the Olympic Movement
in African countries. You should consult with the National Olympic Committees in the
countries involved.”162 Furthering the growth of the Olympic Movement in African
countries was of strategic importance for the IOC, faced, as it was, with international
criticism of its stance on the South African issue.
Letters from the public and concerned groups began to arrive at the IOC. The first
of many such letters, forwarded to Brundage by Mayer, was from Wales sent on behalf
of 1100 Welsh people.163 The author appreciated that the IOC was abiding by its rules
and organizational structure in regard to the South African issue. However, due to
such a governing sport system, the IOC had been limited to ensure that South Africa
fielded a team representative of its population. This letter was indicative of an
increasing international public and critical awareness of South African issue and the
IOC’s position, that the IOC could not fail but to take notice of – the author ultimately
wanted the IOC to take the lead in this issue and either force SANOC to makes
necessary changes or expel it from the Olympic Movement.
In a similar vein, and of potentially greater concern to the IOC, it did not take long
for an organization in the United States to contact Brundage on the South African
issue, indeed making reference to the intervention originating from Wales. John
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Williams, Director of Information of the American Committee on Africa (ACA), wrote
a letter to Brundage on 22 April 1958 upon ACA having been notified that non-white
weightlifters would not be considered by SANOC for the 1960 Games because of their
race.164 He reminded Brundage that the apartheid laws in South Africa forbade racial
mixing. Williams was also aware of the campaign in Wales to ban South Africa from
the Commonwealth Games and, furthermore, reiterated the belief that the IOC had to
take a stand to influence the abolition of racial discrimination in South Africa.
However, Williams’ plea did little to influence Brundage’s position of playing for time:
“The situation in South Africa has been referred to us, and while we do not intervene
in national affairs unless our regulations are violated, we have asked our
representatives in that country to investigate and report to us.”165
Much later, Brundage was once again reminded of the international voice on the
South African issue. In a letter from Lord Hemingford of The Africa Bureau, the
following was noted:
Knowing that the International Olympic Committee upholds the
principle that there should be no discrimination on grounds of race
among the members of the teams representing the various countries,
I am writing to ask that you consider at your meeting in May the firm
application of this principle. I have the case of the Union of South
Africa particularly in mind and trust that you will no longer regard
this as a domestic matter for the South African branch….166
The international message remained consistent – enforce Article 1 of the Olympic
Charter and examine the entire issue at the next IOC session. In his response to
Hemingford, Brundage again provided his stock answer:
… [I] can safely assure you that the International Olympic Committee
has no intention of deviating from its fundamental principle that
there shall be no discrimination against any country or person on
grounds of race, religion or politics…. However, this problem in
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South Africa is a most complicated one and not easy to solve with
justice to all. Moreover, it has unfortunate political implications. In
any event, it has our serious attention.167
Though the IOC was certainly alert to the issue’s political significance, the specific
obstacles that Brundage response claimed existed, made the situation difficult to
resolve without penalizing athletes and SANOC, who had no control over
governmental laws and policies.
Letters continued to arrive at the IOC. A note from a resident of Surrey, England
expressed a sense of disappointment to Brundage for not defending non-whites in
South Africa. The author added: “South Africa is like a concentration camp to us
Coloureds…. We are not allowed to participate in any games and sometimes we are
even barred from watching them play. The prejudice is very bad for us.”168
Given Brundage’s US citizenship, it appeared to some concerned citizens that the
progressiveness they saw at work in America should translate to the IOC. In a long
missive to Brundage, Thomas Hodge from White Plains, New York, took a similar
approach.169 Hodge’s note pointed out several of the many issues that remained to be
resolved, notwithstanding SANOC’s claims to the contrary concerning changes in
South African sport. Although the announcements from those in charge of sport in
South Africa sounded promising, the country’s racial policies continued to prevent
non-whites from enjoying the full freedom that their white counterparts experienced.
Furthermore, the existing sport system that offered funding and training for nonwhite athletes was glaringly inferior to that of white athletes. Hodge insisted that
simply providing an opportunity to non-white athletes to compete in the Olympic
Games was unsatisfactory because of the fundamental inequity that made it virtually
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impossible for non-white athletes to prepare properly in South Africa and to even
reach standards to qualify for international competition. It was the IOC’s duty to deny
South Africa participation in the Olympic Games until SANOC could truly support a
non-segregated sport system.
Antony Steel of CARDS, meanwhile, raised an issue that went to the core of
organized competitive sports, namely, that of meritocratic participation. Non-white
athletes that reached the required qualifying levels of performance, he argued, must
be admitted:
Following the recent assurances made by the South African authorities
that in future there will be no obstacles placed in the way of the
participation of any person regardless of his race or colour in South
African Olympic teams, the Campaign Against Race Discrimination in
Sport … would point out that those bodies accepted for affiliation by the
South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association
[SANOC], and from which the team must be selected, all maintain a
strict colour-bar by regulation or in practice, permitting only European
membership. It can therefore be seen that not only does the difficulty of
selection present itself, but facilities for coloured sportsmen to practice
their sport are severely limited. It is clear that before South Africa can
claim that there is no racial discrimination in sport, these ‘Europeanonly’ clubs must be opened to enthusiasts of all races…. This Campaign
… intends to obtain full details of performances of any coloured
sportsmen who reaches Olympic standards, and will challenge the
South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association
[SANOC] to honour their statement.170
With watchdogs such as CARDS on the alert, the challenge for SANOC and the IOC
to right the race issue in South Africa portended great difficulties. Echoing an
argument made by Hodge, Steel indicated the race issue went far beyond accepting
qualified non-whites for international competition. The sport structure ingrained in
South African society continued to impose restrictions for non-white athletes to
become successful.
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In a letter from Sven Ekström,171 to the IOC, he characterized the debates unfolding
in Sweden being based on the “crimes against humanity in South Africa.”172 There had
been serious discussions in Sweden of playing South Africa in the Davis Cup, where,
ultimately, it was decided to play the match. Ekström continued to provide examples
when human rights were violated, such as the atrocities performed by the Nazis and
Soviets, whereby, in his opinion, no major international organizations, including the
IOC, expressed an explicit stance against such violent acts. The South African case
contained obvious facts and evidence highlighting a racist sport system that should
provide reason for action from international sport organizations.
Though the IOC and Brundage were fully aware of all the issues raised by Ekström,
the IOC clung to its position of being non-political. Nonetheless, due to all these
concerns, Ekström’s sport editorial department had a few questions for the IOC. He
asked how apartheid can coincide with the Olympic Charter and if the IOC would make
a pronouncement condemning South Africa?173 Since many of these questions were
addressed privately in the correspondence between IOC representatives and those
closely involved with the South African issue, Ekström saw fit to send Brundage a copy
of the letter he himself had sent to the IOC. He encouraged a reply. At the bottom of
the copy of the Ekström letter was Brundage’s handwritten response. Brundage wrote
to Ekström that the IOC was concerned with the rules and regulations only in the
context of the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games. Further, since SANOC assured
the opportunity of non-white athletes, the IOC had confidence in SANOC to fulfill its
obligations.174 Though this was not an official response from Brundage, it was clear
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that the IOC had specific directives and was working with SANOC to achieve a
compromise with the South African government and non-white athletes.
Meanwhile, Mayer received a letter from Antony Steel of CARDS requesting that
the question of racial discrimination in South Africa be included on the agenda of the
IOC meeting to follow.175 His request would have involved the IOC much more closely
with the politics of South Africa by connecting it to Article 1 of the Olympic Charter.
Recalling the police raid on SASA, and pointing to the complete lack of communication
with SASA representatives Brutus and Rangasamy, Steel expressed the concern that
they might have been imprisoned without trial. Steel wrote: “… speaking quite
personally … I sincerely hope that the latest events in South Africa and the ruthless
suppressing of the South African Sports Association because it presses for interracial
sport will awaken many members of the IOC to the urgency of enforcing Article 1 of
the Olympic Charter and requiring all countries either to accept it or get out of the
Olympic Games.”176
Steel’s emotionally charged letter reflected the hardening consensus of the
international sporting community. In Mayer’s response to Steel, he reiterated the
IOC’s standard response that it would not involve itself in political matters:
According to that rule, we have had a long discussion on that
problem, regarding the situation in South Africa, at our Session in
Munich last year. Full assurances have been given to us that all
coloured man sports Associations, may be affiliated to the South
African existing National Federations and therefore, to the South
African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association [SANOC].
Furthermore assurance has been given to us that all coloured
athletes may take part in the Olympic Games with the South African
team, as long as it is proved that they are of Olympic or international
caliber. It seems that this is not the fact at the moment being…. As
you can judge, our Committee has done all what was in its power and
it has received full assurances on this matter. More, I think, we
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cannot do. Our President has informed shortly Mr. Brutus by
letter.177
Although assurances had been made by SANOC to accommodate non-white
participation, Mayer conceded that such assurances had not been fully met. The
stance of the IOC was reiterated when Brundage officially addressed Ekström’s
questions raised in the 10 May letter:
… please be advised that the International Olympic Committee is
concerned solely with the Olympic Movement and it does not
intervene in other fields…. One of our fundamental principles is that
no discrimination is allowed against any country or person on
grounds of race, religion or politics. We have complete confidence in
the South African [National] Olympic Committee, which is
responsible for Olympic affairs in South Africa and which is well
aware of our Rules and Regulations. It has assured us that no South
African of Olympic calibre will be barred from the South African
Olympic team by reason of race, religion or political affiliation.
Moreover, the South African Government has agreed to issue the
necessary exit papers…. The South African [National] Olympic
Committee is also trying to promote athletic competition for all
segments of the population.178
It was obvious that a disconnect existed between the IOC’s position and assurances
given by SANOC. Though the IOC claimed to shun involvement in a country’s political
and domestic matters, it was those matters that eventually impinged on the principles
of the Olympic Movement.
International response continued unabated. John Papandrew, Minister of the
Community Church of New York, registered his protest against the inclusion of South
Africa in the 1960 Rome Games. In a letter to Brundage, Papandrew opined:
The leitmotiv of the Olympic Games of Ancient Greece was to bring
people together not to separate them. South Africa and its system of
apartheid included in this year’s Olympics is a mockery in the light
of the official policy of the South African government. Going against
all that is meaningful to the games and inherent within them is a
deeper sense of religion, your acceptance of such a team from the
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Union of South Africa is an affront to the very spirit which undergirds
these games.179
Papandrew’s letter underscored a common theme emerging from the international
narrative of criticism reaching Brundage and the IOC: that the IOC’s ongoing
association with South Africa risked sacrificing of values which undergirded the
Olympic Games. Likewise, when A.J. Ayer, Chairman of CARDS, wrote to the IOC, he
argued that Honey had not lived up to his statements made at Munich in 1959.180 He
pointed out specific examples of athletes who had performed better than their white
competitors and reiterated the inequality and inequity experienced by non-white
athletes that created a competitive disadvantage and a lack of opportunity.
Nonetheless, SANOC claimed: “(1) it does not believe in discrimination but its member
organisations do…. (2) that the performances [of the] coloured athletes have been
exaggerated.”181 Ayer, of course, was convinced these points were ridiculous based on
the current state of the sport system in South Africa.
Marshall Knappen, a member of the American Committee on Africa, shared Ayer’s
stance, writing Brundage to protest that the all-white South African team’s
participation in the 1960 Olympic Games was in violation of Olympic rules because no
non-white athletes had even been permitted to try out. He added: “From past
experiences I know that the drafters of such manifestoes are inclined to overstate
their case, but if the facts are as represented I hope that the South African team is
barred if its organizers have not conformed to ‘Olympic rules’.”182
Whether a violation of the values of the Olympic Movement, or an infraction of
actual rules of the Olympic Charter was at issue, the international message was clear:
resolve the racial discrimination or expel SANOC. The pressure felt by Brundage and

118
the IOC was clearly increasing, and to slightly appease the public outcries, Mayer
confirmed receiving Ayer’s 8 June letter, sending copies to Honey and Brundage to
remind them that the assurances from SANOC had not been upheld properly. 183
Meanwhile, Brundage informed Papandrew of the current situation, reiterating yet
again the standard IOC response, but providing the added argument that no
sufficiently qualified non-white athletes had been located:
One of the fundamental principles of the Olympic Movement is that
there shall be no discrimination by reason of race, religion or politics.
The South African [National] Olympic Committee is well aware of
this and we are assured that any South African athlete of Olympic
Calibre, regardless of color, will be included in the South African
team…. Apparently you have been misinformed…. P.S. We have
copies of native African newspapers admitting that there are no
negro athletes at this time of Olympic calibre.184
Brundage clearly seemed to feel the rising pressure, when in a letter to Marshall
Knappen, he expressed his rising annoyance with the entire South African affair:
Since I have received several letters similar to yours of June 11, I
concluded that I was being made the target of a campaign.
Apparently the organizers of this campaign are as you surmise,
ignorant of the facts…. If you will be good enough to transmit this
information to the American Committee on Africa, which might have
saved everyone a great deal of trouble had it approached us directly,
it will be appreciated. Of course, it must be understood that the
International Olympic Committee is concerned solely with the
Olympic Movement and does not intervene in other fields. It is
trouble enough to keep your own house clean these days.185
There is no doubt that Brundage’s alarm, prompted by “uninformed international
opinions,” was mounting. Accommodating Brundage’s request with regard to ACA,
Knappen replied: “In accordance with your suggestion I am forwarding your letter on
to the American Committee on Africa headquarters, with the request that they submit
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directly to you the evidence they claim to have that ‘no Africans are permitted even to
try out for the South African team’.”186
Brundage was not the only person involved who was growing increasingly
frustrated trying to solve the racial issue. Emery, in particular, became increasingly
angered by outside, as he viewed it, uninformed opinions without any authority. He
wrote to Steel in a curt tone:
Your remarks regarding the [South African National Olympic
Committee] are impertinent. I will not have this letter placed before the
Council of the [South African National Olympic Committee], as my
Council is not interested in dealing with individuals…. I am writing this
letter quite personally and suggest that until such time as you are in a
position to obtain authentic reports from the so-called National Sports
Federation for non-Whites in this country, you should keep your
remarks to yourself…. I am sending a copy of this reply to His Grace, The
Archbishop of Cape Town, Rev. Joost de Blank, who I understand is
connected with your campaign.187
Steel, not to be rebuffed by letters requesting proof, informed Mayer that the
constitution of the South African Amateur Rowing Union, whose oarsmen would
represent South Africa in the Olympics, contained an important stipulation: “‘No
Association shall admit to membership nor permit clubs to it affiliated to admit to
membership any person who is not a European and an amateur and every association
shall rigorously apply the definition set out and enforce the same, and require clubs
to them affiliated to do the same’.”188
Steel then interjected: “This clause in the constitution is completely contrary to
Article 1 of the Olympic Charter and must surely exclude at least the South African
Amateur Rowing Union from representing its country in the Olympic Games.”189 Ann
Morrissett of the ACA also responded to Brundage’s insistence on factual proof, albeit
in a somewhat more conciliatory manner:
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… individuals … received replies to the effect that you are satisfied
that the South African representation in the Olympics is nondiscriminatory…. We understand that you are in a very difficult
positon and would like to clarify for you that we and those who may
write to you are not conducting a ‘campaign’ against you personally.
Nor are we ignorant of the very complex situation in South Africa
which has resulted in the selection of whites only in a manner over
which you and the International Olympic Committee no doubt have
little control, since this is considered an ‘internal matter’…. If you will
read through the enclosed sheet, however, I think you will have a
better understanding of the situation as we see it and have been able
to summarize it to the best of our knowledge. It is our hope that in
this one international area the policy of apartheid may receive still
another challenge and possible further reconsideration by the South
African government before it is too late for all concerned.190
The item concluding this correspondence before the 1960 Rome Games between
the IOC and international organizations, consisted of an exchange between Steel and
Mayer. Steel supplemented his previous letter, casting doubt on the reliability of the
Drum newspaper previously referenced by Brundage and Mayer in support of their
position. Steel argued that the Drum, although targeted at a non-white readership, was
owned by a white millionaire and “edited by a Brit.”191 Instead of accepting the Drum’s
potentially biased and skewed reporting, Steel recommended the Golden City Post,
which carried articles in opposition to the views expressed in the Drum. The Golden
City Post had identified two weightlifters and six boxers worthy enough to compete
for South Africa,192 and Steel highlighted an example of a non-white weightlifter
“drastically” out-lifting a white opponent, but the white athlete, nevertheless, being
selected. How could it have been possible, Steel demanded, that in 64 years not a
single African, Indian or Coloured had merited a trial? And further, if current
administrative bodies were opponents of racial discrimination, why could a nonwhite athlete not simply join such organizations? In addition, the terms of affiliation
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with sports organizations were discriminatory for non-whites, as evidenced by the
fact that ten non-white votes were equal to one white vote. Further, all committee
representatives had to be white, and non-whites actually had to join separate clubs.
Such dictums stymied “mixing.” Ultimately, Steel cautioned Mayer not to be duped:
Please do not believe that the SANOCGA sincerely believes in the
Olympic principles. If it did it would do something about the colourbar in associations affiliated to it. It is only the total of the affiliated
organizations and the officials and officers are the same. It is only
grudgingly starting to make excuses now because of the attacks of
outsiders who detest the colour-bar in South African sport. Why did
it do nothing before? We have written numerous letters to the
SANOCGA and other South African sports bodies and often get no
reply at all.193
Mayer simply responded to Steel’s letter about the South African Rowing
Federation,194 by reporting that the Federation changed its constitution to
accommodate both white and non-whites equally.195

5. Discussion: Developments during the Phase 19551960
The dialogue, commentaries, press examinations, and position statements
discussing the South African situation from 1955 to 1960 generated ‘three dominant
voices’—South African Olympic affiliates, domestic resistance, and international
community—that provided much evidence to understand the IOC’s stance in regard
to South Africa by the eve of the 1960 Rome Games. Each voice had a distinct message.
With this multiplicity of voices, three factors shaped the final decision regarding
South Africa’s participation in the 1960 Rome Games. First, Brundage and the IOC’s
responses consistently reverted to Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, which included:
“No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on ground of race,
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religion or politics.”196 Article 1 became the main element in the definition of
Brundage’s and the IOC’s position on the South African situation. Second, the protocol
and structure of the IOC was strongly defended in the correspondence, which defined
an unrelentingly formal position to provide a rationale for the IOC’s actions and
positions. The NOCs represented Olympic matters in their respective countries, and
the IOC trusted the NOCs to have the ideals of the Olympic Movement and the IOC’s
rules and regulations in mind when making decisions regarding participation in the
Olympic Games. Further, all domestic organizations had to proceed through their
NOCs in communication with the IOC. Third, the IOC maintained a firm position to not
involve itself in political and domestic issues of any country. In view of these three key
points, the question arose: why was South Africa still part of the Olympic Movement
by the time of the 1960 Rome Games?
According to the literal interpretation of Article 1, it is reasonable to conclude that
SANOC should have been excluded from the 1960 Rome Games. Racial discrimination
was forbidden and SANOC clearly violated Article 1. In Chapter 4, it becomes evident
why Brundage and the IOC overtly ignored the literal interpretation of Article 1.
However, based on the correspondence from 1955 to 1960, Brundage’s and the IOC’s
decisions were dominated by: (a) IOC protocol and structure, and (b) the IOC’s
strategy not to involve itself in member countries’ domestic matters. Focussing on
these two points helps to understand why South Africa was allowed to remain a
member in good standing of the Olympic Movement.
From the time the South African Olympic affiliates’ voices were being heard, it was
anticipated that the South African situation would quickly be resolved because of two
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factors: (1) Article 1, and (2) assurances from SANOC that the issues would be
resolved in due time. SANOC, though consistently mentioning the difficulties
encountered from organizational, governmental, and athletic talent standpoints, was
steadfast in the desire to bring about a solution by its own resolve and action, without
external interference. The IOC administration was initially satisfied that SANOC
would do this – after all, NOCs must take care of domestic concerns in regard to
“domestic” Olympic matters. In this case, however, the South African government
played such a large role in the issue that the IOC, ultimately, could not help but be
involved. Although the IOC administration allowed SANOC considerable flexibility, in
time it became impatient because matters did not move towards a resolution in an
expedient fashion. The requests by SANOC to delay discussions on the South African
situation until after the 1960 Rome Games were finally rebutted by Brundage who
refused to delay any longer. Brundage reported on racial discrimination in South
Africa for the first time at the 1959 Munich IOC Executive Board meeting.197 At that
time, a report was rendered by Honey and consequently discussed at the IOC General
Session following.198 Dialogue on racism in South Africa continued in the Executive
Board meeting and General Session held in Rome 1960. The report of the General
Session mentioned that a delegation of South African activists presented itself in
Rome to confer with the Executive Board.199 On that occasion, the Executive Board
heard from Rev. Michael Scott, as discussed in the Domestic Resistance section of this
chapter. A debate ensued which concluded with two findings: (1) SANOC had made a
reasonable effort to implement the undertakings proposed by Honey at the 1959
Munich Sessions; and (2) considering the effort and “amiable attitude” from both the

124
current South African sport bodies and the organization of non-white associations,
future misunderstandings from the current South African sport bodies in regard to
non-white inclusion should be minimal.200
Brundage’s and the IOC’s trust in SANOC to resolve the racial issue was not
necessarily violated in their eyes because it was interpreted that SANOC had done its
best to resolve the complicated situation. On the other hand, SANOC’s efforts clearly
were failures in the mind of domestic resistance and international constituents.
However, did its rising unrest matter? Not to Brundage and the IOC, who wanted
SANOC to solve the issue on its own, keeping the IOC out of political and domestic
involvement. Abiding by IOC protocol and structure, and a policy to be non-political,
the voices of the domestic and international resistance were heard, but no action
resulted. The information from domestic and international sources, though valuable
to Brundage, did not prompt him to meet the issue “head on,” but he managed to delay
its resolution until after the 1960 Games through a policy firmly focussed on formal
procedure and institutional arrangement. The IOC was concerned with SANOC and its
commitment to the Olympic Charter. Domestic resistance, the international
community, and even the South African government’s laws and policies had minimal
influence on the immediate decision to not ban South Africa from the 1960 Rome
Games.
Despite Brundage and the IOC insisting that they stood by the non-discrimination
ideals expressed in Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, their implicit acceptance of South
Africa into the Olympic Games in full awareness of SANOC’s complicit actions,
amounted to institutionalized racism. Such racism, as was mentioned above, was not
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the result of explicitly expressed racializing positions or actions, but emerged from
the structural properties of the social system within which people and organizations
act: people act to effect certain outcomes while disregarding racially discriminatory
consequences resulting from their actions. Since the rules and regulations of the IOC
permitted and encouraged SANOC to ignore the domestic politics of South Africa in
order ‘to keep sport and politics’ separate and thus be able to participate in the
Olympic Games, SANOC’s actions, directed at adhering to this foundational IOC
dictum, amounted, if not to outright active support for apartheid policies, then at least
to an indirect support of the status quo by ignoring its racializing implications.
Whatever explanation was offered by Brundage and the IOC, any arrangement to
accommodate South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic
Movement that did not include the complete abolition of racial discrimination can be
interpreted as accepting racism in South African sport.
My task in the next chapter, treating the 1960-1964 period, will, therefore, be to
discover how – and if so, to what extent – the messages from the ‘three dominant
voices’ changed and how the Brundage and the IOC negotiated with those voices to
affect SANOC’s existence and South African sport.
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Chapter Three:
Avery Brundage and the IOC’s First
Confrontation with the South African
National Olympic Committee, 1960-1964
1.

Introduction
The dialogue between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), South African

Olympic affiliates, domestic resistance forces, and the international community
continued with substantial force between the 1960 Rome Games and the 1964 Tokyo
Games. Each voice remained strong, their respective messages about the status of
non-whites in South African sport were consistent. To appease the IOC, the South
African Olympic affiliates, represented primarily by the South African National
Olympic Committee (SANOC), engaged in limited efforts to integrate non-white
athletes and organizations into the current white-dominated sport system. The
integration process, handled with extreme caution, was ultimately directed by South
African government policies. Domestic resistance entities maintained a contradictory
stance to SANOC’s feeble efforts and the South African government’s apartheid
restrictions. Those supporting the domestic resistance network vied to take control
of SANOC as the legitimate National Olympic Committee (NOC), or, at the very least,
to have SANOC suspended until the South African situation was corrected. The
international community persisted to advocate for the domestic resistance. Until
SANOC abided by IOC rules and regulations, the international community petitioned
for SANOC’s suspension or expulsion and a new non-racial NOC to be established in
South Africa.
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As these voices became more vigorous with their messages enunciated more
clearly, it became apparent how they shaped the responses and decisions affecting
SANOC’s position and South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games, and
Olympic Movement. The years of correspondence, information, and action leading up
to the 1964 Tokyo Games yielded a different result than the years approaching the
1960 Rome Games. By 1964, Brundage and the IOC did not trust SANOC’s
commitment and ability to resolve the racial issues in South African Olympic sport.
The result was a firm decision to retract the invitation to South Africa to participate
in the 1964 Tokyo Games.

2.

South African Olympic Affiliates
Immediately following the 1960 Rome Games, Emery thanked Mayer and

Brundage for how they dealt with the South African case. His comments were
optimistic: “I do sincerely hope that you will realise that all the information I have
given both you and Mr. Brundage has been completely honest…. Our team from the
commencement to the completion of the Games, met with nothing else but courtesy
and friendliness from all the competing nations, irrespective of race, colour or creed.”1
Mayer’s response to Emery assumed a “business as usual” manner.2
Four months later, SANOC extended its activities against the upstart South African
Sports Association (SASA) in order to retain power in South African Olympic sport.
Emery reaffirmed SANOC’s position to Brundage by attacking those in charge of SASA:
The efforts by Brutus and Rangasamy are absolutely political….
Their demands that we be expelled from the Olympic Games of 1964
will again be made to the IOC and it is going to be the same thing over
again and we must deny their allegations and again give our promise
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that if any of the non-Whites are good enough at the trials, they will
represent South Africa in international sport.3
Emery did not think that these activities by SASA could be overcome without the
IOC’s cooperation: “It would be appreciated if your Chancellor could send us a copy of
any report that may be received by him from Brutus, as they studiously avoid letting
us know what they have said to the IOC. To this date we have not yet received a copy
of the long report they placed before the IOC 12 months ago.”4 To mitigate the
controversy associated with SANOC, Emery deferred all other issues in order to
maintain focus on SANOC’s goal of repairing its image. To this end, Emery announced
the affiliation of two non-white sports associations in boxing and athletics, with the
current national bodies, placing this move in the context of his opposition to Brutus:
“In the opinion of my Association it would be wrong for the proposition forwarded
you by Mr. Brutus to be placed on the agenda for the meeting in Athens, as we have
repeatedly told you this is a political body and does not control non-White sport in
this country.”5 SANOC evidently was frustrated from having to continually defend its
position on non-white sport in response to Brutus’ and SASA’s political activities.
To maintain a certain level of transparency and dialogue, Emery openly discussed
with Brundage the correspondence sent to Mayer and Brutus. Mentioning once again
SANOC’s goals of current affiliation and future affiliation of the non-white Olympic
sporting bodies, Emery continued to attack Brutus and SASA:
We again give you an assurance that the [South African National
Olympic Committee] is doing all possible to meet the wishes of the
IOC in regard to all races being recognised and you will appreciate
that the affiliation of the above two bodies is proof of this…. It is the
opinion of my association that it would be wrong for the Notice of
Motion forwarded by Mr. Brutus to be placed on your agenda in
Athens, as we have repeatedly told you and given you facts that the
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South African Sports Association is more interested in political
matters than in promoting sport for the non-Whites. We have
repeatedly asked this body to give us the names of their so-called
affiliated bodies, the name and addresses of their secretaries, and
what sports meetings they have organised. We still have had no reply
to this question…. From this you will see that events are moving in a
direction the IOC requires, and we ask you again not to be fooled by
Mr. Brutus or any member of his committee or any person such as
the Rev. M. Scott who knows nothing of the actual conditions
regarding our efforts in having the non-Whites properly
represented.6
Emery insinuated that SANOC was doing everything possible to fulfill the promises
made towards change in South African sport. On the same day Emery wrote to
Brundage, Mayer responded to Emery’s 9 February 1961 letter, pointing to certain
discrepancies between Emery’s public and private stance:
There seems to be a little contradiction in your letter compared with
the press article, when you say that it will permit proper trials for
the selection of your future teams. While in the cutting it is said that
trials are prohibited and that they should take place somewhere in
Rhodesia or in private. In my personal opinion there should be open
trials in the Union. This might also be an important problem for you
to study in view to find a satisfactorily solution…. Regarding Mr.
Brutus’ letter I am expecting Mr. Brundage’s suggestion before
replying. I just received today another letter from him sending a
protest against efforts to secure recognition by the IOC for the
International World Judo Federation…. it is not Mr. Brutus’ business
to interfere in this problem …7
Although Mayer responded to Brutus on this matter assuring that the IOC only
recognized one International Sports Federation (ISF) in each sport and that any
National Sport Federation (NSF) might apply to an ISF, 8 Brutus was undoubtedly
overestimating SASA’s influence and power with the IOC.
This increase in the international correspondence on the South African issue, and
the issue's resulting increased international profile could be regarded as progress of
sorts, but it was still questionable as to how the IOC viewed Brutus, SASA, and those
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in charge of the domestic movement. For example, after thanking Emery for the
update on the current advances in various South African sporting circles, Brundage
reassured Emery that there was no salient reason to include Brutus’ motion on the
agenda for the upcoming June IOC General Session in Greece.9 Brundage may have felt
that Brutus was not an important voice, or that the South African issue was actually
improving. Regardless of Brundage’s own thoughts on Brutus, Emery persisted in
seeking to disavow Brutus while supporting SANOC’s place in the Olympic Movement,
pointing to what he identified as Brutus’ “not very helpful” actions .10 As evidence,
Emery provided an article discussing the development of non-white athletes, as well
as his most recent correspondence with Brutus in which Brutus and SASA, had given
SANOC an ultimatum, pointing out that SASA was “fully determined that all sportsmen
shall be given fair and equal treatment, particularly in matters of organisation,
representation, facilities and trials.”11 Emery responded by reaffirming SANOC’s
authority:
The [South African National Olympic Committee] deals only with
South African Governing Bodies of Sport who are affiliated to their
individual international federations…. Your reference to the
International Olympic Committee is noted and a photostatic copy of
your letter is being sent to the IOC … The IOC has been advised that
non-white associations for athletics, cycling and boxing have been
affiliated to the S.A. Governing Bodies of Sport. When further nonwhite associations affiliate to the respective S.A. Governing Body as
has been done by the three mentioned, the IOC will be advised
accordingly.12
SANOC remained in control of South African Olympic sport, due to South Africa’s
impending separation from the Commonwealth on 1 June 1961, but Emery wondered
whether the end of South Africa’s participation in the Commonwealth Games would
have Olympic implications.13 After hearing that there might be a possible connection
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between the Commonwealth Games and the IOC through South Africa’s IOC
representative Reginald Honey, Emery asked Brundage, should he be contacted by the
Commonwealth committee, to advise it of the progress of non-white athletes and
organizations in South Africa. Emery appeared to need this support from the IOC
because of the opposition’s widening scope, now counting the newly formed AllAfrican Sports Federation among its members. Pointing to news reports, Emery noted
that the Federation had decided that:
… if a team from South Africa [was] selected for international
meetings which ha[d] been dictated by race, the Federation [would]
withdraw all African entries…. The threat implied … that Afro-Asian
sporting associations would then appeal to British and other
organisations to take similar steps, thus forcing South African White
sportsmen, and women out of world class athletics…. We in South
Africa, do not know the make-up of this All-African Sports
Federation, but I, personally, am of the opinion that Mr. Brutus
through the South African Sports Association has representation on
this body.14
Clearly, such a development would have left SANOC in a difficult situation. To
solidify South Africa’s stance, Emery confirmed that, if possible, Reginald Honey
would personally advise the IOC on the South African position, either at the meeting
in Athens, or in a personal conversation with Brundage.15 In support of SANOC’s
position, Emery provided Brundage with an example of the progress he saw occurring
in South Africa,16 drawing attention to the remarks by then current SANOC President,
General H.B. Klopper: “If and when a non-white sportsman in South Africa reaches
world standard, the Olympic Games Council will do all in its power to get him overseas
for international competition…. We encourage sport among all races in the Union,
within the traditional policy of South African.”17 Nonetheless, South African policies
forbade mixed sport, so to divert responsibility from SANOC, General Klopper added
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that SANOC did not make policy, but that the NSFs were charged with addressing
mixed sports and the affiliation process of non-white associations. Shifting
responsibility to the government and NSFs did not release SANOC from its obligations
to enforce change, but it weakened the strength of the example used by Emery.
When Brundage responded to Emery, he reassured the latter of two issues: first,
the subject of South Africa would not be on the upcoming agenda for the IOC General
Session in Athens; and, second, the IOC had no connection with the British Empire and
Commonwealth Games, but, if asked, the IOC would be glad to give its opinion on any
progress made in South African sport.18 This support from Brundage echoed Mayer’s
somewhat livelier letter in regard to Emery’s concerns about the Commonwealth
Games: “In my opinion, we have nothing to do with the Commonwealth Games, as they
never asked our patronage and they prefer to ignore us (all the best for the IOC). Why
should we now interfere when there is some trouble??? … They should look into their
own affairs. I think the South Africans are mistaken if they think that the British will
ask us anything!”19
Relieved by the assurances from Brundage, Emery remained optimistic, “It is going
to be a slow battle, but I am convinced that ultimately at least when the Tokyo Games
are held, South Africa will have overcome the racial prejudice in sport.”20 He offered
newspaper reports as evidence of SANOC’s efforts to overcome the colour bar,
pointing to examples where, as he saw it “…South African white officials are doing
their utmost to get the non-whites well trained in athletics and other sports…. Sooner
or later when the non-whites are properly trained and coached, we will find one who
can represent South Africa.”21
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According to SANOC and the IOC, there was absolutely no confusion about who was
in charge of the Olympic Movement in South Africa. Mayer reminded SANOC of its
responsibility to control IOC intellectual property from being used by outside
organizations, such as a Johannesburg club naming a competition Olympiad of the
Hellenic in Africa: “This is an abuse of the terms which are our property and should
not be allowed. It is the duty of the National Olympic Committees to control such
abuses and we do hope that such terms which have no connection at all with such
competitions will be cancelled”.22
The ongoing dialogue between the IOC and SANOC confirmed the stability of the
relationship. Nonetheless, later that month, Mayer wrote to the new Secretary General
of SANOC, L.M. Francey, to remind her that the IOC kept a constant watch, raising
specific criteria of athletic performance and “required standards” in conjunction with
the problem of racial exclusionary policies as the underlying issue:
I note with satisfaction that your Executive have asked you to
reiterate your policy as previously given to us, that you will stand by
your undertaking that should non-white sportsmen be up to the
required standard he will be considered for inclusion with teams
sent overseas. If this is already an important step, I must say that one
hears often that the White Sports Organizations in South African do
nothing to help non-whites to reach that required standard and that
they are even not allowed to train with white athletes, nor can a
white athlete race with a non-white. As an example I may mention
the case of that young white cyclist who followed only (without
taking part) a race of non-white cyclists and who has been
suspended. Those are the facts which are making very bad publicity
over here and in the World…. I have also read today in the European
press that the South African Football Association has been
suspended by the International Body (FIFA) just because of those
racial discriminations…. Therefore the problem is, in my opinion, not
at all settled.23
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Mayer remained apprehensive about SANOC’s willingness to improve South
African Olympic sport for non-whites. At the bottom of Brundage’s copy of the above
letter, Mayer characterized as “ridiculous” SANOC’s argument about the deficiencies
of non-white athletes’ performance standards since SANOC “[did] all they can not to
help them to reach that standard.”24
Mayer’s reservations of SANOC’s ability to improve South African sport were
confirmed in a handwritten letter from Reginald Honey explaining South Africa’s
woes. Although SANOC was trying hard to abide by IOC rules, Honey believed the
troubles with Olympic officials continued to increase. Especially with the foolish
statements from the government, which continually put pressure on SANOC in an
already difficult situation.25 Brundage agreed with Honey and informed him that the
South African situation will be one of the topics discussed at an upcoming IOC
Executive Board meeting. Based on the many newspaper clippings from South Africa
and the letters of protest received by the IOC, the situation was far from becoming
better.26
Attempting to keep the dialogue going forward, Francey sought to update Mayer
before submitting a formal report based on the next SANOC Executive Board meeting
on 27 March 1962. She informally advised Mayer on a number of issues, such as the
movement towards integrating white and non-white athletes and organizations,
SANOC’s renewed commitment to the promises of Reginald Honey, the improvement
of non-white athletes’ performances, and the increase in multi-racial teams for
international competitions.27 In addition, Francey reported the challenges posed by
Brutus and SASA:
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We seem to find it most difficult to make him understand that as an
Association controlling a number of sports they cannot have direct
affiliation to our Association, but that the individual sports can
become affiliated to the various S.A. Governing Bodies of Sport, and
have equal membership. We have a South African Sports Federation
(White Association) and the Maccabi Games Association who are
interested in various sports but they do not demand affiliation to our
Association – we are all autonomous bodies but we try and assist
each other when the occasion rises…. there is nothing to prevent the
South African Sports Association to affiliate the sections which are
applicable to the S.A. Governing Bodies of Sport, which have direct
representation on our Association.28
Francey strove to keep SANOC at a distance from SASA, whereas SASA seemed to
wish to ignore that SANOC was in charge and that SASA had to go through the same
channels as all other organizations to gain representation in South African Olympic
sport. In the main, SANOC remained as confident as ever about its capabilities to
retain control over the transition process in South African Olympic sport. However,
according to Francey, since progress was happening in South African sport as a result
of the continual effort to welcome non-white athletes and sporting bodies, SANOC was
perplexed when receiving news from the IOC Executive Board that no progress had
been made in regard to the inclusion of the non-white population.29 Francey insisted
that SANOC was abiding by its promises: “… we have no intention of diverting in the
very least from the Olympic ideal, of selecting the best athletes in all Olympic sports
irrespective of colour, provided such athletes reach standards laid down by the
International Olympic Committee,” and the relationship between SANOC and the IOC
was being tested by “a politically inspired controversy aimed at the breaking of [their]
good relations.”30
In response, Mayer reiterated the IOC’s position and in particular the obligations
arising from Article 1 of the Olympic Charter forbidding discrimination on grounds of
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race, religion, or political affiliation. ”Unfortunately,” Mayer noted, while somewhat
exonerating SANOC itself, “facts are there to prove that the elimination of non-whites
athletes is still in mind in several circles, but probably not in the idea of your
association, who still keeps the responsibility, where Olympic matters are
concerned.31
Both Francey’s and Mayer’s letters bespoke the mindset of SANOC and the IOC,
respectively. Although each letter seemed confrontational, Gen. Klopper noted the
IOC’s reluctance to break the current relationship, reassuring Mayer that SANOC
would pursue a steady policy course of action.32 However, Mayer’s official update to
SANOC after the 1962 IOC General Session in Moscow, and in response to Reginald
Honey’s report at the General Session as well as to new political developments in
South Africa, was anything but reassuring – the threat “immediate exclusion”33 was
voiced:
… in Rome in 1960, we were assured that your Government would
permit the inclusion of coloured athletes on your team for the
Olympic Games. Now we understand the situation has changed and
that your Government has forbidden such a mixed team. In this
event, of course, you cannot fulfill your obligations as a National
Olympic Committee recognized by the International Olympic
Committee…. It was decided therefore that you must be warned that
unless your Government withdraws this prohibition so that you can
carry out your work in full conformity with Olympic statues, before
October 1963, the date of our next Session in Nairobi, that we will be
forced, much as we dislike to take such a drastic action against one
of our loyal National Olympic Committees, to suspend the South
African [National] Olympic Committee until it can function
correctly.34
SANOC, so it appeared, had rather overestimated the effectiveness of its own
efforts. Indeed, its future position with the IOC seemed to be uncertain, but ultimately
a more expanded time line was defined to resolve the issue; Emery expressed his
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appreciation, insisting again on the convenient stance of sport being a non-political
entity:
… as long as the Group Areas Act is in being in the Republic, Whites
and non-Whites will never be permitted to compete in trials against
each other…. I take this opportunity of congratulating the IOC on
giving South Africa at least 12 months to make up their mind about
inter-racial sport…. I am not a politician, nor do I take sides in any
political matters, but if we belong to the IOC surely we must abide by
the rules or if we cannot abide by the rules, we should gracefully
withdraw.35
Complications, meanwhile, also arose with regard to direct political opposition
resulting from the actions of Brutus: Mayer advised Francey of Brutus’ aim “to form a
new ‘Non-racial South African [National] Olympic Committee’ which would ask for
recognition by the IOC … I [understand] that your South African Government is not
going to stop the racial discrimination in sport, which is very unfortunate.”36
Brutus’ non-racial organization might had challenged the legitimacy of SANOC,
already weakened by the actions of the South African government. In response,
SANOC member Jan Botha advised Mayer of the evolution of SANOC’s efforts,
downplaying the legitimacy of the new organization:
I can, in the meantime, assure you that large sums of money are being
spent on the development of sport for our Coloured people and that
the European officials and sportsmen are making a real effort to
assist them in coaching, officiating and administration…. The socalled South African Sports Association does not represent any
appreciable proportion of the Coloured people and virtually
amounts to a self-proclaimed group. The majority of our Coloured
people are happy to co-operate with the existing governing bodies of
sport and the [South African National Olympic Committee].37
About a month later, Botha followed up with the lengthy documentation of
favourable comments by a track coach in the United States conerning the opportunity
and assistance given to non-white athletes in South Africa,38 but Mayer dismissed the
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veracity of Botha’s source: “… I must say that we have other sources of information
which do not quite correspond with [his] opinion.”39
By early November 1962, Francey had become concerned with determining the
degree of Mayer’s involvement with SASA in forming the South African Non-Racial
Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC). Had the IOC Executive in fact decided, without
informing SANOC, to forward a copy of their rules to SAN-ROC, “this unofficial body
who are trying to undermine the good work done by this body”? 40 SAN-ROC, after all,
merely consisted of “small splinter groups who are not accepting affiliation to the
recognised National Sports Bodies.”41 Francey pursued the same line of investigation
with Brundage himself, endeavouring to determine at what level of authority the IOC’s
exchanges with SAN-ROC had been authorized. We “would like to know upon whose
instructions [Mayer] is corresponding with this unofficial body; whether it was upon
the instructions of your Executive or not,” she criticized the IOC, “I can assure you that
my Council are most unhappy about the position which appears to exist between the
IOC and this splinter group…. We are most anxious to maintain the happy relationship
which has existed between the IOC and the Association since 19[08], and we should
like to be reassured that no official negotiations have been ordered by yourself or your
Executive with the unofficial body.”42 Francey attached clippings from the South
African Rand Daily Mail and Dagbreek newspapers which, she explained, indicated the
degree of confusion and mistrust created by the IOC’s ambiguous position. She urged
Brundage “to look into this matter as soon as possible, and let me have your airmail
reply.”43
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In his response, Mayer sought to allay some of SANOC’s concerns, adopting the
formal position that “[u]p to the time of writing we have not received any application
for recognition from SAN-ROC. As long as your Association remains recognised by us,
there is no reason to recognise another body as we can recognise only one Olympic
committee in a country. “44 Mayer went on to emphasize that the IOC’s discussion
relative to the position of SANOC had until then focussed on “suspension … this still
does not mean that your association will be expelled. … Furthermore, may I add that
I did not correspond at all with SAN-ROC of which I ignore the existence by [sic] the
time being. It is certain that if they write and if I should have to give them a brief
answer you will get a copy of our letter as we always have done in the past.”45 Mayer
ruled out negotiations with SAN-ROC in the near future. Brundage also responded to
Francey’s missive, expressing sympathy for SANOC’s difficult position but expressing
the hope that “somehow the necessary adjustments can be made to permit you to
function according to the Olympic code, and we have no intention of dealing with
anyone else. Since the difficulty seems to rest in the laws or policies of your country,
it is doubtful that any other organization could function any better than you can.”46
As a strategic goodwill gesture, Francey and SANOC extended an invitation to
Mayer to visit South Africa.47 Mayer cited his busy schedule as preventing him from
accepting the invitation himself, but suggested the new delegate for African affairs
instead, who would report back to Brundage himself.
South Africa’s political position seemed to shift somewhat over two months later.
It became known to Francey that Mayer was waiting for SANOC’s reaction to a letter
by the Minister of the Interior who had stated: “Should there be Non-Whites who
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qualify for inclusion in the South African contingent which will participate in the next
Olympic Games, application for travelling facilities should be made in good time and
each application will then be considered on its own merits and in the light of
Government policy.”48 It seemed that the Minister gave SANOC the green light to
include non-white athletes, but now it would be up to SANOC to make sure that if nonwhite athletes were selected, they made it to the Olympic Games. Final responsibility
with issuing the necessary travel documents, however, would remain with the
Minister, who would ensure that “white and non-white citizens of South Africa
seeking passports …ha[d] a clear character.”49 SANOC was elated with the Minister’s
statement because it meant both white and non-whites would have equal opportunity
for selection to and participation in the Olympic Games. To add to the positive news,
Francey also referred to a press release mentioning that members of SANOC had
engaged in informal discussions earlier in January with representatives from SASA.50
SANOC’s President subsequently reaffirmed that if a non-white athlete reached
international standard, she or he would be considered for Olympic participation, but
points of contention remained over the organizational implementation of such
improved relations:
The President likewise indicated how non-white sportsmen could
improve their standards of achievement and offered all the
assistance available to the [South African National Olympic
Committee]. The representatives of the South African Sports
Association indicated that they would not be satisfied with any form
of parallel affiliation with the National Governing Bodies of Sport,
and would maintain their opposition to the [South African National
Olympic Committee] unless integration from club level up was
forthwith enforced. This is clearly quite beyond the purview and
powers of the [South African National Olympic Committee]…. The
Executive of the [South African National Olympic Committee] wishes
to point out that the greater majority of non-white sportsmen are
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enjoying the benefits referred to above through their affiliation to
the existing National Governing Bodies of Sport.51
The objective of all this was to demonstrate the growth of non-white participation
in sport, but SASA’s constant dissatisfaction was impossible to ignore, and the initial
goodwill diminished such that two months later Francey complained to Brundage
about being ignored by SAN-ROC, and the latter’s inappropriate use of the term
‘Olympic.’ 52
In his first letter to newly elected SANOC President Frank Braun, Mayer remained
unsympathetic towards SANOC’s position: “[M]ay I tell you that following the press, I
read that the racial discrimination in your country is still worse than ever. That makes
me think that in Sport one follows the Government’s instructions too?”53 The
unauthorized use of Olympic symbols by organizations such as SAN-ROC, likewise,
was a consequence of the flawed political regulations in place in South Africa: “If you
had a law in South Africa forbidding unauthorized organizations to use the Olympic
words and symbols, such as there are in the United States and in other countries, you
would be able to take action against SAN-ROC.”54 Francey, in response, insisted on the
“tremendous progress” made by non-White sports organizations that had affiliated to
the national sports organizations: “Where athletes are accepting affiliation, help and
guidance from the official National Sports Federation, they are making excellent
progress.”55
Mayer acknowledged the difficulty of pursuing a solution without involving SANOC
in political dealings, a foundation of the IOC’s approach to keep sport and politics
apart: “… if the South African Government issues laws of racial discrimination, I don’t
think that you can go against them in spite of the fact that you don’t wish to mix
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politics to sport.”56 Instead, Mayer mooted the possibility of coming to an
arrangement in the area of sports exclusively, through a rapprochement between
SAN-ROC and SANOC: “I am sure that you have no difficulties with the Non-white
sporting bodies who have affiliated to your National Sports Federation …. But I think
that all your efforts should be put in the view of having ALL the Non-White National
Bodies affiliating to the existing Organization. Why does the SAN-ROC remain in its
position? Is it not possible to include their leaders into your Organization?”57
Despite their criticism, both Mayer and Brundage wanted to aid SANOC, putting the
issue on the agenda of the upcoming session in Nairobi, where the IOC hoped to
receive a report from SANOC that would restore its standing. “[D]on’t forget that we
must have strong arguments in your favour and that we have to expect several
interventions on the subject,” Mayer advised, “do mention also in your Report how
many National Bodies have included Non-Whites and how many not, while
mentioning the name of those Federations.58 To assist SANOC reclaim its place as a
legitimate IOC member, Mayer gave permission to send the President, one delegate,
and two observers to the upcoming meeting in Nairobi.59 Francey showed herself
appreciative of Mayer’s good faith, but could not hide her concerns regarding the
plans of SAN-ROC, pointing to one John Harris’ hope to attend the meeting on behalf
of SAN-ROC, and place “their propaganda before your members. Great play is being
made in certain newspapers of the fact that this SAN-ROC representative has managed
to get in ahead of us with an address to the IOC, and has been able to side-step my
Association, which is your official representative in this country… My Executive Board
has the greatest confidence in your handling of this gentleman and his unofficial
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approach to the IOC, especially after his London representatives have been told that
the IOC will not receive them at its meeting.”60
It was obvious that SAN-ROC’s unilateral action concerned Francey, who
bemoaned the lack of co-operation between the two organizations, “an appeal to them
to work with us in achieving the above aims [the development of sport in South Africa]
was refused.”61 The whole issue, Francey argued, could have been laid to rest if
SANOC’s earlier offer of co-operation for the non-white organizations had been
followed through on: “At that time the whole question was one of affiliation, and a
promise was made to your President and members that all athletes of Affiliated
Bodies would be considered in every way for equal privileges as members of South
African teams, provided they belong to affiliated sports and reach international
standards…. I take this opportunity of placing on record once again that everything
possible is being done to encourage the affiliation of non-white groups to the
recognised Governing Bodies of Sport…”62 In his response, Mayer pointed out that the
meeting between IOC members and John Harris, the SAN-ROC representative, had
been of an informal nature only:
In spite of the fact that we asked the SAN-ROC Organization to send
no representative to our Lausanne Olympic meetings of June 5th and
6th, the South African Non-Racial Committee delegated Mr. Harris
who arrived on the eve of our meetings. I informed him that he could
not meet the IOC Executive Board, because the problem of South
Africa was not on the agenda and would only be discussed in Nairobi,
after the recognized South African [National] Olympic Committee
would have sent us a report…. Mr. Harris insisted and waited for
hours behind our meeting room. After the meeting was closed, we
agreed out of courtesy and owing to the fact that Mr. Harris had made
such a long journey, to let him talk for 5 minutes when our meeting
was over. Several members of the Executive Board had already left
the room and therefore Mr. Harris was not received officially and no
mention about his presence will appear in our minutes. Mr. Harris

151
spoke for about three minutes and handed over some documents to
the members still present…. I wanted you to know the truth which
seems to have been distorted by Mr. Harris when he gave
information to the press.63
The IOC’s fairly cooperative stance towards SANOC notwithstanding, Brundage
himself soon thereafter increased the pressure on SANOC to reach a solution of the
issue, advising Francey that “unless you can produce evidence that it is possible for
you to comply with Olympic regulations … the International Olympic Committee
would be forced to remove your name from the list of recognized Olympic
Committees.”64 Francey reassured Brundage that SANOC was in a position “to present
acceptable evidence to show that we comply fully with all Olympic rules.”65 Mayer
offered the additional suggestion “that you bring along some of those coloured or
negro men with your delegation to testify what you have done in providing facilities,
coaches, etc. It may help in your case to have some negro testimony.”66 At the same
time, he acknowledged that South African race legislation which rendered the mixing
of white and non-whites illegal, ultimately over-ruled any arrangements the sports
organizations might have attempted. “I think,” he concluded, “that it would not be a
wise politic from us to suspend the present Olympic Committee in South Africa. It
would make more trouble than good.”67
In fact, he suggested, based on a tendentious report from Swiss journalist Rudolph
Balsiger, that “the coloured men seem to be very happy there although, personally I
am against any discrimination in sport. One thing I don’t like there is that difference
they make between whites and coloured men, where training in sport is concerned.
Why don’t they mix them together? Of course there are Government Laws against
which nothing can be done.” 68 Mayer’s message to Brundage thus was somewhat
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ambiguous, on the one hand rejecting racial discrimination, while at the same time
making a case in SANOC’s favour based on Balsiger’s report.
Permitted to go anywhere and meet with anyone, Balsiger’s report was initially
confidential, but he decided to make it public, since the facts as he saw were at great
variance with other representations of the issue appearing in other print sources.
Balsiger was clearly pro-SANOC, pointing to the development of sports activities
among non-whites that had commenced over 10 years previously.69 His published
report included a brief historical synopsis in which he made light of “the ‘Apartheid’”,
noting that its depiction in the media was “far away from the truth.” Apartheid
according to Balsiger was, in fact, not a discriminatory regime, but the,
… separate, calm and systematic development of the white and the
Bantu, each group within its own geo-political homeland, according
to inherent characteristics and talents. Both races are far apart in
cultural, ethnographical and social-political ways and a joint
development of the two is completely out of the question. … The
difference between the primitive culture of the Bantu and the Atomic
Age is so great that no resolutions of the UN Security Council, threats
of boycotts or decisions to suspend (IOC) would do any good or have
any constructive value. … Apartheid in Sports favor Black and
Colored [sic]. Anybody who knows anything about the young African
countries can readily see that the living standard of the Black in
South Africa is far higher than anywhere else.”70
Mayer used Balsiger’s report to cast doubt on SAN-ROC’s position as a genuine
sports organization, referencing Balsiger’s opinion that “SAN-ROC [was] trying to
infiltrate the sports with politics to make the South African sports a tool of some shady
political ambitions. … The ‘representations’ are a document which would not
originate from a sports authority but rather originate in the kitchen of the communist
party."71 Balsiger was convinced that should SAN-ROC succeed at the IOC, the present
financial support for “the Bantu sports would stop immediately. The victims would
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only be the Black[s] themselves.”72 Mayer concluded with a rhetorical question that
may have implied his concurrence with Balsiger:
Is it not an insult to the Olympic idea when a small number of
opportunistic politicians who exploit the present insecurity which
could have possibly been caused by the IOC decision in Moscow. …
South Africa will be thrown into chaos and anarchy if Apartheid [sic]
is not maintained. Maybe 100 years from now the Bantus will be able
to provide the necessary understanding to share equal
responsibilities. A racial unity is much easier achieved in sport,
especially when all political influences are kept from it.73
Mayer himself remained ambiguous about the content and direction of Balsiger’s
report, but its public release just prior to SANOC submitting its own report, must have
seemed fortuitous for the South African organization.74 SANOC’s own report detailed
its claimed progress and current position on South African sport. The report resulted
from the resolution at the 1962 IOC General Session in Moscow and two subsequent
letters by Mayer and Brundage, written in June 1962 and August 1963, respectively.75
SANOC’s report included its interpretation of the Moscow resolution:
From the aforementioned Resolution taken in Moscow and the
letters … it would appear that there is no charge or allegation that
the South African [National] Olympic Committee is responsible for
any breach or disregard of Fundamental Rule No. 1. It is gratifying to
note that the South African [National] Olympic Committee enjoys the
confidence of the International Olympic Committee. We take this
opportunity to re-affirm that it has always been and still is the policy
of the South African [National] Olympic Committee to abide by this
rule … It would appear, however, that the International Olympic
Committee is under the impression that Governmental prohibitions
limit the freedom of action and prevent the observance by the South
African [National] Olympic Committee of this Olympic Rule.76
An ambiguous position emerged from the report. SANOC argued that it had not
breached Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. It was ‘governmental prohibitions’ that
were seen as the cause of the problem, but, in reality, “… there [was] no justification
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nor any valid basis for the charge made against the South African Government.”77 To
justify its claims, SANOC cited three examples as evidence. First, a statement had been
made by the Minister of the Interior on 18 January 1963: “Should there be NonEuropeans who qualify for inclusion in the South African contingent which will
participate in the next Olympic Games, application for travelling facilities should be
made in good time, and each application will then be considered on its own merits
and in the light of Government Policy.”78 This statement did not directly identify
discrimination against participation, but it did not specify what ‘government policy’
might entail; the latter, as the IOC well knew, underscored racial discrimination.
Second, the report listed a variety of international events that had been held where
both South African whites and non-whites participated: (1) boxing in Rhodesia
(December, 1961) and the U.S.A. (March, 1963); (2) athletics in Britain (July, 1963);
and (3) weightlifting in Stockholm and the Mr. Universe contests (September, 1963).
Unmentioned, however, were occasional controversies at these international events,
such as the case of black weightlifter Precious McKenzie, who qualified to compete,
but due to his refusal to join an association affiliated with SANOC, was not invited to
the competition. Third, obtaining passports and international travel was mentioned
as encountering no difficulties, but individual decisions remained entirely at the whim
of the government. Those athletes and sporting personnel who did not receive
clearance were not allowed to leave the country.
The second significant issue emphasized in SANOC’s report was the adherence to
IOC rules and regulations. It was established IOC principle that the IOC did not
interfere with the internal policies of countries, and that its chief concerns were the
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maintenance of amateur regulations and the rejection of exclusion from participation
for racial reasons. SANOC reaffirmed that athletes selected on merit and with proper
affiliation would be included in the coming Olympic Games. A complete list of bodies
affiliated to SANOC, each of which provided for the inclusion of non-white
associations, was provided. Also specified were the non-white organizations of
Olympic-type sports, each of which had affiliated to the national controlling bodies.
Thirdly, the issue of material and financial support was raised. SANOC argued that
“[c]onsiderable financial assistance has been made available both by Government and
Local authorities, as well as by private industry, particularly the mining industry, to
the non-white South Africa sportsmen for their benefit and welfare.”79 Therefore, the
organization concluded, “phenomenal advancement and improvement in the various
branches of sport in which the non-whites are interested has been accomplished in
recent years.”80 Multiple examples of assistance that, in SANOC’s view, benefited nonwhites in sport, were listed.
SAN-ROC, unsurprisingly, but also some IOC members remained dissatisfied with
SANOC’s report, and Brundage invited a select group of IOC members to join him for
a conference on 16 October 1963, to discuss the South African question.81 Resolution
proposals were drafted by Sir Arthur Porritt (New Zealand),82 Mr. Alexander
(Kenya),83 Mr. G.D. Sondhi (India),84 Mr. Massard (France),85 and Marquess of Exeter
(England),86 and the Baden-Baden IOC General Session minutes reported that SANOC
did not move from its position: “The [South African] delegation frankly states that
apartheid is no business of the IOC. Anyhow: Non-whites can train together with
whites and competitions can also take place between them outside South Africa. If
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non-whites qualify they will be nominated to the team.”87 Resistance to South African
participation therefore, so SANOC argued, was stirred up by “political agitators.”88 The
IOC noted “that important progress had been made,” 89 but it remained unconvinced.
The final resolution was carried by 30 to 20 votes; it instructed SANOC,
… to make a firm declaration of its acceptance of the spirit of the
Olympic Code and in particular of Principle 1 and Rule 24 read
together, and must get from its Government by December 31st 1963
a change in policy regarding racial discrimination in sports and
competitions in its country, failing which the South African National
Olympic Committee will be debarred from entering its teams in the
Olympic Games.90
The threat of South Africa’s suspension had now been formally raised. To ensure
participation in the 1964 Tokyo Games, the obligation to fulfill the requirements of
the resolution now clearly rested with SANOC. SANOC representative Reginald Honey
was present at the decisive meeting and voted on the resolution, and SANOC president
Braun had a conversation on the issue with Brundage, but Braun claimed nonetheless
that no official statement had been issued on South African participation. Although
taken aback by this claim, Mayer acknowledged a potential miscommunication and
volunteered to "extend the delay to January 15th 1964 [i.e., two weeks].… If I missed
to follow the right line, I regret it and apologize.”91 Mayer pointed out to Brundage
that SANOC’s “silly excuse not to reply in time” had been seized on by SAN-ROC: “My
sources of information are: A telephone call from the DAILY MAIL, LONDON and a
cable from that silly HARRIS chairman of SAN-ROC which I received this morning,
saying this: ‘Mr. Braun claims South African [National] Olympic Committee has had no
official notification of Baden-Baden decision and is therefore not bound to report to
IOC. Urgently request you do not allow this evasion’.”92
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In the official letter withdrawing South Africa’s invitation to the Tokyo Games, the
IOC cited the reasons for the retraction and listed the conditions under which SANOC
would be reconsidered for participation in the Olympics. First, proper trials for
selection of a truly representative South African team had to take place. Second,
SANOC had an obligation to disassociate itself from government policy, which, the IOC
determined, SANOC had failed to do. Lastly, once SANOC had carried out its duty
arising from Article 24 of the Olympic Charter, the IOC would reconsider its
participation in the Olympic Movement.93
Undeterred by the IOC General Session’s decision, Braun continued to argue for
SANOC’s participation in the Tokyo and later Olympic Games, assuming that the
retraction of the invitation had not been decided on lightly since “… it would create a
precedent which could have very far-reaching repercussions upon the ideals of the
Olympic Movement itself.”94 Probably attempting to delay, as was part of SANOC’s
plan, he reiterated SANOC’s argument that significant progress had been made in
South African non-white sports, and that the IOC’s decision could only have adverse
effects: “… we have opened the door from within, and now it may be shut from
without.”95
The resolution’s fundamental rationale, Braun argued, focussed directly on
governmental policies, and as such it was misdirected: “It is regrettable that the
opponents of South Africa should have sought to exploit the Baden-Baden Congress
as a political arena by making athletes political hostages to force ‘a change in policy
regarding racial discrimination in sports and competitions in their country’.”96 The
implications of the resolution might therefore well be detrimental to the functioning
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of the IOC itself: “… your resolution creates a very dangerous slope on which to place
sport and is tantamount to requiring us – the sportsmen and athletes of South Africa
to enter into Politics – NOT MERELY TO OPPOSE BUT TO DENOUNCE OUR
GOVERNMENT.97
The South African government declined to consider a policy change, but
reaffirmed its stated position, viz., that any athlete selected on merit would be given
the opportunity to participate in the Tokyo Games. Braun used this reaffirmation to
ask for “a little tolerance and goodwill and a measure of sympathetic co-operation,”
and pleaded for a deferment of action until after 1964 Tokyo Games: “The test of the
sincerity and bona-fides of my Association and the success of its efforts in upholding
Olympic Principles will be in the manner in which we deal with our country’s
participation in the forthcoming Tokyo Olympic Games. My Association will faithfully
abide by the undertakings given by me at Baden-Baden to bring to the Olympic Games
the best athletes in this country, regardless of race.” 98 Braun may have taken comfort
from the fact that the decision had by no means been unanimous. A vote of 30-20 in
favour, with three abstentions, demonstrated a significant remaining base of support
for SANOC. Braun certainly felt inclined to thank the Marquess of Exeter, for one, for
assistance given: “…we especially thank you for the outspoken and fully justified
sentiments…. Your comments on the resolution bring home very clearly with striking
force, that this Resolution in its present form, if carried into effect, will achieve
nothing except to exclude and sacrifice athletes who are in no way responsible for,
nor can in any way bring about any change in Governmental policy.”99

159
In his correspondence with the IOC, meanwhile, Braun pursued SANOC’s
customary line of reasoning. He claimed as before that significant developments in
non-White sports had been brought about by the organization, which would be put at
risk by the exclusion of South Africa; all that was required was more time to bring to
fruition a strategy that was, furthermore, constrained by the fact that SANOC was not
in a position to override official South African government policies: “I beg to suggest
that with further similar help and encouragement from the IOC more will be
accomplished in this direction. … Drastic action at this stage by the IOC would be in
conflict with the Olympic Ideal and would not contribute towards the eventual
successful outcome of our efforts, but on the contrary it would defeat its very
purpose.”100 In a personal note to Brundage, Braun then added a new argument,
pointing to South Africa’s being “strongly represented” at the Tokyo World Paraplegic
Games, giving rise to the “anomalous position … [of being] absent from the premier
sporting festival the next week; where the flower of South African sportsmen have
participated since 1908 with distinction, and honoured all Olympic rules and
regulations without incident of any sort.”101 Faced with expulsion, Braun recalibrated
SANOC’s approach, expressing contrition about the style of his interactions with the
IOC without admitting to doubts about the organization’s arguments, pointing out
that his occasionally perhaps intemperate interventions had been fuelled by “a sense
of frustration and also a deep sense of disappointment, which I feel at the injustice
that will be done to our Non-White athletes, in particular, and to our other young
sportsmen if they are deprived of the opportunity of marching with pride and dignity
alongside the other athletes of the world.”102 His concluding missive reaffirmed
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contrition by assuming a supplicatory posture: “If you feel that the presence of a South
African delegate at Innsbruck may serve some purpose, please advise me as soon as
possible so that arrangements can be made in good time.”103 Both Mayer’s and
Brundage’s responses were conciliatory. “It will do no harm and possibly some good
if you have a representative at Innsbruck,”104 wrote Brundage, but the IOC meetings
at Innsbruck would place a damper on Braun’s and SANOC’s hopes. The IOC Executive
Board noted an overall lack of progress, and a failing on SANOC’s part publically to
dissociate itself from South African government policies. Brundage “…noted some
progress but [said] that the promises from Baden-Baden had not been kept. The other
members said that SANOC had not carried out its obligations…. A resolution to that
effect would be proposed to the Session.”105 At the General Session, the same
conclusion was reached: “The resolution passed at Baden-Baden still stands and the
invitation to the South African team to compete in Tokyo is withdrawn. When the
SANOC has carried out its duty under rule 24 it will then be in a position to return to
the IOC for reconsideration of the decision.”106
Undaunted, Braun continued his efforts to promote SANOC and to publicize
improvements in the current status of sport in South Africa. In an official statement to
the IOC Executive Board, SANOC reaffirmed the acceptance and recognition of Article
1, including “…the principle that complete equality of opportunity shall be afforded to
all citizens of the Republic of South Africa to compete in the Olympic Games.”107
Complying with Article 24 was not an issue since all prospective contestants were
entitled to compete for the South African Olympic team by meeting the necessary
standards. A list of nominations for the forthcoming Olympics – comprising both non-
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whites and whites – was provided and final team selection was to be made in
collaboration with administrators of both white and non-white sports bodies
affiliated with SANOC; all athletes selected would be issued the same South African
Olympic colours. With such assurances in place, SANOC implied, the onus now rested
with the IOC, not SANOC: “… it now rests with the International Olympic Committee
Executive to decide whether non-whites from this country shall be given an
opportunity of participating in the Olympic Games, or if this privilege is to be denied
to them.”108 Braun followed up this strategic shifting of responsibilities by attempting
to rationalize SANOC’s position that despite the strictures posed by South African race
politics, the organization was in the forefront of non-white sports development:
Whilst we do not denounce present policy in South Africa, it must be
obvious to you and the Gentlemen of the Executive Board that more
is being done in this country for the Non-white Sportsmen and sports
women than in most other parts of Africa. And whilst we do not in
any way wish to point a finger at any of our opponents, we bring to
your attention the fact that tremendous strides have been made with
Government help to furnish our Non-white community with modern
facilities of every description, so that the standard of their sport can
be raised to heights which will help them to aspire to Olympic
honours.109
It was, in this interpretation offered by SANOC, thus the IOC and not SANOC itself who
had “to realise that it has a very responsible decision to make for the furtherance of
our non-white athletic aspirations”110 – by admitting the South African team to the
Tokyo Olympics.
Braun followed up on this theme. He also wrote to Brundage under the same date,
attempting to demonstrate to Brundage the loss that South African exclusion would
entail, by submitting a provisional selection of a proposed Olympic Games team that
would attend the Tokyo Games. This, he wrote, was to demonstrate that SANOC had
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“nothing more at heart than the progressive development of Non-white sport in South
Africa to bring it to the standard of white sport and into the sphere of international
competition. With the magnificent facilities being provided by the Government, Local
Authorities and private sources, together with the expert coaching provided, it is
already evident that great heights can be reached by our Non-white athlete.”111 And
the IOC would share in the international approbation incurred by such a development,
“you and your Executive will have reason to be proud of the part you have played in
furthering your Olympic Ideals in South Africa.”112 According to Braun, the best course
of action was to include South Africa in the upcoming Olympic Games:
There is nothing to be gained by preventing the South African Team,
which will include the selected Non-white athletes, from competing
at Tokyo, but far more will be achieved along the lines requested by
you if these sportsmen are given the opportunity to travel to the next
Olympic Games as representatives of South Africa…. Knowing that
you have always had our interests very sincerely at heart, I leave the
further consideration of this matter in your hands with the greatest
confidence.113
But following the IOC Executive Board meeting in Lausanne, little had changed in
the IOC’s position: “As the NOC had not publicly stated that it disassociated itself from
the Apartheid [sic] policy the requirements of the resolution from [the] Innsbruck
[General Session] have not been met. If South Africa has not done so before August 16
(= final date for the entries) their participation cannot be considered.”114 Frustrated,
Braun now interpreted the IOC stance itself as indicative of discrimination: “Failure
of the IOC Executive to restore our invitation to Tokyo would be tantamount to the
[South African National Olympic Committee] and the South African athletes being
made the victims of political discrimination.”115 Mayer returned the argument,
locating the issue of political discrimination firmly in the South African system. “I very
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much regret,” Mayer noted, “that you have nothing further to add to your last letter of
June 20th. As I wrote to you, the Executive Board of the IOC, at its meeting of June 26th
in Lausanne, confirmed the conditions decided previously and under which only your
Committee might receive an invitation to take part in the Tokyo Games. Those
conditions having not been fulfilled…. We certainly regret that your athletes are
deprived of taking part in the Tokyo Games owing to racial discrimination in sport in
your country, although we have done our best. There is certainly no political
discrimination, as you say, in the IOC’s decision.”116 The IOC would not reconsider its
decision.

2.1 The Unofficial Correspondence of Ira Emery
Subsequent to the 1960 Rome Games, Lilian Francey succeeded Ira Emery as
Secretary General of SANOC. Emery attributed his defeat to the opposition of
influential groups that had been antagonized by, as he noted, his endeavour “to have
our colour bar question, insofar as sport is concerned, amicably settled…. I am firmly
of the opinion, that through my efforts in this direction, certain elements in this
country are annoyed with me through my persuasion in forcing these affiliations.… I
am fully convinced that my efforts on behalf of the non-Whites have been the cause of
my having lost the position of Secretary General which I coveted for so many years.”117
IOC member Reginald Honey, for one, concurred, and upon learning that Emery had
not been re-elected as Secretary General, immediately resigned from SANOC.
Emery had lost his office, but not his interest in South African sports, and he
offered Brundage his unofficial services: “If you would care at any time to write to me
unofficially about the position regarding the non-whites and Whites, particularly in
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regard to their travelling to international contests, I would be happy to give you
confidentially, the true picture here, as I have always done in the past.”118 Since Emery
maintained his domestic and international contacts, he, in effect, remained a valuable
source of intelligence over the next three years approaching the 1964 Tokyo Olympic
Games. From this position, he helped to assess the future of SANOC within the Olympic
Movement. In addition to scores of letters with commentary, some five dozen missives
were sent to Brundage or Mayer containing contemporary newspaper clippings.
Emery’s unofficial correspondence offers important insights into the issue under
consideration here.
About a month after his removal from SANOC, Emery entered into his
correspondence with Brundage, appraising him of developments in the problematic
between race and sports in South Africa. With him and Reginald Honey gone from the
organization, he noted, “the extremists in our Association [i.e., SANOC] seem to have
gained control, and much as I regret to say it, unless Mr. Honey and I can work
underground as it were, the chances of mixed competitions in this country for trials
for the Games in Tokyo will go by the board.”119 The hardening of SANOC’s stance
could only lead to political backlash by the “non-European [sic] associations in this
country [who] will make more strenuous efforts to force the issue not only in this
country but with countries outside.”120 In view of these developments, Emery
remained skeptical about the probability of SANOC receiving much support at the
subsequent IOC meeting: “mixed sport must come if we are to remain a member of
the IOC.”121
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Emery understood clearly what SANOC must accomplish in order to retain its
membership in the IOC. He realized that the pressures from domestic resistance
would only increase if no solution was found: “It would appear to me that this attitude
… will give a great lead to the South African Sports Association (the organiser of whom
is Mr. Brutus) to carry on their campaign with countries throughout the world.”122
Brundage also saw the political liability of the issue increasing: “Already we are
receiving vigorous protests and it will be difficult to keep this subject off the agenda
for our [March Executive Board] meeting [in Lausanne].”123 Nonetheless, in view of
the South African government’s political stance, the issue would be difficult to resolve
in the area of sports alone. “If we endeavour to arrange mixed sport now in this
country,” Emery replied, “the Group Areas Act (1960) will be put into operation by
the Government, which most certainly will preclude us from having mixed trials in
any branch of sport…. if [South Africans] are not permitted in the Olympic Games of
1964 there will be such a rumpus among the sport people in this country that it may
mean a complete revision of the feeling towards mixed sport.”124 In particular so, as
Emery noted, similar action might also be coming from FIFA, the powerful
organization running international soccer (association football): “… the sporting
public of this country will be so incensed, that it may force the issue [of interracial
sports] with the present Government authorities responsible for the prohibition of
such trials.”125 Then perhaps, he concluded a day later, “we will be able to come back
honestly into the fold of the Olympic and Empire Games.”126 But this would only be
achieved through reactions in South Africa to the actual exclusion of South African
teams that would put pressure on the South African government, and “I still contend
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that the actions taken by the various international Sports Federation against us will
be the only way in which we can beat the colour bar in sport.”127 The underlying issue,
for Emery, was and remained the official policies of the South African government on
race relations, and it might be possible to move ahead through intervention by
international sports organizations:
Owing to Government regulations and the Group Areas Act, Whites
and non-Whites may not compete in sport in the Republic of South
Africa…. I am quite convinced that the [boxing] match organised in
Rhodesia between Whites and non-Whites was occasioned only
through threat of expulsion of South Africa from the International
Olympic Committee owing to the colour…. As I pointed out to you
previously, I am quite sure that if international sports associations
demand competition in the Republic of South Africa of Whites and
non-Whites, and not have to hold matches outside, this colour bar
will be broken down as far as sports is concerned in the Republic.128
Emery’s seasoned sense of the South African sport culture gave him a credibility
acknowledged by Brundage: “I have read the clippings which you sent, with interest,
and I hope it will be possible to find a solution to this thorny problem before too
long.”129 But Emery harboured no illusions concerning the difficulties of SANOC’s
position: “I do hope that Mr. Honey can make the trip to Warsaw as I am afraid that
there will be strong opposition to our competing at Tokyo if the case is not handled
properly by somebody from this country. I know you will do all in your power to help
us but sometimes it looks rather hopeless.”130
Although outside of SANOC’s control, controversies such as the denial of training
facilities to a visiting swimming team from Japan by the Pretoria City Council at the
end of 1962, 131 did not help matters. Emery was left to consider the negative impacts
of such incidents for South Africa’s Olympic aspirations, but he looked for a silver
lining: “You may recall that I suggested if a warning were given to South Africa, actions
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of this kind will make it imperative for the matter to be discussed at Warsaw and may
stop the agitation against multi-racial sports in this country.”132 The ban was lifted
eventually, and Emery viewed other such incidents in the same light, pinning his hope
on the South African sports system being stirred into action in response to the racial
policies of the country. “You will see,” he advised Brundage, “that even very senior
Government action is to be taken regarding the refusal of Pretoria to permit Chinese
to play with Whites in soft-ball, and that the Police have warned Whites not to play
football with non-Whites in Natal…. I am sure you will, and your Executive will realise
that sportsmen in this country will eventually force the issue as far as multi-racial
sport is concerned.”133 Emery went so far as to speculate that a one-year suspension,
though not an expulsion, for SANOC might serve as a corrective to spur the
government into action – while still leaving sufficient time for South Africa to prepare
for readmission to the Tokyo Games at the end of such a period.134
For Emery thus, SANOC’s position remained in doubt because of what he viewed
as the uncertainty over the country’s political direction. He was disappointed by the
statement on mixed sport by the Minister of Interior, Jan De Klerk, when the latter
was asked to assess the impact for SANOC’s continuing membership or expulsion
from the IOC, of the incidents mentioned above, “… this final statement by the Minister
… cut the ground away from my feet and there is little more I can do. I doubt also if
your representative in this country, Mr. R. Honey can do anymore.”135 Both Emery and
Honey were approached by the press to comment on the statement by De Klerk. For
lack of a better option, Honey, so Emery noted, resorted to SANOC’s stock reponse:
“The only statement Mr. Honey was prepared to make was that he did give an

168
assurance to the International Committee that if a non-European was up to standard
he would be sent.”136 What was really needed, Emery thought, were changes to the
Minister of the Interior’s statement and thus a policy change, but those did not appear
to be forthcoming.137
Public debates in the media regarding the necessity for a change in government
policy on the issues of racially segregated or unified teams, and the permission of nonwhite athletes to travel abroad, came to the fore during the subsequent days. Emery
informed Brundage of the scope of this discussion, ranging from a call for a clear shift
in race segregation policies to the endorsement of a team selected solely on athletic
merit and allowed to travel overseas regardless of colour.138 Ultimately, Emery noted,
any political strategy leading to the debarment of the South African team would “upset
many, many people in this country including ardent supporters of the present
Government. Sport is a very strong cog in the wheels of this country.”139 Ultimately,
however, Emery admitted, that SANOC’s hands were tied unless the Minister changed
the government’s stance of outlawing mixed sport in- and outside the country.140 This,
as he had observed already, could more likely be effected by IOC action than any
pressure the internal opposition might be able to muster. His review for Brundage of
an abundance of new items in the South African papers on the issue, did not change
his earlier evaluation: “My feeling is that if we are suspended from the IOC until such
time as a modification of the statement is made, such modification will be made
sooner than one expects.”141
Brundage shared Emery’s overall view, but considered the effects of this situation
on the IOC: “This will undoubtedly force the International Olympic Committee to take
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action, since we are under pressure from many quarters…. The situation in South
Africa now seems to be a definite violation of our fundamental principle against racial
discrimination. We have been lenient enough, I think you will agree.”142
The IOC’s range of options was increasingly restricted with every racial
discriminatory comment by the government and SANOC’S inability or unwillingness
to respond, but Brundage was not in favour of a two-team solution suggested by
Emery: “I am sure the IOC will not approve two separate teams from any country.
However, it might be that a South African team could be sent in two sections, but even
this would be difficult to arrange. … Unless the Committee is assured that its rules and
regulations are going to be followed in South Africa, it is almost certain that drastic
action, which I regret, will have to be taken.”143 SANOC’s suspension seemed
unavoidable by then, particularly so since that even if a two-team approach had been
acceptable for international events, it would simply have been illegal according to the
legal regulations: “There is one thing that you can rest quite assured, that irrespective
of whether the S.A. Government will allow non-Whites to represent South Africa
overseas, they will never be permitted to take part in mixed trials in this country, as
the Group Areas Act, which is law, will at all times be evoked, so preventing any trials
whatsoever between Black and White in the Republic.”144 An intermediate suggestion
of sorts, to let the soon to be instituted quasi-independent Republic of Transkei (one
of the Bantustans to be reserved for non-white populations) affiliate to the IOC, to
balance representation of white and non-white teams. “This is so much utter
nonsense,” Emery noted, “as the Transkei will always be governed by the Republic
and the non-Whites from the Republic outside the area of the Transkei could never be
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accommodated in that area.”145 It is indeed true that throughout the almost thirty
years of its existence, the Transkei (now a part of South Africa’s Eastern Cape
province) was diplomatically recognized by just one country, South Africa.
Matters worsened, and internal tensions within the South African sporting
community also increased. Opposition from Dennis Brutus and SASA was energized
by a failure on the South African Amateur Athletics Union’s (SAAAU) part to nominate
and select to the team two non-white athletes who had met the defined performance
standards at the trials. SAAAU president, Mr. Marè, so Emery thought, had bowed to
government pressure. “I have defended the various associations here against Mr.
Brutus … insofar as the standard of the non-White sportsmen was concerned…. I
cannot honestly defend the S.A.A. Athletics Union any further.”146 Not having official
standing himself any longer, Emery urged the Marquess of Exeter to ask Mr. Marè at
the subsequent meeting of the International Amateur Athletic Federation: why his
assurances have been reversed; whether non-whites would be permitted to compete
with white athletes in the Republic; and, whether non-white athletes would be
permitted to have contests in places reserved for Whites?147 Emery believed that
SAAAU’s irresponsibility merited suspension from SANOC, “… I am afraid now that
politics has entered into athletic sport in this country…. the suspension, not expulsion
of the S.A. Athletic Union would, I am sure have a salutary effect on other Governing
Bodies of sport in this country and in turn would have a very serious effect on the
attitude of certain members of the Government of this country.”148 None of this made
conceivable the unproblematic acceptance of non-white athletes in a country where
“certain people have been charged in the Magistrate’s Court for playing in a mixed
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game, when the Group Areas Act … was evoked.”149 It would take the suspension of
South Africa from international sports governing bodies to “get close to achieving the
ideals of the International Olympic Committee sooner than one expects.”150 The
evasive position taken by SAAAU on the issue, which according to Emery, referred to
“the many factors [that] had to be taken into consideration before the decision was
made,” without elaborating on those factors could not obscure the underlying racerelated reasoning.151 Emery was convinced that the non-white athletes had not been
selected because of their skin colour, but SANOC President Gen. Klopper justified the
decision, pointing out that although the non-white athlete had met the standard, the
white runner had beaten his time in two different meetings.152 Therefore, athletic
criteria alone had been applied.
As the IOC Moscow meetings drew nearer, de Klerk still showed no inclination to
alter his statement about mixed sport, where Reg Honey was to represent South
Africa.153 Not wishing to impugn Honey who surely would not seek to mislead the IOC,
Emery was nonetheless dubious about the veracity of the government information on
the removal of restrictions on multi-racial sport reaching SANOC and thus Honey, via
SANOC President General Klopper.154 Klopper himself had made it crystal-clear “that
over his dead body would non-Whites and Whites compete in trials against each other
in South Africa,”155 and Mr. Marè of the SAAAU had recently had to yield to political
pressure in refusing to condone an inter-racial competition at a meeting to be
attended by South African athletes in Lourence Marques,156 present-day Maputo, the
capital of Mozambique; so much for the promise of international, if not internal, interracial sports competitions. The notion of mixed sports had to remain a pipedream.

172
With only twelve months to go until the IOC’s final decision, the likelihood of interracial trials in South Africa remained extremely unlikely, a fact that SANOC’s and
Klopper’s prevarications did little to obscure. “I do not think that statements as made
by Gen. Klopper that non-Whites will be selected to represent South Africa in
international sport (you will notice he has never mentioned the Olympic Games) can
be relied upon”.157 The intractability of the South African political situation led
Brundage to re-emphasize the primacy of IOC regulations in arriving at an adequate
resolution: “I think you will agree that we were not as harsh as we might have been.
We are not asking the Government to change its policies, all we require is that the
Government permits the National Olympic Committee to function according to our
regulations. If it is prevented from doing so, there is only one course we can take.”158
SANOC’s expulsion seemed to be that inevitable course of action, and Emery
concurred with Brundage: “I quite agree that the IOC were more than lenient with
your South African counterpart, and I am equally certain the members of the South
African body were more than surprised at the fair hearing given to your
representative for South Africa, Mr. Honey.”159 However, Emery doubted that
government attitudes would change before the deadline of the upcoming General
Session in Nairobi. He remained convinced that mixed sport would never happen,
insinuating that “… when the team is finally selected, even in two years’ time, it will
be found that the non-Whites are not up to the required standard.”160 Emery thought
SANOC should ask the government whether the Group Areas Act could be set aside if
non-whites demanded facilities and trials, and the government agreed to a mixed race
team to represent South Africa at the next Olympic Games. “Unless the [South African

173
National Olympic Committee] can give this assurance,” expressed Emery, “then I
contend, the matter should again be discussed by your Executive.”161 Brundage
remained cautious, however, reluctant directly to involve himself in South African
internal policy matters, insisting at the same time on the precedence of IOC rules:
“Naturally we cannot interfere in the domestic affairs of any country, but we can
enforce our own rules and this would prevent two teams from one country.”162 At the
end of the day, if changes were not made to accommodate a single, mixed team, South
Africa would have no team at all, and certainly not two. The fall-out of that decision,
Brundage noted, would have asymmetrical impacts since the IOC would be
“penalizing maybe 100 innocent white athletes for the sake of a handful of colored
athletes. This doesn’t seem quite fair either, but we do have to hold our principles.”163
Emery expected little help from the “non-European,” that is, non-white South
African organization such as SASA who were under-organized, under-developed,
under-funded, and, most importantly, they did not have “the sports bodies which are
attached to the Olympic Games movement, and they will never have the finance to
organise such an association. This latest attempt is quite ridiculous, and more than
ever political.” 164 Neither was it likely that such under-powered organizations could
be represented at SANOC by non-white representatives, an idea that had been mooted
by new SANOC Secretary General, Mrs. Francey, creating a “considerable amount of
embarrassment to the President of the Association, General Klopper.”165
As the correspondence indicates, the situation did not improve in the subsequent
months,166 but by mid-November 1962 Brundage received an invitation to visit South
Africa, all expenses paid by De Vaterland, a pro-government publication. He solicited
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Emery’s advice: “I replied that if and when I went to South Africa it would be at my
own expense. Incidentally, would any purpose be served by such a visit? What do you
think? Mr. Honey has been after me to make the trip, and as you know, I will be in
Africa next year.”167 Emery was skeptical about the utility of such a trip: The
government’s position had not changed; neither would the arrival of Brundage lead
to any accommodation of the opposing positions. The only possibility that offered
itself therefore would be the nomination of two separate teams, a solution entirely
unacceptable to the IOC. Moreover, since such teams also would have to be selected
through entirely separate trials,
… each team [would] represent its own section of the populace, then
your meeting in Johannesburg can, I think, be embarrassing to you….
Things however, may change between now and 1963/4…. Pressure
is being brought to bear on certain Government officials which may
eventually result in a compromise between White and non-White
representatives on national bodies…. On the other hand, there are so
many die-hards against this mixing, that I personally do not think the
Government will change their decision at the present time.168
Emery advised Brundage to visit Johannesburg, and Brundage set forth conditions
to indicate his arm’s-length distance from the South African organizations: “If I do
come to South Africa, it will be after our meeting in Kenya and not before, and at my
expense as I said before. After the South African [National] Olympic Committee has
made its report, I will review the situation and decide whether it is advisable for me
to make the trip.”169
Shortly after, in early 1963, Emery deliberated on the news that Sir Stanley Rous
was to visit South Africa to end FIFA’s, the world football (soccer) association’s,
suspension. When Rous did appear, there was a demonstration by non-whites
demanding a fair hearing. “I do not know what views Sir Stanley will bring back to
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England or pass on to you,” Emery noted to Brundage, “but he is adamant that two
associations will not be affiliated to the International Football Federation.”170 It was
clear to Emery that Rous’ visit had brought the issue of mixed as opposed to separate
teams back into the area of public media debate: “I have had a private luncheon with
certain Ministers of our cabinet and I am still definitely of the opinion that the
Government will not permit a mixed team to compete in South Africa or outside the
Republic,”

171

Emery summarized the situation, but some suspense remained in

regard to “Sir Stanley Rous’ reaction to his meeting with the Non-Europeans.”172 The
press, Emery reported to Brundage, also took the theme up again, shining in this
context again a light on the position of SAN-ROC, an inevitable aspect of any discussion
concerning the possibility or impossibility of a mixed team: neither the government,
nor the white and non-white public would accept the legitimacy of SAN-ROC, and thus
of a mixed team. Emery thought that this could only lead to the expulsion of South
Africa, unless SAN-ROC were to change “its attitude regarding segregation of sport,
suspension must follow. The setup will be, as far as you are concerned, that South
Africa will select one or two Non-Whites, whether they are up to standard or not, if
South Africa is permitted to take part in the Games in Tokyo. This will of course be a
blind [alley], as the non-Whites and the Whites will not travel as one team, nor will
they enter against each other in any one event of the Olympic Games.”173
For Emery, it was obvious, the unlawfulness of mixed sports remained the
intractable obstacle. As long as mixed sport was not allowed, SANOC’s chances to
participate in the 1964 Tokyo Games were nil. For Brundage, likewise, this remained
“a difficult nut to crack,”174 and although he assured Emery that the IOC did not expect
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much of SAN-ROC, since it “would have no more success in organizing a satisfactory
South African team than the South African Olympic Association, with the existing
attitude of the Government,”175 he at least did for the first time explicitly acknowledge
the organization’s existence, in other words, a first reference to organized domestic
resistance.
However, given the circumstances in South African sports, no organization could
succeed in developing a non-racial Olympic team; equality of opportunity for nonwhite athletes simply did not exist, and the impetus for change would have to come
from the outside: “This, in my opinion, is going to be the last wail from the non-Whites,
because they will contend, and quite rightly so, that the Whites have far better
facilities for their training and final competitions…. Mr. Honey has advocated that
there should be mixed sport in South Africa, but I am afraid this statement has not
been taken too well in Government circles or by the majority of the public…. It will
only be through drastic action by the international sports Federations, that mixed
sport inside and outside the Republic will be permitted.”176
An unlikely solution briefly floated, one Emery was sure the IOC would also reject
out of hand, would consist of “a suggestion … made to you that if non-Whites are
selected, they will represent the non-White population, and the Whites – the White
population…. Only on these conditions will non-Whites be able to attend the
Games.”177 The strength of sentiment against any solution accommodating non-white
athletes was indicated by the government-controlled South African Broadcasting
Corporation’s refusal to broadcast the Natal Golf Open because it promoted multiracial sport. Brundage responded that if a mutually satisfactory conclusion could not
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be found, the IOC might be forced to take drastic action,178 but to Emery it seemed that
herein might indeed be found a resolution: “For some time now I have suggested that
if drastic action was threatened against South Africa for its racial policy by the
International Federations, it would force change. You have no doubt been advised that
change in a manner has come about.”179 He offered as an example for the success of
such a strategy that four white and four non-white boxers had been sent to Utica (New
York) for a competition. They travelled on separate planes, but stayed in the same
hotel. This was the first time this had happened in South African sport. To Emery, this
represented a promising development, but he remained concerned that “applications
will now be made for Whites and non-Whites to tour this country and compete in
multi-racial sport, which the Government will not allow. I think that now you will not
have to take such drastic action as was first contemplated and hope that the advent of
the White and non-White boxers going to the U.S.A. will at least relieve some pressure
on you.”180 Brundage was equally optimistic in his response: “Progress has indeed
been made when South Africa sends both black and white boxers to take part in a
tournament in the United States…. There is no reason why the same procedure cannot
be followed in the Olympic Games, and this may well solve our problem.”181
Brundage nonetheless sought to remain aware of all possible options to influence
a difficult situation. SAN-ROC was an unknown entity, but in requesting more
information from Emery, he indirectly acknowledged its existence as a possible part
of a solution. Emery was skeptical: “… [Chairman] Mr. Harris is quite unknown in
white sporting circles in this country…. I personally have never heard of him, and as
far as this country is concerned, he carries no weight at all in international sport.”182
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Brundage however, was insistent: “How many members has the South African NonRacial Olympic Committee and how many people do they represent? Is it not true that
they are more interested in politics than they are in sport? … I hope we can find a more
satisfactory solution at our meeting next month in Baden-Baden.”183 Emery dismissed
SAN-ROC as representing “some thousands of non-White sportsmen, but I am quite
certain they have never yet organized any particular function in sport.”184
The meetings in Baden-Baden ended with a formal resolution threatening the
suspension of SANOC, if no solution could be found in due time. If it did not abide by
the Olympic Charter in due time, a suspension would be inevitable. SANOC’s progress
was acknowledged, and even though “very few outside of those having political
animus wanted to punish anyone,” it would be necessary for SANOC “as an agent of
the International Olympic Committee, to make a public expression of its position on
the subject of racial discrimination. The choice was of keeping a few individuals out
of the Olympic Games or of suspending the Committee, which would inhibit its
activities.”185 Brundage and Emery alike were surprised to find Reginald Honey’s
public approach at the Baden-Baden meeting to be more hindrance than help. Emery
expressed his shock “when my dear friend Reg. Honey gave his supposed outburst
against the International Olympic Committee. I am quite sure he was mis-reported
but nevertheless he seemed upset at the outcome of the discussions.”186 But Emery
did not share even the slight optimism that Brundage had expressed; the political
obstacles appeared unsurmountable: “I am glad you feel that the situation is not
entirely hopeless but I must tell you now that the [South African National Olympic
Committee] through its affiliated governing bodies of sport will not be able to hold
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mixed trials in this country. There is a law against White and non-Whites taking part
in boxing and wrestling against each other.”187 Braun of SANOC, to the approval of the
South African Minister of the Interior, also had expressed opposition to “the IOC’s
ruling that multi-racial trials must be held in South Africa.” 188 Were a foreign athletic
team ever to compete in South Africa, Emery concluded on a skeptical note, “no nonWhite would be permitted to take part against them.”189 Brundage, looking for a
positive, did not think that “the situation [was] entirely hopeless, but most certainly
it will have to be handled very carefully if a satisfactory solution is to be found.”190 He
certainly was willing to remain conciliatory and consider representations on behalf of
South Africa placed before the upcoming IOC meeting in Innsbruck. After all, it was
not the IOC’s business “to keep people out of the Olympic Games – our business is to
keep them in.”191
Yet Brundage could not have drawn much encouragement from the government’s
response to the South African Paraplegic Games Association’s (SAPGA) request for
clarification on the organization’s goal to include qualified non-white athletes on the
South African team. The Minister of the Interior remained principally unyielding. It
refused to sanction a single, multi-racial team, but stated that there “would be no
objection to two teams going forward, one representing White South Africa and one
representing Non-White South Africa … [nor] to permit both racial group teams to
travel in the same aircraft.” 192 The Minister also voiced objection to two such racially
divided teams competing against each other, should that circumstance arise during
the competition. Brundage immediately rejected as “subterfuge” the attempt to mask
the racial discrimination evident in the Minister’s response, in particular the thinly
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veiled attempt to obfuscate it through accepting the possibility of fielding two
separate teams. 193
The obstacles to the inclusion of South Africa remained, although an occasional
small step forward could be observed, as Emery noted, for example, “… the awarding
of Springbok colours to two non-white athletes who have been selected to tour
overseas.”194 However, after attending a SANOC meeting, Emery came to see that
racial integration was not to be achieved as long as SANOC insisted on quibbling over
technicalities and the Minister of the Interior retained ultimate decision-making
power:
Great play was made of the paragraph in the IOC constitution about
whether or not the rules affect the country only when it reaches the
Olympic Games and not concern itself with the internal workings of
a country. … I can assure you that a very genuine effort has been
made to meet the requirements of the IOC by the sporting bodies, but
the matter does not finally rest with them, as the Minister of the
Interior will have the final say.195
Emery hoped that efforts by other South African sporting bodies might move the
Minister to change his position, especially since all South African sport associations
except the SAAAU agreed that non-whites should be given Springbok colours when
competing for South Africa.196 If a broader inclusion of non-white competitors were
to be achieved, it seemed to Emery, perhaps SANOC should have considered
withdrawing from the Tokyo Games and investing the money in the provision of
better coaching for both white and non-white athletes. 197
The quandary, in Brundage’s view, was whether the decision rested with the
political or the sporting organizations. Could the IOC’s stance be seen as implying an
intervention in South African political issues? Brundage, insisting on the separation
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of sport from politics – the IOC’s standard position – thought not, and apportioned
responsibilities accordingly:
I note that some of the newspapers seem to think we called upon the
South African [National] Olympic Committee to denounce its
Government. This, of course, is not the case at all, we simply asked
them to state publicly that they believe in the Olympic principles of
non-discrimination. If it were prevented from following this
principle by its Government, of course, that is quite a different thing,
and the South African [National] Olympic Committee cannot be
censured for this reason …. There are two question here – one
political and one sport, and the International Olympic Committee is
trying to keep them quite separate and distinct. Unfortunately, this
is one of those problems to which there is no answer that will satisfy
everyone.198
Brundage wanted to retain what he understood as the separation of sport and
politics, as he had tried to do during the approach of the 1960 Rome Games. This
remained difficult to accomplish, since, as Emery pointed out, internal disagreements
structured the internal South African sports landscape. In principle, SANOC accepted
the nomination of both white and non-white athletes for the Tokyo Games, but the
Amateur Athletic Union withdrew a mixed team slated to enter the British
Championships; the Minister of the Interior added that non-mixed teams would be
allowed. Matters might come to a head at the next IOC meeting, where the “Afro-Asian
group” might work towards South Africa’s expulsion. As a fall-back position, Emery
again suggested to suspend, but not expel, South Africa, “as once the country is
expelled, in my opinion, it will be very hard to be re-admitted, but under suspension
the matter may be a far easier one when it comes to the 1968 Olympic Games.”199
SANOC thus found itself in a delicate position, a fact not lost on Brundage: “We are
doing our best to keep the sport and the political phases of this problem, separate,
although, as you know, it is almost impossible. It is too much to expect the [South
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African National Olympic Committee] to denounce its own Government, as many
demand.”200 Though Brundage reassured Emery that the South African question
would not be on the agenda, he emphasized that any member might raise the issue
during the General Session.201 Any campaign carried on by South African domestic
resistance forces that might consider such an action, was not to be taken lightly
because they had both the ability and resources to raise the South African issue
anytime and anywhere.

3.

Domestic Resistance
Trying to maintain momentum from measures taken during the period leading up

to the 1960 Rome Games, domestic resistance proved just as persistent during the
approach to the 1964 Tokyo Games. A few months after the 1960 Rome Games, SASA,
once again, began engaging with the IOC on the South African issue. At a general
meeting of SASA, the following resolution was developed for the upcoming Athens IOC
General Session:
‘That the International Olympic Committee demand from the South
African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association an
undertaking that it will immediately ensure that all its constituent
bodies will offer membership to all South Africans on a basis of
equality and that if the undertaking is not given, the International
Olympic Committee expel the SANOC and offer membership to a
non-racial South African Olympic Association which offers
membership equally to all South Africans in conformity with the
Olympic Charter.’ The South African Sports Association respectfully
requests that this resolution be placed on the Agenda of the Congress
and undertakes to supply conclusive evidence, if required, to show
that the recognised Association discriminates against non-white
South Africans on the grounds of racial origins in violation of the
Olympic Charter.202
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SASA sought change and progress in South African sport, but its lack of real
influence served to diminish the force of the ultimatum it issued SANOC: “If the
discriminatory conditions of membership offered to non-white sportsmen are not
removed, the South African Sports Association, in the interests of true sportsmanship,
will have no alternative but to ask the International Olympic Committee to take action
and to instruct its affiliated international Sports Federation to do likewise.”

203

Emery’s response for SANOC served to ascertain where the true responsibilities
rested: “The [South African National Olympic Committee] deals only with South
African Governing Bodies of Sport who are affiliated to their individual international
federations…. Your reference to the International Olympic Committee is noted and a
photostatic copy of your letter is being sent to the IOC.”204
Brutus obviously did not want SANOC to function as his intermediary with the IOC;
he requested that a representative be allowed to speak on behalf of SASA at the next
IOC General Session in June: “We do not feel that the member of the International
Olympic Committee resident in South Africa can fairly present our case because he
has already defended the existing racial discrimination in South African sport and
advised non-white sportsmen to accept it as a ‘compromise’.”205 IOC Chancellor Otto
Mayer denied Brutus’ request, noting that “the problem of racial discrimination has
not been brought on our Agenda,” for the upcoming session in Athens. “As a matter of
fact and contrarily of what you express in your letter,” Mayer continued, “the
Executive Board of the IOC has received a South African delegation of non-whites
during the Rome Games with whom we held a meeting. It was composed by Rev.
Michael Scott assisted by a non-white gentleman on one side, and by Mr. Reginald
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Honey and Mr. Braun (chef de mission of the South African team) on the other side.”206
A general discussion occurred on that occasion, Mayer recapitulated, “and it was felt
by the IOC representatives that the S.A. Olympic Committee had made every
reasonable effort to implement the undertaking of Mr. R. Honey, given at Munich in
1959, to ensure that no competitor of requisite caliber was excluded from the South
African team.”207 It surely could only have been a “misunderstanding” that had led
SASA to put forward its request. Brutus responded by pointing to what he interpreted
as an admission made by none other than Reginald Honey in an address to the South
African Sports Association:
… that there was racial discrimination in the recognised bodies
governing sport in South Africa and [that Honey] advised the nonracial sporting bodies to agree to a compromise with the governing
bodies and accept racial discrimination…. The South African Sports
Association is certain that this is in violation of the Olympic Charter
and requests that Mr. Honey be required by your Committee to
furnish an explanation and to explain the position to your Committee
at its Meeting in June.208
Brutus also repeated his demand that SASA be allowed to report to the IOC
meeting, but also tied his action to the political circumstances of the country: “In the
event of our spokesman being refused travelling facilities by the Government, as has
happened on a previous occasion, we request that you decline to accept a report from
one side only and instead institute an impartial Commission to conduct a full
investigation into the true position.”209
Over six months later, on 12 November 1961, Brutus, on behalf of SASA, again
requested that, in view of the lack of any progress, the matter of racial discrimination
in South Africa be considered by the IOC again.210 He requested to withhold South
Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Games until the issue had been investigated officially;
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that the issue be placed on the agenda of the upcoming IOC meeting and that SASA be
allowed to submit written or verbal evidence. “We will not rest content,” he
concluded, “until there is fair play for all South Africans and the Olympic Charter is
faithfully observed by all National Sports Federation in our country.”211
Brutus sought to increase the impact of this intervention by sending out an appeal
to all NOCs, requesting support to remove racial discrimination and secure
international recognition for all South African sportsmen. He stated that the IOC was
requested to reopen the South African issue for discussion in future IOC sessions,
since discrimination still existed and athletes were being prevented from
participating in international competition.212 SASA, moving forward with its agenda
for a meeting in February,213 received growing international support from its
supporters, among them John Rogers, the SASA representative in London, England,
and also a member of the British Olympic Committee. Stated Rogers to Brundage: “I
am sure that the now apparent seriousness of the position in South Africa in regard
to discrimination in Olympic sport, is blatantly obvious to sportsmen all over the
world.”214
Brundage and the IOC initially ignored Brutus and SASA’s request to reopen the
South African discussion. Failing to receive a response to a letter he sent to Brundage
in November 1961,215 Brutus reminded Brundage, yet again, of SASA’s concerns to
place the race discrimination issue on the agenda of the subsequent IOC meeting, and
investigate SASA’s complaints.216 The IOC finally reopened the South African racial
discrimination issue by calling for a report from SANOC. Brutus urged the IOC to
accept a supplementary report from SASA: “As a co-ordinating body representing the
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overwhelming number of South African sportsmen of all racial groups we believe that
we can supply important information and that this would be essential in order to
obtain an accurate account of the position in our country.”217
The subsequent IOC Executive Board meeting led to a hardening of the IOC’s
attitude towards SANOC’s position. President Brundage was “very disappointed as
none of the promises made by the IOC-member Honey in Rome ha[ve] turned out as
positive as he thought. It is decided to write the NOC and ask why. If no explication
strong proceedings must be taken against South-Africa.”218 Chancellor Mayer also
noted the complete lack of progress on the issue: “…even the South African
Government has stated last month again that it is against policy to permit any racially
mixed sport anywhere in the Republic or to allow any racially-mixed teams to leave
the country.”219 Absent any noticeable progress, the Executive Board would be
compelled to place the issue on the agenda of the upcoming Moscow General Session:
“It may be that special measures might be taken towards your Olympic Committee,
what we and you would like surely to avoid.”220
Otto Mayer maintained a dialogue with Brutus, noting that in regard to the
supplementary report offered by Brutus, Mayer was willing to receive such a report
from SASA if it was shared with SANOC. “As we heard,” Mayer said, “the situation
seems to [be] improv[ing] and we sincerely hope that the racial discrimination in
sport will disappear in the shortest delay.”221 Mayer also wrote a letter to Lilian
Francey, reminding her of SANOC’s responsibilities.
This promising exchange notwithstanding, two months later Brutus used SASA’s
supplementary report to ask the IOC immediately to expel SANOC at the upcoming
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IOC General Session in Moscow. The report contained the following charges, among
others: SANOC condoned racial discrimination in organizations affiliated to it; neither
SANOC nor its affiliated organizations had shown any signs of admitting non-whites
to full and equal membership; SANOC would not oppose government race
discrimination policies; increasing government interference in sports occurred in
contravention of Olympic principles; the acceptance of “mixed teams of sportsmen,
either inside or outside the country,”222 was contrary to official government policy;
principles of athletic merit, according to which qualified non-white competitors
should have been selected to representative teams, had been disregarded; worse,
“[n]ine sportsmen – white, coloured and Indian – are due to appear in court this
month because they organised a football match on a non-racial basis on a ground
‘zoned’ for Indians.” 223
While SASA thus pursued its strategies through official IOC channels, domestic
resistance also served to widen the breadth of public exposure. SASA President G.K.
Rangasamy befriended prominent Springbok cricketer, Owen Wynne. Wynne had
requested a national sport convention during a recent interview, and Rangasamy
suggested to him that an upcoming SASA conference would be a suitable venue in
which to launch his idea, with SASA and SANOC as co-sponsors. This, Rangasamy
claimed, would finally be a conference with broad representation since, SASA “…
represent[ed] the overwhelming majority of the non-white sportsmen of the country,
through their non-racial bodies, and can undertake to arrange their support.”224 In the
context of these developments, SASA also attempted to position itself in direct
competition to SANOC, announcing that it would reconstitute itself through
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dissolution and subsequent reincorporation as the “South African Non-Racial Olympic
Committee (SAN-ROC) … and apply for membership of the IOC at its meeting in
Nairobi in October, 1963.”225
Beyond advances pursued by each South African NSF and their corresponding ISF,
staging the “Wynne Conference,” sponsored by both SANOC and SASA, demonstrated
significant progress. SASA President Rangasamy wrote Honey to solicit support and
coordinate the conference with SANOC. Furthermore, with the proposition to dissolve
SASA in sight, Rangasamy suggested: “The time would therefore seem to be opportune
for a convention to consider the formation of a single non-racial Olympic Association
which would be truly representative of our country and which would remove the
imminent danger of expulsion now threatening [the] all-white racialistic and
unrepresentative Olympic Association.”226
While awaiting a response from Honey, Rangasamy circulated a letter to all NSFs
in South Africa about the possibility of a national sport conference in October 1962.
Ideas and support were welcomed because it was an opportune time to discuss the
problems in South Africa and develop a solution: “We can save any section of our
population from being excluded from the Olympics and we can ensure that all South
Africans are represented on the basis of merit…. For this it is essential that we come
together to speak frankly and to uphold the ideals of fair play which we profess to
believe in.”227
Unexpectedly, Rangasamy received a seemingly conciliatory letter from Lilian
Francey requesting a list of the sports associations affiliated to SASA, “[a]ssuring you
that my Association has the interest of all amateur sportsmen at heart, irrespective of
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race, colour or creed, in terms of the Olympic ideal, and that every effort will be made
to ensure that no athlete of international standard in any Olympic branch of sport will
be denied the opportunity of representing South Africa at the next Olympic Games.”228
SANOC’s request for information was aimed at remaining in control of South
African Olympic sport, and, Rangasamy assessed Francey’s request for information as
a delaying tactic. His response was curt: “I am inclined to state bluntly that your
inquiries are one more attempt to stall: there has been no attempt on the part of your
association to come to grips with the problem of racialism or to give frank answers to
our questions…. I repeat my request that your Association should support a
sportsman’s national convention and hope that this time we shall get a frank and
direct answer.”229
Whether SASA really expected SANOC to cooperate on such a convention, remains
doubtful. Brutus, for his part, certainly sought to leverage the possibility of forming
SAN-ROC as a non-racial successor to SASA and replacement for SANOC at the IOC, in
order to force SANOC to reach some form of understanding: “We have indicated that
if all South African amateur sportsmen can be admitted to equal membership of the
national bodies affiliated to the [South African National Olympic Committee], then we
will not proceed with the development of a South African Non-Racial Olympic
Committee (SAN-ROC).”230
On the same day, Brutus was similarly unequivocal in explaining the strategic
purpose of the proposed new organization to Honey: “It was also agreed that SANROC would agree to ask the [South African National Olympic Committee] to arrange
talks on the question of admitting all South African sportsmen to equal membership
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of its affiliated bodies…. On behalf of SAN-ROC I hereby submit the request for talks
with your Association on the question of equal membership of all South African
sportsmen in its affiliated national bodies.”231 Brutus anticipated the subsequent
January as the date for the formal inauguration of SAN-ROC, but, “if a satisfactory
solution can be found,” he continued, “it is probable that it would be unnecessary to
proceed with the development of SAN-ROC. It would therefore be most fruitful if our
talks could be arranged before January, 1963.”232 The responsibility to initiate
discussions with SANOC devolved to Honey.
SASA kept up the pressure, and followed up with another letter to SANOC detailing
the necessity of establishing SAN-ROC – unless the two organizations met to work
towards the removal of racialism within South African sport. No reply had been
received by early October. Another month passed, and SASA, interpreting SANOC’s
non-reply as a stalling tactic, continued with the pressure:
Since it appears that we are not likely to receive a definite reply in
the near future, in spite of my putting into your hands personally the
information you said you required in your letter of the 9th November,
I must advise you that this body and the South African Non-Racial
Olympic Committee have no option but to press ahead with plans for
building up a strong Committee and seeking membership of the
International Olympic Committee at its Congress in Nairobi next
year…. It is unfortunate that we should be compelled to do this. So
much is entailed in the establishment of the Committee and in
seeking membership of the IOC that we cannot afford to have any
unnecessary delay: it is hard not to see the evasiveness of your body
as an attempt to impede our work for the removal of racial
discrimination and the achievement of true sportsmanship for all
South Africans in the Olympic field.233
Since no constructive meetings were held between SASA and SANOC, SAN-ROC
was officially formed on 13 January 1963. Its first order of business was to issue a
letter that protested Sir Stanley Rous (President of FIFA) addressing members of the
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IOC on the racial issue in South Africa;234 Rous was unfit to speak, since during his
previous visit to South Africa, he had publicly come out in favour of the racial
arrangements in South Africa.235 R. Hlongwane’s (Secretary of SAN-ROC) address at
the second biennial General Meeting of SASA, signalled that change was on the
horizon, but that hard work was required to effect it:
In October of this year the International Olympic Committee will be
discussing S. Africa. The racial Olympic body was given a warning
last year and it has disregarded that warning. Now we must prove
that they do not represent the country and that they do not carry out
the Olympic ideals. But to strengthen our case, we must prove that
the majority of our sportsmen are excluded from the racial body and
that they are opposed to racialism.236
Hlongwane sent Brundage news clippings as evidence of the South African
government’s interference in all matters relating to sport, especially the Nationalist
party’s coercion of existing sporting organizations.237 The South African Olympic
administration, however, was more concerned with the formal use of the term,
‘Olympic,’ than with engaging SAN-ROC on the substantive issues.
On 9 February 1963, SASA President Rangasamy responded to an earlier letter
from SANOC requesting that SAN-ROC eliminate the word ‘Olympic’ in the
organization’s title. Not being a SAN-ROC official, Rangasamy could not resist the
temptation to return the charge of illicit use of Olympic symbolism, while also letting
SANOC know that SAN-ROC would only communicate with the IOC itself:
You are aware that we dispute the right of your body to use the title
‘Olympic’ since it openly violates the principles of the Charter of the
International Olympic Committee and that we are preparing to raise
this matter with the IOC … I must also point out that SAN-ROC cannot
recognise the jurisdiction of your body and will only act on a request
from the International Olympic Committee itself. This is, however, a
matter on which you will no doubt receive an opinion from SAN-ROC
once you have directed your request to the correct questers.238
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SAN-ROC President N. Rathinasany then followed up on this challenge to the
legitimacy of SANOC, requesting from Brundage that the “question of racialism in
South African sport be discussed at the Nairobi Congress of the IOC in October of this
year and that the membership of the present body representing South Africa … be
questioned, since this body in no way checks the practice of racialism in the racial
bodies affiliated to it.”239
Brundage gave assurances that the IOC was aware of the problems in South
African sport, that they had been discussed previously and would be on the agenda at
the next meeting, but he also curtailed communication with SAN-ROC on a
technicality. He notified Rathinasany that the organization’s use of the word ‘Olympic’
contravened IOC regulations,240 and the IOC later “resolved that, whilst SAN-ROC uses
the word ‘Olympic’ in its title, neither the International Olympic Committee nor any
of its officials shall have any communication or dealings with it.”241
Undeterred by such admonishments and resolutions, SAN-ROC continued to
attempt to influence the IOC towards advancing its agenda. He asked Mayer to
forward a letter to the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) requesting that the JOC
withdraw its invitation to SANOC for the upcoming Olympic Games,
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since it was

SAN-ROC’s “outspoken contention, which we can support with facts, that racialism
has increased and is even worse than before in sport in our country.”243 Mayer grew
exasperated at what he considered SAN-ROC’s overreaching approach: “It is certainly
not [SAN-ROC’s] business to interfere in our affairs and to give orders to the Tokyo
Committee!”244 SAN-ROC’s letter would not be forwarded to the JOC, but Rathinasamy
sought an even broader audience, continually promoting SAN-ROC at the expense of
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SANOC. In a May 1963 missive addressed to “all Olympic Committees and sportsmen,”
Rathinasamy elaborated the organization’s position: Racial discrimination in South
African sports was more deeply entrenched than ever: “There are now more bodies
recognised by the South African [National] Olympic Committee which are composed
exclusively of White South Africans only or Black South Africans only. Members of the
two groups never compete against each other and thus there are no fair trials to select
the best sportsmen to represent our land at international events such as the Olympic
Games.”245 Those who sought an alternative to this situation by establishing nonracial sports organizations were not recognized by SANOC. In consequence, SAN-ROC
had requested a hearing at the upcoming Nairobi IOC meetings. “We ask the
sportsmen of the world,” Rathinasamy concluded, “to take note of this and to oppose
racial discrimination in sport.”246
Avoiding the political implications of this missive, the IOC remained insistent on
resolving SAN-ROC’s illegitimate use of the IOC’s trademark, referring to the race
issue only in passing and casting doubt on SAN-ROC’s legitimacy: “The South African
National Olympic Committee is still in good standing, although the subject will be
discussed at our next Session at Nairobi in October.”247 In its own view, SAN-ROC’s
existence as a formally constituted organization legitimized such interventions, a
viewpoint it emphasized by forwarding to the IOC and ISFs a copy of its own
constitution, on the subsequent day.248 Two months later, Rathinasany agreed
nonetheless to comply with Brundage’s original demand and change the word
“Olympic” in its name to “Open.” He pointed out, however, that SANOC used the word
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illegitimately in a rather more substantively political sense, since its accommodation
of racial politics amounted to a breach of Olympic Charter stipulations.249
The IOC was none too pleased with the determination shown by SAN-ROC as it
pursued its agenda. SAN-ROC’s representative John Harris had without invitation
come to an IOC Executive Board Meeting in Lausanne in early June 1963. His
insistence gained him “a few minutes – out of courtesy – after the meeting was over,”
which provided Harris an opportunity to achieve press visibility. “Mr. Harris’
communication to the press was obnoxious,”250 Mayer responded with considerable
irritation. SAN-ROC nonetheless attempted to position itself as the authoritative, bestinformed source for the IOC on Olympic sports and racism in South Africa, requesting
a visible presence “before the relevant meetings of the International Olympic
Committee and its concerned sub-committees,” at the October meetings in Nairobi.251
Mayer at least did not ignore Harris’ communication, but passed it on to Brundage.252
Some weeks later, Dennis Brutus gave the argument a more explicitly political turn:
white sportsmen and organizations who were complicit in Hendrik Verwoerd’s
imposition of apartheid, were guilty of racism, since no laws prohibited racially mixed
sport – but sportsmen still imposed racial rules. The current system only allowed nonwhites to affiliate with white organizations by maintaining inferior positions while
still retaining segregated organizations – one white and one non-white.253 Brutus
concluded with a call to “all true sportsmen to FIGHT RACIALISM. We ask them to
demand the suspension of the racialist South African [National] Olympic Committee.
We ask them to stand firm and not permit racial discrimination to be tolerated in an
organisation which is pledged to outlaw discrimination and to uphold the principles
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of fair play and sportsmanship.”254 To reinforce the message, SAN-ROC representative
Harris issued a similarly worded statement on the same day.255 SAN-ROC extended
the message by suggesting that SAN-ROC rather than SANOC was the legitimate body
for Olympic sport in South Africa, and by demanding the suspension of SANOC at the
upcoming Baden-Baden meeting, “such suspension to remain in force until the SANOC
can show that it grants affiliation only to controlling bodies which are in all ways nonracial.”256
These statements coalesced into a four-page document outlining the case for
SANOC’s suspension: SAN-ROC argued that it could represent South Africa better than
SANOC. SANOC had lost its legitimacy when it failed to speak out against both Brutus
and Harris being detained in South Africa since the government did not want those
who spoke out against racism to leave the country.257 SAN-ROC reiterated that in June
1962, the IOC had made a decision that if the policy of racial discrimination had not
changed by October 1963, the IOC would suspend SANOC. Since then, the government
had made, on 4 February 1963, a full statement regarding its policy on sport.258 Some
of the notable points from that statement reinforced racial discrimination: (a) white
and non-whites must play separately; (b) international mixed representation would
not be approved; (c) non-white associations could exist alongside white associations,
whereby one to two whites could represent the non-white association at the
Executive Board level; however, if white representation was not practicable, a nonwhite could serve on the white committee; and (d) white Executive Boards could
serve as a liaison between association and world organizations.259 SAN-ROC
emphasized the two overarching ramifications of this statement: first, complete
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segregation in sport was to be retained; second, overall control must remain with
whites.260 The reality was, according to SAN-ROC, that South African policy had
hardened since the Moscow meetings, not relaxed. Importantly, SANOC’s compliance
was voluntary because there were no laws prohibiting whites and non-whites
coexisting on an organizational level. Therefore, segregation and racial discrimination
by SANOC was in violation of Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. This warranted the
suspension of SANOC until it could demonstrate an entirely non-racial approach.261
A new development strengthened SAN-ROC’s credibility. Harris wrote to Mayer
noting that SAN-ROC had been invited by the Indonesian Minister of Sport to put
together a team to compete in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),
which was established as an Olympic Games alternative. Harris, not wanting to risk
his position with the IOC, declined the invitation: “While strongly sharing GANEFO’s
opposition to all forms of oppression SAN-ROC is unable in terms of its constitution
to accept your invitation…. We are committed to following the lead of the IOC, to the
requirements of which we have at all times scrupulously adhered.”262 In copying
Mayer on his response, Harris sought to improve relationships between SAN-ROC and
the IOC: “We trust that our decision meets with your approval and that you will make
our action known to those who will soon be considering the entire question of sports
organization in South Africa. This particular piece of information should surely be
known to those who will decide our fate at Baden-Baden.”263
At the same time, SANOC issued a report detailing the progress of, and its current
position on, South African sport. It is noteworthy that, before publishing a response,
SAN-ROC representatives travelled to Baden-Baden attempting to arrange a meeting
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with Brundage to hand-deliver a letter from Brutus.264 SAN-ROC’s response focussed
on several points. It interpreted SANOC’s report itself as confirmation of the
continued existence of racial discrimination, pointing among other indications to
SANOC’s lack of opposition to the South African government’s unchanging policies,
and to a letter by Balsiger in support of apartheid and included in one of the
appendices.265 Then there was the simple obvious facts that organizations affiliated
to SANOC still did not permit multi-racial competitions, and that non-white
organizations seeking affiliation could still only do so from a position of inferiority:
“This means, in fact, the exclusion of a great many of the best non-white sportsmen in
South Africa.”266 Then there was SANOC’s contention that apartheid offered separate
but equal opportunities – merely a convenient illusion, especially in regard to
facilities: even the selection of competitors was to occur separately, without any
competition between whites and non-whites. Lastly,

Braun’s report was

disingenuous and misleading since, although white and non-white athletes were sent
for competitions, they had to represent each faction separately, not as a combined
team; mixed sport was not allowed.267
Some months later, Harris followed up with an open letter to the IOC Executive
Board. He focussed on two aspects of the Baden-Baden resolution that, if followed,
would improve the chances of SANOC’s acceptance for participation in the Olympic
Games: (1) SANOC’s declaration of acceptance of Articles 1 and 24; and, (2) convincing
the South African government to change its racial policy, and to work towards the
elimination of racism in South African sports.268 This, however, was not sufficient; to
motivate SANOC to seek real progress on the issue, Harris urged the IOC to suspend
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SANOC for the time being: “ANY LESSER ACTION WILL REPRESENT ACCEPTANCE OF
THE POLCIES AND ACTIONS OF A BODY WHICH ABSOLUTELY DENIES THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT.”269
SAN-ROC kept up the pressure to achieve South Africa’s suspension in a letter
addressed to the IOC, some months later. The letter pointed again to what SAN-ROC
viewed as SANOC’s voluntary compliance with “a policy of total Apartheid [sic] in
South African sport. Mixed sport is not illegal in South Africa. Hence the South African
[National] Olympic Committee could certainly make an immediate declaration of its
own opposition to Apartheid [sic].”270 The fact that SANOC chose not to do so was
“surely the clearest evidence of its own positive attachment to Apartheid [sic].”271
SANOC should therefore be informed that, in addition of the retraction of its
invitations to the 1964 Games, it would be expelled from the IOC unless it changed the
policy of the sports bodies affiliated to it.
There can be little doubt that efforts emanating from the sphere of domestic
resistance were considered in the IOC’s assessment of SANOC’s suitability to
participate in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Part of the domestic resistance movement’s
support network existed outside SASA and SAN-ROC, and indeed outside of South
Africa. This added another dimension to the resistance’s wider recognition.

4.

International Community
Almost a year after the conclusion of the 1960 Rome Games, the IOC received a

letter from Antony Steel, Secretary of the Campaign Against Race Discrimination in
Sport (CARDS), based in London, England. One of South Africa’s leading white cyclists
had been suspended for riding in a match with coloured cyclists. When he was
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summoned to appear before the board of the South African Amateur Athletic and
Cycling Association, he was the target of a racial slur by one of the Board’s members.
Steel was furious:
This association … is a leading affiliate of the South African [National
Olympic Committee] which you and your Executive protect
continually. Writing quite personally it just makes me lose patience
that your Executive is so ready always to find excuses to save the
South African [National Olympic Committee] … All that happens is
that just before each meeting of the IOC the South African spokesmen
say a few sweet remarks about their belief in inter-racial sport but
the government makes it impossible or at least very difficult, but in
between these IOC meetings this is the way they behave. You will
observe that it is not the government which takes action … but the
South African Amateur Athletic and Cycling Union quite voluntarily.
Perhaps you would like to ask that friend of the IOC Executive, Mr.
Reginald Honey for his excuses this time.272
Steel’s heated words were shared by many who desired change in South Africa.
However, the IOC’s Mayer thought some of Steels’ remarks were too harsh: “I very
much regret that I cannot agree with some remarks contained in your letter, when
you say that our Executive Board protect the South African [National Olympic
Committee] regarding the racial discrimination or when you mention that South
African spokesmen say ‘a few sweet remarks’ etc…. I have informed you already that
we had a joined meeting in Rome with the delegates of the South African [National]
Olympic Committee and a Rev. Father together with a coloured gentleman. Full
satisfaction was given to us.”273
Mayer certainly was not oblivious to the energy of Steel’s comments. In a private
note to Brundage, attached to Brundage’s copy of this letter, he offered a more farreaching perspective on the issue than the IOC had ever stated publicly: “Dear Avery:
Between you and me, don’t you think that we should have suspended the South
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African [National Olympic Committee] since a long time, as after all and in spite of all
they tell us, there is a race discrimination in sport in that country.… Why should we
not have the courage to suspend them?”274 This was the first time that a high-ranking
IOC official questioned the organization’s stance on the issue, albeit in a private. Mayer
seemed to argue that harsher measures should have been applied to South African for
its race discrimination. Was SANOC receiving preferential treatment, after all?
Less than a month later, Steel expressed a more ambivalent attitude about SANOC
and its possibilities. Writing to Mayer, Steel included in his letter SANOC’s reply to the
Table Tennis Board as to why its athletes were refused passports to attend the world
championships in China; SANOC elaborated that it was not customary to provide
reasons for the refusal.275 Steel pointed out that mixed sport was not supported by
the government which, in turn, prevented SANOC from honoring its promises made
at the 1959 Munich IOC General Session. Passports would be denied to those nonwhites who did progress towards international competition through white sport
associations. Since only one organization, which, in South Africa was controlled by
whites, was allowed to be affiliated with SANOC, and therefore to participate
internationally, the IOC, in essence, endorsed white control of sport in South Africa.276
Noted Steel: “This is obviously completely contrary to the Olympic declaration and I
would be grateful if you would bring these new vitally important facts that have just
emerged to the notice of your committee for their consideration, for I just do not see
how Mr. Honey can continue to argue the way he has done in the past, in the light of
this evidence, and I hope that South Africa will finally be told to have its official sports
associations open to all, irrespective of race, or else leave the IOC.”277
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Other international activists, such as John Rogers, SASA representative in London,
and member of the British Olympic Committee, added their voice on the issue; the
international response was clearly broadening: “I am sure that the now apparent
seriousness of the position in South Africa in regard to discrimination in Olympic
sport, is blatantly obvious to sportsmen all over the world.” 278 One Dr. André Ungar,
Rabbi of Temple Emanuel in Westwood, New Jersey, also wrote to Brundage on behalf
of Brutus, resending an earlier letter by Brutus, and providing Brundage with an
elegant option to redress his earlier remissness in responding to Brutus:
I am forwarding to you another copy of a letter he had addressed to
you some time ago. With South African postal and political
conditions being what they are, it is quite possible that their letters
to you – and yours to them – have been held up in the mail. It is, thus,
as an additional precaution that this copy is being sent awaiting your
kind attention…. I know, Sir, that your concern for the maintenance
of the Olympic code that debars racial discrimination in
international sport, will prompt you to take prompt and affective
action in this matter. My own circle of acquaintances in the New
York-New Jersey area, including American sportsmen and sports
writers of note, supports the firm conviction that a very substantial
amount of popular sympathy exists in this country for the cause of
decency in South Africa’s sport – above all on the international
Olympic level…. Please let me know what steps I might further take
to support Mr. Brutus’ petition and the urgent and valid issue that
lies beyond it.279
Even a growing segment of the South African population became more vocal on the
issue. E.T. Harriott, assistant editor of Drum magazine, requested a comment from
Brundage on the current state of South African sport, asking for “some suggestions
about how the major non-white sporting bodies can gain international recognition….
I hope you can help us in this way because so many people in South Africa are vitally
interested in the Olympic prospects of all racial people.”280 Brundage’s reply remained
non-committal,281 but Harriott persisted, offering his co-operation: “If there is any
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information I can supply to you on the situation I will be glad to do so and, in fact, we
are sending to you shortly, an article from the current issue of DRUM, which reflects
on the above-mentioned situation.”282 Harriott in turn hoped for access to news about
the IOC’s deliberations, hinting that he “would be grateful if it could be arranged for
the deliberations of the Olympics Committee in Moscow next month, to be reported
to me in some way. An official note of the proceedings with regard to South African
sport would be very welcome.”283 Harriott indeed subsequently forwarded to
Brundage the Drum’s coverage of the issue.284
In general, the IOC remained non-committal and cautious in its public statements,
especially those which might be published in a potentially not neutral magazine, such
as the Drum, but South African non-white media produced a steady stream of
newspaper articles explicitly describing racial discrimination in South African sport.
Steel was mainly pleased with the general tendency of these news items, since they
tended to confirm the opposition’s comments about the negative actions of South
African sport authorities. But in view of the public frequently being misled by SANOC
representatives, would people actually believe the news? Steel hoped “that the truth
of all that we have said over the past years is accepted, and that your committee will
see how time and time again they have been misled by the South African
representatives who will say anything to avoid expulsion.”285
But Mayer notified Steel that the IOC itself had no shortage of evidence, and that
the issue would be discussed at the Moscow Session.286 Copying Brundage on this
correspondence, Mayer attached a personal note that indicated that the direction of
SANOC’s fate was obvious:
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After all the documents we have received I really think that our
South African National Olympic Committee is working against our
rules. At least the National Sports Federations of that country. They
had their General Annual meeting on March 27th and promised to let
us have a report which never reached us…. I think we should look
over this problem very seriously in Moscow and take a decision, even
if we have to suspend that Olympic Committee.287
Brundage also found a new ally by forging a liaison with an organization in the
political realm. Endeavouring to situate the Liberal Party of South Africa on the
“proper” side of history, Peter Brown, National Chairman, wrote Mayer to extend to
the IOC its full support, passing a resolution at the 1962 National Congress of the
Liberal Party of South Africa. The resolution stated: “That this congress of the Liberal
Party urges the International Olympic Committee to debar South Africa from the next
Olympic Games unless she is represented by a team selected from athletes of all races
who measure up to Olympic standards.”288 Brown added that the Liberal Party was
the only party open to members of all races, and that thus it was the party’s position
“that to select an Olympic team on any other basis than that of the ability of the
contestant was an affront to human dignity…. I would be most grateful if the text of
this resolution could be brought to the notice of your committee when it next
meets.”289
Although Brundage wanted to avoid political connections, Peter Brown’s initiative
can be seen a symbol of the momentum for change in South Africa. A contributor to
this momentum was the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). On 26 April 1963, AAM
released a “Boycott Apartheid Campaign” information sheet.290 It provided a
summary of the current state of apartheid in South Africa, including those sporting
bodies who had taken action against apartheid. AAM fully supported SASA in calling
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for a boycott of all sport tours unless they were based on non-racial lines. Racism in
sport should not be tolerated: “It is not a question of bringing politics into sport but
of keeping politics out of it,” proclaimed AAM.291 “Every effort must be made to ensure
that the International Olympic Committee, FIFA, and other international sports bodies
refuse to condone white supremacy in sport.”292
International support was growing. Nations such as the Sudan, represented by the
Secretary of the Sudanese National Olympic Committee, endorsed the movement
against racism in sport, decrying the violation of Olympic principles: “You can be rest
assured of our full support in Nairobi and will fight until we see the South African
[National] Olympic Committee kicked out.”293 Keeping the public informed was
essential. On 1 June 1963, S. Abdul, Secretary of the AAM, released a statement for
both the press and sporting bodies which highlighted Brutus’ arrest for failing to
comply with a “banning order” from the South African government. 294 Brutus was
arrested on May 29th when meeting with Swiss journalist, Mr. Balsiger, after being
assured by Jan Botha, a member of SANOC and the government, that Balsiger was able
to meet with whomever he wished in order to construct a complete story. This,
according to Abdul, displayed the government’s determination to suppress the truth.
“The Anti-Apartheid Movement will continue to expose racial discrimination in South
African sport,” exclaimed Abdul, “and we hope that in accordance with the Olympic
Charter all national and international sports bodies will refuse to condone or accept
racial discrimination in sport. Racialism should have no place in the international
sporting community.”295
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With disbelief at the shooting of Brutus, who was trying to escape the authorities,
Steel argued that the IOC had to shoulder at least some of the responsibility for the
incident: “I honestly cannot see what further evidence you need of the ill-will of the
South Africans and their fear of the case for non-racial sport being put against them….
I feel that if the case, put for year after year … had not been turned down mainly on
the insistence of a few powerful men despite all the evidence produced, this tragedy
may well not have happened.”296
The AAM also released a statement on the case, implicitly pointing a finger at
SANOC for its collusion through inaction, in the government’s race policies: “Mr.
Brutus remains in prison in South Africa with the prospect of a serious charge facing
him soon: it is the duty of all who detest this alliance with apartheid to protest to the
British, Portuguese and Federal authorities, and to demand his release. Those who
appease Verwoerd and aid him in persecuting men who believe in fundamental rights
and dignity should not be permitted to get away with their duplicity. 297
On a more reserved note, Americans’ expression of concern also reached
Brundage’s desk. Is it noteworthy that these letters were written not by
representatives of political or sports organization, but by ordinary private citizens.
For example, Nancy Tucker of South Hadley, Massachusetts argued:
Like many Americans, I am concerned about the racial crises of
today, both at home and abroad. Whether in the USA or in South
Africa, I oppose racial segregation of any sort.… the South African
[National] Olympic Committee have not agreed to open their
membership to South African sportsmen of all races, even though
they were asked to do so by the International Olympic Committee in
June, 1962. This to me seems like a most unsportsmanlike and
prejudiced attitude. I therefore strongly urge you to refuse … the
right of representing South Africa at the Olympic Games in Tokyo.298
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Catherine Morris of Chicago was more specific in apportioning a large share of the
blame to SANOC rather than the Government of South Africa: “At the present time, all
sport in South Africa is segregated. This is so, not (primarily) because of the South
African government’s policy of apartheid, but as a result of the policy and practises of
the South African National Olympic Committee. This body, which governs all South
African sport, refuse to recognise racially integrated teams and support all-white
teams.”299 SANOC had, she continued, consistently supplied non-white athletes with
inferior training opportunities and facilities, and disproportionally favoured white
athletes. Only “a South Africa on an integrated, non-racial basis will be included in all
sport; thus the Olympic principles will be upheld, and the growth of amateur sport
throughout the world will be furthered.”300
Stephen Groves of Chicago added a moral element to his complaints about SANOC:
I hope you have received a huge number of pleas to deny South
Africa’s segregated Olympic group international recognition. This
and similar acknowledgement of her is condoning or approval of her
inhumane policies. This country’s open, blatant, official, even selfrighteous entrenchment of her uncivilized indignities to darkskinned alleged citizens is preposterous. Every dodging or
rationalizing or begging the issue further perpetuates, even
vindicates, their practices and ‘philosophy’…. Anyone in any position
to alleviate tyranny has an obligation to conscience, country, the U.N.
and international humanity’s conscience to identify these tyrannies
for what they are and act against them with clarity and conviction:
How else do we make our lives worthwhile and improve this human
race?301
The amount of mail Brundage, Mayer, and the IOC received relative to the South
African issue grew to be overwhelming. At times, it was difficult to truly understand
the legitimacy and intentions of a writer. This was certainly the case with one Ahmed
Ebrahim who in a later letter identified himself as one of “the discriminated
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sportsmen of South Africa.”302 He submitted an appeal to Brundage on behalf of nonwhite athletes, believing that the IOC’s “decision should not be influenced by the fact
that very many countries are hostile towards South Africa and are using this
organization to further their political aims. The International Olympic Committee
must simply consider whether the Olympic Committee of South Africa is fully
complying with the fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter or not.”303
Had not the IOC been doing just that? Ebrahim developed his argument further by
elaborating that for 50 years those who represented South Africa had been white.
Invitations to trials were reserved for whites only although no laws prevented SANOC
from organizing mixed sport, yet it did not facilitate mixed sport. Non-whites were
only encouraged to affiliate in order to keep the white organizations relevant. This
gave the illusion of non-white acceptance: “The South African [National] Olympic
Committee is not prepared to hold mixed trials … it is not prepared to allow white and
non-white athletes to compete together against visiting teams … it is not prepared to
provide equal facilities … it is not prepared to permit non-whites to hold offices in the
S.A. Olympic Committee executive … Yet it is guilty of all these and I cannot see how
such a committee can be tolerated by the IOC when it openly and willfully defies the
basic, fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter.”304
In Ebrahim’s opinion, the IOC had no alternative but to expel SANOC: “If the IOC
condones the Olympic Committee of South Africa at this session then posterity will
hold the IOC guilty of discriminating against 17,000 men non-white sportsmen of
South Africa who for the past 55 years have been begging for recognition.”305 Some
three months later, Ebrahim dispatched another lengthy letter to Brundage,
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reiterating the same arguments he had advanced previously.306 He outlined all the
facts to date, leading to the same conclusion as stated in the previous letter: “Sir, in
compliance with the Olympic Spirit, we the discriminated sportsmen of South Africa
demand the immediate suspension of South Africa and the elimination of race
prejudice in the IOC and by the IOC.”307
Ebrahim’s information and arguments appeared to be solid. Why would the IOC
not consider such a well-expressed statement? It was not until a telegram from Harris
to Mayer that doubts were cast on Ebrahim’s remarks: “We believe Ebrahim to be an
agent of the South African government deliberately attempting to sabotage SANROC’s campaign against racialism in sport. He was expelled from SAN-ROC for this
reason. The entire SAN-ROC committee from Brutus downwards repudiates him
totally. Please disregard his attempts to cloud the vital issue.”308
Although Ebrahim’s proclamations were composed eloquently, his intentions
could have been less than honest. However, his example was unique. Messages
continued to arrive at the IOC. The South African Students’ Union in Germany, for
example, “with the support of all African states including the overwhelming majority
of the people of South Africa appeal to you to exclude the South African Republic from
the Olympic Games until its apartheid practises in sport cease. The coloured South
African delegate at your conference is nominated by the all-white government and
does not represent the interest of the non-European population of South Africa.”309
Two weeks after SANOC issued its report to the IOC, the American Committee on
Africa (ACA) rejuvenated its support for domestic resistance forces. Famed black
baseball player Jackie Robinson of the ACA, made a request to the IOC to withdraw
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SANOC’s credentials. “The South African [National] Olympic Committee operates on
racist principles,” Robinson argued. “It has never selected a non-white athlete for
Olympic competition. Its non-white affiliates are rigidly segregated. These facts
constitute a clear denial of the spirit of the Olympic Games … Sports competition is a
uniquely non-racial activity. Only performance counts.”310 Rather, Robinson argued,
an organization such as SAN-ROC should select the team for the 1964 Tokyo Games;
handing control to SAN-ROC would encourage sport among non-whites, demonstrate
disapproval of Brutus’ behaviour, and remove sport from government control.311
Should the IOC avoid a clear decision on this issue, Robinson put the IOC on notice
that he was
…prepared to undertake the following action: I, together with others
of similar opinion, will urge that individual participants in the Games
carefully consider how they feel about such discrimination,
particularly when competing against a white South African. If they
find themselves of the same opinion as myself, let them seriously
consider whether they can in good conscience compete unless the
South African scratches himself. I am aware that a boycott of this sort
would create serious disruptions of the Games, but I see no other
way of asserting a basic principle of all sportsmen: that a winner is
the man whose performance is best, not whose skin is lightest.312
Robinson's intervention suggested a novel strategy: rather than intervene at the
organizational level, he was prepared to use his notoriety and convince individual
athletes to reflect on the morality of their actions. The advantage of this strategy
would be that it could cause serious disruptions at the Olympic Games without
opening itself up to the charge that its proponents were playing the much criticized
game of institutional politics.
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On the other hand, Professor Peter Kaiser of Princeton University was more
outright in proposing an immediate change in the organizations representing South
Africa in the IOC and Olympic Movement:
It has come to my attention that the Olympic credentials of the South
African [National Olympic Committee] may be discredited by the
International Olympic Committee, in view of the racial policies
followed by that organization. You therefore have my wholehearted
support should you decide to accept the credentials of some such
integrated Olympic sport organizations as the South African NonRacial Olympic Committee and the South African Sports
Association.313
An emphatic missive from one of their own, the President of the Ghana Olympic
Committee, may have carried greater weight with Brundage and the IOC, in particular
as the President refused to exonerate SANOC by pointing to South African race
politics, up until then a position frequently invoked by SANOC and the IOC alike; it was
very doubtful whether SANOC had been acting ‘without fear or favour’:
[A] [f]undamental principle of the Olympic bible insists on no
discrimination against any country or person on grounds of race,
religion, or political affiliation. Apartheid South African [National]
Olympic Committee is indefensibly guilty of a rude and insolent
violation of this essential principle. That the conduct of South
Africa’s Olympic Committee is influenced by political pressure from
its government is a mere balderdash for Article 25 of the Olympic
bible clearly demanding that National Olympic Committees must be
completely independent and autonomous and in a position to resist
all political religious or commercial pressure. Since the South African
[National] Olympic Committee appears to be incapable of
conforming to the rules and regulations, the provisions of paragraph
2 Article 25 – National Olympic [Committees] that do not conform to
the rules and regulations of the International Olympic Committee
forfeit their recognition and their right to send participants to the
Olympic Games – should apply without fear or favour in order to
instill confidence in the IOC. The present generation of African
sportsmen is no longer docile and passive over issues affecting their
interest and defeating the lofty ideals of the Olympic Movement. The
rest of Africa should not be sacrificed by the IOC on the altar of
apartheid hoping that the Baden-Baden spirit will direct the IOC to
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take a bold and uncompromising decision as demanded by
paragraph of Article 25 of the Olympic family.314
The IOC needed to thoroughly assess the information it received, and new
perspectives were welcomed. Count Dönhoff, European Director of the South African
Foundation,315 was eager to emphasize four points in light of SANOC’s proposed
exclusion.316 First, it was hard to convince South African athletes that the exclusion
was a just and equitable measure, especially considering what was happening in other
African countries. Second, why would the IOC wish to interrupt the development of
South African sport? A guarantee that any athlete with Olympic standards could
compete was a remarkable development and significant when considering the
country’s context. Third, Soviet or Afro-Asian National Olympic Committees voting in
favour of expulsion seemed unconscionable considering their own practices at home.
For example, Dönhoff cited countries such as Zanzibar, Rwanda, India, Pakistan,
Cyprus, Kenya, Tanganyika, and the Congo, each of which dealt with racial tolerance
through mass genocide.317 Finally, realising the political roots and implications of the
problem in South Africa, Dönhoff noted: “… the sporting public in the Continental
European countries will have but little comprehension for an Olympic analogy to the
United Nations’ treatment of South Africa, e.g. for a defamation of a proud little group
of first class athletes by countries, the intolerance of which against their racial
minorities is causing more and more concern to the civilized world.”318
The premises and explanation in Dönhoff’s letter were strong arguments for
reconsidering South Africa’s admittance to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Brundage
responded by pointing out that “we have not closed the door and that it is still possible
for it [South Africa] to qualify for participation in the next Olympic Games in Tokyo….
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As you undoubtedly know, in the international climate which exists in this matter, it
is very difficult for us to confine the argument to sport and avoid all political
implications.”319 This may have been the first instance in which Brundage explicitly
conceded that dealing with the South African issue would of course have ‘political
implications.’ In the face of the stark realities of life in South Africa, the convenient
separation of sport from politics, a strategy often employed by the IOC, could no
longer be sustained.
The final discussion item received by the IOC on the banning of South Africa came
from England-based SASA representative John Rogers. Rogers sought clarification on
the policies of SASA and SAN-ROC, and unsurprisingly appealed to Mayer to use his
influence to expel SANOC at the upcoming Congress of the IOC in Tokyo:
How can this body remain in ‘good standing’ within the IOC or with
other Olympic members or International Federations? … The
provisional team of eighty-two athletes which the SANOC issued for
the Tokyo Games included 7 non-whites. Frank Braun, the SANOC
President, said that the whites and non-whites would be strictly
segregated if they competed in Tokyo! … This has been the only
‘concession’ to non-white South African sportsmen since the IOC
warning to the SANOC over two years ago…. Non-racial sport is
perfectly legal in South Africa. The SANOC could not publicly declare
their belief in integration of sport and its administration as directed
by the IOC because they believe in segregation.320
Rogers used the conclusion of his letter to sever his long association with the IOC.
Neither Mayer nor Brundage responded to Rogers’ letter before the Tokyo Games; the
plea to expel SANOC at the scheduled IOC Session in Japan fell on deaf ears. However,
the rising tide of South African and world censure led Brundage and the IOC to
ultimately withdraw the invitation to SANOC to participate in the Tokyo Games.
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5.

Discussion: The Developments from 1960-1964
The ‘three dominant voices’—South African Olympic affiliates, domestic

resistance, and international community—continued to resonate from 1960 to 1964.
On the eve of the 1964 Tokyo Games, they provided sufficient evidence to allow a
detailed insight into Avery Brundage’s, and the IOC’s, ultimate stance in regard to the
South African situation. Each voice sustained a definitive narrative.
These three genre voices were salient factors contributing to the IOC’s final
decision regarding South Africa’s participation in the 1960 Rome Games, and were
also effective in the IOC’s decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 1964
Tokyo Games. First, Article 1 of the Olympic Charter was still at the core of the IOC’s
debates regarding SANOC’s suspension, and Article 1 in conjunction with Article 24
ultimately caused the downfall of SANOC. Article 24 stated: “[National Olympic
Committees] shall enforce all the Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic
Committee.”321 SANOC appeared to be trying to overcome the discrimination and
racism in South African sport, but its actions were circumscribed by, among other
things, South African government policies. Therefore, it could not truly enforce IOC
rules and regulations.
Second, the protocol and structure of the IOC was a deciding force as the 1964
Tokyo Games approached. NOCs must embrace the Olympic Movement’s ideals and
the IOC’s rules and regulations when making decisions regarding participation in the
Olympic Games. Further, a number of resolutions involving SANOC were submitted to
IOC members for voting decisions. Despite SANOC’s belief in properly enforcing IOC
rules and regulations, and abiding by the imposed resolutions, there was a difference
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between the IOC’s and SANOC’s interpretation of the IOC rules, regulations, and
resolutions. However, the most important element of the IOC structure that led to the
suspension of SANOC was the IOC bureaucracy itself. The power of the IOC to enforce
change was, and remains, within the hands of its members. SANOC could not abide by
the resolutions imposed by the IOC membership at the 1962 Moscow and 1963
Baden-Baden General Sessions. Although leniency was afforded to SANOC by
interpreting the conditions of the Baden-Baden resolution in SANOC’s favour—the
request for proper trials to select the South African Olympic team and carrying out its
duties under Article 24—there was one other condition that had to be unequivocally
fulfilled. SANOC had to publicly dissociate itself from the South African government’s
policy of non-competition and non-integration in sport between whites and nonwhites. According to the discussion from the 1964 Innsbruck IOC General Session,
SANOC did not fulfill this obligation, which resulted in the withdrawal of the invitation
to the 1964 Tokyo Games. SANOC did have more time to abide by the Baden-Baden
resolution, since the final date to submit entries was not until mid-August, but it never
publicly dissociated itself from the government’s racist policy.
Third, it remained nonnegotiable for the IOC not to involve itself in political and
domestic issues of any country. However, at this stage of the South African situation,
the IOC’s policy to keep the Olympic Movement non-political was being heavily
challenged. Brundage acknowledged that political implications affected the IOC’s
decision-making process to suspend SANOC, but every effort was still made to base
the decision on the IOC rules and regulations, and protocol and structure, even if
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political and domestic issues influenced SANOC’s actions that led to its withdrawal
from the Olympic Games.
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that points one and two elaborated above
dominated how the IOC administration handled the South African situation during the
period leading up to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Politics were an element of the process,
but they were not, yet, an overwhelming factor. Although the IOC only became
tangentially involved with domestic matters due to the nature of the resolutions that
were voted on by its members in the General Sessions, if a NOC was suspended or
expelled partly based on the political element of Article 24, which, in this case, had to
do with South Africa’s government, then that was clearly a reflection of a domestic
issue.
However, based on the correspondence from 1960 to 1964, Brundage’s and the
IOC’s decisions were dominated by: (a) IOC rules and regulations, and (b) IOC protocol
and structure. Focussing on these two points helps to understand why South Africa’s
invitation was withdrawn for the 1964 Tokyo Games. Despite SANOC’s belief that it
had abided by IOC rules, and that racial discrimination in South African sport was
diminishing, it became obvious that the South African sporting situation stood
awkwardly in confrontation with Articles 1 and 24 of the Olympic Charter. Further,
SANOC did not fully meet the IOC’s standards, nor did it fulfill its promises made at
the 1960 Rome IOC General Session, nor meet any subsequent obligations imposed
by each new resolution approved by the IOC’s members. The reality was that SANOC’s
effort to integrate non-white athletes and organizations to the IOC’s satisfaction was
a failure. SANOC’s actions, combined with the South African government’s policies,
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underscored the decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo
Games.
In light of SANOC’s suspension, what influence, if any, did domestic resistance and
the international community have on the IOC? Domestic resistance and international
community perspectives shared the same sentiment expressed before the 1960 Rome
Games: SANOC was a disgrace. If its messages and stances did not change, did its
opinions matter? It was concluded earlier that its opinions failed to affect the
decisions that were made in regard to SANOC’s participation in the Olympic
Movement leading up to the 1960 Rome Games. Even though the tone of messages
scarcely changed leading up to the 1964 Tokyo Games, domestic resistance and
international community perspectives played a greater role in SANOC’s fate.
Ultimately, SANOC itself provided sufficient evidence to justify its withdrawal from
the Tokyo Games. Yet, because of the growth in both size and strength of censor
against apartheid in South Africa, it was impossible to completely ignore domestic and
international resistance perspectives.
Although the IOC’s decisions leading up to the 1964 Tokyo Games resulted in South
Africa’s invitation to be withdrawn, was there any evidence of structural racism? The
benefit of the doubt was given to SANOC when the IOC membership discussed if
SANOC abided by the Baden-Baden resolution. SANOC’s efforts in light of the South
African government’s laws and policies were noted, but SANOC had to dissociate itself
from the government’s stance on non-competition and non-integration of whites and
non-whites in South African sport. SANOC’s non-compliance of the resolution did
prevent a more complicated problem for the IOC. If SANOC did dissociate itself from
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the South African government, the IOC would have upheld the invitation to South
Africa for the Tokyo Games, which would have meant that the IOC allowed SANOC to
participate knowing fully that racial discrimination was occurring in South African
sport. Once again, depending on the interpretation of the Olympic Charter, the IOC
could have implicitly supported the racial discrimination in South African sport. Any
arrangement to accommodate South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic Games,
and Olympic Movement that did not include the complete abolition of racial
discrimination could be interpreted as accepting racism in South African sport.
SANOC did save the IOC from any further difficult decisions regarding South Africa’s
participation in the Tokyo Games. However, the details of the resolution served to
create conditions of institutionalized racism.
Nonetheless, the organized efforts of those who opposed SANOC and the South
African government were substantial, at least enough, to help clarify and provide the
facts of the South African sporting situation to Brundage and the IOC, which led to the
withdrawal of SANOC’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. In the next
chapter, treatment of the 1964-1968 period is the aim to discover if the messages
from the ‘three dominant voices’ changed. Did those voices gain strength? Did they
diminish? Or did they remain the same? Further, what was the reaction of the IOC and
its leader, Avery Brundage?

218

Endnotes for Chapter Three

Ira Emery to Otto Mayer, 20 September 1960, Avery Brundage Collection (hereafter cited
as ABC), box 144, reel 81.
2 Mayer to Emery, 23 September 1960, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
3 Emery to Avery Brundage, 25 January 1961, box 144, reel 81.
4 Ibid.
5 Emery to Mayer, 9 February 1961, box 144, reel 81.
6 Emery to Brundage, 13 February 1961, box 144, reel 81.
7 Mayer to Emery, 13 February 1961, box 144, reel 81.
8 Mayer to Brutus, 14 February 1961, box 144, reel 81.
9 Brundage to Emery, 18 February 1961, box 144, reel 81.
10 Emery to Brundage, 28 March 1961, box 144, reel 81.
11 Brutus to Emery, 25 March 1961, box 144, reel 81 found in ibid.
12 Emery to Brutus, 28 March 1961, box 144, reel 81 found in Emery to Brundage, 28 March
1961, box 144, reel 81.
13 Emery to Brundage, 10 April 1961, box 144, reel 81.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Emery to Brundage, 17 April 1961, box 144, reel 81.
17 “Gen. Klopper’s Assurance to Non-White Sportsmen,” The Star, Johannesburg, 15 April
1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81, found in ibid.
18 Brundage to Emery, 18 April 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
19 Mayer to Brundage, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
20 Emery to Brundage, 15 June 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
21 Ibid.
22 Mayer to South African National Olympic Committee (hereafter cited as SANOC), 25
September 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Capitalized in original.
23 Mayer to L.M. Francey, 28 September 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
24 Ibid.
25 Honey to Brundage, 13 February 1962, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
26 Brundage to Honey, 22 February 1962, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
27 Francey to Mayer, 19 March 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
28 Ibid.
29 Francey to Mayer, 30 April 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
30 Ibid. Underscored in original.
31 Mayer to Francey, 7 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
32 H.B. Klopper to Mayer, 25 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
1

219

IOC, “60th IOC Session, Moscow, 1962,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992).
34 Mayer to SANOC, 19 June 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
35 Emery to IOC, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
36 Mayer to Francey, 19 August 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
37 Jan Botha to Mayer, 20 September 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
38 Botha to Mayer, 18 October 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
39 Mayer to Botha, 26 October 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
40 Francey to Mayer, 5 November 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81; see also Rangasamy to
Francey, 22 August 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in South African Non-Racial
Olympic Committee (hereafter cited as SAN-ROC) package, 24 May 1963, ABC, box 144,
reel 81.
41 Ibid.
42 Francey to Brundage, 5 November 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
43 Ibid.
44 Mayer to Francey, 12 November 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
45 Ibid. Underscored in original.
46 Brundage to SANOC (Attn.: Francey), 19 November 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
47 Mayer to Francey, 20 November 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
48 Francey to Mayer, 5 February 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
49 Ibid.
50 SANOC Press Release, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in Francey to Mayer, 5
February 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
51 Ibid.
52 Francey to Brundage, 16 April 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
53 Mayer to Francey, 6 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
54 Brundage to Francey, 8 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
55 Francey to Mayer, 9 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
56 Mayer to Francey, 14 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
57 Ibid. Capitalized in original.
58 Ibid.
59 Mayer to Francey, 20 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
60 Francey to Mayer, 4 June 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in Francey to Brundage, 4
June 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. Underscored in original.
63 Mayer to Francey, 12 June 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
64 Brundage to SANOC, 5 August 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
65 Francey to Brundage, 12 September 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
66 Mayer to Francey, 14 September 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
67 Ibid.
33

220

Ibid.
69 Summary of Rudolph Balsiger’s Report, 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 The only correspondence available from Brundage to Balsiger appears almost a year after
Brundage received the summary of Balsiger’s report. Since the time of Brundage’s
response was so much later, he might be responding to a different letter from Balsiger:
“Thank you for your long and interesting letter on the South African problem, which
troubles us greatly. There is much truth in what you say. I have also studied your
pamphlet…. We are, of course, solely concerned with sport and in this case it is very
difficult to keep sport questions and political question separate.” (Brundage to Balsiger,
22 August 1964, ABC, box 144, reel 81).
75 SANOC Report, 1 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Willi Daume to Select Group, 15 October 1963, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
82 Sir Arthur Porritt Resolution, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
83 R.S. Alexander Motion, October 1963, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
84 G.D. Sondhi Proposition, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
85 Massard Proposition, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
86 Marquess of Exeter Resolution, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
87 IOC, “61st IOC Session, Baden-Baden, 1963,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV
(1956-1988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic
Studies, University of Western Ontario, 1992), 80.
88 Unaddressed, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Mayer to Francey, 18 December 1963, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
92 Ibid.
93 IOC Letter, undated, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
94 Frank Braun to Brundage and IOC Members, 8 January 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. Underscored and capitalized in original.
98 Ibid.
99 Braun to Marquess of Exeter, 8 January 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
100 Braun to Mayer, 8 January 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in original.
68

221

Braun to Brundage, 8 January 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Brundage to Braun, 18 January 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
105 IOC, “1964. Innsbruck,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 169. Bolded in original.
106 IOC, “62nd IOC Session, Innsbruck, 1964,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 88-9.
107 SANOC Statement, 16 June 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82 found in Braun to Mayer, 20 June
1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
108 Ibid.
109 Braun to Mayer, 20 June 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
110 Ibid.
111 Braun to Brundage, 20 June 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 IOC, “1964. Lausanne,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 171.
115 Braun to Mayer, 8 August 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
116 Mayer to Braun, 13 August 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
117 Emery to Brundage, 4 July 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
118 Ibid.
119 Emery to Brundage, 11 August 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Emery to Brundage, 14 August 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
123 Brundage to Emery, 28 August 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
124 Emery to Brundage, 1 September 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81. The Group Areas Act
discussed by Emery was first implemented in 1950. The Act divided the entire country
into geographical areas based on race. See Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, South
Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2004) for
more detail.
125 Emery to Brundage, 27 September 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
126 Emery to Brundage, 28 September 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
127 Emery to Brundage, 9 October 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
128 Emery to Brundage, 4 December 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
129 Brundage to Emery, 15 December 1961, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
130 Emery to Brundage, 30 January 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
131 Emery to Brundage, 31 January 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
132 Emery to Brundage, 2 February 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
101

222

Emery to Brundage, 5 February 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
134 Emery to Brundage, 5 February 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
135 Emery to Brundage, 12 February 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
136 Emery to Brundage, 14 February 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
137 Ibid.
138 Emery to Brundage, 19 February 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
139 Ibid.
140 Emery to Brundage, 29 March 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
141 Emery to Brundage, 2 April 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
142 Brundage to Emery, 7 April 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
143 Brundage to Emery, 16 April 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
144 Emery to Brundage, 24 April 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81. Underscored in original.
145 Ibid.
146 Emery to Marquess of Exeter, 1 May 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Emery to Brundage, 8 May 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
150 Emery to Mayer, 10 May 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
151 Emery to Marquess of Exeter, 14 May 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81 found in Emery to
Mayer, 14 May 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
152 H.B. Klopper to Mayer, 25 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
153 Emery to Brundage, 24 May 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
154 Ibid.
155 Emery to Mayer, 8 June 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81. (Note: only the first page of this
letter was available in the ABC).
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Brundage to Emery, 14 July 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81. Underscoring is mine.
159 Emery to Brundage, 24 July 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Brundage to Emery, 3 August 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
163 Ibid.
164 Emery to Mayer, 21 August, 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
165 Ibid.
166 See, for example, Mayer to Emery, 12 November 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
167 Brundage to Emery, 19 November 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81. Capitalized in original.
168 Emery to Brundage, 27 November 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
169 Brundage to Emery, 12 December 1962, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
170 Emery to Brundage, 10 January 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
171 Ibid.
133

223

Emery to Brundage, 11 January 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
173 Emery to Brundage, 14 January 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
174 Brundage to Emery, 19 January 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
175 Ibid.
176 Emery to Brundage, 21 January 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
177 Ibid.
178 Brundage to Emery, 25 February 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
179 Emery to Brundage, 1 March 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
180 Ibid.
181 Brundage to Emery, 18 March 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
182 Emery to Brundage, 11 June 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
183 Brundage to Emery, 20 September 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
184 Emery to Brundage, 7 October 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
185 Brundage to Emery, 26 October 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
186 Brundage to Emery, 12 November 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Emery to Brundage, 22 November 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
190 Brundage to Emery, 2 December 1963, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
191 Brundage to Emery, 9 January 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
192 Emery to Brundage, 25 March 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
193 Brundage to Emery, 31 March 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
194 Emery to Brundage, 15 June 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
195 Emery to Brundage, 18 June 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
196 Ibid.
197 Article Translation, Dabbreek en Sondagnuus, 28 June 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
198 Brundage to Emery, 10 July 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
199 Emery to Brundage, 21 July 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
200 Brundage to Emery, 29 July 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
201 Brundage to Emery, 20 August 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
202 Dennis Brutus to Mayer, 6 February 1961, box 144, reel 81.
203 Brutus to Emery, 25 March 1961, box 144, reel 81 found in ibid.
204 Emery to Brutus, 28 March 1961, box 144, reel 81 found in Emery to Brundage, 28 March
1961, box 144, reel 81.
205 Brutus to Emery, 3 April 1961, box 144, reel 81.
206 Mayer to Brutus, 26 April 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
207 Ibid.
208 Brutus to Mayer, 26 April 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
209 Ibid.
210 Brutus to Brundage, 12 November 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
211 Ibid.
172

224

Brutus to National Olympic Committees (hereafter cited as NOC), 1 January 1962, ABC,
box 144, reel 81.
213 Brutus (South African Sports Association [hereafter cited as SASA] general release), 7
February 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
214 John Rogers to Brundage, 3 January 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
215 Brutus to Brundage, 12 February 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
216 Ibid.
217 Brutus to Mayer, 6 March 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
218 International Olympic Committee (hereafter cited as IOC), “1962. Lausanne,” in IOC
Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969), translations and summaries by Wolf
Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, 1992), 157.
219 Mayer to SANOC, 10 March 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
220 Ibid.
221 Mayer to Brutus, 23 March 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
222 Brutus (Supplementary Report on Racial Discrimination in South African Sport from the
SASA), 24 May 1962, box 144, reel 81 found in ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 G.K. Rangasamy to Owen Wynne, 1 July 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
225 SASA document, 9 July 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
226 Rangasamy to Reginald Honey, 16 July 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
227 Rangasamy to South African National Sports Federation, 7 August 1962, ABC, box 144,
reel 81.
228 Francey to Rangasamy, 15 August 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
229 Rangasamy to Francey, 22 August 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in South African
Non-Racial Olympic Committee (hereafter cited as SAN-ROC) package, 24 May 1963, ABC,
box 144, reel 81.
230 Brutus to Brundage, 9 October 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
231 Brutus to Honey, 9 October 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
232 Ibid.
233 SASA to Francey, 25 November 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
234 Reg Hlongwane to Mayer, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
235 Ibid.
236 Hlongwane, Address to 2nd Biennial General Meeting of SASA, 13 January 1963, ABC, box
144, reel 81 found in SAN-ROC package, 24 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
237 Hlongwane to Brundage, 6 February 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
238 Rangasamy to Francey, 9 February 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
239 N. Rathinasany to Brundage, 9 March 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
240 Brundage to Rathinasany, 25 March 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
241 Unaddressed, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
242 Rathinasany to Mayer, 18 April 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
243 Rathinasany to Secretary of the Japanese Olympic Committee, 18 April 1963, ABC, box
144, reel 81 found in ibid.
212

225

Mayer to Brundage, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
245 Rathinasany to all Olympic Committees and Sportsmen, 5 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel
81 found in SAN-ROC package, 24 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
246 Ibid.
247 Mayer to Rathinasany, 23 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
248 SAN-ROC package, 24 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
249 Ibid.
250 Mayer to Secretary of SAN-ROC, 12 June 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Underscored in
original.
251 John Harris to Mayer, 22 July 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
252 Mayer to Harris, 29 July 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
253 Brutus statement, 26 August 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
254 Ibid. Capitalized in original.
255 Harris Statement, 26 August 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in Abdul to IOC, 1 October
1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Underscored in original.
256 SAN-ROC Statement, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in Abdul to IOC, 1 October
1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
257 Harris, The Case for the Suspension of the South African Olympic Committee, undated, ABC,
box 144, reel 81.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid
261 Ibid.
262 Harris to Mayer, 1 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
263 Ibid.
264 Abdul Minty to Brundage, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
265 SAN-ROC Statement, 14 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
268 Harris to IOC Executive Board, 13 December 1963, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
269 Ibid. Capitalized in original.
270 Ann Hams to IOC Executive Board, 25 May 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Although this was
a two-page letter, the second page is completely faded, therefore, illegible. Underscored
in original.
271 Ibid.
272 Antony Steel to Mayer, 14 August 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
273 Mayer to Steel, 16 August 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
274 Ibid. A response from Brundage to Mayer’s private comments was unavailable at hand.
275 Steel to Mayer, 5 September 1961, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 John Rogers to Brundage, 3 January 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
244

226

André Ungar to Brundage, 5 April 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
280 E.T. Harriott to Brundage, 24 April 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
281 Brundage to Harriott, 4 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
282 Harriott to Brundage, 15 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
283 Ibid.
284 Harriot to Brundage, 23 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81
285 Steel to Mayer, 1 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
286 Mayer to Steel, 2 May 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
287 Ibid.
288 Peter Brown to Mayer, 3 December 1962, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
289 Ibid.
290 The Anti-Apartheid Movement (cited hereafter as AAM), Boycott Apartheid Campaign, 26
April 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found S. Abdul to IOC, 1 October 1963, ABC, box 144,
reel 81.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Kaim Osman Hussein Osman (Secretary of the Sudanese National Olympic Committee) to
AAM Secretary, 30 April 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
294 Abdul Statement, 1 June 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in Abdul to IOC, 1 October
1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
295 Ibid.
296 Steel to IOC Chancellor, 23 September 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
297 AAM, Dennis Brutus, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in Abdul to IOC, 1 October
1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
298 Nancy Tucker to Brundage, 5 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
299 Catherine Morris to Brundage, 5 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
300 Ibid.
301 Stephen Groves to Brundage, 11 October, 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
302 See, Ebrahim to Brundage, 28 January 1964, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
303 Ahmed Ebrahim to Brundage, 13 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
306 Ebrahim to Brundage, 28 January 1964, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
307 Ibid.
308 Harris to Mayer, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
309 Bennett Marengwa and Victor Kadalie to Brundage, 14 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel
81.
310 Jackie Robinson to IOC, 16 October 1963, box 144, reel 81.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
313 Peter Kaiser to Brundage, 21 October 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
314 Ghana Olympic Committee President to IOC, 16 January 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
279

227

According to Count Dönhoff, the South African Foundation was “a non-political national
organisation, which has been created three years ago by 200 leading South African
personalities from all walks of life and from all political denominations including the
opposition parties…. working for the Foundation’s aim to promote better international
understanding of the South African facts and problems.” (Count Dönhoff to Brundage, 27
January 1964, ABC, box 144, reel 81).
316 Dönhoff to Brundage, 27 January 1964, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Brundage to Dönhoff, 2 February 1964, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
320 Rogers to Mayer, 16 September 1964, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in original.
321 IOC, The Olympic Games: Fundamental Principles, Rules and Regulations, General
Information (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1962), 16.
315

Chapter Four:
Succumbing to International Political
Pressure: Avery Brundage and the IOC,
1964-1968
1.

Introduction
The overall tensions and dynamic of the South African discussion increased

immensely between the 1964 Tokyo Games and the 1968 Mexico City Games.
Although the dialogue between the IOC, South African Olympic affiliates, domestic
resistance forces, and voices of the international community continued, two new
elements – the IOC South Africa Commission (SAC) and the opinions of individual IOC
and National Olympic Committee (NOC) members – added content to an already
complicated situation. The main messages on the status of non-whites in South
African sport continued to resonate in global perspective. South African Olympic
affiliates, represented primarily by the South African National Olympic Committee
(SANOC), were fighting a “life or death” battle to remain in the Olympic Games and
Olympic Movement. Efforts to integrate non-white athletes and organizations into the
white-dominated sport system continued. Some concessions were achieved from the
South African government to accommodate the IOC’s requests, but ultimately, the
continued effort failed to garner the needed approbation from those who opposed
apartheid. The domestic resistance entities present from 1955-1964, waned between
1964 and 1968. However, domestic resistance forces acquired new sources of support
that maintained a contradictory stance with SANOC’s ongoing progress. Those
supporting the domestic resistance network, once again, vied to have SANOC
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suspended until the South African situation was corrected. The majority of the
international community persisted to advocate in support of the domestic resistance.
Until SANOC abided by IOC rules and regulations, the international community
petitioned for SANOC’s suspension or its expulsion altogether.
As these genre voices became more complex, it became apparent how they shaped
the responses and decisions affecting SANOC’s status and South Africa’s participation
in the IOC, the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement in general. The years of
correspondence, information, and action leading up to the 1968 Mexico City Games
yielded the same result as the years approaching the 1964 Tokyo Games. By 1968, the
IOC was forced to succumb to international and political pressure to save the future
of the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. The result was a decision to once again
withdraw the invitation from South Africa to participate in the 1968 Mexico City
Games.

2.

South African Olympic Affiliates
It was almost a full year after the 1964 Tokyo Games before Avery Brundage was

contacted by a South African Olympic affiliate. Frank Braun, SANOC President,
extended an invitation to Brundage to visit South Africa in early 1966.1 Perhaps it was
the suspension from the 1964 Tokyo Games that prompted silence between IOC
officials and SANOC. However, South African Olympic affiliates remained eager to
continue the process of gaining re-entry into the Olympic Games and Olympic
Movement as soon as possible. The first attempt to reintegrate into the Olympic
community occurred at a National Olympic Committee (NOC) Assembly in Rome.

230
Giulio Onesti, Italian NOC President, sent an invitation to SANOC. Reginald Honey, the
South African IOC member, decided to participate, though Onesti was reluctant to
have SANOC representatives attend. Due to the protest and threatened boycott from
other participating countries in the Assembly, the Italian hosts tried to broker a
compromise. He proposed to formally identify Honey solely as a member of the IOC,
but not a representative of SANOC: “Mr. Honey did not want to assent to this proposal
and made violent charges against the IOC and its President, regarding them
responsible for interference in South Africa’s home affairs. He affirmed that he was
not going to bestow anything to anybody and that he would be present at the meeting
as representative of the SANOC.”2
In the face of Honey’s uncompromising stance, Italian officials tried to convince
him to withdraw from the meeting, but Honey insisted on attending. If he was to be
denied attendance he insisted that the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI)
prepare and read a letter in front of the entire Assembly explaining why he could not
participate. His request was denied, and it was stated to Honey that the reason for his
withdrawal was due to South Africa’s exclusion from the 1964 Tokyo Games. In a fit
of rancour, Honey held a press conference before the Rome session commenced. This
was seen by Onesti as a rebellious act. Onesti apologized to Brundage for such a farce,
belatedly realizing that the Italian delegation should not have invited SANOC to the
NOC Assembly in the first place. According to Onesti, Honey was treated with the
utmost hospitality, but Onesti hoped for further clarifications from Brundage and the
IOC on how best to handle such a matter, hoping that “the NOC[s] receive clear and
precise indications in this respect.”3 Honey, in turn, wrote to Brundage, offering his
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own view of CONI’s conduct: “To me, the attitude of the C.O.N.I. is incomprehensible
and I think it is my duty to disclose the facts to you at once. I certainly think that they
should be disclosed to those attending the meeting of the IOC in Madrid…. I want you
and every one to appreciate that there was no personal rudeness to me. But I quite
candidly feel that my N.O.C. has been treated very shabbily, if not insulted.”4
The NOC incident garnered enough attention to generate discussions at both the
Executive Board and General Sessions in Madrid. In the Executive Board meeting, it
was pointed out that SANOC was only suspended, not expelled from the IOC.
Nonetheless, the “IOC had hoped that Mr. Honey could convince his Government to
abolish apartheid in sports, but nothing had been done…. DECISION: to propose that
the NOC take a stand against this discrimination. If it does not comply, to suspend the
NOC until such time as their Rules will be in conformity with those of IOC.”5
Discussions at the General Session served to keep the pressure on South African
Olympic officials. African delegates noted it as “peculiar that South Africa’s athletes
could not participate, but its officials continued to sit in on Olympic meetings.” No
option remained other than to tell Honey to leave, in particular since “Brundage
reported that the African NOCs present in Madrid during the NOC meeting had been
agitated, but after his promise that the IOC would make a decision, [the African NOCs]
had promised to refrain from protests.” The assembly reached the decision that if no
progress were to be noted in South Africa by the 1966 Rome session, it would be
suspended, “and its officials will no longer be able to participate in meetings.”6
After the Madrid IOC meetings, Brundage raised with SANOC president Braun the
invitation to visit South Africa that had been extended earlier. Perhaps it was time for
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Brundage to see the situation for himself, and he was quite optimistic about the
likelihood of such a visit.7 The official position of the IOC on the results of the Madrid
meeting was communicated by IOC Secretary, Lydia Zanchi. Representatives of
African NOCs had raised the question of the suspension of South Africa. The IOC would
invite SANOC representatives to the Rome Executive Board meeting scheduled for late
April, to appraise the IOC of SANOC’s activities and any improvements evident in
South African sports, “in accordance with the Olympic Regulations and about the
declaration voted during the Baden-Baden and Innsbruck sessions in 1963 and
1964.”8
SANOC’s presentation to the Executive Board in Rome pointed to a significant
change in the political strategies of South Africa on the issue. SANOC committed itself
“to follow IOC rules and … pick 50 percent of the [1968 Olympic team] with 50 percent
non-whites, both athletes and officials. The Government has accepted this which is an
enormous step forward because the Apartheid [sic] laws are so important that if you
break them severe punishment is a risk. The IOC can publish this if it so wishes.”9 The
Executive Board in response decided to delay any decisions on the removal of South
Africa, arguing that “it serve[d] nobody to throw South Africa out of the Olympic
Movement. The only losers will be the athletes. It decides to wait to hear the results
of the work of its mixed committee.”10 SANOC succeeded in delaying any adverse
decisions for yet another year; no decision would be taken until the 1967 Tehran
meetings. In addition, Braun reported that the government agreed to form a
committee to select a team, the first time that the government acceded to such a
request. Brundage rationalized the decision by pointing out that apartheid law was an
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official government matter; SANOC would risk sanctions if it violated those laws;
overly precipitate action would be worse than a little more patience. “If we expel them
now, we will never see them again. If we suspend them it might endanger the
arrangement they are working on with the Government.”11
The conciliatory atmosphere at 1966 Rome meetings notwithstanding, some in the
Olympic community remained doubtful of SANOC’s assurance. For example, Reginald
Alexander, Kenyan IOC member, affirmed that the Kenyan Olympic Committee
supported the barring of SANOC until it abided by the Olympic Charter, but he advised
the IOC to maintain contact with SANOC and exert all possible pressure to effect
compliance.12
Nevertheless, hope for change in South African sport was high. Brundage wrote
Honey to discuss the tragic assassination of South African Prime Minster, Hendrik
Verwoerd, and its implications for South African sport’s progress. Foremost on his
mind was the IOC fact-finding Commission under consideration to study the
conditions of sport in South Africa.13 Honey noted his approval of the Commission,
recommending Ade Ademola (Nigeria), Reginald Alexander (Kenya) and Johann
Westerhoff (Netherlands);14 Brundage appointed all three to join the South Africa
Commission (SAC).15
Appointed to SAC, Westerhoff, who was then serving as IOC Secretary General,
wrote to Braun requesting detailed organization information on the structure,
organization and membership of South African Olympic sports; appointment
procedure for NOC and NSF officials; the state of sport facilities; and explanations of
government policies affecting sports. Westerhoff concluded with a political
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admonition: “In connection herewith we should like to have with the Memorandum,
from your side, recommendations to enable the South African [National] Olympic
Committee to fulfill the Olympic Code.”16 The IOC Executive Board likewise wished
the Commission to focus on the racializing contexts of South African sports: “What the
IOC has to find out is whether or not all athletes regardless of colour are able to
compete in the Games or whether the NOC, regardless of colour, picks the best
athletes, and by doing so, comply with the rules.”17
Westerhoff acknowledged SANOC’s information package but pointed out that by
then the Commission had run out of time for an adequate tour of inspection, and
would have to delay the trip until after the IOC meetings in Tehran.18 Braun
complained to Brundage that SANOC had not been advised of the potential relevance
of the Tehran meetings after Honey was dismissed from the 1965 NOC Assembly
meetings in Rome: “Mr. Onesti did not consider it necessary to advise us of the Tehran
Meetings…. Apart from the fact that as you already know the position of sport in our
country has been considerably changed, I consider it essential that we should be
allowed to attend his unofficial Meetings to hear what is going on behind the scenes
in certain N.O.C. circles.”19
During the Executive Board meeting in Tehran, an update was provided on SAC’s
status. If further delays were encountered concerning the appointed members of SAC,
new members would have to be selected.20 The discussions at the Tehran General
Session indicated that a firmer direction was required. Westerhoff regretted the
unanticipated delays, and made reference to the illegitimate use of the word mark,
‘Olympic’ by an organization called SAN-ROC, which would therefore not be on the list
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of consulting organizations during the tour. Brundage himself emphasized again the
IOC’s common perspective at the time – it was not the Commission’s remit to pass
judgement on South African policies; it was to concern itself solely with issues directly
related to sports: “… there is a difference between the government Policy of Apartheid
and Racial Discrimination [sic] in sport. We, as IOC, are concerned with sport only and
the Olympic Movement.”21 SANOC President Frank Braun framed his report around a
compatible message, arguing that the South African government had made several
concessions in its policy; this appeared sufficient to decision-makers at the meeting.
Despite forceful opposition by delegates from Nigeria, Mali, Congo Brazzaville and
Uganda, supported by Russia, Romania, Cuba, and the United Arab Republic,22 it was
thus decided to dispatch the Commission no later than the end of August 1967, to
submit a report in time for consideration by IOC at the Grenoble 1968 meeting. 23
The wording of SANOC’s detailed report served to obfuscate the underlying South
African position; apartheid in sports would continue to be practiced at home, but – for
white athletes at least – not abroad, since:
… it was not the intention to export the policy of separate
development and that it was therefore perfectly in order for whites
to compete against non-whites overseas. As each population group
would make its own nominations, trials, as such, before the
departure of the team were not necessary. In those instances where
a doubt could exist and where only one competitor can be entered,
but reserves are allowed, such as in boxing, the elimination or final
selection could be arranged at the venue of the competition.24
The implicit assumption that in that case, non-white athletes might also be allowed
to attend trials outside of South Africa, was rejected as a misunderstanding and
countered with the release of a clarifying press release.25 This did nothing to assuage
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the concerns of some delegates, and after SANOC delegates had made their case on
May 6, “[a]lmost immediately … the Russian and United Arab Republic IOC Members
made a vehement attack on ‘the South Africa Race Policy’ and demanded that under
the circumstances the South Africa National Olympic Committee should be expelled
from the Olympic Family of Nations…”26
The IOC arrived at a formal decision on the subsequent day. Noting the progress
that had occurred in South Africa, concerning the issue of racial segregation in sports,
the IOC resolved to dispatch the Commission no later than late August 1967, “for
consideration by the International Olympic Committee at Grenoble in February,
1968…. this resolution prevents South Africa’s participation in the 1967 Pre-Olympic
Meeting in Mexico and the Winter Games in Grenoble.”27 A related resolution enjoined
SAN-ROC to desist making use of the term ‘Olympic’ in its name, since this served to
create the erroneous impression that SAN-ROC was a legitimate representative of
South African Olympic sports. 28
Two months after the Tehran meetings, Westerhoff reviewed with Braun some
necessary conditions for SAC’s visit. The Commission insisted on guarantees of
unrestricted travel and access, “to contact anybody wanted and to stay together
during that visit, and that the necessary entry permits be obtained.”29 Of particular
concern was the position of Commission member and IOC representative for Nigeria
Sir Adetokunbo Ademola:
… any unforeseen happening, whatever it may be, could immediately
cause great embarrassment, if not more, between your country and
Nigeria, or between Africans black and white, all precautions should
be taken to avoid such a situation. It is therefore necessary that we
should receive special guarantees from you and your government as
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to the personal safety of Sir Ade Ademola and that of the commission
as a whole….30
The concerns seem to have been unfounded, the Commission’s travels proceeded
without impediment, as is indicated by the letter of thanks sent to Braun by SAC
Chairman Lord Killanin subsequent to the end of the trip.31 (The Commission’s
substantive work will be considered in a subsequent section of this chapter.)
The IOC Grenoble meetings, where the SAC report was to be presented, were
projected to be poorly attended; it was deemed necessary to organize a postal vote to
decide SANOC’s fate.32 Killanin informed Honey of the postal vote,33 and SANOC
president Braun expressed the concern that it would be impossible for members not
present at the meeting, to do the issue full justice, since “all IOC Members voting
should have the benefit of the discussions that will be taking place at the meeting.”34
Since some members would not be able to attend, “in the interests of justice and in
fairness to all concerned my Executive Board feels that after the discussions which
will take place on 3rd February, 1968, a verbatim report, including all observations
made by the South Africa delegation should be furnished to Members who will not be
present in Grenoble, for consideration by them before exercising their vote.”35
Brundage, for his part, suggested to Braun the best strategy for SANOC to adopt in
preparation for the Grenoble Session, exhibiting a certain degree of sympathy for
SANOC’s position:
If I were you I would have a statement ready for circulation,
containing all the reasons for recognition. It should cite all the
progress you have made, the fact that the vast majority if not all of
the athletes, both white and black, want to participate, as against the
handful of expatriates who would not be eligible in any event, etc.
etc…. If South Africa cannot participate, it is the athletes, who have
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nothing to do with the Government policy, that are penalized, not the
Government. Point out that apartheid is a political issue like
Communism and Nazism, and that we are concerned only with sport
and not with politics. As I understand it, the Government has agreed
to respect the policies of other countries and only asks that other
countries respect its policies within its borders. A mixed team
selected by a mixed committee, wearing the same uniform and
traveling together will be produced. This you should point out, in the
circumstances, will be a great victory for sport. The success of such
a team will no doubt help you establish Olympic conditions within
the country…. You have a copy I am sure, of the resolution offered by
the African NOCs at Tehran. It would be well to answer this point by
point. Emphasize the fact that sport should not be used as a tool or
as a weapon for political purposes.36
In his speech at the Grenoble meeting, Braun provided SANOC’s response to the
SAC report. He argued that the report highlighted the excitement of all South Africans
for the 1968 Mexico City Games. The policy presented at Tehran, he stated, provided
a sound base for co-operation between the races, underscored the illegitimacy of SANROC, and emphasized SANOC’s progress since 1963.37 His interpretation of the SAC
report concluded that “South Africa ha[d] every justification of claiming that it will in
future be able to take part in the Olympic Games with a team comprising the best
athletes on a guaranteed basis of equal opportunity and non-discrimination.”
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Exclusion of South Africa by the IOC would do nothing to change the political situation
in the country, and only inflict harm on “the sportsmen, both Whites and more so the
Non-Whites.” 39 It had to be understood that sports could only be organized under the
social and political conditions prevailing in a given country, to change which was
beyond the IOC’s authority. “By re-extending the hand of friendship in sports to the
South African [National] Olympic Committee, the IOC can become the instrument
which will lift sport out of politics. South Africa was asked to comply with certain
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requirements,” Braun concluded. “This has been done and now we are ready to accept
your invitation to compete in the 1968 Olympic Games.”40
A lengthy discussion ensued, and the postal vote was completed by mid-February.
The result by absolute majority was to re-admit a mixed South African team to the
1968 Games in Mexico City.41 In a telegram to Brundage, Braun described the nonwhite reaction in South Africa as “very favourable. Arrangement for a joint non-white
selection committee is already in hand.… South Africa will not let you down.”42 A week
later, towards the end of February 1968, Westerhoff restated to Braun the proposition
made by SANOC at Tehran, a proposition that had to be effected in order to gain full
recognition by the IOC. The conditions included a multi-racial team; the team must
travel together; they must wear the same uniform and march under one flag; white
and non-whites would be allowed to compete against each other at international
meetings; and white and non-white officials involved in selecting the team.
Westerhoff reiterated that the situation was still far from being resolved satisfactorily
by attaching a copy of the complete Grenoble resolution, crafted by Australian IOC
member Hugh Weir, focusing on the central demand that “a multi-racial team will be
selected on merit.”43 As long as the conditions laid down in the Tehran proposition
were met, SANOC would be officially sanctioned to participate in the 1968 Mexico City
Games.44 At this juncture, Braun sent a highly complimentary and optimistic letter to
Brundage, offering his,
… own humble tribute to your good self for the magnificent way in
which you have handled the whole question. No one could possibly
accuse you of taking sides in the matter and I have seldom in my
experience, found a Chairman who has dealt so fairly with all parties
concerned.… it has been South Africa’s paramount wish over the last
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eight years to be able to participate with everybody belonging to the
Olympic family and although we ourselves have suffered exclusion
from the Tokyo Games, we feel that this would be the opportunity
for all countries to celebrate the admission of a full multi-racial South
African Team to the world’s premier sporting event.45
Neither the celebratory mood nor SANOC’s optimism were to last. “The
tremendous uproar, particularly in the press,” 46 caused by the Grenoble decision on
South Africa’s mixed team, indicated that the problem was as contentious as ever.
Westerhoff was concerned that the vociferous public and media reaction might induce
some members to propound problematic positions in order to assuage the public
mood: “We have done our utmost here to give the press exact information and to ask
them to stop writing about the issue and by so doing to help us avoid placing the
different parties in such a situation that they cannot retract certain decisions.”47 Some
IOC members were even considering calling an extraordinary IOC Executive Board
meeting. Twenty-four requests for such a meeting had to be submitted, but the
meeting then would require attendance by thirty-five members to achieve quorum;
Westerhoff considered this unlikely – not a fortuitous display of IOC internal
coherence.48
In an effort to control the situation, Brundage advised Westerhoff to notify the
Mexican Organizing Committee to forward an invitation to SANOC.49 Further,
Brundage advised Braun to “… see that caution is used in public statements from
South Africa and keep me advised of developments, particularly the spontaneous
response of the non-whites in your country.”50 Brundage also encouraged Honey to
prepare a strong statement with evidence and referencing laws to prevent the
withdrawal of the invitation to South Africa from the Mexico City Games.51
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Brundage also was aware that no official withdrawals from the Mexico City Games
had yet been received, and, although he had acknowledged a dozen requests for a
special meeting, he was doubtful that any of NOCs had changed their stances, “and I
doubt if many will after spending six years studying, debating and investigating the
problem.”52 Nonetheless, he felt compelled to issue a formal, lengthy statement to all
IOC and NOC members and to all ISFs asserting that the Grenoble decision did not
amount to an endorsement of South African policies: it was focussed solely on sportsrelated issues, and the South African team would be multi-racial and selected by a
multi-racial committee. The statement was noteworthy for the clarity with which it
laid out the IOC’s fundamental principles, if under the circumstances somewhat
theoretical insistence, of the separation of sports from politics: “For the first time the
16,000,000 non-whites of South Africa will have an opportunity to participate in the
Olympic Games on a completely equal basis according to Olympic regulations. This
invitation is for the 1968 Games only and the situation will be reviewed before the
1972 Games.”53 Rumors of boycotts of the Games which had begun to circulate, he
averred, would “astonish the 16,000,000 non-whites of South Africa who have no
responsibility for South African political policies and who are rejoicing at their first
opportunity to participate in world sport on the same basis as anyone else.”54 The
history of Olympic crises, Brundage argued, showed that in every case, the crisis was
caused by the intrusion of politics into the area of sports. He cited as examples the
1936 Games, the uproar caused by the entry of teams from the Communist block into
the 1952 Games, and the crisis of the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956. Political
responses in all of these cases inevitably occurred at the expense of sports, confirming
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the necessity for the IOC’s principally non-political stance. In the case of the 1956
Games, for example, “[c]ountry after country announced its withdrawal from the
Games refusing to participate against the aggressors.… Hungarians and Russians were
both there and the Games were a great success.” Therefore, he argued:
It has been amply proven that, if there is one place an athlete, no
matter what race, colour, religion or political affiliation, can display
his talents and his abilities before the world, on a completely equal
basis, it is the Olympic Games. Those who would abstain, forget the
fundamental principle of no discrimination of the Olympic
Movement and its objective to bring the young people of the world
(who are not responsible for political policies) together in friendly
competition. They would not only deprive their own athletes of this
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity…55
In short, he concluded, the IOC stood “firmly against discrimination of any kind in
sport; this is the fundamental basis of the Olympic Movement. Equally important is
the necessity of preventing the Olympic Movement from being used as a tool or
weapon for other causes…. Olympic rules alas, apply only to the Olympic Games, they
have no further competence. The IOC cannot very well reform the world…”56
Brundage reinforced this message in a another lengthy, internal communication
sent to Executive Board members in preparation for the special meeting of the
Executive Board to discuss the South African situation. He reiterated the IOC’s stance
in principle not to accept the intrusion of politics, since it was:
… individuals and teams that must conform to Olympic regulations.…
Olympic rules pertain only to the Olympic Movement, obviously they
have no competence in other areas. Are we going to try to extend
them to entire countries and to the whole world? … These
momentous questions which concern the integrity of the IOC must
be given the most serious study before they are answered – the
future of the Olympic Movement is at stake.57
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While Brundage was trying to firmly retain control against further damage within
the IOC and in the public view, Killanin communicated with Braun on developments
in South Africa. The IOC’s decision to re-admit South Africa was under attack on
multiple grounds, including ostensible misrepresentation in the SAC report of nonwhite reactions in South Africa, legal pressure from Mexico City, and the question of
Olympic trials in South Africa.58 Neither was SANOC to be assuaged which took
“strong exception to this vexatious and unjustified effort to rescind the resolution
which was recently passed, and which now entitles South Africa to participate in the
Mexico Olympic Games. … we accepted without any qualification this decision and the
conditions therein contained, and this we feel, with respect, finally disposes of the
South African issue until at least 1970.”59 Although certain NOCs might want to reopen
this issue, this would only serve to create “a tragedy not only for South Africa’s NonWhite Sportsmen, but also for the whole world of Olympic Sport.”60
Attempts to contain or resolve the uproar stemming from the re-admittance of
South Africa to the 1968 Games began at the April 1968 Lausanne Executive Board
meeting. Brundage fended off complaints about the procedural handling of the
Grenoble meetings,61 deploring “… the deep division within the IOC which threatened
to wreck the Olympic Movement and which was due to the actions of some of its own
members.”62 In view of these tensions, there were only two possible solutions: to
leave things as they were or not to admit South Africa, but the crisis had reached such
a state that “[b]oth solutions would leave a bitter division in the IOC and in the
world.”63 The course of action that promised the least amount of damage to either the
IOC, SANOC, the NOCs, or the Mexico City Organizing Committee “would be to have
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South Africa withdraw voluntarily, since then the IOC would be reasonably happy, the
Mexican OCO appreciative, and SANOC relieved in not being obliged to send a team
under present circumstances. SANOC would be asked to withdraw for several good
reasons as it was in the interest of the IOC and the Olympic Movement and that a
withdrawal would solve the desperate situation in which IOC found itself.”64
After an extended discussion of several options to resolve the issue, and “[i]n view
of all the information on the international climate received by the Executive Board at
this Meeting,” 65 Brundage communicated in an urgent cablegram to IOC members, the
Board had expressed the unanimous opinion “that it would be most unwise for a
South African team to participate in the Games of the XIX Olympiad – therefore, the
Executive Board strongly recommends that [the IOC members] endorse this
unanimous proposal to withdraw the invitation to these Games. … Please [respond]
immediately by cable.”66
The proposal was supported by a majority vote of IOC members, thus effecting the
withdrawal of the invitation to SANOC to participate in the 1968 Mexico City Games.
In a subsequently released public statement, Brundage could not hide his bitterness:
“Ignoring completely the unsportsmanlike threats, boycotts and legal technicalities,
which have no place in Olympic circles, but recognizing the explosive conditions that
prevail in much of the world, and in view of the ugly violence that has already
occurred, I decided to recommend the action.… It is deplorable, and sad commentary
on the state of the world today, that the Olympic Games, one of the most priceless and
powerful instruments of our present civilization, should be endangered by
controversies of this kind.”67 The decision may have amounted to a setback for the
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IOC, but Brundage refused to accept it as a total failure: “No yielding of Olympic
principles. A victory of a kind, not a defeat,”68 he added in brackets at the bottom of
the release, but even three months later, Brundage’s exasperation still had not
dissipated entirely:
The world, alas, is full of injustice, aggression, violence and warfare,
against which all civilized persons rebel, but this is no reason to
destroy the nucleus of international cooperation and good will we
have in the Olympic Movement…. If participation in sport is to be
stopped every time the politicians violate the laws of humanity,
there will never be any international contests. Is it not better to
maintain and support the Olympic Games, one of the most priceless
and powerful instruments of our present civilization and try to
expand the fair play and sportsmanship of the athletic field into
other areas?69
The personal relationship between Brundage and South African IOC member
Reginald Honey survived the controversy intact. Honey thanked Brundage for his
help, noting that the situation would in time “work itself out.”70 Brundage assured
Honey that the Executive Board members held no grudges, reminding him: “Don’t
forget that the South African [National] Olympic Committee has some friends and
supporters who will protect your interests.”71

2.1 Ira Emery
Before discussing in detail the role of the IOC South Africa Commission and its visit
to South Africa, both contributing factors to the controversy in 1968, the
correspondence between Ira Emery and Avery Brundage on these developments
merits attention. As before, Emery maintained a steady exchange of views with
Brundage and other relevant players between 1964 and 1968, contributing to our
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understanding of the developments leading to the 1968 crisis and the retraction of
South Africa’s invitation to the Mexico City Games.
Right after the 1964 Tokyo Games, Emery raised the issue of mixed teams as a
possible means to resolve the impasse, since this could be an indication of change in
the right direction: “I will let you know the reactions from the S.A. Government
regarding the demand for mixed teams inside and outside this country. Personally, I
feel there will be a change of front.”72 Brundage also shared Emery’s optimism about
South African sport: “I hope it will be possible to untangle the sport and political
questions soon so that we can have South Africa back in the fold before 1968.” 73 By
early November, however, Emery had become concerned about possible
complications regarding the South African Olympic team, since the signals coming
from the South African government remained anything but positive. The Prime
Minister remained unmoved in his opposition to mixed teams, and it was thus unlikely
that Minister of the Interior J. de Klerk could be prevailed upon to issue visas for a
mixed team to travel and participate in the Olympics, unless a diversionary measure
could be agreed upon: “There may be some way out and they will grant visas provided
the team does not travel together, or compete against each other or be housed
together. I do not know whether you will consider this a feasible proposition but at
least if you do get the information direct from the Government, your Executive will
know exactly where they stand.”74 In fact, the political situation appeared to be
deteriorating since the stipulations of the Group Areas Act had just been extended to
ban non-whites “from watching any sport below provincial level at the Wanderers
Stadium in Johannesburg…. In all cases now, permits must be issued by the
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Government department concerned to permit non-whites to attend any sports event
in which Whites participate.”75 The sport experiences of non-whites in South Africa
were deteriorating, but alternative possibilities to involve non-whites in international
sport still offered themselves on occasion. Emery suggested the possibility to
establish an Olympic Committee in one of the South African territories that would
represent non-white sportsmen throughout Africa.76 But Brundage was concerned
what the acceptability of such an option would be with regard to the Olympic
principles of unifying team representation: “If South African policy is ‘When we are
guests of another country we behave according to their traditions – the fact that we
accept their invitations means we will adapt ourselves to their customs’, can we
understand from this that South Africa will accept Olympic customs?”77 With this in
mind, SANOC President Frank Braun’s statement about the possibility of sending two
teams to the Olympic Games that Emery reported to Brundage,78 anticipated a
negative response from Brundage, since the IOC would not permit two teams from
one governed state.
And SANOC had other challenges to address. A resolution put forth by Black African
states to suspend South Africa had to be put on the agenda of the subsequent SANOC
meeting, and what the organizations saw as Reginald Honey’s shabby treatment by
the Italian delegation at the previous NOC meeting had not been forgotten.79
Brundage’s description of the incident for Emery indicates the tensions of that
meeting:
Because of a personal appeal from me, the African delegates did not
walk out of the meeting we had in Madrid. They had threatened to
do so at the meeting held in Rome and this resulted in Mr. Honey’s
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exclusion. I informed them that we operated in a more civilized
fashion and suggested that they present a resolution, which would
be entertained. This postponed the crisis at least until our meeting
in Rome next April.80
The issue of South Africa’s presence at Olympic events clearly had to be managed
with delicacy. Emery attempted to dissuade SANOC from sending delegates to the
Rome meeting to advance South Africa’s case. He believed that SANOC needed to
openly declare itself against apartheid with a letter to the IOC before it could credibly
advance any other arguments for reinstatement: “One suggestion which might be
given consideration is that until such time as South Africa could abide by the ruling of
the IOC (and which would quite conceivably be altered) it remains a member of the
IOC without attending meetings, and with-holding an entry for the 1968 Olympic
Games in Mexico.”81
Emery argued that the question of South African sport first had to be resolved as
an internal matter. SANOC should save the expense of sending delegates to discuss
these matters with the IOC when a letter would suffice and create less antagonism. It
did not help that the South African government did not remain silent about its
discriminatory sport policies, especially those involving mixed sport. 82 This stance
was obviously in contradiction to the conditions laid down by the IOC, which would
allow South Africa to compete in the Olympic Games provided it accepted mixed sport.
Emery argued to hold the issue in abeyance: “…until such time as South Africa can
obey the conditions which have been imposed by the IOC as far as mixed sport is
concerned, South Africa should state it will not take part in the Mexico City Games and
any future Olympic Games until they can follow the conditions imposed. This, I think
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would save a lot of embarrassment at your meeting and should at least permit South
Africa to remain a member of the IOC.”83 Unable to identify other options, Brundage
agreed. The IOC had to maintain its principle of non-discrimination, but SANOC could
not defy its government.84
The impending, much anticipated arrival of the fact-finding South Africa
Commission did little to lessen Emery’s skepticism. The Commission “… would be
shown what is being done for the non-whites but you will not see any competing
against whites; on some occasions non-whites are not permitted to watch sporting
fixtures held by whites.”85 In view of the government’s rigid and unyielding attitude,
the resolution would lead to an organizational convolution that the IOC would surely
find unacceptable: “The Minister will not agree to a mixed committee and a non-white
committee will discuss matters concerning the non-whites; a white committee will
discuss matters concerning the whites, but both will be under the chairmanship of Mr.
Braun, but not at the same time.”86 In rejecting such an option, Brundage reiterated
that the separation of sports and politics would not allow the IOC to accept a
resolution that had so clearly been adjusted to political circumstances: “…
government policy is a political matter and … it is the athletes of all colors that are
suffering.”87
A new wrinkle was added to this debate by the South African government decision
to form a Department of Sport. To anticipate the degree of political interference this
could cause for South African Olympic sports, Emery asked Brundage about
precedents of government interference with NOC matters in recent IOC history.88 The
Argentine Olympic Committee had been suspended for just such an incident,
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Brundage replied: “When the politicians have taken control our only recourse has
been to withdraw recognition from the Committee until it regained its independence
and freedom.”89 To forestall such a development repeating itself in South Africa,
Brundage decided to initiate contact with the South African government and discuss
the idea of sending a fact-finding mission to the country.90 Braun asked that the SAC
visit be postponed to give the government time to adjust, where possible, its
approach.91 “You will note,” Emery followed up, “that the Prime Minister said he
‘would give consideration to creating facilities for non-Whites to take part in the
Olympic Games, but only within the framework of the principle of separation’.”92 To
make its case, SANOC firmly planned to send delegates to the Tehran meeting, a
strategy that Emery considered to be distinctly unhelpful and counter-productive.
Brundage argued that not all was lost as yet: “Our sole interest is that the National
Olympic Committee is permitted to function according to Olympic rules, which
provide that the Games are open to all and no discrimination of any kind is allowed….
It is not likely that a settlement will be reached before our Committee of Investigation
visits South Africa, although if President Braun comes to Tehran we will probably hear
his report.”93 In any case, Brundage noted, in view of misleading media reports
coming out of South Africa which stated that the Prime Minister was trying to
accommodate non-white sport in South Africa, no decision would be made until after
the Commission had submitted its report.94
By now, Brundage had accepted the fact that “… the Government has gone as far as
it can go in trying to satisfy the Olympic authorities…. A great deal will depend on the
attitude of the black sport organizations which I understand are not unfavorable to
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the procedure which the South African [National] Olympic Committee offers to
follow.”95 The Commission, Emery thought, had left a favourable impression in South
Africa,96 but Brundage was concerned that some NOCs had reached a decision before
the Commission submitted its report: “There will undoubtedly be a bitter debate at
our session in Grenoble since, unfortunately, some have made up their mind without
waiting for the report.”97
In the aftermath of the IOC’s reversal its erstwhile decision to reinstate SANOC,
Emery felt apologetic about the attacks on Brundage coming from certain members
of SANOC:
I am very sorry that there has been such an attack made on you by
Braun … but I can assure you that as far as I am concerned I know
how genuine you were when you were in South Africa and discussed
with me the possibilities of the outcome of the voting at the IOC. I am
certain that you wanted us in and I feel equally certain that your fear
of unpleasantness to the South African Team if it had to go to Mexico
must have influenced you a lot in your thinking. Some of the
statements made by Mr. Braun are quite hysterical, particularly the
one where he stated that thousands of Non-Whites are in training for
athletics in this country.98
Brundage remained unfazed by the criticism directed at him: “I can assure you that
any other action taken at the meeting would have been far worse from the South
African point of view….[SANOC’s]

invitation was withdrawn because of world

conditions.”99 In any case, Brundage noted, he acted out of a concern for the safety of
the South African team at the Mexico Olympics: “My name would never have been
attached to the cablegram sent to the members of the IOC asking them to withdraw
the invitation to SANOC had I not been completely convinced that it would both be
unwise and unsafe for the South Africa team to appear in Mexico.”100
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3.

The IOC South Africa Commission
The IOC’s South Africa Commission (SAC) was first discussed by the IOC at the 1966

Rome General Session.101 The official delegation was formally announced by
Brundage during the Executive Board meetings in Mexico City that same year.102 The
announcement was met with some concern about the utility of such a mission. Kenyan
IOC member Reginald Alexander asked: “Is there any evidence of the Olympic
Sportsmen in South Africa merely ‘taking cover’ behind ‘Government policy’ without
any effort on their part to achieve compliance with our Olympic principles and rules;
we cannot expect them to break the law but there is much they can and must do,
towards integration in Sports Administration and Competition.”103
In the early stages of the selection process, it was not certain whether Brundage
himself would be a member of the Commission to reinforce its clout. Alexander wrote
to Johan Westerhoff: “As I understand it, the proposal is that Sir Ade Ademola and
myself, accompanied by you as [IOC] Secretary General, should visit South Africa and
that if, during such a visit, we consider progress is possible then Mr. Brundage would
join us in South Africa for final deliberations.”104 Brundage postponed talking to
Alexander about the proposed visit to South Africa until the Executive Board meeting
in Mexico City.105 By then, Westerhoff sounded more positive on developments in
South Africa: “On the question of the disapproval of multi-racial universities and
Political Parties the South African Government appears to be having second thoughts.
This might indicate that they are prepared to be more Liberal in sport. But I just do
not really know, and no one will, until they are faced with a real test.”106
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Once Alexander was officially appointed to lead the SAC, his first order of business
was to make arrangements for safe and unimpeded travel throughout South Africa.
Concerns, as was mentioned previously, centred on the person of Sir Ade Ademola, a
black SAC member, and they were heightened by statements coming from SANOC Vice
President Arthur Foster, who had expressed his approval of the existing status quo.
All commission members were to be accommodated appropriately, Alexander
insisted – identical living quarters, and identical freedoms to move and act as needed
to complete the mission.107
Ademola initially declined to join the Commission.108 Foster’s remarks clearly had
a damaging effect,109 and Alexander requested an official retraction by SANOC
President Braun on behalf of his organization “before the Sub-Committee commences
its work.”110 Seeking to calm the situation, Braun complied. He guaranteed freedom of
movement as long as the Commission did not seek talks with the banned Communists.
In addition, Braun made it known through the newspaper that Foster’s views did not
represent SANOC’s official position. “I hope that by that time we arrive there,”
Alexander noted, “they will have disposed of [Foster].”111 SANOC did indeed
disassociate itself from Foster. 112
By mid-May Brundage himself sought to convince Ademola to join the Commission,
concerned about the credibility of a Commission without a non-white member: “If you
are not on the commission … there may be criticism of the fact that the black African
countries are not represented.”113 Although European himself, Lord Killanin was for
a time considered to be a viable alternate, but he himself was skeptical: “Reading in
the papers I feel that Ademola will be out of the running with his own internal
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problems. I might say I am not anxious to go on the commission to South Africa,”114
but a few days later, Ademola reluctantly agreed to serve on the SAC: “… I must confess
I share the views of my Government that considering my position as the Chief Justice
of Nigeria should anything untoward happen as a result of the behaviour of the South
African Government (or any South African) to me when I am in that country, it will
cause a great embarrassment to Nigeria. I should hate to be the centre of any dispute
which is likely to spark off any bitterness in race relationship between Africans
(blacks) and the whites. … Somehow, I have not the necessary confidence in the South
African Government.”115 Ademola would join the Commission, contingent on SANOC
providing assurances for proper security.
With Alexander busy attempting to retain Ademola’s services, it fell to Westerhoff
to engage with SAN-ROC. He met its co-founder Chris de Broglio who provided a list
of officials the Commission should meet on its tour, but not all seemed well in South
Africa. “They [SAN-ROC] seem to be very afraid that this list may get into the hands of
people other than you and me, so I ask you to deal very carefully with it.”116 Alexander
had encountered a similar attitude on a trip to South Africa during the preceding year:
“I, too, had a list of addresses of officials of ‘non-racial’ organizations but I found them
reluctant to make contact. Therefore, my advice is that you write now from Lausanne
to the names with which you have been supplied by Brutus and de Broglio; this will, I
consider perhaps give them the confidence and assurance of having received a letter
direct from the IOC Headquarters and will also give them time to think.”117 It would
be advantageous to suggest to those contacts to “[t]ry and keep themselves informed
about the movements of the commission so that we can contact them quickly when
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we are in South Africa.”118 Much as Alexander encouraged input from SAN-ROC, he
was still put off by the organization’s use of the word mark ‘Olympic,’ and he did not
consider SAN-ROC’s membership claim of 70,000 credible: “The Africans are the
majority of the population (they number about 10 million) and it is important that we
establish who is talking for them. Therefore, please ask de Broglio for an estimated
breakdown of the 70,000 into races or Communities.”119
But Secretary General Westerhoff’s efforts as a member of the Commission did not
last long. Dutch IOC member Herman van Karnebeek recommended that Westerhoff
be excluded from the three-man Commission. He was seen as too close to Brundage,
and he was not a full-fledged IOC member. Lastly, in view of Westerhoff’s Dutch origin,
and the South African colonial power and government consisting of Afrikaaners
(Dutch descendants), it would be preferable to protect Westerhoff from potential
political defamation.120 Karnebeek stressed that the fact-finding commission was too
important for such distractions. Brundage took the suggestions seriously, and
indicated to Killanin to be ready to join the Commission instead, contingent on
Ademola also accepting the call.121 Brundage proposed that the Commission should
consist of Alexander, Ademola, and Killanin. If Ademola could not participate, Jan
Staubo from Norway would take his place.122 Ademola, for his part, deferred to the
President and Executive Board on any decision concerning Westerhoff’s
membership.123
Westerhoff was in agreement with this arrangement, since he had become
convinced “that the Secretary General should be neutral and undisputable as well as
the IOC organization.”124 Killanin then suggested that Westerhoff might join the
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Commission on its travels, not as a member, “but [he] would purely go in a reporting
capacity and not … speak or open his mouth. I think it is essential for him to be present
to listen to all the facts but I quite agree with our colleague from the Netherlands that
it would be unwise to use his own nationality or that he should be directly involved in
any questioning, etc.”125 Alexander echoed this suggestion, but Killanin remained cool
to the idea.126
Killanin agreed to join SAC, but he was concerned that he might have his own
credibility problem to consider, inasmuch as he had been a sponsor of an antiapartheid movement in Ireland; he felt that an announcement should be issued
indicating that he would not be biased.127 He then proceeded to demand a much
broader preparatory information-gathering approach. He suggested obtaining
various lists and diverse information on South African laws, and requested that
Brundage define a very specific objective for the trip.128 Killanin assumed that such
strict arrangements would be necessary to assure efficiency: “I would have thought it
very important for the Executive to discuss the South African report which I think will
take much more time and work than anyone realizes, well before the Lausanne
meeting,”129 rescheduled for December 1967.
Looking ahead, Killanin even gave thought to a media release strategy to be
adopted as the Commission went about its work, noting that “the release of the news
of the Commission should be announced as soon as they are certain, to avoid any
leakages.”130 At the same time, staying ahead of the news cycle did not mean that the
investigation had to proceed in a hurried manner: “There was a suggestion of an
Executive meeting at the end of September, but I do not think we should be hurried
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too much as we may well wish to digest some facts and have to circulate the final draft
of the report between the three of us. It would be fatal to be hurried in one’s
judgement and no final decision can be taken until the full Session at Grenoble
although the Executive may wish to ask for further information.”131
Westerhoff was now off the Commission, but as Secretary General he maintained
his contacts with SANOC representatives, especially on the pivotal issues of
Commission security and unhindered travel. L.M. Francey, SANOC’s Secretary
General, offered positive assurances: “The members of your delegation will be able to
speak to or contact anyone with the same freedom as any citizen of this country and
as any visitor to this country…. In regard to your references to assurances from our
Government, we feel we should mention that your delegation will be received by the
South African National Olympic Committee, which is an independent and autonomous
body and not by the Government.”132 This did not mean, she pointed out, that the
Government would be entirely unconcerned: “…, it should be pointed out that it is
customary for the Government of this country to ensure the safety, well-being and
dignity of foreign visitors. I, therefore, have no hesitation in assuring you that this will
apply equally to your delegation to whom every courtesy will be extended and within
the framework of the laws of this country, no hindrance will be placed on the
movements of the members of the delegation.”133
With all preparations completed, a press release about the work of the SAC was
published. It described the Commission’s purpose and remit as follows:
The IOC expects this commission to make a thorough investigation
of amateur sport in South Africa. It is to report facts, not to make
recommendations. One knows that apartheid is the policy of the
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South African government. The IOC is concerned with whether or not
Olympic regulations can be met, and every athlete, regardless of
race, will have an opportunity to participate in the Olympic Games.
It wants to know the attitude of the athletes themselves as well as
the opinion of the amateur sports organizations of all races. The
investigation will cover different cities and sections of the country,
the available facilities and the number of coaches and trainers, what
kind of competitions are arranged, the extent of sport participation
by various sections of the population, and the different kinds of
Olympic sports engaged in by the different races…. The International
Olympic Committee will study the report prepared by the
investigation Commission, and it will take a decision on the
participation of a South African delegation in the 1968 Olympic
Games at its session in Grenoble from 1st to 3rd February 1968.134
With the trip to South Africa less than a month away, Killanin reminded Westerhoff
of organizational loose ends, such as a secretary who was not South African; access to
money; documentation of the rules of SANOC, white and non-white organizations, and
affiliated associations; and, notification that the public had the opportunity to provide
evidence directly to the Commission.135 Further, Killanin stressed the importance of
Dennis Brutus and his people to the Commission; he wanted to make sure that Brutus
was given the details of the SAC’s whereabouts and contact information at any time.136
Killanin’s energetic preparation for SAC’s trip resulted in his appointment to the
Chairmanship by Brundage. Despite Brundage’s confidence in him, Killanin remained
worried, about the Commission’s reliance on SANOC assistance: “… I was very
concerned that we were only to have secretariat from the South African [National]
Olympic Committee which would make it quite impossible to prepare a report which
must, in the first instance, be of a confidential nature as we thrash out the facts. I have
spoken to the Secretary General and it is now agreed that someone from Lausanne
will join us.”137 The same concern was raised about SAC’s capability to make its
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presence and purpose known to South Africans: “… I would like a note,” Alexander
communicated to Braun, “stating how you propose that all shades of opinion in
Olympic Sport in your country should know of the Commission, and the opportunity
they will have personally to appear before the Commission…. The Secretary General
sent you a questionnaire early in the year. The replies to this are now urgently
required.”138 Not wanting solely to rely on SANOC’s intermediary help, Alexander
suggested to Westerhoff to use a list supplied by SANOC and containing names and
addresses of persons in South Africa prepared to give evidence on behalf of ‘nonracial’ sporting organizations, to write to each of them individually, inviting them to
submit evidence, and offering them a meeting with the Commission in one of the
scheduled cities on the trip.139 Braun, on the other hand, was quoted in newspapers
saying that only representatives of national and provincial sports bodies might give
evidence to the committee.140 “It is important,” Alexander rejoined, “that no one in
your country who wishes to discuss with us should have any excuse whatsoever for
being unable to make contact.”141 Braun, in response, assured Alexander that there
was sufficient publicity to encourage people to approach SAC.142
Finally, on the eve of SAC’s departure to South Africa, Brundage provided a firm
directive that rigidly placed the focus on sport-related issues:
If we are to judge apartheid per se, it is not necessary to send a
commission at all. Our concern is with the National Olympic
Committee and what it is doing to comply with Olympic regulations,
especially Articles 24 and 25…. We had an analogous situation in
1936, when most of the world condemned Nazism and many wanted
to remove the Games from Berlin. Also, after the II World War many
of those who were against Communism wanted to keep the Eastern
countries out of the Games…. We must not become involved in
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political issues, nor permit the Olympic Games to be used as a tool or
as a weapon for extraneous causes.143
Upon the trip’s completion, Killanin provided Brundage with a brief synopsis of
SAC’s activities in South Africa and an update on the report’s status. By the beginning
of December 1967, Killanin reported that the final draft was complete.144 Killanin
likewise kept Braun updated on the fact that South Africa had been discussed at a
recent Executive Board meeting and that after the report was received by all IOC
members and subsequently discussed at Grenoble, a postal vote would determine
SANOC’s fate.145 He also notified Braun that SAC was still waiting on some
documentation requested from South African NSFs. This information would have to
be added to the report verbally at the 1968 Grenoble Sessions.146
SAC’s report numbered over 200 pages; Killanin emphasized its main thrust as
follows:
I would like to report that in general everybody we have seen, with
perhaps five exceptions, have said that they want to come back into
the Olympic Games and accept the Tehran five points but there are
variations, from those who think it is technically impossible, to those
who say ‘Will we really be represented, it is equal, but the Chairman
is European.’ I don’t think any single group, except possibly one
section, have said this, but certain individuals in groups have
expressed that view. As far as I can recall there have not been any,
the only ones that have been in specific sports was weightlifting,
which was explained to Mr. F. Braun. I think the decision that we
made on Friday night was certainly the correct one in your interests,
that of you being with us. When I left we raised the question of the
Constitutions and I am glad to say that I have them all except from
the Amateur Athletic Union…. We will contact the key International
Federations (a) out of courtesy and (b) also to report to them that
we have seen unaffiliated bodies but we have made it clear to all the
unaffiliated bodies that whatever is accomplished by the IOC they
still cannot compete unless they are affiliated internationally and
that is something over which we have no control whatsoever. We
only recognise one international Federation and everyone must be
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affiliated to it. That is as far as I can go on that side of it…. We have
had a great weight of evidence of people objecting to Brutus
representing them outside the country. There have also been groups
who support him. So this is our intention. If he had not been seen
originally by the IOC, but he has been seen, and think that in all
justice we have to see him. We have not yet decided that we all see
him or only one of us and perhaps Westerhoff.147
In reference to the postal vote based on SAC’s report, Alexander suggested to
Brundage, “… that there must be a specific motion of the Executive Board upon which
members must decide. To leave it merely to a YES/NO on the existing suspension of
the South African National Olympic Committee will lead to confusion as it is not as
simple as that. I have my idea of an appropriate motion but then that it is none of my
business.”148 In addition, Killanin explained to Westerhoff: “… the wording of the
Resolution must be very clear and very simple as the Executive agreed it would be
purely based on permission to make entries for the Games at Mexico City. The whole
situation would be subject to review after it was seen that the selection for Mexico
worked fairly.”149 It was Alexander’s recommended draft of the resolution that
Killanin endorsed to base the postal vote on.150
Ademola, anxious to avoid any controversy about the vote, added some comments
on the subject of the postal vote, advising SAC members to refrain from moving
forward any motions at the upcoming meeting: “Our duty to my mind is to answer
questions which members may like to put to us on our Report, which naturally brings
us into the discussion.… I think it should be left to the Executive to formulate its own
plans as to how a ballot should be effected without any confusion.”151 Killanin also
agreed with Ademola on the necessity to recuse the Commission in respect of making
any motions on the report at the meeting: “Our object is to do whatever is best for the
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Olympic Movement and that is why I think the wording of the Resolution should not
be weighed one way or the other by the Commission…. I feel if members of the IOC
cannot make up their minds on the report and on the summary nothing much can be
done about it.”152
SAC’s desire for transparency and objectivity was commendable. Its thorough
process provided a grounded report towards assisting the development of an
informed decision. Now it was in the hands of the IOC Executive Board and General
Assembly to leverage the report in deciding South Africa’s destiny with regard to the
1968 Mexico City Games.

4.

IOC and NOC Opinions
The correspondence from IOC and NOC members to Avery Brundage related to the

South African issue mushroomed in the months leading up to the 1968 Mexico City
Games,153 more than likely energized by important actors such as Killanin
underscoring the importance of this particular vote: “In regard to South Africa,” he
noted, “I think it is very important when the results are announced that it is made very
clear on what people were voting, i.e. the details of Hugh Weir’s Resolution…. A direct
vote of yes or no could well be misinterpreted in the world as an approval of apartheid
rather than the qualifying motion on which we are voting.”154 The result of the historic
vote was 36 to 25 in favour of readmitting South Africa to the Mexico City Games. 155
This decision reverberated through the Olympic world. Indeed, it took many IOC and
NOC members by surprise.
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Concerned to prevent even more controversy than there had been already,
Reginald Alexander advised Frank Braun to remain quiet on the issue: “Pipe down….
You have got what you want, for the moment. Now is the time for tact, calm and
statesmanship. Let the others do the shouting if they want.”156 ‘Shouting’ was an
appropriate description of what happened between the time of the vote in Grenoble
and the 1968 Mexico City Games. Giulio Onesti claimed that the decision had caused
unexpected reactions among the majority of the IOC members: “The evolution of this
situation throughout the world is such today that no doubt seems to remain that the
international Olympic Movement is in danger and that its very existence is seriously
threatened.”157 Onesti believed that the whole of Africa and parts of Asia would forego
participation in the upcoming Games. He wanted Brundage urgently to convene a
formal IOC Extraordinay Session to reconsider the question of South African
participation in the Olympic Games.158 General Vladimir Stoytchev, IOC member for
Bulgaria, supported Onesti’s request. “You have probably heard and seen the
repercussion which the IOC’s decision about South Africa has had in the whole world.
It may have unpleasant consequences for the future of our Olympic Movement….
Therefore I beg you to convoke the IOC members to an extraordinary session in order
to reconsider that question.”159
South Africa’s re-admittance to the Olympic Games had again become a front page
international story. Two sides naturally developed – those who supported the
decision and those who opposed it. The ‘yes’ vote was influenced by the SAC report or
was convinced in the course of the hours of subsequent discussion. Even SAC
Chairman Killanin who was surprised by the degree of media attention, did not
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anticipate the attention he received from the media. He told Brundage: “In regard to
South Africa, I have had innumerable offers to appear on television, etc., even, I
believe, at the risk of my amateur status but I consider as chairman of the Committee
and as your representative I should not express any views although I may have to
make a short statement to my own national committee if any questions are asked.”160
Killanin probably felt it a challenge to refrain from offering public evaluations of
the South African situation; he privately confided to Brundage that the Commission’s
trip left him feeling “more strongly than ever that what the South African Government
is doing is very evil.”161 He nonetheless remained steadfastly loyal to Brundage and
the IOC.
In the end, it was the Chairman of the Mexican Organizing Committee of the Games
of the XIX Olympiad, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, along with IOC members, Marte R.
Gómez and José de Jesus Clark, who convinced Brundage to revisit the South African
vote. They invoked the “lofty objectives of the international Olympic Movement… an
expression of a fundamental conviction of the permanent validity of the basic
principles of the Olympic Games, a belief in the equality of man, in his freedom and in
respect for human dignity.”162 It was “alien circumstances” that had harmed the IOC’s
ability to comply with established formal procedures in this case, and the Mexico City
Organizing Committee thus was entitled “to appeal an agreement that has notoriously
been a cause of controversy concerning the Olympic Games, and which is of a nontechnical nature,” in this case the vote that repealed the veto against SANOC. The
Organizing Committee, wrote Vazquez, “…wishe[d] to reiterate that the
manifestations that have occurred throughout the world and the threat of possible
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abstentions from the Games are clear evidence that the basic principle of non-racial
discrimination, as stated in Olympic Rule No. 1 has been questioned.”163 To prevent
further harm to the forthcoming Games, a review of the repeal was urgently required.
Since the request came from the Mexico Organizing Committee, Brundage had to
give the issue some thought. Meanwhile, Alexander advised Brundage to remain calm
and avoid ill-conceived action: “Now is the time to avoid precipitate words or actions,
anywhere in the world that could hinder progress. … in Grenoble I said that there
would be uproar in Africa for about two months; wait for the dust to settle! … What I
ask is that you do your utmost to prevent any of our colleagues creating more
difficulties or impossible situations; your leadership is vital now…. Braun must be
fixed and quickly. He is a menace.”164
Alexander’s opinion was not shared by all his IOC colleagues. Onesti continued to
request an extraordinary session,165 gaining support from colleagues such as his
Italian IOC colleague Giorgio De Stefani, who advised Brundage that the call for an
Extraordinary Session should more suitably come from the President rather than
from a vote by the membership: “The Government, the Press and the public opinion
[in Italy are] unanimously criticizing the vote of Grenoble and I believe it is my duty
to inform [you] about it…. Our colleague Mr. Onesti has informed me that he has made
a formal request to you to convene an extraordinary Session of the IOC to re-examine
the present situation as a whole. I would like to support his request.”166
But there were certainly supporters of the Grenoble vote. The Marquess of Exeter
attempted to encourage like-minded members to make public statements against a
boycott of the Mexico City Games, provided the stipulations of the initial resolution of
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readmittance had been fulfilled: “I see that a number of countries including Japan and
Norway have stated their intention of going to Mexico, and the British Olympic
Association issued a statement yesterday noting that a multi-racial team from South
Africa would be present in Mexico and stating that they had received an invitation and
had accepted it.”167
Brundage, however, did not sit idle. Rather than wait for NOCs to accept or reject
the invitation to the 1968 Mexico City Games, he met with Ramírez Vázquez, Gómez,
and Clark in Chicago, and called a special meeting of the IOC Executive Board.168 For
the time being, however, this did not quell the media furor, as Alexander reported
from Kenya: “There is now a real danger that expediency will encourage and
capitulate to extremism. The issue up to now has been ‘mixed trials’ inside South
Africa but this could now easily extend to a demand that the IOC must first change the
Government of South Africa!”169
Hugh Weir, Australian IOC member, responsible for the wording of the Grenoble
resolution, was pleased at the final result of the mail vote. However, he was shocked
of the African attitude. He complained to Brundage:
It is quite evident that far from a sporting attitude, their thinking is
governed by political motives. I go so far as to say that few, if any of
the African N.O.C.’s [sic] made a decision of their own volition. I am
convinced that they were told what to do by their respective
Governments…. The inconsistency of their combined attitude lies in
the fact that in alleged protest against racial discrimination, they are
now practicing political discrimination against South Africa. Which
is the worst?170
Weir opposed a review of the Grenoble decision, threatening to leave the IOC if the
vote were repealed. He, for one, was particularly suspicious of the motives of many of
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the African NOCs in joining threats to boycott the Mexico City Games: “[H]ow many of
the 40 odd N.O.C.’s [sic] loudly announcing their withdrawal would have participated
at Mexico City next October under [n]ormal circumstances? I venture to suggest that
quite a number of the smaller and weaker States would have been absentees for the
reasons that they have no athletes of sufficient calibre or they have no money to
waste.”171 And even if those African NOCs were to make good on their threat, there
was no reason for the Organizing Committee to be overly concerned. “Do they not
realise that even if the whole 40 nations do withdraw, they will still have
representation from 80 of the most powerful athletic nations in the world including
Australia.”172
Weir’s sense of the situation was shared by some, Marquess Exeter among them.
In preparation for the upcoming IOC Executive Board meeting called by Brundage,
Exeter wanted the IOC President to look at the laws of procedure and possible angles
of international law.173 He also forecasted the logistics of the meeting and possible
votes for and against, and suggested another postal vote if things progressed to
another motion. However, Exeter believed the meeting should be led by three
questions: Will the Games go on? Should a General Session be called? Should there be
postal vote?174 To prevent another General Session, Exeter raised the danger of Onesti
getting enough signatures for an Extraordinary Session before the planned Executive
Board meeting. However, Danish IOC member, Ivar Vind, pointed out to Brundage, the
chances of preventing an Extraordinary Session were becoming slimmer by the day:
“[I] strongly believe every day you delay sending a firm circular letter will give
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disloyal IOC members the chance to wreck the Olympic Movement. You simply must
take the lead and forcefully defend the results of postal voting.”175
Vind had first-hand experience with perceived disloyalty among IOC members.
Onesti was working hard to collect the one-third votes insuring Extraordinary
General Session. But Vind believed Onesti was not applying Article 18 properly since
it seemed nonsensical to Vind that a quorum of one-third of the votes should be in a
position to repeal a vote at will.176 Anyhow, Denmark, in any event, supported the IOC
decision and from what he could tell, so would Finland, Norway and Iceland. Vind
concluded with four suggestions to help diffuse the situation: (1) Send a circular letter
to all IOC members, possibly showing disapproval of disloyalty shown through
decisions made; (2) Send a circular letter to NOC Presidents to fill them in on the exact
details about the Commission’s report and wording of resolution; (3) Tell the Mexican
organizing committee and NOC to stay quiet; and, (4) Tell SANOC to stay quiet and
refrain from circulating any letters.177
To help expedite the Executive Board meeting, the Mexican delegation sent urgent
telegrams to the Board members to organize the meeting as soon as possible.178 A
frustrated Vind wrote to Brundage: “I am really getting sick with all the IOC members
who primarily are concerned with feathering their own nests and only regard their
IOC membership as a matter for prestige and social standing.”179 The
misrepresentation of the details of the Grenoble decision in the media was also a
nuisance to Vind. He insisted that the IOC must do better to inform the public. In
preparation for the Executive Board meeting, Clark notified the IOC Executive Board
that Brundage called the meeting to consider the appeal from Ramírez Vázquez by
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exercising Article 41 of the Olympic Charter.180 The Executive Board, he offered, could
resolve the appeal without calling an extraordinary plenary session. Clark reminded
them where the differences were in relation to voting for or against the Grenoble
motion between those who voted on the stipulations in principal enshrined in Article
1, and those who were only focussed on expediently resolving the problems posed by
a specific case, that is, focussed “on eliminating discrimination in the specific
representation of a country at the Olympic Games, which in essence, is contradictory
to the Ideal and does not offer a definite and permanent solution.”181
Konstantin Andrianov, IOC Vice President, likewise, was convinced that the initial
decision had been wrong; he laid much of the blame at Brundage’s feet: “We are at the
moment on the brink of splitting of the international Olympic Movement, the unity of
which you fully supported verbally many times…. The international importance of this
social phenomenon is too great to be offered a sacrifice to those who violate the main
principle of the humanism that is the equality of all the races.”182
Andrianov finished his letter by mentioning that the USSR was unlikely to send
athletes if South Africa was admitted to the 1968 Mexico City Games.183 Andrianov
copied his letter to all IOC members.184 It claimed that South Africa continued to
violate the Olympic Charter, and therefore, forfeited its rights to participate in the
Olympic Games. Further, SAC’s report confirmed racial discrimination and the
procedure and order of voting for South Africa’s readmission were contrary to the
Olympic Charter’s protocol.185
Hungarian IOC member Árpád Csanádi likewise wrote to Brundage in favour of
rescinding the original decision:
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The report of the IOC delegation having visited South Africa also
reflects the reality that owing to the policy of apartheid in force as a
state law in South Africa the lasting noble aims of non-discrimination
of the IOC cannot be enforced when composing the South African
Olympic team. Simultaneously it is also clear that the South Africa
National Olympic Committee is not able to conform its activity with
the IOC rules as a result of the apartheid policy…. Consequently not
only its “promise” of doubtful value concerning its participation at
the Olympic Games can be considered as debatable, but, also the
activity of the South African National Olympic Committee as a whole,
which does not meet the requirements or the ideas of the IOC.186
To prepare for this wave of opposition, Brundage studied Robert’s Rules of Order,
directed Honey’s attention to the possibility of legal action, and mentioned the
possibility of sending Westerhoff to Africa to “buy more time.”187 During his attempt
to contain the situation, Brundage admitted: “Many of our difficulties, as usual, come
from our own members. Something will have to be done about this.”188 Brundage also
updated Onesti on the special Executive Board meeting to encourage those who
opposed South Africa’s Olympic involvement to refrain from drawing attention to the
situation, “… I think all members should defer public statements or actions until they
hear from the Executive Board.”189
German IOC member, Dr. Georg von Opel, emphasized the fact that the IOC had
neither the authority nor the influence to involve itself in the internal political
situation of a country, and had to observe the internal integrity of its own decisionmaking procedures. The procedural argument in favour of retaining the original
decision, were clear: “…. the statutes of the IOC are only then practicable if they are
limited to that sphere of operation for which an IOC may only issue statutes, and that
is with respect to the intercourse between the Olympic family of nations and the
performance of the Games…. Since all conditions of the IOC statutes are met, South
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Africa must be admitted.”190 This, he continued, certainly did not mean that the IOC
“by re-admitting South Africa identif[ied] itself with the racialism in that country nor
does it identify itself with the political system of such countries whose teams are
admitted to the games and which are dictatorially governed.”191 The IOC therefore,
had to “clarify the sphere of operation of its statues in the next session. Who is then
not willing to submit to the only reasonable and practicable rules of the Games and
thinks he can extort the IOC, has to accept the consequences and withdraw.”192
Exeter concurred with von Opel’s evaluation. First, as von Opel had pointed out,
Article 1 referred only to the Olympic Games themselves; the IOC should never make
eligibility dependent on governments and their internal laws. Second, Article 24
stated that they must abide by rules, but it did not state that they must break the laws
of their own countries, even though an effort must be made for change. Lastly, Article
20 outlined conditions where the President could call for a postal vote between
meetings, but there was nothing in the rules to indicate that the IOC General
membership itself could not call one.193
Prince Francois-Joseph de Liechtenstein offered a more pragmatic evaluation of
the issue, noting that “moral indignation concerning the invitation of the South
Africans [was] groundless considering how many athletes from countries governed
by dictatorial regimes with unlimited power over the individual attend the Olympic
Games.”194 With similar pragmatism, he expressed a preference for the Executive
Board of the IOC to resolve the issue. “This seems to me preferable to a convocation
of the IOC at this point, which, I fear, might turn into a worldwide sensation,
detrimental to our aims for friendship and peace amongst youth of the world.”195
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Perhaps, Exeter continued his deliberations, part of the virulent reaction to the
South African issue was a lack of understanding of the details. He wondered if
Brundage should distribute a fact sheet emphasizing that South Africa was never
suspended; that SANOC was not allowed to enter a team in Tokyo because they did
not fulfill certain conditions; that neither was it the IOC’s remit to deal with
governments, nor were participating athletes responsible for their laws; the IOC only
determined conditions under which they could participate; lastly, the fact sheet
should point out SAC’s evaluation that South Africa had met the conditions, and the
conditions for participation in the Games were accepted by the overwhelming
number of non-whites.196 Useful as such a leaflet might have been, procedural
questions reaching well beyond such a fact sheet were being raised.
Reginald Alexander wanted to know what authority an Organizing Committee had
to withhold invitations from specific NOCs, possibly in contravention of decisions
made by the IOC. “Once this game starts it opens wide the possibility of any
Organising Committee avoiding an invitation to one or more National Olympic
Committees for reasons of its own and with the object of influencing a decision. ….
Imperfection is everywhere, all of us must strive to do better, and be given the chance
to do so.”197 In responding to von Opel, and touching on arguments also raised by
Alexander, Brundage admitted that it was impossible to expect all IOC members to act
independent of political pressures. “This is a constant source of danger that we have
to tolerate if we are to unite the world of sport. …. The issue now is whether the
politicians or sportsmen are going to control the Olympic Games. It is as simple as
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that. Our rules, alas, pertain solely to the Olympic Games as you say and not to
countries, otherwise it might be a better world.”198
Letters of support of the original motion continued to arrive in Brundage’s mailbox.
Prince George William of Hanover, President of the International Olympic Academy,
argued that the decision to readmit South Africa was made after much discussion and
a second vote would be inappropriate. He was not supportive of reopening the South
African issue, since a second vote would, “… weaken the authority of the International
Olympic Committee and create a precedence for any other decision where the
minority might take advantage of this example. The functioning of the International
Olympic Committee would then become hopelessly difficult and still more expensive
for the members.”199 Though the strength of the IOC was in its solidarity, the feeling
of loyalty was not necessarily shared by all NOCs, as evidenced by a letter to
Westerhoff from the NOC of India: “… a country like South Africa which does not
follow the Olympic Charter inside its boundaries amongst its own people, has no right
to take part in the Olympic Games merely because it has agreed to send a few coloured
people in its team. The method of selection of these coloured people is not in
accordance with the Olympic Charter which is totally against any kind of racial
discrimination.”200
Under ideal conditions, the priorities of the IOC and NOCs would align; however,
the interpretation and application of “priorities” varied, especially where political
orientations did not correspond to traditional IOC interpretations of the rules and
regulations. Exactly this thought perplexed Vind. Writing Brundage from Denmark, he
observed:
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I simply cannot see how we can change what was decided upon in
Grenoble. Whatever the world opinion is, I am convinced that we
have chosen the right path – it’s only bad that more people cannot or
will not see it. Our job as servant to the Olympic Movement is not to
destroy but to build up. We have succeeded in obtaining concessions
which nobody else has been able to get, and we have therefore
decided to give the white and the non-white athletes of South Africa
the chance to prove themselves in a mixed team at the Olympic
Games in Mexico City. I am sure you will agree with me that members
of the Executive Board, at their next meeting, cannot possibly change
this decision!! … If we bend before political pressure and if we
change our decision made in Grenoble, it will be a disaster and a
terrible blow to the cause of the Olympic Movement. A blow from
which I am convinced we might not recover nor possibly even
survive.201
While Vind argued on political grounds, Onesti adopted a formal perspective,
pointing out that the issue was simply a matter of the proper application of rules and
regulations, especially Articles 1, 24, and 25. Since South Africa, he wrote Brundage,
was not able to incorporate in its statute, Article 1, the South Africa question,
… should not have been brought up for examination at the Grenoble
Session…. In fact, the resolution of the IOC authorising the South
African NOC to present a team at the Mexico City Games is legally
absurd. In effect, either that NOC is considered to be ‘recognised’ in
accordance with Art. 24, in which case its right to ‘enter’ a team for
the Olympic Games derives automatically from the first paragraph of
Art. 24, and the IOC Assembly cannot either attribute or deny it such
a right. Or, on the other hand, it may be considered that that NOC
cannot enter a team in the Games, failing a special authorisation from
the IOC Assembly, thereby admitting that the NOC is not legitimate
to make such an entry…. By the fact of departing from the solemn
principles of the IOC Regulations, a political act has been committed.
And it is useless to deplore today the reactions of which you are well
aware, since the error has been committed by the IOC in an anti-legal
provision.202
Brundage was aggravated at this diversity of contradictory opinions. He confided
to Killanin: “Despite the discussion at our last meeting, the practice of venting
personal opinion, not to mention adverse criticism of the Committee, has continued.
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In an important matter of this kind, this verges on treason and I think it has come to
the point where it should be punished.”203 Member organizations should at least
withhold public statements, even if they disagreed with decisions taken by the IOC. “If
they feel so strongly, they can always resign.”204
The internal loyalties of the IOC and Olympic Movement were being sorely tested.
In the face of the tidal wave of correspondence reaching his desk, Brundage was
unable to set the parameters of the public debate and narrative.
It was becoming increasingly clear that the issue was not going to be fully resolved
before the Executive Board met in Lausanne to discuss options, but a resolution of the
issue would not be easy, as Brundage pointed out to Andrianov: “I am sure every
member of the Committee stands firmly against discrimination of any kind in sport.
Some think, however, that because of its political policies, South Africa must be
completely ostracized, while others believe that the admission of a multi-racial team
to the Game[s] will be more effective in correcting the existing condition. I hope we
can find a satisfactory solution in our meeting in Lausanne next week.”205 To effect
such a solution, Alexander advised Brundage to take firm control and contain the
issue,
… you alone must make the decision. You have nothing to lose and
everything to gain.… under Clause 18 the President must rule that
the power to convene a meeting relates only to new questions. There
is nothing new about the South African question; it has always been
known that several countries would threaten boycott if South Africa
is included…. Here again the President must rule that the organisers
have flagrantly and willfully violated the IOC rules, and if they do not
immediately cease to meddle with the South African question their
authority to hold the Games must be withdrawn. In this case there is
new information and new circumstances to consider at an IOC
meeting to be convened for the purpose.206
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Brundage, as USA IOC member Douglas Roby pointed out, might not now have the
power base in the IOC to take control of the situation, but the fact was that a clear
majority had voted for readmitting South Africa. “…the final decision was participated
in by approximately 66 of our 71 members. Some of the legal minds who are members
of the IOC now contend that our procedure was improper and, therefore, the decision,
as taken at Grenoble, should be disregarded. I think these questions should have been
raised at Grenoble if they were of substance and the fact that all of those who are now
complaining did participate in the vote places their stamp of approval on the
procedure as taken. …. I realize that numbers now on the Executive Board are against
you, but I hope that you and the few that you have with you will continue on the course
which was charted at Grenoble.”207
After two days of discussion in Lausanne, the Executive Board settled on a
recommendation “… to withdraw the invitation which the South African [National]
Olympic Committee has received to participate in the Games of the XIX Olympiad.”208
Brundage provided the official rationale:
It should be emphasized that in adopting this recommendation the
International Olympic Committee is not bowing to threats or
pressures of any kind from those who do not understand the true
Olympic philosophy. Boycott is not a word used in sport circles….
The Executive Board was facing a deep and worldwide cleavage in
public opinion that threatened to split the Olympic family and to
endanger the success of the Games of the XIX Olympiad. It was
necessary to reach a decision, and if possible a unanimous decision
immediately…. The only point in the lengthy discussions on which
none of the members of the Executive Board could agree, was, that
because of the explosive conditions throughout the world and the
ugly demonstrations, rioting, and other violent happenings in many
different countries during the last sixty days, there was actual
danger if a South African team appeared at the Games…. You will find
in the carefully worded cablegram, which was sent to all members of
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the International Olympic Committee, after two solid days of heated
but earnest discussions, that there is no criticism of Mexico, no
criticism of South Africa and no criticism of the International
Olympic Committee. There were no suspensions nor expulsions nor
were there any legal technicalities mentioned. Such procedures are
foreign to the sport world, which is based on fair play and good
sportsmanship, but in its endeavour to preserve the Olympic
Movement, one of the most priceless and powerful instruments of
our present civilization, it was necessary to be realistic; facts right or
wrong must be faced…. Since our primary concern is the assembly of
the youth of all the 135 countries now active in the Olympic
Movement, in friendly and peaceful competition, we regret deeply
the consequences for the individual participants who had hoped to
take part in this Grand Festival of Youth in Mexico City. It is a sad
commentary on the state of the world today…. All of the ballots have
not yet been received, so the voting is not finished. There will be
another statement tomorrow.209
When the results of the vote were finalized, Brundage distributed a circular letter
recounting the history of the South African issue since the Grenoble meeting,
emphasizing the importance of the concessions the IOC had been able to extract from
the South African government, but these were necessarily limited to the Olympic
Games only. “If nations are to be excluded because of repression or discrimination of
one kind or another within their borders either by law or by practice,” he noted, “there
will be few if any countries in the Olympic Games. Large and small, practically every
country in the world is guilty in some respects.”210 Nonetheless, the Grenoble decision
had immediately provoked a campaign which saw the Olympic Games “unexpectedly
precipitated into the middle of a world-wide, racial controversy, which has torn the
world apart,” and ultimately threatened the very success of the Mexico Olympiad.
Only these dire circumstances had induced him to call a Special Meeting of the
Executive Board. After protracted discussions “at last it was determined that all
members seemed to agree, although for different reasons, that it would be unwise, for
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its own sake, as well as for the sake of the Olympic Movement, for a South African
team to appear in Mexico City next October.” Brundage emphasized that this decision
did not indicate that the IOC had bowed to political pressure; rather, the decision had
been taken to put an end to the general disorder and violence the issue had given rise
to in many countries. “Had the recommendation not been adopted, the Games of the
XIX Olympiad would undoubtedly have been ruined, if not canceled, and the Olympic
Movement would have received a blow from which it would take years to recover.”211
Naturally, this did not please everyone. Australian member Weir, for one, was
upset at the result: “I cannot help feeling that the IOC and the Olympic Movement
throughout the world has been seriously harmed and our prestige very seriously
damaged. Unquestionable, the Black races and those who supported them in their
threatened boycott are regarding the decision as a great victory.”212 Surely, he thought
this was Brundage’s most embarrassing and disheartening moment as President.213
Brundage agreed with him.214
It was now difficult to determine the strength, trustworthiness, and legitimacy of
the IOC and South Africa’s future in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement.
Though Killanin believed the right decision had eventually been made, he told
Brundage the IOC was in for more trouble in the near future: “We are living in a very
different era to that in which Baron de Coubertin constituted the Olympic Games and
I think it would be stupid for us to bury our head in the sand. I am certain we have
taken the right decision in the end regarding South Africa but it was unfortunate we
had to yield certain principles. In point of fact it could be argued that South Africa has
been kept out by us for political reasons!” 215 What was necessary, he argued, in view
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of “no doubt … a good deal of trouble from Africa during the next eight to twelve
years,” was for the IOC to secure its future position in Africa by making “contacts
regarding suitable people for the IOC.”216
Brundage agreed; the IOC needed serious review to prepare for and to anticipate
what lay ahead: “We must be prepared. We saved the Games of the 19th Olympiad and
prevented a complete rupture of international sport, although we were thrown into
the middle of this terrible international racial controversy, the last place we should
be. It was really a victory although we have to admit that is not the public
impression.”217

5.

Domestic Resistance
Coincidentally, and similar to the case of SANOC correspondence, there was a large

gap in the communication between Avery Brundage and the foremost organization of
domestic resistance in South Africa. Over a year’s time had passed after the 1964
Tokyo Olympics before SAN-ROC representative John Rogers contacted Brundage
from London, reviewing the history of the IOC’s treatment of the South African issue:
“I am requested to strongly demand the unequivocal expulsion of the South Africa
Olympic Committee from the Olympic Movement under Rule 25 of the Olympic
Charter and regulations.”218 The domestic resistance was not satisfied solely with the
withdrawal of the invitation to SANOC for the 1964 Tokyo Games. According to
Rogers, SANOC’s continued violation of Olympic rules and regulations merited
expulsion from the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement.
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Some nine months after Roger’s letter, one of the founding members of SAN-ROC,
Chris de Broglio, pointed out to Brundage the recurring discrimination in South Africa.
South Africa’s suspension from the Olympic Games had not impeded the opportunity
for international competition for white athletes who, like the South African Amateur
Athletic Union, simply sought expanded opportunities for participation at World
Championships. “In this way their white athletes will take part even more frequently
in International Competitions whilst the Coloured South Africans are simply deprived
of any form of international competition…. We also wish to point out to you that two
South African Coloured sportsmen who were forced to leave their country because of
the colour bar in sport have recently been selected to represent Great Britain … The
great shame is that many others are being deprived of their right of participation in
international sport because of their colour.”219 Such examples of racial discrimination
in South African sport, according to SAN-ROC, did not bode well for the re-admittance
of South Africa to the Olympic Games.
Four months later, in November 1966, SAN-ROC President Dennis Brutus
contacted Brundage. When Brutus heard that the IOC was planning a fact-finding
committee to be sent to South Africa to report on the state of Olympic sport, he saw it
as a chance to improve relationships with the IOC: “…we would like to submit
information to the Investigating Commission…. Please be good enough to inform us
whether we can send information either written or oral or both and if we can arrange
for representatives of the non-racial sporting bodies to submit evidence to the
Commission…. We welcome the decision of the IOC to see the facts for [themselves]

281
and believe that this will do much to bring South African sport into conformity with
the requirements of the Olympic Movement.”220
As cooperative and as positive as this letter seemed, Brutus may have been acting
in opposition to SANOC as much from a desire to establish better relationships with
the IOC.221 In any case, subsequent letters from Brutus portrayed SAN-ROC as
accommodating and helpful – assisting in any way to improve the South African sport
situation by combating racial discrimination. Brutus reminded Brundage that SANROC, in doing so, fully supported IOC rules and regulations, and wished to submit
evidence to the Commission: “We believe that the bodies which wish to participate in
international sport should state this frankly to show that they are opposed to racial
discrimination in sport. They must make it clear that they wish to have events and
trials and selection open to all regardless of race or colour. It is our belief that the IOC
should grant recognition and participation to all who make this declaration.”222
Westerhoff responded for the IOC several days later; he requested detailed
information on the state of Olympic sport in South Africa, administrative procedures,
the state of sports facilities, and detailed information on the role of the South African
government, and sports-related legislation.223 Westerhoff also sent a similar list to
SANOC.
Soon, however, the issue of SAN-ROC’s illicit use of the word mark ‘Olympic,’ began
to affect the exchanges adversely.224 The IOC had warned SAN-ROC about the
unauthorized use of ‘Olympic’ before,225 and SAN-ROC had pledged to stop using it.226
Further, a month earlier, Alexander had provided some friendly advice to Chris de
Broglio, “… it is improper to use the word ‘Olympic’ in sport without the approval of
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the International Olympic Committee and continued disregard by you of this point
will only arouse reactions which you can well afford to avoid.”227
After this incident, Brutus attempted to keep in touch with Brundage more
regularly, even by arranging to meet in the United States when Brutus was visiting.
He wanted “… to discuss with you some aspects of the organisation of sport in South
Africa, with special reference to the observance of the Olympic rules.”228 Two months
later, knowing that South African participation in the 1968 Mexico City Games was a
topic of discussion at the IOC Tehran meetings, Brutus wrote Brundage. On SAN-ROC’s
behalf, he highlighted six points:
1. We believe that the IOC must provide for all amateur sportsmen
and all countries in the world who fall within the Olympic code;
2. We believe that the IOC correctly excluded South Africa from
participation in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and that South Africa
should only be granted participation as soon as they make it clear
that they do not have racial discrimination in sport but provide
fairly and equally for all sportsmen;
3. The present changes in the sports arrangements in South Africa
are only APPARENT: they DO NOT REMOVE RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION. This is freely admitted by the Prime Minister,
the sports administrators and the Press in South Africa;
4. We believe that these facts can easily be established by the IOC
Commission which is to visit South Africa and report; the
investigations to be conducted by the world bodies for
Weightlifting and Gymnastics will also prove this;
5. We believe that the IOC should insist on the full observance of the
Olympic rules by the governing sports bodies in South Africa; if
there is government interference then this will disqualify them;
6. We call on the International Olympic Committee and all national
Olympic Committees to stand firm on these principles.229
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Brutus also gave assurance that SAN-ROC had the desire to see Olympic principles
rightfully applied in South African sport, and that it would be willing to work towards
achieving the Olympic ideals. Such declarations were the right things to say to display
SAN-ROC’s commitment to improve South African sport. After the IOC Tehran
meetings, de Broglio released a detailed summary of events at the meetings, from
SAN-ROC’s perspective.230 He was cautiously optimistic, but noted that SANOC had
not fully complied with Olympic rules. Further, there was growing opposition to
South Africa’s participation: “The African delegates were unanimous in declaring their
support for the resolution adopted in Bamako, which inter alia asked all African
countries to reserve their decision to participate in the 1968 Olympics should a South
African team be invited whilst racial segregation and discrimination is enforced in
South African sport.”231 For the first time, SAN-ROC publicly stated that, “… [it did] not
have the ambition of controlling South African sport. If a genuine merger of all existing
organisations did take place with complete equality, SANROC would have no more
reason to exist.”232 All in all, de Broglio hoped SANOC left the meeting with a sense
that work still needed to be done: “It [was] becoming very clear that apartheid in sport
will no longer be tolerated by the large majority of members making up the Olympic
Movement.”233
When the SAC report finally became public six months later, Brutus laid out SANROC’s perspective on the report. He noted that the document demonstrated the
persistence of racism in South African sports, and a lack of willingness on SANOC’s
part to effect any changes. A high degree of government interference likewise served
to reproduce the racialized set-up of South African sports, even though the
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“overwhelming majority of South African sportsmen – and this is the standpoint SANROC represents – fe[lt] abhorrence for segregation in sport."234
To complement his public statement, Brutus elaborated on his concerns in a letter
to Brundage: “We note with some alarm the indications in the Report that the
Commission seemed to think that the fact that some South Africans – white or nonwhite, but in any case a minority of the sportsmen – favours racial discrimination in
sport was sufficient grounds for the IOC to approve a violation of its fundamental
principles.”235 SAN-ROC, in any case, refuted the insinuation that the organization was
“not supported by the non-racial sports bodies in South Africa…. I wish to renew the
request that SAN-ROC, as an interested body, should be heard when the views of other
bodies are sought.”236
Long-time SAN-ROC member Reg Hlongwane, sent a cablegram to Brundage
pointing out some possible considerations when interpreting SAC’s report: “Evidence
given by most Coloured and Indian sportsmen in South Africa does not reflect the true
desire of these sportsmen. It must be appreciated that the political situation there
makes protests against apartheid intolerable to the present government and this
subjects opponents to police surveillance and intimidation.”237
Brutus’ and Hlongwane’s interventions notwithstanding, the IOC, as was pointed
out above, sanctioned SANOC’s participation in the 1968 Mexico City Games. Brutus
was dismayed at the decision “… to invite the South African Racial Olympic Committee
to the Mexico City Games.”

238

This decision could only threaten the continued

existence of the IOC and the Olympic Movement. The Resolution further required that
the South African team
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… must be one which ‘conforms with Fundamental Principle 1’ and
‘on the understanding that it continues vigorously its efforts to have
ALL forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport removed.’ The
South African spokesmen have made it clear that they will NOT work
to have all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport removed;
I ask that they give a firm assurance that they will do this…. we
deeply regret that the IOC has been willing to betray its own high
principles in full knowledge of the vicious racist policies which
dominate sport in South Africa; all who truly care for fair play and
justice in sport must continue to oppose racial discrimination in
sport.239
In a letter to Lord Killanin, de Broglio argued that much damage had been done to
the IOC by an impression created in the report that “an overwhelming majority of nonwhite officials and sportsmen favoured a return to the Olympics under the prevailing
conditions inside S.A. The report gave the further impression that this aspect was of
crucial importance in deciding the issue…. I contend that this argument is invalid as a
basis for the readmission of a National Olympic Committee which practices and has
always practised racial discrimination at all levels of its organization.”240 And even if
a majority of officials interviewed by the Commission had come out in favour of the
status quo, “I doubt very much that these officials represented a majority of
sportsmen …To be fair the report should have made it clear that a number of nonwhite officials with large memberships insisted on the principle of Mixed Trials. This
can be clearly seen from numerous press reports during the visit of your
commission.… This omission from the report is a very serious one as this was the
deciding factor in favour of the racialist organisation.”241 Ultimately, he concluded,
even these points were of minor significance as long as the IOC failed to extract from
SANOC “solid guarantee to eliminate all forms of discrimination within the next two
or three years.”242
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Killanin rejected de Broglio’s charge that the Commission had rested its
conclusions on a skewed and tendentious sampling of interviewees. “I might say we
took considerable care to find out those people who spoke to us, who they
represented and, where possible, the numbers of affiliations, clubs, etc. Had the views
which you now express been correct I feel they would have been put by those people
who opposed the re-entry of South Africa during the debate in the IOC.”243
The last SAN-ROC missive before the 1968 Mexico City Games came from Brutus,
just before the special Executive Board meeting described above. He wished to
impress on the board members the importance of entertaining the “view of the nonracial sportsmen and sports bodies which support the Olympic principles in South
Africa,” largely to counter “the dishonesty of the South African National Olympic
Committee in agreeing to accept terms laid down by the IOC when they have made it
clear elsewhere that they have neither the desire nor the capacity to comply with
these terms. Any agreement by them to ‘continue to work for the removal of all racial
discrimination in amateur sport’ is made meaningless by their declaration that they
cannot foresee integrated sport in the foreseeable future and that they fully support
the racial discrimination enjoined by government policies.”244 The reasons for
withdrawing the invitation to South Africa, Brutus concluded, just were still valid.
The lack of correspondence from domestic resistance forces subsequent to the
Executive Board’s decision leading to a majority vote by IOC members to withdraw
the invitation to South Africa for the 1968 Mexico City Games, can be viewed as an
indication of the fact that the resistance and SAN-ROC had achieved its immediate
objective. Between 1964 and 1968, the activities of SAN-ROC and the South African
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Sports Association appeared less energetic than in previous years. The domestic
resistance message owed much appreciation to the IOC and NOC members who
opposed South Africa’s re-admittance to the 1968 Games, and to the vociferous
international community who made sure that its voice disapproving of South Africa’s
involvement in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement was heard.

6.

The International Community
The period between the 1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games produced

more correspondence from the international community than any other period
examined. Over 100 letters from the general public within the South African folders
of the Avery Brundage Collection can be noted.245 Unlike the two earlier time periods
under investigation here, the correspondence was not significantly weighted in
favour of either suspending or expelling South Africa from the Olympic Games. The
highly publicized readmission South Africa and the subsequent repeal of that decision,
stirred feelings that produced both supportive and oppositional arguments
concerning the inclusion of South Africa in the Games.
Congratulatory letters were still being received by Brundage and the IOC after the
1964 Tokyo Games. For example, P.B. Woolley of Australia pronounced: “I am writing
… to applaud the Olympic Federation on its action in banning South Africa from the
Tokyo Olympic Games. If this were done by all sporting bodies, then the struggle for
racial tolerance would be greatly furthered, and as the only sporting body to take such
action, we feel that the Olympic Federation should be especially commended.”246
Nonetheless, the letters pertinent to the re-admittance of South Africa to the 1968
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Mexico City Games began to appear a year and a half after the Tokyo Games. Jackie
Robinson, residing in Albany, New York, threatened to work towards a boycott,
should the initial decision to bar South Africa be rescinded: “I must alert you, that if
there are any changes in this decision we will do everything within our power to have
all Civil Rights organizations urge Negroes to withdraw from any competition as far
as the Olympic Games are concerned…. America cannot in 1967 condone the racist
policies of South Africa. … We hope that unless there is a change in the South African
policy, the United States delegation will fight vigorously any changes from its present
position.”247
This letter was straightforward – keep South Africa out or the IOC will risk a
boycott. Letters advocating a boycott of the Mexico City Games provided an ongoing
thread at this stage of the debate.
On the other hand, some letters supporting the re-admittance of South Africa had
severe racist and political undertones; however, they sometimes reflected on the
internal condition of the letter writer’s own country, rather than those prevailing in
South Africa: “Thank you very much for this, that is, the guts to speak up. I’m so fed up
hearing about and seeing the negro I could throw up. This America of ours reflects so
little of its basic culture anymore that I’m beginning to think I’m the minority. I’d just
love to see an all-white team represent the USA and let the negro go to hell.”248
Brundage did not need support based in its own form of racism. Letters from
people such as noted Olympic competitor Ralph Boston, in response to one of
Brundage’s public statements, struck a rational yet exceedingly critical tone: “As an
Olympic competitor, I am strongly against [the] use of the Olympic Games for anything
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other than the reason for which they were organized. I am sure that you are aware of
the fact that sports has helped the cause of the Negro’s [sic] more than any other single
thing and that chances for a boycott are practically nil. The people who are saying
such things are not appointed leaders and have no reason to attempt to speak for
Negroes as a whole. In short they are ‘out of order’.”249
Frequently, Brundage sought to correct what he considered erroneous information
in the public debate. Usually, he reiterated the IOC’s basic position that the
organization did not condone racial discrimination in sports and insisted on the
separation of sport and politics. The task of the Commission investigating the South
African situation was to determine just those conditions in the country, as Brundage
explained to Tom Jacobson: “The fundamental basis of the Olympic Movement is no
discrimination because of race, color, religion or political affiliations. Apartheid is a
political policy of the South African government and we do not deal with
governments. … We have sent a committee to investigate and there will be a report
at the next meeting of the International Olympic Committee in Grenoble next
February.”250
The amount of correspondence directed to Brundage spiked following the IOC
South Africa Commission visit to South Africa. M.O. Whitsel Sr. of Louisiana argued
that action deriving from the Commission would only serve to harm the athletes: “I
read an article, in which so called big leaders, are talking [about] boycotts by
American negroes to the International meets…. It is them (big leaders) who are
hurting the negro athletes. These men who are great in sports have worked hard to
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get where they are. Now some big so-called leaders are hurting these men and women
who have worked hard to get to the top.”251
Ralph Davis, a lawyer from Chicago, USA, expressed a similar opinion: “After
hearing the proposals [of the American Negro athletes], I commented that they were
‘shooting’ at the wrong persons. In my opinion you had always been the ‘Champion’
of the rights of the amateur and minority groups.”252 The reception of principally
supportive letters was balanced against those with a negative connotation, as, for
example, a note from John Laird of California: “Just let those negroes go to – do not
even try to pacify them; we can get along without them and they will be the losers so
just sit tight and leave them alone…. Of course they won’t want to stay home since
they like to be seen on TV so much…. If the TV station would stop showing them
waving their arms telling their crowds what to do, most of the rioting would stop.”253
Vera Herbstman, by contrast, encouraged Brundage to join the Black American
boycott of the Olympic Games.254 D.K. Miller passed on support from people on Capitol
Hill, commending the position Brundage had taken.255 Ardis Bryant sent Brundage a
six-page booklet discussing how the boycott would negatively affect black athletes.256
Of far greater weight was the letter Brundage received from Douglas Roby,
President of the United States Olympic Committee257 and IOC member. Roby
expressed himself skeptical of South Africa’s aims:
I am writing to express my concern about the possibility of South
Africa’s readmission to the Olympic Games, despite her continued
policy of ‘separation’, that is, apartheid, in sports. If the Olympic
Committee seriously respects the Olympic Charter it cannot possibly
allow South Africa to participate, since it is obvious that Vorster’s
new sports policy is merely a new face for the same old situation of
discrimination. South Africa, by enforcing separation of the races in
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sports up to actual participation in the Games, is obviously going
against the Charter.… apartheid is necessarily a political matter, and
its intrusion into sports matters is grounds for the continued
expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Games. I therefore urge
the International Olympic Committee, at its meeting at the end of the
month in Grenoble, to decide not to allow South Africa back into the
Olympics. This will be one of the strongest ways in which the world
can express its abhorrence of South Africa’s racial policies, and it is
an opportunity which must not be missed.258
This was the first letter specifically referring to the upcoming IOC Grenoble
meeting where a decision to readmit South Africa was to be made. Advice for
Brundage relative to the Grenoble meetings continued to come in. Joseph and Carol
Schwab of New York basically mirrored Roby’s argument: “We are not fooled—and
trust that you are not fooled either—by South Africa’s promise to send a racially
mixed team to the Olympics; obviously, black athletes do not have an opportunity
equal to that of whites to qualify for a South African team…. We hope that as you
consider your position on this matter you will think of the human degradation that is
committed under apartheid in South Africa.”259
SAN-ROC’s attempts to mobilize international opinion was also increasingly
reflected in the correspondence. For example, Margaret Flory of New York based her
opinion on information circulated by SAN-ROC: “Mr. Dennis Brutus, President of
South Africa’s Non-Racial Olympic Committee has himself stated that South Africa’s
‘New Sports Policy’ has so far been nothing more than a propaganda tool and has not
in any way affected the racial structure of South African sports. Therefore[,] South
Africa’s policies of racial discrimination in sports continue unchecked. …We feel that
the IOC must not allow South Africa in the Olympic competition until she does in fact
learn to accept the principles of racial equality….”260
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Rudolph Balsiger, who had published an extensive and one-sided report in 1963,
distributed a long letter to IOC members. He reiterated many of the arguments made
in the report mentioned in an earlier chapter. He insisted on racial separation, arguing
that the guidance of whites through a policy of separate development had contributed
much to the development of the non-white population of South Africa, compared to
other African countries. SAN-ROC, in contrast to the ostensibly benevolent white
organization, was “an illegal, political Committee which tries to win the allegiance of
Non-White sport organizations and render them subservient to their political
designs.”261 And Dennis Brutus, he argued, certainly could not be trusted: After all, it
must have been Brutus himself who, on the occasion of a meeting organized in 1963
by SANOC and attended by both Balsiger and the then banned Brutus, through “selfdenunciation” had seen to it that South African police appeared on the scene, in order
“to show me, a foreigner, what a police state South Africa was.”262 When Brutus was
later shot by South African police, John Harris took over for SAN-ROC whose
statements, Balsiger insisted, “showed more and more his true attitude which, in my
opinion, had nothing to do with sport, but uncovered the Communist agent more and
more.”263 Ultimately, Balsiger warned the IOC not to overestimate its influence on
South African racial politics, and focus on the sports situation within the context of
that racial policy: “The racial legislation in South Africa would never be changed by or
because of sport, in the same way as no other Government, whether of the East, West
or Africa, would change her laws as a result of the wishes of the IOC. And there are
many things in many countries which could be rendered more worthy of human
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beings…. A boycott of South Africa by the IOC would direct itself in the first instance
and with all its force against the Non-White sportsmen of this country.”264
By contrast, contributors such as Robert Maurer, Mathew Ahmann, or Arne
Sovik,265 based their opposition to the racial policies of South Africa on human rights
and the unity of the human race. Until South Africa provided social change and racial
integration, they urged the IOC to deny South Africa’s participation in the 1968 Mexico
City Games. Nor would have Balsiger convinced Leon Shull, J. Murray MacInnes, Tim
Smith, or Edwin Luidens,266 all of whom individually addressed the inauthenticity of
South Africa’s “New Sports Policy.” Shull, for example, noted that “… further
examination reveal[ed] that the team’s membership still [was] chosen through
racially segregated trial competition. Separate racial competition and inferior
facilities for non-white athletes repudiates the essence of free, unrestrained
competition mandatory for national representation…”267 Shull therefore urged the
IOC “not to accept the ‘New Sports Policy’ that would allow South African participation
in the 1968 Olympics.”268 Bruce A. Cronnell, similarly, appealed to the necessity of not
supporting racism,269 while others, such as Vel Phillips and Bettie Mae Eisendrath,270
as well as Elizabeth Landis,271 based their arguments on the Olympic Charter and
South African law. Landis pointed out that, the new sport policy notwithstanding “the
South African government prevents compliance with the Olympic Charter, in
particular Principle 1 and Clause 25…. The fact that South Africa may be represented
by a team which includes non-white athletes, chosen, after separate competitions for
members of each racial group, by a multi-racial committee on which whites have a
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built-in dominant position, does not change the fundamentally discriminatory nature
of all sports in South Africa.…”272
Some of the correspondents argued for the exclusion of South Africa from the basis
of personal experiences in the country, among them James Dorothy and Tina Bristol
of Philadelphia: “As a result of two years of experience in Southern Africa, we are
deeply aware of the racial injustice daily, doing violence [to] millions [of] non-white
Africans. International condemnation of apartheid is necessary. South Africa’s new
sports policy is hypocritical, leaving unaltered racially segregated trial competitions
for selection of the Olympic team.”273
Though the majority of early correspondence on the matter was from the USA,
letters from other parts of the world also continued to reach the IOC. Lars BorgeAndersen wrote on behalf of the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa which “fully
support[ed] the demand for continued exclusion of South Africa from the Olympic
Games, as long as coloured sportsmen are not allowed to compete freely with white….,
[we] request Olympic sportsmen to condemn sports racism in South Africa and to
insist on the decision of 1963 not to permit South Africa to take part in the Olympics
until there has been ‘a change of policy regarding colour discrimination in sports and
competitions in its county’.”274
Palmer Van Gundy, who wanted Brundage to use his influence and power to keep
South Africa out of the Games, was another who offered that line of reasoning.275
George Houser of the American Committee on Africa (ACA), similarly wrote to
Westerhoff to complain: “The IOC’s decision to readmit South Africa to the Olympics
has destroyed the integrity of the Games. South Africa’s policy does not change
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apartheid in sports in South African and still defies Olympic rules. Reaction in much
of the world will confirm the fact that the IOC accepts racism.”276
Houser’s intervention drew a lengthy reply from Geoffrey Picard, a bronze medalist
at the 1964 Tokyo Games. He objected to ACA’s call for a boycott since the racial
segregation it targeted, was by no means limited to South Africa, but rather
“appear[ed] indicative of ‘fuzzy thinking’,” inasmuch as such segregation was not
unique to a single country. “I suspect,” he averred,
that either directly or indirectly the Hindus’ discrimination against
Moslems and other Hindus, the Moslems’ discrimination against
Hindus, the discrimination against Chinese in Malaysia and
Indonesia is reflected in the composition of the Olympic teams of
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia respectively. Obviously we
can go further: Should not the anti-Asian policy of Kenya be
considered? And, if so, what about the U.K.? We have not even
mentioned the U.S.A. … Were your [ACA’s] protest one against
discrimination in general, it would be far more effective. Indeed, in
this case, the protest could be focused on South African apartheid as
a concrete symbol of a much larger problem. Lacking emphasis on
these broader implications significantly weakens the proposal.… 277
Picard concluded his argument against a boycott by pointing out that it would only
lead to the denial of important opportunities to participate in high-level competitions
to “blacks, whites, and Asian, however selected.”278
The international correspondence remained strong as evidenced by missives from
The National Executive Board and Pan African Students’ Organization in the
Americas,279 Leonard West, on behalf of the Africa Cultural Centre,280 and David H.
Rubenstein, the Associate Secretary for Africa for The United Church Board for World
Ministries. He argued that the IOC’s admittance of South Africa amounted to a
contravention of Articles 1 and 25 of the Olympic Charter; he “urge[d] that the
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International Olympic Committee reconsider its decision concerning South Africa’s
participation under its present declared policy, and thus make it unnecessary for the
Supreme Council of Sports for Africa and other nations of the world to boycott the
Olympic Games in 1968.”281
Nonetheless, there were those who, for various reasons, supported South Africa’s
re-admittance. Henry Cathles, writing to Brundage, deplored that “… the tendency of
communist and new African states not educated in the enlightened classical purpose
of the Olympic Games as originally established in Greece, is to use them for political
boycott, spreading hate and unrest…. Of course one cannot help wondering if we are
not better off without the barbarian communists, etc. in the games at all!” 282 Nancy
Lee Hanson, expressed her support of South Africa’s re-admittance, inasmuch as it
had “taken the first amazing step forward by agreeing to an integrated team. This
surely will be followed by other steps – certainly if the negro athletes do themselves
proud and win some medals or shatter some records. Think what that would do for
Black morale in South Africa…. I think you are doing a wonderful job toward better
world relations. Keep it up.”283 T.R. Kendrick III of Georgia, offered similar words of
encouragement: “I believe that the Union of South Africa by being willing to liberalize
its apartheid philosophy and enter a completely integrated team is a mammoth step
forward for that nation and is a ‘big feather in the cap’ of international athletics. This
is the first indication of liberalization of the apartheid philosophy that even economic
and political embargoes have been unable to change. I believe it would be a very big
mistake for the International Olympic Committee to give in to a threat of boycott by
several minor fourth and fifth class nations….”284
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Often enough, however, letters in favour of South African reinstatement carried
racist undertones. Forbes Norris, for example, declared himself “…sick and tired of
reading about these ‘unhappy black racists.’ Now they want to dictate how the
Olympics should be run…. I hope you and the Board will stick to your guns and let
South Africa compete. If the blacks don’t like it, fine. I’d rather we lost without them
than win with them. I wish they’d all get out…. don’t let the blacks ruin it.”285
While Brundage received letters expressing concern about the effects of such
decisions on various countries,286 most focussed strictly on the IOC and South Africa.
Sir Arnold Lunn broke down the situation to two choices for the IOC. When one
explored them, certain contradictions surfaced:
The Olympic Committee could adopt one of two logical policies with
regard to countries in which men are persecuted or discriminated
against for religious, political or racial reasons. The Committee could
exclude from the Games all teams representing countries in which
there is such persecution, and this I believe might lead to a real
diminution of persecution, or the Committee could admit all teams,
irrespective of the domestic policies of the countries entering them,
but in a century in which there has been more persecution than in
any previous century, to signal out one country, South Africa, for
excommunication, is a classic example of selective indignation…. As
the IOC officially disapproved of apartheid as practised by South
Africa, why did the Committee ignore apartheid as practised by
Germany and Russia? … I am not criticising the Olympic Committee
for admitting Russia to the Games … but the inconsistency in
applying what you profess to be the Olympic Committee’s principles.
‘Apartheid, Nazism and Communism …’ you write, ‘are political
doctrines, and we have enough troubles in sport without venturing
into politics.’ But you did venture into politics when you
excommunicated South Africa for its apartheid politics. The form of
anti-Semitic apartheid practised by Nazi Germany was infinitely, I
repeat, infinitely, more objectionable than that practised by South
Africa, and if you had withdrawn the Olympic Games from Germany
when it became impossible to deny that thousands of Jews were
being persecuted, the blow to Hitler’s prestige might have been
incalculable.287
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The IOC did indeed begin to understand that its decisions concerning forms of
political discrimination that had affected earlier Olympic Games, were exerting a
significant influence on its options to reach a decision on the South African case.
Indeed, one effect of this international debate was that the issue of discrimination and
its connection to political intervention was discussed prominently.
Brundage even received resolutions that were more closely linked to political
decision making bodies, such as the Japanese Diet Member Sports Promotion
Federation: “Though we believe the world of sports should not be influenced by
politics or ideologies, the current controversy involving re-entry of South Africa in the
Olympic games comes from the people[’]s innate idea[s] demanding nondiscrimination of races and equal treatment for them, and we strongly request that
the IOC should take proper steps, in the light of the spirit of the Charter of Olympics,
to open conversation urgently with the representatives of African nations so as to
prevent the so-called Five-Rings Rally being reduced to a Four-Rings one.”288 This
missive made it clear that the political connotations of the situation could not be
avoided.
This resolution focused on involving every African country in the discussion
because of the politics involved. It seemed that political repercussions were
unavoidable according to the Rt. Rev. C. Edward Crowther’s personal experience:
Having been deported by the South African government in June last
year because of the stand I was obliged to take in the light of the
tremendous suffering of my people, I believe that I can speak with
reasonable knowledge of the situation…. I know how politically
useful to the government of South Africa the decision of the Olympic
Committee will be. I am perfectly aware of the argument that politics
has no place in sport. I only wish that were so. In South Africa, sport
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is politics. The triumph of Mr. Vorster in furthering the belief of the
whites of South Africa that the world will learn to accept apartheid
is a terrible blow to the many non-white people and those South
African whites who look to the outside world for hope and support….
It is in the hope that sport can be preserved from politics that I urge
you to seek reconsideration of South Africa’s participation in the
Olympic Games.289
Brundage was not willing to accept the possibility that sports and politics could be
so inextricably intertwined. “The International Olympic Committee does not deal with
governments nor with political policies,” he informed SAN-ROC representative John
Rogers, “[e]very member of the Committee is firmly opposed to discrimination of any
kind in sport. South Africa has not been admitted to the Olympic Games, we are
inviting a multi-racial team selected by a multi-racial committee in accordance with
the Olympic regulations.”290
Brundage appreciated those, who like him, clearly separated SANOC from South
African politics. When he agreed with people, such as correspondents Nancy Lee
Hanson, T.R. Kendrick III, and Martin Pape,291 he wrote letters thanking them for their
support. However, Brundage did not expect all feedback to be positive and he well
realized that some of the IOC’s conflicts were necessary. He pointed out to
correspondent Henry Cathles: “It seems to be a continuous battle to keep the Olympic
Movement free from politics and commercialism. In this last squabble they seem to
overlook the fact that the IOC is the only organization that has ever done something
for the underprivileged non-whites of South Africa.”292
Regardless of the good Brundage thought the IOC was able to accomplish,
statements of personal support and criticism, of morals or political reasoning,
continued to arrive, many in support of South Africa’s exclusion from the 1968 Mexico
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City Games. A Canadian labour union, misunderstanding IOC administrative
procedures, even requested that the Canadian federal government, through the
Canadian Olympic Committee, involve itself directly and “demand an extraordinary
meeting of the 71-member International Olympic Committee to reverse its earlier
decision to readmit South Africa for participation in the Summer Olympics, to be held
in Mexico City in October of this year…. Failing such reversal by the IOC, this Union
requests the Canadian Government that it advise the Canadian Olympic Committee to
withdraw from the Summer Olympics.”293
Such a suggestion to mix sports with political processes was sure to raise the IOC’s,
and Brundage’s, ire. To the latter’s credit, he was consistent in his convictions and did
not waver in his message, which he continually repeated in his correspondence. To
correspondents such as Hugh McGee, Carl Bauer, James Wilson, James Lee, Joseph
Pratt, Ira Nadler, or Edwin Mosler,294 Brundage offered the same unchanging position:
The issue was whether politicians or sportsmen controlled the Olympic Games.
Correspondent

Alejandro Sanchez Robles of Mexico offered insight from the

perspective of just such a sportsman: “…if the majority is against the participation of
South Africa, it is because it does not take the trouble to consider that athletes cannot
be held responsible for the political attitude of their governments. The fact that South
Africa has agreed to send a multi-racial team to Mexico indicates that she is prepared
to respect the Olympic Ideal…. The Olympic Games are not competitions between
nations but between individuals, and claims from countries which refuse to
understand this are not worth further attention.”295 Edwin Mosler likewise
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emphatically expressed his support for Brundage’s insistence on the separation of
sports from politics:
We have a right to expect that the Olympic Committee will not
interfere in internal politics, laws, or policy, and that the nations that
compete will not use the Olympic Games as a forum to express their
political views or advance their ideologies. If South Africa is admitted
to the Olympic Games and lives up to the Olympic regulation and
ideals, I expect to support those Games and I am willing to work a
little harder if that’s what it means…. When the IOC allows politics to
enter the picture and accedes to the demands of nations who
disagree in politics or ideologies, that’s when I will lose interest…. I
hope your committee will stand by its decision.296
Some correspondents, on the other hand, invoked the notion of a universal
morality: “It is within the power of the International Olympic Committee to help
prevent the dangerous division between the black and white races of the world. Please
express your belief in the equality of all men by [having] representation in the
Olympics by the athletes from South Africa.”297 Grace Campbell likewise excoriated
“South Africa’s deplorable and inhumane policy of apartheid [which] simply cannot
and must not be tolerated any longer by the freedom loving, just and humane peoples
of the world…. We intend to do our utmost to influence all the people we can against
visiting the games or Mexico because of this shameful condition.”298 To the extent that
moral considerations entered the discussion, as this example indicates, they were in
the large majority of contributions targeted at a discussion of the race-related issue.
This, in consequence, became the dominant strand of this narrative, leading the
majority of correspondents to demand a retraction of the invitation, and to ignore
possible side effects such as the foreclosure of opportunities to participate in high-
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level competitions. Hideji Kawasaki’s letter to Brundage provided a good example of
this race-centred aspect of the developing narrative:
… there lies a fundamental question on the participation of South
Africa in the Olympic Games since it has been pursuing, as the
national policy, strict discrimination between the white and nonwhite people which go counter to the spirit of Olympics…. The
statement made by the South African [National] Olympic Committee
on February 28, 1968, seemed to be a step forward to the right
direction, and the invitation of the IOC extended to it bas[ed] on the
said statement should be said reasonable…. It is reported, however,
by some reliable sources that there have been instances in South
Africa recently in which whites were given preferential treatment in
selection of players in some athletic events and that uni-racial bouts
of boxing were held. Viewing from these facts, it must be said that in
South Africa there will never be equitable selection which is
essential to the Olympic Games.299
This emphatic dimension of the debate was also echoed in a close concern with the
stipulations of Article 1 touching on discrimination. Ira E. Gillet of Portland, Oregon,
suggested that a clarification of those stipulations would be helpful: “It seems to me
the code needs clarification else decision and boycotts will occur because of
interpretations which are not warranted by the wording of the code…. ‘No
discrimination is allowed’ by whom? By IOC? Or by the internal regulations of the
participating countries in their selection of teams? … One could scarcely conceive of
an IOC being permitted to discriminate on the grounds mentioned.”300 Going further,
Lynn Moran suggested an even more simplified decision-making framework. South
Africa’s willingness to nominate white and non-white athletes indicated the country’s
adherence to the Olympic oath; this would be sufficient to decide the case: “The
Olympic oath should be followed, of course, but what a country does outside the
Olympics should not ever concern the IOC, which must consider itself strictly separate
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from politics or national pressures at all times.”301 ACA Director George Houser, on
the other hand, denied that such a possibility existed, since racial discrimination in
South Africa could not be overcome without political intervention, and sports could
not be an exception. The withdrawal of South Africa’s invitation could not be
understood as anything other than a political act: “… the resolution passed by the IOC
in its re-admittance of South Africa admits that South Africa’s internal sports policy is
discriminatory and that the South African National Olympic Committee does not
achieve the aims of Fundamental Principle I. Yet, paradoxically, the IOC has decided
to still allow South Africa to participate in the Games…. South Africa would have the
world think that there has been a change in its internal racial policy of apartheid.
There has been no change…”302 Brundage, as may be expected, objected to this
perspective, pointing out that the IOC did not “deal with governments nor with
political policies [sic]. The South Africa Olympic Committee has agreed to send a
multi-racial team, selected by a multiracial committee to the Games of the XIX
Olympiad in Mexico City;” this decision remained internal to the relevant sporting
organizations.303
The volume of correspondence increased until mere days before the pivotal 1968
Lausanne Executive Board meeting to discuss the South African issue. Reactions
subsequent to the meetings expressed a wide range of opinions, from disappointment
to emphatic support for the decision. Some statements commented on the lack of a
black voice in the decision-making process: “In all the ‘hue and cry’ over the
participation of South Africa in the Olympics, one big observation is that at no time,
by no person, have the black athletes themselves been given a choice in the matter! …

304
I am sure THEY would argue that for South Africa to enter with integrated teams,
represents an important step forward.… I am not a ‘white racist’—in fact, my own
husband is a Negro—BUT we are both realistic enough to believe that if a man is to
preach an end to hypocrisy, he had better NOT be found practicing it himself!”304
Philip Melnick similarly registered his disappointment “to hear of the decision to
keep South Africa from participating in this year’s Olympics in Mexico! This action will
not help but only increase the racial tensions in that country…. Sports should be free
from such methods of coercion and intimidation.”305 Further, J. Maurice Clark
expressed his discontent in a letter to Westerhoff, but acknowledged that Brundage
had had to maintain a very finely tuned balance: “Sportsmen everywhere will surely
deplore the action of your board in recommending withdrawal of South Africa’s
invitation to participate in this year’s Games…. Apartheid has nothing to do in this
connection, because the South Africa team was to have been multi-racial…. I am not
racialist, and I dislike apartheid. But I also dislike the habit, so prevalent now-a-days,
of yielding to every irresponsible and immature outcry by the so-called ‘coloured’
peoples. Your Board, Sir, has just afforded a prime example of this weak-minded
surrender…”306
Many correspondents, P.F.S. Otten of the Netherlands among them, argued by
comparison, questioning as unfair treatment the singling-out of South Africa when
several examples of similarly problematic conditions could easily be identified:
“Really I do not understand the attitude of your International Olympic Committee
with respect to South Africa. In the later years I have had the opportunity to visit many
countries in Africa and in none of them the position and treatment of the coloured
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people (Bantus) is so good as in South Africa…. It is being an unfair and unwise
popular attitude always again to criticize South Africa, without having been there and
in other countries of Africa and without serious knowledge and a yardstick for
comparison.”307 Ernst V. Lotz also criticized the IOC’s strategy as unfair and
unbalanced: “To be consistent, the IOC should now also ban the following countries
from the Games: Russia, for all the atrocities committed in the name of Communism
(the Wall of Shame in Berlin, to name but one); Great Britain and Australia for
discrimination against would be non-white immigrants; Israel for her recent war of
aggression, etc., etc. Then, when all the devils have been banned,” he continued
sardonically, “the angels will have the field all to themselves.”308
This sentiment was echoed by Mr. and Mrs. Haldiman’s letter: “What nation does
not discriminate …. Russia anti-Semitic, Israel anti-Arab, Black African Nations antiwhite and on and on. And South Africa had agreed to integrate its team fully…. The
next trip we take will be to South Africa, a good friend to America [who] is really
feeling discrimination at the hands of our irresponsible ‘leaders’ in Washington and
the U.N.”309 Edward Schinman, lastly, criticized the IOC for excluding South Africa
while failing to do likewise in the case of “countries as Nigeria, who have boycotted
athletes both on the basis of race and religion and you have also welcomed Soviet
Russia among whose representatives I am sure you will be hard pressed to find noncommunists or Jews. The same applies, for example, to Poland, and how many Asians
will you find on the team representing Kenya…. It would appear that the Olympic
Committee is now engaging in politics….”310
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Stuart Morris from Wisconsin, on the other hand, acknowledged that Brundage
could not control many aspects of the South African debacle: “As but one man, you
could not have prevented the outcry over South Africa’s admission to the ’68 summer
games, but how right it was that she be admitted after agreeing to send an integrated
team. Even thus, have politics subverted the Baron’s ideals and goals.”311 But had
Brundage, after all, lacked the courage of his convictions? “But you could have taken
one more courageous step—you could have indicated that South Africa’s admission
was more important to you than your position as President, or more important than
the ’68 games themselves, for that matter—you could have resigned in protest!”312
Peter Luisa of Queens, New York, was even more scathing in his criticism of the IOC:
I would like to say that it is an outright shame that people even think
like you do in a world such as ours. Don’t you, and more importantly,
the African nations realize that by your actions you have thrown into
the ground and completely crushed, the first formidable chance that
the Negro has had to prove himself in South Africa ….I thought that
your actions were a crime. I realize that you were all under
tremendous pressure … but it is totally incomprehensible to me, that
you could be true to yourselves in fostering such actions, as banning
South Africa again after letting them re-enter the Olympics….313
Rutherford Platt’s disappointment at the decision was also based in the
understanding usually advocated by the IOC, namely, that only sport-internal factors
should be taken into consideration: “I am sure that the young athletes who entered
the lists from South Africa, were not in the least involved in making any political
decision in their country, whether those decisions are right or wrong in others’
opinions. That has nothing to do with your criteria. They must have offered to
compete as sportsmen, purely.”314 Alan Cochet’s criticism likewise focussed on the
fact that the decision would affect the athletes rather than the political system at the
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root of all the problems: “Sir, if you allow political differences to prevent South Africa
from participating in the Olympic Games, you are not punishing South Africa, but her
athletes and all the athletes of the world…. It was previously a cliché to say that the
Olympics generate international good will. I am terribly afraid that henceforth it will
be stated that the Olympics generate international controversy…. I deeply feel that
South Africa should not be barred from competing in the 1968 summer Olympic
Games.”315
Considerations of fair and unfair treatment, of countries reprehensible or
commendable, frequently shifted towards a discussion of the political characteristics
by which such distinctions should be made, in particular between the Communist and
non-Communist countries of the time. Here, the exclusion of South Africa was often
understood as a victory for ‘blackmail’ from the Communist Bloc countries who were
identified negatively by their support for what was seen as problematic opposition
from Black African countries. Correspondent Andrew McAllister spoke of the Games
becoming a weapon for “Communists against the Free World,” warning that the USA
should not compete in the Games in order to send a message to the world that it would
not submit to blackmail from Communists or “the black power block.”316 Dewey Taft
argued that the IOC shocked the entire world by barring South Africa while allowing
“barbarian professionals from Communist countries” to dominate the Games.317
Ralph Russell interpreted South Africa’s exclusion as “another stunning victory for the
Communist conspiracy. …. By this one act,” he criticized the IOC, “you have changed
the Games from an athletic event to a political/racial sideshow. You will have allowed
the Communists to use the Games as a tool for political propaganda. Try to think of
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the black and white athletes of the Union of South Africa, these men and women have
worked just as hard and waited just as long as their counterparts in the other
countries for a chance that will never come their way again.”318 J.D. Bell also expressed
his disdain for the IOC’s “[y]ielding to such flagrant blackmail … [which] has utterly
destroyed its image and prestige. It was a shocking exhibition of cowardice and
unjustified prejudice.”319
Charles Soltis, on the other hand, acknowledged the difficult position Brundage
and the IOC had found themselves in as they sought to bring about a resolution of the
issue, but, he noted, the organization would have emerged stronger had it “taken a
stand on principle – that it keep the door barred to political pressure and interference;
that the original vote to reinstate the Republic of South Africa was valid and should
not have been brought up again.” Surely, nobody would have equated the acceptance
of South Africa with an endorsement of its racial politics: “I am positive that the
participation of Russia in the Olympic Games cannot be interpreted to mean that the
people of the world at large approve of the system of Communism.” In consequence
of the IOC’s actions, Soltis concluded, “the future of the Olympic Games has been
weakened … not strengthened; …this short-sighted decision based on politics and
expediency will introduce long-run problem of monumental proportions.”320
Brundage in dealing with the torrent of correspondence precipitated by the
exclusion of South Africa, largely held fast to his strategic position, insisting that the
decisions were driven by considerations internal to the Olympic community, and not
by political objectives; therefore, no Olympic principles were abandoned. His defense
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remained consistent, as is evidenced by several pieces of similar correspondence, for
which the following is a typical example:
The Olympic Movement with its basic principle of no discrimination
of any kind found itself of all places in the middle of this terrible
international racial conflict…. We saved the Games of the XIX
Olympiad and prevented a complete rupture in the world of
international sport without yielding any Olympic Principles.
However, it is a sad commentary on our so-called civilization that
one cannot stage Games designed to promote international
friendship without demonstrations, boycotts, disorder and
violence.321
Some people commended Brundage on his strength and resilience. Sgt. James E.
Moore thanked Brundage for his unwavering stand. He acknowledged that the
international pressure on Brundage must have been immense at a time when
Brundage also had to manage conflicting national interests. He suggested that the IOC
“… release to UPI or the AP the two IOC votes country by country which eventually
disqualified South Africa from the Olympics. The sports fans of this world are entitled
to know how treacherous and backbiting some of the Nations really are.”322 Such an
act would have been beyond Brundage’s authority, however, and it would have
amounted to a breach of trust. The stability of the Olympic Movement, whose
credibility had already suffered in consequence of these developments, might well
have been crushed by such an incident. After all, it was not uncommon to encounter
opinions of the IOC such as that espoused by Marjorie Headly, who was sharply critical
of the men “who sit as officials in the Olympic Committee [who] are, in my opinion, a
bunch of self-righteous hypocrites, who, while maintaining that the Olympics are
nonpartisan, which it is not, has dragged the question of political expediency into the
sports arena….”323
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Brundage and the IOC, it was clear, were walking a fine line; no matter what
decision the Movement arrived at in the end, it was certain to generate opposition and
hostility to the same degree that it gave rise to approbation and approval. The
exclusion of South Africa from the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, did nothing to
resolve these tensions.

7. Discussion: Developments during the Period,
1964-1968
It was clear by the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games that the ‘three dominant
voices’—South African Olympic affiliates, domestic resistance, and international
community—were representative of two distinct sides of the South African situation:
supportive of South Africa’s re-admittance or supportive of South Africa’s
banishment. The result of the IOC vote to readmit South Africa to the Mexico City
Games sparked unprecedented discussion and divide. Nonetheless, there was
sufficient evidence for explaining the IOC’s ultimate stance. Though each voice
continued to espouse a recognizable message, the international community
dominated the discourse.
The three factors that shaped the final decision regarding South Africa’s
participation in the 1960 Rome Games and 1964 Tokyo Games remained relevant in
the IOC’s decision to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Mexico City
Games. First of all, at the core of the debate, as it had been for over a decade, was
Article 1 of the Olympic Charter. Arguments based on a combination of Articles 1, 24,
and 25 contributed to the withdrawal of South Africa’s invitation to the 1968 Mexico
City Games. Article 1 forbade any racial discrimination, Article 24 instructed NOCs to
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follow the rules and regulations of the IOC, and Article 25 emphasized the need for
NOCs to be politically independent and autonomous, able “to resist all political,
religious or commercial pressure… National Olympic Committees that do not conform
to the Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic Committee forfeit their
recognition and their right to send participants to the Olympic Games.”324
SANOC tried to overcome the discrimination and racism in South African sport by
brokering concessions with the government that allowed SANOC to select a multiracial team. However, the sticking issue was the point succinctly stated by Mexico’s
IOC member José de Jesus Clark:
There is no doubt that the desire of all voters was to eliminate racial
discrimination, with the only difference that some aimed at
maintaining non-discrimination within the stipulations of Rule No.
1, in a permanent way and as one of the basic fundamentals of the
Olympic Ideal, and the others only thought of eliminating
discrimination in the specific representation of a country at the
Olympic Games, which in essence, is contradictory to the Ideal and
does not offer a definite and permanent solution.325
Although Brundage and other IOC members viewed Article 1 as only applicable to
a country’s Olympic team in regard to the Olympic Games itself, the interpretation of
Article 1 as a permanent, basic fundamental Olympic Ideal dominated the debate that
led to South Africa’s suspension for both the 1964 and 1968 Olympic Games.
Second, the IOC’s trust in its own protocol and structure affected decisions as the
1968 Mexico City Games approached. The SANOC delegation had the opportunity to
present its case to the IOC Executive Board and General Session for reinstatement to
the Olympic Games. As a result, an IOC South Africa Commission (SAC) was assembled
to evaluate the sport landscape in South Africa devoid of any political considerations.
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SAC’s directive was to specifically investigate if SANOC complied with Article 24 and
25 of the Olympic Charter. Remaining distant from any resolutions or
recommendations to the IOC membership, SAC presented a report of its findings in
South Africa. Based on SANOC’s willingness and preparedness to form a mixed team
for the upcoming Mexico City Games and the results of SAC’s report, a resolution was
approved by an absolute majority that allowed SANOC to enter a team into the 1968
Olympic Games. According to the conditions of the resolution, as long as SANOC’s
team conformed specifically to Article 1, in addition to the other rules and regulations,
of the Olympic Charter and SANOC’s efforts continued to remove all racial
discrimination from amateur sport, the question of South Africa’s participation in the
IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement would not be reconsidered until 1970.
This decision created international controversy.
As a result of a large faction unhappy with the re-admission of South Africa to the
Olympic Games, the goal of those who opposed the Grenoble vote was to call an
Extraordinary Session to discuss the South African situation and, possibly, muster
another vote. After much discussion about the various rules that could have been
invoked to force Brundage to call a plenary session, Brundage had an emergency
meeting with the Mexican delegation of Ramírez Vázquez, Gómez, and Clark in
Chicago. Brundage received a petition from the Chairman of the Mexican Organizing
Committee, Ramírez Vázquez, that set into motion Article 41 of the Olympic Charter,
which allowed an Organizing Committee to submit a request to the Executive Board
to decide on a matter of controversy of a non-technical nature concerning the Olympic
Games. Without that particular request, the whole controversy would not have been
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discussed in a timely manner. Article 41 was responsible for opening a much needed
discussion on South Africa. Due to Brundage’s Chicago meeting, he decided to call a
special Executive Board meeting to discuss the South African situation. The result of
the 1968 Lausanne Executive Board meeting was a unanimous proposal to withdraw
SANOC’s invitation to the Mexico City Games. The proposal was approved by the IOC
membership through the administration of a postal vote.
Third, the IOC was unwillingly drawn into the political and domestic issues
entangled in the South African situation. SANOC’s re-admittance to the 1968 Mexico
City Games while South Africa’s apartheid policies did not fully allow SANOC to
properly abide by Articles 1, 24, and 25 triggered international and political unrest,
which led to the threat of a boycott. The opposition to South Africa’s participation was
based on an anti-apartheid movement, which was a stand against South Africa’s laws
and policies. This politically charged group smothered the discussion in regard to
SANOC’s participation in the Olympic Games, giving the IOC no choice but to succumb
to international and political pressure. However, according to Brundage, the reason
for withdrawing the invitation to South Africa for the Olympic Games was to prevent
a violent and dangerous atmosphere in Mexico City.
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that this latter point dominated how Brundage
and the IOC handled the South African situation during the period leading up to the
1968 Mexico City Games. The Grenoble vote triggered an international controversy
that made politics the overwhelming factor. However, it was protocol and procedure
that masked the political undertones of the IOC’s decision-making. Protocol and
structure allowed Brundage to call a special Executive Board session that was
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responsible for issuing a postal vote, which overturned the Grenoble vote, resulting
in the withdrawal of the invitation to South Africa to the Mexico City Games. The
ultimate rationale to withdraw the invitation was creating a safe environment for a
successful Games, not the political pressure to make an anti-apartheid stance.
Nonetheless, though protocol and structure were a tool to succumb to international
and political pressures, protocol and structure were not the main impetuses that led
to SANOC’s suspension.
Based on the correspondence from 1964 to 1968, Brundage’s and the IOC’s
decisions were dominated by: (a) IOC rules and regulations, and (b) the influence of
political and domestic issues. Focussing on these two points helps to understand why
South Africa’s invitation for the 1968 Mexico City Games was withdrawn. Despite
SANOC’s argument that it had overcome the charges of non-compliance with IOC
rules, through the concessions wrung from the government, violations of Articles 1,
24, and 25 of the Olympic Charter were unavoidable. Further, the controversy
spawning from the Grenoble vote became a public image disaster. It ignited
international attention and pressure that was too great for the IOC to handle.
Domestic resistance support and international community perspectives were finally
extremely influential factors in SANOC’s suspension. There were two catalyzing
elements missing from the domestic resistance and international community
correspondence leading up to the 1960 Rome Games and 1964 Tokyo Games, but that
made their correspondence effective leading up to the 1968 Mexico City Games. First,
the Grenoble vote allowing SANOC to enter a team in the Mexico City Games sparked
an international controversy – people questioned how an apartheid laden South
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Africa could be allowed to participate in the Olympics. Second, because of the
international attention, IOC and NOC members felt pressure to overturn the Grenoble
vote; this in itself provided more substance and support to domestic resistance and
international community forces.
The IOC’s decisions did result in South Africa’s invitation to be withdrawn, but
Brundage’s publicly stated reason was to provide a safe environment for a successful
Olympic Games. Even if the underlying reason for withdrawing SANOC’s invitation
was political pressure, racial discrimination as an explicit reason for South Africa’s
suspension was in the background. Due to the initial decision of the IOC from the
Grenoble vote and the explanation given for the final result from the subsequent vote,
do these points lend credence to identify here a case for structural racism? Supporting
SANOC’s re-entry to the Olympic Games and not explicitly referencing racial
discrimination as a reason to withdraw its invitation does raise some questions. For
Brundage and some IOC members, it was a matter of how one interpreted the
application of the Olympic Charter. However, regardless of whether one wished to
limit applicability of IOC general principles to the Olympic Games only or sought to
extend their applicability beyond the Olympics themselves, South African laws and
policies were racially discriminatory and SANOC had to work within those laws and
policies. The latter interpretation of IOC’s general principles made the decision to
banish South Africa from the Olympic Movement easy. Abiding by the former
interpretation of the general principles indeed amounted to structural racism.
Although SANOC assured fielding a mixed team, whites and non-whites could not
train together or compete against each other. Under those circumstances, in accepting
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a mixed team, the IOC condoned discriminatory practices. Further, the Grenoble
resolution that achieved an absolute majority and allowed SANOC to field a team in
the Olympic Games, had two major deficiencies. First, the one condition retained from
the Baden-Baden resolution—SANOC had to publicly dissociate itself from the South
African government’s policy of non-competition and non-integration of whites and
non-whites—strangely no longer was a concern in the Grenoble resolution. Second,
the wording of the Grenoble resolution indicated that the IOC was aware of racial
discrimination in South African sport and society.
The organized efforts of those who opposed SANOC and the South African
government were the largest and most effective of those during the three time periods
examined in this dissertation. However, what did the withdrawal of the invitation for
a second time mean for the South African sporting situation? Would the government
relax its apartheid policies enough for SANOC to field a team in the next Olympic
Games? Or would South Africa be uninvited again from the 1972 Munich Olympic
Games?

317

Endnotes for Chapter Four
Braun to Brundage, 23 September 1965, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
2 Giulio Onesti to Brundage, 2 October 1965, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
3 Ibid.
4 Honey to Brundage, October 1965, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
5 International Olympic Committee (hereafter cited as IOC), “1965. Madrid,” in IOC Executive
Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg
(London: Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, 1992), 184.
6 IOC, “64th IOC Session, Madrid, 1965,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 103. Underscored in original.
7 Brundage to Braun, 20 October 1965, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
8 L. Zanchi to SANOC, 26 October 1965, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
9 IOC, “1966. Rome,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969), translations
and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies, University of
Western Ontario, 1992), 186.
10 Ibid.
11 IOC, “65th IOC Session, Rome, 1966,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 117. Underscored in original.
12 Memorandum from R.S. Alexander, 16 June 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
13 Brundage to Honey, 23 September 1966, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
14 Honey to Brundage, 11 October 1966, ABC, box 58, reel 34. Although Johann Westerhoff
was employed as the IOC Secretary General, he was not a member of the IOC.
15 IOC, “1966. Mexico City,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 190.
16 J.W. Westerhoff to Braun, 5 January 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
17 IOC, “1967. Copenhagen,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 194.
18 Westerhoff to Braun, 28 February 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
19 Braun to Brundage, 5 April 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
20 IOC, “1967. Tehran,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 197.
1

318

IOC, “66th IOC Session, Tehran, 1967,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 126.
22 SANOC Report, 15 May 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
23 IOC, “66th IOC Session, Tehran, 1967,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 126.
24 SANOC Report, 15 May 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Westerhoff to Braun, 6 July 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
30 Westerhoff to Braun, 6 July 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
31 Killanin to Braun, 25 September 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
32 IOC, “1967. Lausanne,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 200.
33 Killanin to Honey, 18 December 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
34 Braun to Brundage, 10 January 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
35 Ibid.
36 Brundage to Braun, 12 January 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
37 Braun Statement, 3 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 IOC, “67th IOC Session, Grenoble, 1968,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 133-4.
42 Braun to Brundage, 19 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
43 Westerhoff to Braun, 27 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
44 Westerhoff to Braun, 27 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
45 Braun to Brundage, 26 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
46 Westerhoff to Brundage, 6 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Brundage to Westerhoff, 7 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
50 Brundage to Braun, 9 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
51 Brundage to Honey, 9 March 1968, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
52 Brundage to Westerhoff, 18 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
53 Brundage to IOC Members, NOC Members, and ISFs, 18 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
54 Ibid.
21

319

Ibid.
Ibid.
57 Brundage to IOC Executive Board Members, 28 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
Underscored in original.
58 Killanin to Braun, 30 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
59 Braun to Brundage, 30 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
60 Ibid.
61 IOC, “1968. Lausanne,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992).
62 Ibid, 208.
63 Ibid, 208-9.
64 Ibid, 208-9.
65 Brundage Cablegram, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
66 Ibid.
67 Brundage Release, 3 May 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
68 Ibid.
69 Brundage Press Release, 23 August 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
70 Honey to Brundage, 26 August 1968, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
71 Brundage to Honey, 27 August 1968, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
72 Emery to Brundage, 30 October 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
73 Brundage to Emery, 12 November 1964, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
74 Emery to Brundage, 13 January 1965, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
75 Emery to Brundage, 15 March 1965, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
76 Emery to Brundage, 14 May 1965, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
77 Brundage to Emery, 14 September 1965, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
78 Emery to Brundage, 20 October 1965, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
79 Ibid.
80 Brundage to Emery, 28 December 1965, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
81 Emery to SANOC, 9 February 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
82 Emery to Brundage, 9 February 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
83 Ibid.
84 Brundage to Emery, 17 February 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
85 Emery to Brundage, 28 April 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
86 Emery to Brundage, 3 May 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
87 Brundage to Emery, 19 May 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
88 Emery to Brundage, 21 June 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
89 Brundage to Emery, 30 June 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
90 Brundage to Emery, 16 November 1966, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
91 Emery to Brundage, 20 February 1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81
92 Emery to Brundage, 7 March 1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
55
56

320

Brundage to Emery, 7 April 1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
Emery to Brundage, 13 April 1967, ABC box 145, reel 81; Brundage to Emery, 20 April
1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
95 Brundage to Emery, 23 June 1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
96 Emery to Brundage, 21 September 1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
97 Brundage to Emery, 9 October 1967, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
98 Emery to Brundage, 23 April 1968, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
99 Bundage to Emery, 3 May, 1968, ABC, box 145, reel 81.
100 Brundage to Emery, 10 June 1968, ABC, box 145, reel 81
101 IOC, “65th IOC Session, Rome, 1966,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 117.
102 IOC, “1966. Mexico City,” in IOC Executive Committee Minutes, Volume II (1948-1969),
translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 190.
103 Alexander to Brundage, 8 August 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
104 Alexander to Westerhoff, 2 September 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
105 Brundage to Alexander, 24 September 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
106 Alexander to Brundage, 30 September 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
107 Alexander to Braun, 19 November 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
108 Alexander to Westerhoff, 13 January 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
109 Alexander to D. McIldowie, 17 January 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
110 Alexander to Braun, 23 January 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
111 Alexander to Ademola, 23 January 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
112 Alexander to Ademola, 26 January, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
113 Brundage to Ademola, 19 May 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
114 Killanin to Brundage, 2 June 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 35.
115 Ademola to Brundage, 5 June 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
116 Westerhoff to Alexander, 31 January 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
117 Alexander to Westerhoff, 4 February 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
118 Ibid.
119 Alexander to Westerhoff, 6 February 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
120 Herman van Karnebeek to Brudange, 20 June 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
121 Brundage to Killanin, 23 June 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 35.
122 Brundage to Karnebeek, 26 June 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 34.
123 Ademola to Westerhoff, 17 July 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
124 Westerhoff to Killanin, 28 June 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 54.
125 Killanin to Brundage, 28 June 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
126 Alexander to Brundage, 8 July 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55; Killanin to Alexander, 11 July
1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
127 Killanin to Westerhoff, 7 July 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 35.
93
94

321

Killanin to Brundage, 30 June 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 35.
Killanin to Brundage, 8 July 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 35.
130 Killanin to Alexander, 19 July 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
131 Ibid.
132 Francey to Westerhoff, 18 July 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
133 Ibid.
134 IOC Press Release, IOC Commission in South Africa, 10 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
135 Killanin to Westerhoff, 16 August 1967, ABC, box 58, reel 35.
136 Ibid.
137 Killanin to Brundage, 19 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
138 Alexander to Braun, 21 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
139 Alexander to Westerhoff, 25 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
140 Alexander to Braun, 29 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
141 Ibid.
142 Killanin to Ademola, 29 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
143 Brundage to South Africa Commission, 31 August 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
144 Killanin to Brundage, 1 December 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
145 Killanin to Braun, 18 December 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
146 Killanin to Braun, 22 December 1967, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
147 South Africa Commission Report, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
148 Alexander to Brundage, 27 December 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
149 Killanin to Westerhoff, 1 January 1968, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
150 Killanin to Alexander, 4 January 1968, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
151 Ademola to Alexander, 12 January 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
152 Killanin to Brundage, 18 January 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
153 This section of the dissertation focusses on emphasizing arguments raised in favour of
the dominant positions – those who were in favour of re-admitting SANOC to the 1968
Mexico City Games and those who were opposed to it.
154 Killanin to Brundage, 10 February 1968, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
155 IOC, “68th IOC Session, Mexico, 1968,” in IOC General Session Minutes, Volume IV (19561988), translations and summaries by Wolf Lyberg (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
University of Western Ontario, 1992), 144.
156 Alexander to Braun, 20 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
157 Onesti to Brundage, 21 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
158 Ibid.
159 Stoytchev to Brundage 27 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
160 Killanin to Brundage, 28 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
161 Ibid.
162 Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, Marte R. Gómez, José de Jesus Clark to Brundage, 28 February
1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
163 Ibid.
128
129

322

Alexander to Brundage, 29 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
Onesti to Brundage, 29 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
166 Giorgio De Stefani to Brundage, 1 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
167 Marquess of Exeter to Brundage, 1 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
168 Brundage Memorandum, 1 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
169 Alexander to Brundage, 2 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
170 Hugh Weir to Brundage, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Exeter to Brundage, 2 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
174 Ibid.
175 Ivar Vind to Brundage (telegram), 5 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
176 Vind to Brundage (letter), 5 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
177 Ibid.
178 Ramírez Vázquez, Gómez, and Clark to Executive Board Members, 6 March 1968, ABC,
box 147, reel 82.
179 Vind to Brudnage, 7 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
180 Clark to IOC Executive Board, 11 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
181 Ibid.
182 Konstantin Andrianov to Brundage, 11 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
183 Ibid.
184 Andrianov to IOC Members, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82 found in ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 Árpád Csanádi to Brundage, 8 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
187 Brundage to Exeter, 12 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
188 Ibid.
189 Brundage to Onesti, 12 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
190 Georg von Opel to Brundage, 13 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in
original.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Exeter to Brundage, 15 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
194 Lichtenstein to Andrianov, 18 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82 found in ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Exeter to Brundage, 18 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
197 Alexander to Brundage, 20 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in original.
198 Brundage to von Opel, 20 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
199 George W. (Prince of Hanover) to Stoytchev, 15 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82 found
in George W. to Brundage, 27 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
200 Rada Bhalindra Singh to Westerhoff, 28 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
201 Vind to Brundage, 28 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
164
165

323

Onesti to Brundage, 29 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in original.
Brundage to Killanin, 2 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
204 Ibid.
205 Brundage to Andrianov, 8 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
206 Alexander to Brundage, 13 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in original.
207 Roby to Brundage 15 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
208 Brundage Memorandum, 24 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
209 Ibid.
210 Brundage to IOC Members and Perhaps Others, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
Underscored in original.
211 Ibid.
212 Weir to Brundage, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
213 Ibid.
214 Brundage to Weir, 15 June 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
215 Killanin to Brundage, 6 June 1968, ABC, box 59, reel 35.
216 Ibid.
217 Brundage to Killanin, 7 July 1968, ABC, box 59, reel 35.
218 John Rogers to Brundage, October 1965, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
219 C.D. de Broglio to Brundage, 2 July 1966, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
220 Brutus to Brundage, 24 November 1966, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
221 Brutus to Brundage, 3 December 1966, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
222 Brutus to Brundage, 3 January 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
223 Westerhoff to C.D. de Broglio, 5 January 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
224 Brundage to Brutus, 16 January 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
225 Brundage to Rathinasany, 25 March 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
226 Rathinasany to Mayer, 31 May 1963, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
227 Alexander to Chris de Broglio, 7 December 1966, ABC, box 101, reel 55.
228 Brutus to Brundage, 9 February 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
229 Brutus to Brundage, 19 April 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Capitalized in original.
230 De Broglio Release, 25 June 1967, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Dennis Brutus Statement, 31 January 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
235 Brutus to Brundage, 31 January 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
236 Ibid.
237 Reg Hlongwane to Brundage, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
238 Brutus to Brundage, 16 February 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82. Underscored in original.
239 Ibid.
240 Chris de Broglio to Killanin, undated, ABC, box 147, reel 82 found in Killanin to Ademola,
9 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
202
203

324

Ibid.
Ibid.
243 Killanin to de Broglio, 9 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82 found in Killanin to Ademola,
9 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
244 Brutus to Brundage, 15 April 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 83.
245 Since the collection had many letters from multiple sources, a smaller selection was
utilized in this section to showcase the two main positions – those who were in favour of
re-admitting SANOC and those who were against readmitting SANOC into the 1968
Mexico City Games.
246 P.B. Woolley to Brundage, 23 November 1965, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
247 Jackie Robinson to Brundage, 21 March 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
248 Starling A. Hutt to Brundage, 27 November 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
249 Ralph Boston to Brundage, 29 November 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Bolded in original.
250 Brundage to Jacobson, 7 December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
251 M.O. Whitsel Sr. to Brundage, 15 December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Underscored in
original.
252 Ralph Davis to Brundage, 18 December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
253 John Laird to Brundage, 18 December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
254 Vera Herstman to Brundage, 19 December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
255 D.K. Miller to Brundage, 21 December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
256 Ardis Bryant to Brundage, December 1967, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
257 Earlier referred to in context of United States Olympic Association.
258 Elizabeth Moore to Douglas Roby, 13 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
259 Joseph and Carol Schwab to Brundage, 13 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
260 Margaret Flory to Roby and Brundage, 15 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
261 Rudolph Balsiger to IOC Members, 15 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid. Balsiger offered as retrospective confirmation of his concern the fact that Harris was
later charged with terrorism activities by the apartheid government, and executed by
hanging.
264 Ibid. Underscored in original.
265 Robert Maurer to Brundage, 16 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Mathew Ahmann to
Brundage, 17 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Arne Sovik to Brundage, 17 January
1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
266 Leon Shull to Brundage, 18 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; J. Murray MacInnes to
Brundage, 18 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Tim Smith to Brundage, 18 January
1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Edwin Luidens to Brundage, 22 January 1968, ABC, box 144,
reel 81.
267 Leon Shull to Brundage, 18 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
268 Ibid.
269 Bruce A. Cronnell to Brundage, 23 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
270 Vel Phillips and Better Mae Eisendath to Brundage, 24 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel
81.
241
242

325

Elizabeth Landis to Brundage, 25 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
Ibid. Underscored in original.
273 James Dorothy and Tina Bristol to Brundage, 26 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
274 Lars Borge-Anderson to Brundage, 29 January 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
275 Palmer Van Gundy to Brundage, 1 February 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
276 George Houser to Westerhoff, 15 February 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
277 Geoffrey Picard to ACA Representatives, 27 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
278 Ibid.
279 The National Executive Board and Pan African Students’ Organization in the Americas to
Brundage, 27 February 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
280 Leonard H. West III to Brundage, 17 February 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
281 David H. Rubenstein to Brundage, 1 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
282 Henry Cathles to Brundage, 27 February 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
283 Nancy Lee Hanson to Brundage, 3 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
284 T.R. Kendrick III to Brundage, 4 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
285 Forbes Norris to Brundage, 5 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
286 See Forrest Johnson to Brundage, 5 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81, and Rev. John
Morris to Brundage, 7 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
287 Sir Arnold Lunn to Brundage, 5 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Underscored in
original.
288 Request to the IOC on the African Problem, 4 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found
Hideji Kawasaki to Brundage, 6 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
289 Rt. Rev. C. Edward Crowther to Brundage, 6 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
290 Brundage to Rogers, 7 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
291 Brundage to Hanson, 7 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to Kendrick, 7
March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to Pape, 14 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel
81.
292 Brundage to Cathles, 8 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
293 Ellen C. Adams to International Leaders and Organizations, 11 March 1968, ABC, box 144,
reel 81.
294 Brundage to Hugh McGee, 14 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to Carl Bauer,
18 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to James Wilson, 18 March 1968, ABC,
box 144, reel 81; Brundage to James Lee, 18 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81;
Brundage to Joseph Pratt, 18 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to Ira Nadler,
18 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to Mosler, 3 April 1968, ABC, box 144,
reel 81.
295 Abbreviated Translation of a Letter from Alejandro Sanchez Robles, 21 March 1968, ABC,
box 144, reel 81.
296 Edwin Mosler, Jr. to Brundage, 26 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
297 Janet Spring to Brundage, 22 March March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
298 Grace M. Campbell to Oficina de Control de las Alojamintos, 25 March 1968, ABC, box
144, reel 81.
299 Kawasaki to Brundage, 25 March 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
271
272

326

Ira Gillet to Brundage, 5 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
Lyn Moran to Brundage, 6 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Underscored in original.
302 George Houser to Brundage 10 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
303 Brundage to Gillet, 12 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; see also, Brundage to Kawasaki,
10 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
304 Mr. and Mrs. W.J. Givan to Brundage, 23 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Capitalized in
original.
305 Philip Melnick to Brundage, 23 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
306 J. Maurice Clark to Westerhoff, 23 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
307 P.F.S. Otten to Brundage, 24 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
308 Ernst V. Lotz to State Journal, undated, ABC, box 144, reel 81 found in State Journal Editor
to Brundage, 24 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
309 Mr. and Mrs. V. Haldiman to Brundage, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
310 Edward Schinman to IOC, 5 June 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
311 Stuart Morris to Brundage, 24 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81. Underscored in original.
312 Ibid.
313 Peter Luisa to IOC, 24 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
314 Rutherford Platt to IOC, 24 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
315 Alan Cochet to Brundage, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
316 Andrew McAllister to Brundage, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
317 Dewey Taft to Brundage, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
318 Ralph Russell to IOC, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
319 J.D. Bell to Braun, 25 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
320 Charles Soltis to Brundage, 26 April 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
321 Brundage to Eddy, 16 June 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; see also, Brundage to Blake, 13
June 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81; Brundage to Loeb, 16 June 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81;
Brundage to Maritz, 13 July 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
322 Sgt. James E. Moore to Brundage, 21 June 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
323 Marjorie Headly to IOC, 4 September 1968, ABC, box 144, reel 81.
324 IOC, The Olympic Games: Fundamental Principles, Rules and Regulations, General
Information (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1967), 20.
325 Clark to IOC Executive Board, 11 March 1968, ABC, box 147, reel 82.
300
301

Chapter Five:
Summary and Conclusions
1.

South Africa, Brundage, and the IOC
When Avery Brundage was sworn in as the International Olympic Committee (IOC)

President in 1952, he did not know what the future held for him, the IOC, Olympic
Games, or Olympic Movement. However, he did know how he wanted to portray
Olympism and the Olympic Movement within the context of the IOC’s history.
Regardless of what the future held, his vision of an amateur, non-political, and noncommercial Olympic experience remained central to the decision-making of the IOC
to foster success and growth of the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. As leader
of the IOC, Brundage had great responsibility as the face of the Olympic Movement,
which also made him the target of those who challenged the IOC and what it
represented. One such challenge was created by the South African situation.
South Africa’s participation in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement from
1956 to 1970 was a heavily questioned issue because of its apartheid policies that
enforced racial segregation. According to the archival correspondence, the challenge
of racial discrimination in South Africa formally confronted the IOC for the first time
in 1954. Initially, Brundage tried, unsuccessfully, to manage the South African
situation by consulting directly with the South African National Olympic Committee
(SANOC) through its Secretary General, Ira Emery. Largely from Emery’s viewpoint,
Brundage began to familiarize himself with the South African governmental and
sporting landscape, trusting SANOC would combat the racial discrimination issues

328
affecting South African Olympic sports as best it could in order to incorporate the nonwhite community.
With government policies becoming more restrictive, and the South African sport
landscape for non-whites not improving, a domestic resistance movement slowly
gained ground under the leadership of Dennis Brutus. The South African Sports
Association (SASA), formed in 1958, grew out of this movement; it was founded to
address the discrimination in South African sport. This served to increase concerns at
the IOC about South Africa’s place in the IOC and Olympic Movement, in particular
since SASA was able to reach out to the international community. Although SANOC
and the IOC were able to channel the pressure from domestic resistance organizations
and the interested international community leading up to the 1960 Rome Games, this
was not the case for the 1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games.
Through the reconstruction of the correspondence surrounding the South African
situation, it was evident that Brundage and the IOC had to negotiate with ‘three
dominant voices’ after the 1956 Melbourne Games until the 1968 Mexico City Games:
(1) South African Olympic affiliates; (2) domestic resistance; and, (3) international
community. Within each time period between the Olympic Games—1956 to 1960,
1960 to 1964, and 1964 to 1968—the IOC received and transferred thousands of
pages of material discussing South Africa’s place in the IOC, Olympic Games, and
Olympic Movement. Each time period was dominated by one of the ‘three dominant
voices’, but the stance of each voice was consistent over the 12-year period, even
though the details of the South African situation from Games to Games were in flux.
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By the 1960 Rome Games, the basic details of the South African sport climate under
apartheid were in place, establishing the context for each voice. The South African
Olympic affiliates, controlled by SANOC, acknowledged that there was a racial
problem, but did little to challenge the status quo. Although help from the IOC was
appreciated, SANOC wanted to remain in control so it could confine the matter to the
domestic sphere. The South African domestic resistance, led by Dennis Brutus and
SASA, desired an inclusive sport system where non-whites could compete
internationally for South Africa. The domestic resistance sphere remained singularly
dissatisfied with SANOC’s effort and called for urgent measures from the IOC. Voices
from the international sporting community likewise constructed a narrative of
disappointment, and consequently sought to pressure the IOC to take control by
either resolving the racial discrimination issue or expel South Africa from the IOC,
Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement.
As the 1964 Tokyo Games approached, each voice continued to focus on a distinct
narrative. SANOC argued that the racial discrimination in sport was diminishing as a
result of its integration of non-white athletes and associations through affiliation with
legitimate National Sports Federations (NSF). SANOC assumed that it had firm
control, and that it had fulfilled both the promises made by Reginald Honey at the
1960 Rome IOC General Session and the obligations under the 1963 Baden-Baden
resolution. Domestic resistance forces thought the South African Olympic affiliates
had failed to improve the non-white sporting experience. Racial discrimination in
sport was still prevalent, perhaps even worsening. The affiliation terms offered to
non-white associations were restrictive and unfair, and government policies
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continued to discourage mixed sport. The international community continued to
support the domestic resistance, realizing that discrimination in South African sport
remained commonplace – SANOC was not abiding by its obligations to fully
incorporate non-whites into the South African sporting structure. Both domestic
resistance and the international community demanded the suspension of SANOC from
the Olympic Games and would have preferred it if the IOC had gone one step further
and expelled SANOC from the IOC and replace it with a non-racial National Olympic
Committee.
By the 1968 Mexico City Games, the ‘three dominant voices’ represented two
distinct sides of the South African situation: supportive of South Africa’s readmittance or supportive of South Africa’s banishment. Due to its suspension from
the 1964 Tokyo Games, SANOC was determined to achieve re-admittance to the
Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. It thought the unprecedented concessions by
the government combined with the positive progress shown in the IOC’s South Africa
Commission report would guarantee re-admittance to the Olympic Games. Those who
opposed the discriminatory practices of SANOC and South Africa did not yield their
argument to keep SANOC out of the Olympic Games. The opposition considered the
concessions made by the government to accommodate non-white athletes to be minor
and a diversion from the continued discriminatory practices in South African sport.
The dominant domestic resistance entities from 1956 to 1964—SASA and the South
African Non-Racial Open Committee (SAN-ROC)—weakened, but domestic resistance
acquired a new source of support that maintained a contradictory stance with
SANOC’s ongoing progress: the IOC and NOC members who felt pressured to overturn
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the Grenoble vote. Much of the pressure came from a community of international
activists and concerned citizens, who, for the first time during the South African
situation, dominated the spotlight. Although correspondence from the international
community supported both the domestic resistance and the IOC’s re-admittance of
South Africa to the Mexico City Games, the contingent against South Africa’s re-entry
was too strong, resulting in a withdrawal of the invitation to South Africa for the 1968
Mexico City Games.
During the entire 12-year period, Brundage and the IOC stood firm on three factors
that shaped the responses to all ‘three dominant voices’ and affected the decisions
leading to each Olympic Games. First, IOC responses consistently relied on Article 1 of
the Olympic Charter, which forbade discrimination of any kind. Article 1 was the main
pillar that influenced the decisions in regard to the South African situation. However,
throughout the 12-year period, there were multiple interpretations of Article 1,
which, in turn, affected the terms and conditions that SANOC had to abide by in order
to be a participant in 1960, 1964, and 1968 Olympic Games’. Brundage believed that
the Olympic Charter only applied to the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. If a
NOC followed the IOC rules and regulations when selecting a team to represent a
country in the Olympic Games, then the NOC qualified to participate. According to
Brundage, and other IOC members, a country’s domestic and political matters should
not be a determining factor of a NOC’s admission into the IOC and to qualify for the
Olympic Games. The other interpretation of Article 1, and the Olympic Charter, was
that the rules and regulations were fundamental to the Olympic Movement and had
an overarching application, that is, they applied both to the NOC and its home country.
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Brundage’s interpretation separated NOC and country, while the latter interpretation
considered the NOC and country as one entity. Although the IOC rules and regulations
were invoked in all of the discussions regarding the South African situation, they were
most influential in the decision-making for the withdrawal of South Africa’s
invitations for the 1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games.
Second, Brundage firmly defended the protocol and structure of the IOC, defining
an unrelentingly formal position to provide a rationale for the IOC’s actions and
positions. An approved NOC is the official IOC representative of a country. A NOC
approves NSFs (who are members of their respective International Sports
Federations) that, in turn, recommend athletes to the NOC to represent the country in
a particular sport. All athletes must belong to a NSF. The NOC makes the final decisions
for the country’s Olympic team and submits the list of athletes to the IOC. The NOC
manages all domestic issues and the selection of the Olympic team with the ideals of
the Olympic Movement and the IOC’s rules and regulations in mind. Following the
rules and regulations, which defines structure and protocol, guarantees a spot for a
NOC in the IOC and at the Olympic Games. Each country also has one or more IOC
representatives who represent the IOC in that country. Only NOCs and IOC members
can communicate with the IOC, but only IOC members have voting power during the
IOC General Sessions. Nonetheless, both the NOC and IOC members must follow IOC
protocol. Any person or organization beyond the structure and protocol typically has
no sway in IOC matters. The IOC structure and protocol were major factors in the
decisions to include South Africa in the 1960 Rome Games and withdraw South
Africa’s invitation in the 1964 Tokyo Games.
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Third, for the IOC to involve itself in political and domestic issues of any country
was anathema, especially for Brundage. Throughout the IOC’s existence, it had tried
to remain politically neutral, allowing the Olympic Charter to guide the decisions
pertaining to the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. However, the traditional
interpretation of the Olympic Charter, following Coubertin’s vision, had enforced a
certain structure, that when followed, potentially caused undesired repercussions. In
the case of the South African situation, the sole focus on the Charter as a guide to
decision-making kept the focus on the Olympic Games exclusively, with South Africa’s
political and domestic issues basically ignored. This strategy, pursued by Brundage
and the IOC, implicitly left SANOC’s racially discriminatory actions and South Africa’s
apartheid policies unchallenged, in effect contributing to the production of the kind of
structural racism mentioned in the introduction of this study.
It was not until the decision was made to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the
1968 Mexico City Games that politics significantly influenced the actions of the IOC, in
particular through international pressure. The IOC was fully aware of the specific
political and domestic issues in South Africa over the 12-year period, but these did
not play a significant role in the IOC’s decisions to include South Africa in the 1960
Rome Games and withdraw its invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Games. Politics certainly
influenced the outcome for the 1968 Mexico City Games.
To recapitulate, the reconstruction of the deliberations, disputes, opinions, and
proclamations carried on by important actors within a network of exchanges centred
on the IOC and its influential President Avery Brundage, revealed ‘three dominant
voices’ that shaped the debate about the South African situation. Within that debate,
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three factors emerged that guided the decision-making of the IOC. Identifying these
three factors helped explain why Brundage and the IOC allowed South Africa to
participate in the 1960 Rome Games, but withdrew the invitations to the 1964 Tokyo
Games and 1968 Mexico City Games. Ultimately, SANOC did not fulfill the proposed
terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the IOC that were necessary to be
included in the Tokyo and Mexico City Games’. As well, the IOC structure, and
members within that structure, through their actions and resolutions during the 12year period involving the South African situation, contributed to the reproduction of
elements of structural racism.

2.

Conclusions
After the 1968 Mexico City Games, South Africa and SANOC never regained the

trust of the IOC or public. The influence of IOC members who interpreted the Olympic
Charter as fundamental to the Olympic Movement, applicable to all aspects of a NOC’s
existence, grew. The ideal of no race discrimination in combination with domestic and
international anti-apartheid forces, such as the African-Eastern bloc alliance, resulted
in the final expulsion of SANOC and South Africa from the IOC and Olympic Movement
in May 1970. It would take over 20 years for South Africa to rejoin the IOC and the
Olympic Movement.
The IOC’s experience with controversy in regard to the issue of racism and politics
of race was not new. The 1904 St. Louis Olympic Games and 1936 Berlin Olympic
Games serve as two examples of the IOC confronting racial discrimination before the
South Africa situation, which is an example of the IOC’s tacit participation in
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“institutionalized racism.” Due to an interpretation of the Olympic Charter that
allowed the IOC to ignore political and domestic issues, narrowly apply the rules and
regulations to the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement, and trust NOCs to fully
abide by the Olympic Charter, SANOC was permitted to field an Olympic team at the
1960 Rome Games. With that permission, and the evidence of racial discrimination,
the IOC implicitly sanctioned South Africa’s behaviour. In the event, but as a result of
reasons other than specifically racial discrimination, SANOC’s invitations were
withdrawn from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Games, which saved the IOC
from explicitly having to endorse racial discrimination in the Olympic Games and
Olympic Movement.
To date, the aforementioned observations based on a reconstruction of the
deliberations, disputes, opinions, and proclamations found in the archival record, in
reference to the South African situation, have not been delineated in the literature.
Shane Quick focussed on the power shift from Brundage and the IOC to African and
Third World representation.1 Although my findings do indicate the rise of influence
of the African-Eastern bloc alliance in the anti-apartheid movement, especially when
the IOC succumbed to political pressure, the African-Eastern bloc alliance was one
part of a larger international anti-apartheid movement. Quick’s findings were based
on the correspondence of Brundage and South African officials and did not have the
breadth and number of perspectives provided by my examination of the relevant
archival record. The voices of other IOC and NOC members as well as the international
community in response to the Grenoble vote must not be overlooked as significantly
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influences affecting the eventual expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic
Movement.
In Donald Macintosh, Hart Cantelon, and Lisa McDermott’s study, the IOC, under
Brundage’s leadership, was identified as a transnational organization when dealing
with South Africa in the Olympic Movement during the 1950s and 1960. 2 As a
transnational organization, the IOC’s mission was to spread Olympism through NOCs
without exhibiting any interest in political ideologies. The IOC’s decisions were driven
by its commitment to Olympism, explaining why the IOC was interested in SANOC
abiding by the Olympic Charter. Macintosh, Cantelon, and McDermott use records
from the Avery Brundage Collection to highlight the discussions between IOC officials
and SANOC officials as evidence supporting IOC’s mission to spread Olympism. The
authors claimed the interpretation of Olympism affected the treatment of SANOC that
led to its inclusion in the 1960 Rome Games, withdrawal from the 1964 Tokyo Games
and 1968 Mexico City Games, and its expulsion in 1970. Nonetheless, Macintosh,
Cantelon, and McDermott were more interested in confirming the IOC as a
transnational organization, not the minute details of how the change happened from
one interpretation of Olympism to another that affected the decisions to include or
exclude SANOC from the Olympic Games. My findings confirmed the IOC’s dedication
to spreading Brundage’s form of Olympism throughout the world. However, within
the 12-year time frame of this study, the withdrawal of South Africa’s invitation to the
1964 Tokyo Games and 1968 Mexico City Games was not yet due to the change in
Olympism’s interpretation, but due to the IOC rules and regulations, structure and
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protocol, and political pressure within Brundage’s, and others’, traditional
interpretation of Olympism modeled after Coubertin’s ideals.
In a subsequent article, Cantelon and McDermott argued for a connection between
the IOC’s decision-making and Coubertin’s idealist vision.3 Through Brundage’s and
South African IOC member Reginald Honey’s correspondence, the authors wanted to
detail how Coubertin’s idealist vision was ingrained in the IOC organization, which, in
turn, influenced the decisions made when dealing with the South African situation.
This study only provided a small example of one interpretation of the Olympic
Movement. Brundage and Honey did share the same interpretation of the Olympic
Movement, thus affecting how the Olympic Charter was understood and explained.
However, other than Cantelon and McDermott providing some evidence of a certain
interpretation of the Olympic Movement, my findings suggested that the effect of the
relationship between Brundage and Honey on, and Honey’s actual influence in, the
South African situation was infinitesimal. There were a number of more important
relationships and influential correspondences affecting South Africa’s participation in
the IOC, Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement.
One such relationship was between Brundage and Kenyan IOC member Reginald
Alexander. Maureen Smith focused on the correspondence between Brundage and
Alexander in regard to the South African situation.4 According to Smith, Brundage
and Alexander shared a similar interpretation of Olympism and application of the
Olympic Charter, and both men wanted to find the right solution to help the non-white
sportsmen in South Africa. Garnering Brundage’s trust, Alexander was appointed a
member of the IOC South Africa Commission that examined the state of South African
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sport, which resulted in a report that contributed to the absolute majority vote in
Grenoble that readmitted SANOC into the Olympic Games. Smith’s article did provide
some insight on Alexander’s role in the South African situation without the intricate
details of Alexander’s correspondence with Brundage and IOC officials. Further,
Smith’s examination focuses on Alexander’s contributions from 1960 to 1986,
investigating the role of politics of sport. In Smith’s article, the coverage of the 12-year
time period in my study was generally canvassed and acted as a summary of what
occurred from 1960 to 1968. Again, due to Smith’s narrow and succinct treatment, the
amount of detail and actual scope of my findings were not present in the article.
This investigation revealed several specific aspects of this problem not dealt with
in the current literature examining the South African situation from 1955 to 1968. No
author has attempted to reconstruct the deliberations, disputes, opinions, and
proclamations found in the archival records. A reconstruction of the material
provided a detailed account of the key actors involved and the intricacies behind the
decisions of the IOC in regard to South Africa’s participation in the IOC, Olympic
Games, and Olympic Movement. Emerging from the reconstruction are two important
discoveries. First, there are ‘three dominant voices’ of which the IOC had to consider
and negotiate: South African affiliates, domestic resistance and the international
community. Emerging from the discussion surrounding the South African situation
were three factors that shaped the debate and final decisions of the IOC: (a) IOC rules
and regulations; (b) IOC structure and protocol; and, (c) the IOC’s stance to remain
inactive in political and domestic issues of any country.
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The results of examining the South African situation from 1955-1968 yielded six
general observations. First, the emergence of Ira Emery’s private correspondence
from 1961 to 1968 provided a unique insight into the development of this period.
After losing the 1961 election for the SANOC Secretary General position, Emery
maintained close communication with Brundage. Emery’s correspondence may have
served to shift Brundage’s thinking on the issue, since it provided an informative
inside perspective on developments in South Africa that Brundage otherwise might
not have had access to. Although Emery was not referred to specifically in the
correspondence as affecting Brundage’s decision-making, both Brundage and Mayer
referred to alternate sources of information when debating with SANOC
representatives. There was no doubt that Emery was a major source of information
that helped Brundage and the IOC deal with SANOC. The influence Emery had on
Brundage’s decisions remained unclear, but Emery was an important actor that
helped Brundage have a more complete sense of the South African sporting situation,
which, in turn, assisted in the preparations for dealing with SANOC. Emery was a
South African figure whose importance was not highlighted enough in the existing
literature.
Second, Dennis Brutus was certainly a political figure that increased awareness of
the South African situation and maintained pressure on SANOC and the IOC to react
to the racial discriminatory injustices in South African sport. However, in regard to
affecting the decision-making of the IOC, according to the correspondence, he did not
have much influence as an actor who received much attention as part of the larger
group that imposed external pressure on the IOC. There was definite proof of his
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advocacy for equal treatment of the non-white population in sport, but there was a
lack of evidence for Brutus as a major influence in the decisions of the IOC. His
reputation as an influential character in the existing literature was overstated.
Third, the correspondence, actions, and decisions of the IOC continually confirmed
Brundage’s interpretation of Olympism and the Olympic Movement, which indicated
Brundage’s influence and the IOC members’ strong belief in Coubertin’s vision.
Brundage believed the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement were separate from
all other worldly things, and if a NOC could obey and conform to the ideals, rules, and
regulations of the Olympic Charter within the Olympic structure, it could be part of the
IOC family. The consistency of the IOC’s message was impeccable throughout the
correspondence, however, this specific interpretation of the Olympic Movement and
Olympic Charter did result in instances of “institutionalized racism.” Allowing SANOC
to participate implicitly supported the racial discrimination implied by SANOC’s
organization and the political context of South Africa.
Fourth, until the controversial 1968 Grenoble vote, not much credence was
afforded to domestic resistance and international community debate. According to
the popular interpretation of the Olympic Movement and application of the Olympic
Charter, a NOC could have been allowed to submit an Olympic team if it accepted and
abided by IOC rules and regulations. Based on that fact, it was difficult to expel a NOC
from the IOC and Olympic Movement as well as deny it entry into an Olympic Games.
Overturning this result could only be accomplished by changing the interpretation of
the Olympic Charter by obtaining the support of the IOC member majority. The
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interpretation of the Olympic Charter in the South African situation did change
because of international political pressure.
Fifth, although Brundage was IOC President, and was re-elected to serve as
President until 1972, the IOC was morphing into a different version of the Olympic
Movement and interpretation of the Olympic Charter. The composition of the IOC
membership was dynamic because some of the more recently accepted members
integrated into the organization wanted to use the Olympic Games as a political
platform. These newer members gravitated toward the interpretation of the Olympic
Charter as being fundamental to the Olympic Movement and image of the IOC.
Lastly, the IOC was a group of individuals, not one person. Based on the
correspondence, Brundage, as IOC President and the central player in the IOC,
received much of the attention for the successes or failures of the IOC. Many observers
were under the impression that Brundage had more control than he actually did in
making decisions for the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. As President, he
could impress upon other IOC members the importance of one ideal or choice over
another, but ultimately, each IOC member could raise relevant topics during a General
Session and could vote for or against any resolution tabled by Brundage. Considering
the tensions, and the opinions at variance with Brundage’s vision of the IOC, Olympic
Games, and Olympic Movement, it speaks to Brundage’s resilience that he did serve
another term as President after the 1968 Mexico City Games. This vote of confidence
displayed the respect IOC members had for Brundage’s capabilities to steer the IOC
through the difficult challenges of the South African situation.
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Brundage’s leadership in regard to the South African situation, however, begs the
question: did the IOC’s actions help to save the Olympic Games and Olympic
Movement or were the IOC’s actions a disservice to non-whites in South Africa and
internationally? As mentioned in an earlier section, Avery Brundage and the IOC’s
position on Race and Sport, the South African situation was one issue Brundage and
the IOC had to confront during the 1950s and 1960s. Brundage’s insistence on an
amateur, non-commercial, and non-political Olympic Movement while maintaining
Coubertin’s ideals helped create a strong organization that contributed to the success
and existence of the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement. These values guided the
decisions and, in turn, the actions of the IOC in regard to the South African situation.
However, the strict interpretation of the tenets and ideals that made the IOC a strong
organization to survive all the controversy, ultimately, did a disservice to non-whites
in South Africa and internationally. Although Brundage, and the IOC, did not want to
politicize the Olympic Movement, South Africa’s discriminatory laws and policies did
not only violate Article 1 of the Olympic Charter, but these domestic affairs affected
the selection of the South African Olympic team and the entire South African sport
system. The racism undergirding sport in South Africa could not be prevented and
Brundage and the IOC should have made an explicitly stand against apartheid much
earlier than South Africa’s expulsion in 1970.

3.

Recommendations for Future Research
Investigating additional archival resources beyond what was used in this

dissertation is a step in the right direction to create an even clearer picture of the
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viewpoints of all the actors and organizations involved in the South African situation
from 1955 to 1968. Analysing the archives in South Africa, more specifically, the
complete records of SANOC and, if existing, the records of SASA and SAN-ROC would
add to the depth of this study. A newspaper content analysis of both domestic and
international newspapers discussing the IOC, SANOC, domestic resistance, and the
international community would provide a better sense of public sentiments and
pressure.
Projects beyond the precise focus of this dissertation include tracing and analysing
the correspondence covering the South African situation within other ISFs. Perhaps
various international sport organizations received correspondence from the same
three ‘dominant voices’ that emerged in this study. Discovering what was said to other
ISF officials, how certain ISF officials responded, and how the correspondence and
international climate affected ISFs decision-making would develop excellent
comparison material for this dissertation.
Regardless of what future research reveals in regard to the South African situation
from 1955 to 1968, the IOC’s decisions and actions that determined South Africa’s
involvement in the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement remain unchanged. Due
to pressure from the international climate, the IOC opposed apartheid by suspending
South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games through IOC
policy and procedure, which eventually led to South Africa’s expulsion from the IOC,
Olympic Games, and Olympic Movement in 1970.
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